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TIBERIUS SPEAKS.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE UTTERANCES ASCRIBED TO HIM
IN THE *Annals* OF TACITUS.¹

"History . . .," says the heroine of *Northanger Abbey*,² "is very tiresome; and yet I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be invention. The speeches that are put into the heroes' mouths, their thoughts and designs: the chief of all this must be invention, and invention is what delights me in other books." Many students of the Roman historians have agreed with Miss Morland's assessment of the speeches' value, without sharing her delight in their invention; and even those who sympathise with her friend Miss Tilney,³ in her view that "if a speech be well drawn up, I read it with pleasure, by whomsoever it may be made: and probably with much greater, if the production of Mr. Hume or Mr. Robertson, than if the genuine words of Caratacus, Agricola or Alfred the Great," would find it difficult on these grounds alone to justify

¹ The relevant passages are: *Ann.*, I, 7, 11, 12, 25, 47, 69, 73, 74, 78. II, 26, 36, 38, 40. III, 6, 12, 24, 47, 53-4, 56, 65, 69, 73. IV, 8, 14, 15, 16, 30, 37-8, 40, 52. VI, 2, 3, 6, 20, 29, 43 (3 examples). These passages, of varying length and in direct or indirect form, are dramatic speech proper (see my paper in *A. J. P.*, LXXXV [1964], pp. 279-96). There are, in addition, about one hundred lines of non-dramatic *obliqua* attributed to Tiberius. But they are simply short narrative summaries of the gist of a statement and for present purposes relevant only to the study of the speeches' vocabulary.

² Goldfinch edition (London, 1949), p. 111.

³ *Ibid.*

the inclusion in the histories of "imaginary speeches purporting to be historical."⁴

That speeches appear in ancient histories at all is the result of a complex of causes, which are historical, practical, theoretical, and rhetorical. Formal debates and harangues to armies were part of life and therefore of its record; and both are to be found in Homer, whose epic was the nearest thing to a literary model which the first historians possessed. As historical writing became a *genre*, the historians themselves reflected on the proper and improper uses of speeches in their works,⁵ and the literary critics examined their purpose and validity.⁶ All this tradition the Roman historians inherited: and the rhetorical studies, theoretical and practical, which flourished at Rome in the late Republic and early Empire, encouraged them to display their own *expertise*.

The speeches are, as Miss Morland and Miss Tilney recognised, invention. But, properly used, they can be a legitimate tool of historical interpretation, whose value is not simply decorative or literary.⁷ Tacitus, like all the great historians, shows variety and skill in his use of dramatic speech.⁸ Through its medium he will present an analysis or a picture of characters, situations, reactions, and feelings more vividly (because more personally) than a modern historian's narrative critique can do;⁹ and the speech, properly used and properly understood, should command the same sort of validity as the critique.

Within the framework of this convention and his own use of

⁴ H. Furneaux, *The Annals of Tacitus* (London, 1896), Vol. I, p. 32.

⁵ E.g., Thuc., I, 22; Polyb., XII, 25b and XXXVI, 1; Diod. Sic., XX, 1-2.

⁶ E.g., Dion. Hal., *De Thuc.*, 16.

⁷ Cf., e.g., R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 191-3, 316-20, 700-8: *id.*, *Sallust* (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 185-6, 196-201; F. E. Adcock, *Caesar as a Man of Letters* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 65-7; P. G. Walsh, *Livy* (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 219-44; M. L. W. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* (Berkeley, 1947), pp. 16, 42-3, 62, 95-7, 128-9.

⁸ See Syme, *Tacitus* (pages as in n. 7); and A. J. P., LXXXV (as in n. 1).

⁹ Cf., e.g., the dissertations by Cerialis on Empire (*Hist.*, IV, 73-4) and by Cremutius Cordus on Treason (*Ann.*, IV, 34-5); the critique of Augustus in *Ann.*, I, 9-10; the formal exchanges between Seneca and Nero in *Ann.*, XIV, 53-6; and the picture of Tiberius formed from his own utterances and those of other people about him.

it, the speech which Tacitus allots to Tiberius is of particular interest. It is possible, we are told, to lie with statistics; and the calculation of sums and proportions can be, with or without a computer, a tedious enough occupation. But if one poses the right problems and counts the right things, the results can be both startling and illuminating. The following facts¹⁰ about the Tacitean speeches of Tiberius have considerable interest.

A. The Types

Number of examples in each book

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Totals	Totals (all speakers)
<i>contiones</i>	1	2	3	4	0	0	10	33
conversations	2	1	1	1	0	0	5	22
<i>dicta</i>	0	0	1	1	0	4	6	10
condensed combinations	2	0	1	0	0	0	3	31
<i>formulae</i>	2	0	1	1	0	0	4	6
messages	2	1	2	1	0	4	10	11
	9	4	9	8	0	8	38	113

Tiberius is an Emperor, and so the high proportion of formal orations and edicts is natural. About one third of the orations, and two thirds of the *formulae*, which appear in *Annals*, I-VI, are attributed to him, and this seems a reasonable allocation for an important personality and an important period. He is given a fair share of conversations, and of the condensed combinations which present thoughts and motives in dramatic *obliqua*, and he accounts for more than half of the epigrammatic *dicta*—which is interesting: Tacitus is not over-fond of other men's *bons mots*, and the number of them which are Tiberian suggests that he found something appealing in the Emperor's dry and caustic style. Tiberius was an Emperor; he was also,

¹⁰ These useful categories for the classification and examination of speeches were formulated by Konrad Gries in *A. J. P.*, LXX (1949), pp. 118-41, in a paper on Livy, and applied to Tacitus in my paper cited in note 1. The categories are fully explained in both these papers, and are therefore employed here without further comment.

for much of his reign, an absentee Emperor, and this fact is neatly illustrated in the number of messages which appear under his name. Not all of them date from the period of his withdrawal, but the association of Tiberius and messages is interesting and forms another piece of the material which Tacitus fits together to form his mosaic portrait.

B. Contents

Number of remarks on each subject

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Totals	Totals (all speakers)
International politics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Internal politics	7	3	7	6	0	3	26	57
Military affairs	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	27
Personal matters	1	0	2	2	0	5	10	23
	9	4	9	8	0	8	38	113

International politics, the relationships of Rome with other states, were not perhaps of first importance in the early years of the Roman Empire. During the reign of Tiberius, Rome was principally occupied in setting her own house in order, and when the Emperor was involved in foreign affairs, these were mainly connected with Roman military manoeuvres and/or Germanicus, and any thought or speech recorded about them tends to be military or personal. The speeches are, as usual, a guide both to the nature of the material and to the historian's interpretation of it, and it should not therefore surprise us to find that Tiberius is given no speech on foreign politics.

The internal politics of Rome are quite another matter. Two thirds of Tiberius' speeches are on mainly political themes. Tiberius was undoubtedly a personality, and Tacitus is careful to let him display that personality in speeches which vary in type, content, circumstances, length, and distribution. But he has a personality inextricably involved with an interesting political situation, and it is a measure of Tacitus' appreciation of that fact, that he allots to him so many speeches whose content is political. Whether the speeches are founded on Tiberius' own words, or invented solely by Tacitus, they leave us in no doubt

that the historian saw Tiberius not only as an interesting individual, but as a man involved with the fate of Rome. (Nero he presents quite differently.¹¹) Tiberius is involved in politics from start to finish: the only gap comes in *Annals*, V, whose text is largely lost; and the smaller amounts of political speech in II and VI are explained by the concentration of II on Germanicus, and by the fact that VI has an uncertain beginning and a natural emphasis on the personal.

Tiberius was a soldier before he was an Emperor, and he is allowed two speeches to display the Emperor dealing with a military situation. Like all men, too, he had personal interests and concerns, and the dramatic demonstration of those matters becomes more concentrated as he nears his end. But even here, where he is represented with his grandsons, there are overtones of politics and the problem of succession. Tiberius remains a political personality to the last.

C. Speakers¹²

In *Annals*, I-IV, there is no dearth of speakers. Forty-five persons or groups of persons, such as the soldier Percennius and officers like Blaesus or Caecina, senators or Germans, the Roman people or the daughter of Sejanus, a slave or the Pontifex Maximus, help to present a situation or paint a crisis, to characterise an individual or present a minority view. Among them, they account for one hundred and thirteen speeches. Of that number, eleven are made by the Roman people, eight by Germanicus, and (Tiberius apart) the rest speak from one to four times, the majority only once, and never at great length. Tiberius speaks *thirty-eight* times, accounting, both in occasion and bulk, for one third of the dramatic speech which the books contain. Not only that: he is the most frequent speaker in *Annals*, I, III, IV, and VI, and runs Germanicus a close second in II; he makes the major oration in III and IV, and his speech in III is the longest which the *Annals* contains. On all counts Tiberius is, even to the casual reader, the most striking char-

¹¹ See pp. 10-11.

¹² This section, which normally lists the number and variety of speakers in a book, is here presented somewhat differently. When we are immediately concerned with one speaker only, the usual tables are not very meaningful.

acter in the *Annals*; but it is fascinating to see this illustrated anew in the quantity and distribution of the dramatic speech allotted to him:¹³ the speech is integral to his presentation, and its apparent fluctuations are not haphazard.

D. Circumstances

Number of lines in each book

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Totals	Totals (all speakers)
<i>in castris</i>	3	8	0	0	0	0	14	201 (all in I-III)
<i>in proelio</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
<i>apud populum</i>	2	0	13	0	0	0	15	129
<i>in senatu</i>	19	26	111	60	0	18	234	464
<i>in concilio</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>apud legaticnem</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>inter priuatos</i>	13	1	5	36	0	4	59	177
	40	35	129	96	0	22	322	973

The information in this section is a corollary to the Contents already discussed. Tiberius never has occasion to exhort his soldiers on the field of battle, to address the official assembly of a state other than Rome, or to reply to ambassadors elsewhere than in the Senate. He twice sends despatches to his troops in Germany, and twice addresses edicts to the people of Rome. Apart from that, he talks, usually briefly,¹⁴ to his friends and intimates; and at length and frequently, by letter or in person, about politics, personalities, or principles, to the Senate. *Annals*, III and IV are primarily Senatorial books, and the amount of Tiberian Senatorial speech will obviously be higher there. But it is noteworthy that in every book Tiberius speaks more in the Senate than in any other context, and it is difficult to believe that this is accidental. The requirements of the material are mirrored in the dramatic speech.

¹³ See also the discussion of Length and Form.

¹⁴ The only utterance *inter priuatos* of any length is his letter (IV, 40) to Sejanus, a *tour de force* of dramatic characterisation.

E. Length and Form ¹⁵

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Totals
1. Total no. of lines	1442	1386	1233	1332	139	923	6460
2. No. of lines of dramatic speech	266	162	272	186	10	77	973
3. % of 1 accounted for by 2	18.4	11.6	21.9	13.9	7.2	8.3	15
4. No. of lines spoken by Tiberius	40	35	129	96	0	22	322
5. % of 2 accounted for by 4	15	21.6	47.4	51.6	0	28.6	33.1
6. No. of Tiberian lines in <i>recta</i>	0	17	82	58	0	5	162
7. % of 4 accounted for by 6	0	48.5	63.6	60.4	0	22.7	50.3
8. No. of Tiberian lines in <i>obliqua</i>	40	18	47	38	0	17	160
9. % of 4 accounted for by 8	100	51.5	38.4	39.6	0	77.3	49.7

On average, 15% of the Latin which makes up the text of *Annals*, I-VI is in the form of dramatic speech, and (again on average) one third of that speech is attributed to Tiberius, in roughly equal proportions of the direct and indirect forms. If we ignore for the moment V and VI, which contain a negligible amount of Tiberian speech, and whose fragmentary character makes their evidence unsatisfactory, we find an interesting pattern. The proportion of dramatic speech to narrative in *Annals*, I-IV is not constant: it varies with the subject matter. But the proportions of this fluctuating amount of speech which fall to Tiberius are interesting and significant.

In *Ann.*, I, making 15% of the dramatic speech, he speaks nine times, never for more than seven lines, and always in indirect form: seven of the speeches are political, and five of them are delivered in the Senate. *Ann.*, I introduces a major work and a major reign, and it has therefore to set a scene and a mood, to introduce personalities and indicate themes. This is done, insofar as it is done by speech, by a large number of speeches of different kinds, on a variety of topics and by a

¹⁵ See the tables in *A. J. P.*, LXXXV, p. 292.

number of different speakers. With the exception of the Roman people, whose thoughts or feelings are recorded four times, none of the eighteen speakers utters more than twice; but Tiberius nine times, at fairly regular intervals throughout the book. A patient and persistent accumulation of detail keeps the man and his reactions carefully before the reader. This man, the speeches tell us, is political, subtle, and senatorial—information which is not decorative trimming on the stuff of narrative, but a fundamental thread of the fabric.

With *Ann.*, II, we find a different technique. There is less dramatic speech in the book, but Tiberius is already accounting for a higher proportion of it. The speeches are longer and less frequent, and include (ch. 38) his first major statement in *recta*.¹⁶ All four speeches appear between chs. 26-40, so that the character and interests of the Emperor are kept centrally before us, but do not interfere with the exciting story of Germanicus on the Elbe, or the pathetic tale of his death. Germanicus is (just) the hero of *Ann.*, II: he makes the greatest number of public appearances (six speeches to Tiberius' four) and has also slightly the longest speech of the book (ch. 71). He must obviously be allowed the centre of the stage before he leaves it for ever; but it is to be noted that even here he does not act Tiberius right off it.

In *Ann.*, III comes an obvious change in tempo. The interest of the book is political, the proportion of speech is high—and Tiberius accounts for almost half of it. Of his nine utterances (and no other individual among the fifteen speakers speaks more than once), seven are political and delivered in the Senate. Not all are formal speeches; but through their medium the Emperor is presented as involved with the business of state, showing characteristic capability in dealing with a variety of business, characteristic astringency in his comments, characteristic fury at insults to himself or to Rome. He speaks for the first time in ch. 6, and his final recorded utterance is at ch. 73. Tiberius is not so much central as pervasive.

The amount of dramatic speech in *Ann.*, IV drops to just below average: but the proportion attributed to Tiberius increases. This book is again mainly concerned with the Senate,

¹⁶ Some of its vocabulary is discussed on pp. 15, 16, 18.

but Tacitus will not repeat his effects exactly. There is enough speech to preserve the atmosphere of Senatorial business, and to present the characters of Drusus and Sejanus, Agrippina and Tiberius; there is a notable speech (chs. 34-5) attributed to Cremutius Cordus, on one of the central problems of the time—the treason law and its abuses; there are the usual comments from the people of Rome, and a sprinkling of foreign envoys to give an exotic air of variety. But the emphasis on Tiberius begins to be insistent. Nearly all the dramatic speech in the first thirty chapters is his, and in ch. 40 the famous letter to Sejanus provides a focal point in an important relationship, a revelation of characters fundamental to the history. The dramatic speech in *Ann.*, IV marks an increasing urgency in the presentation of Tiberius, in the book which sees his withdrawal from Rome.

The proportion of Tiberian speech from *Ann.*, I to *Ann.*, IV mounts with the tension. Its types vary, its distribution depends on the needs of the material as a whole; it displays (in spite of local variations) a careful balance between the vivid and arresting *recta* and the subtly dramatic *obliqua*; and its total effect is an integral part of Tacitus' interpretation of a man and a reign.

That is, historically speaking, its justification. Has it conceivably a more primary value? A comparison with Nero's speaking habits is instructive.

A. Types

Number of examples in each book

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	Totals	Totals	Totals
						(all speakers)	(Tiberius, I-III)
<i>contiones</i>	1	1	0	0	2	17	6
conversations	0	2	0	0	2	23	4
<i>dicta</i>	1	1	0	0	2	6	1
condensed combinations	0	0	1	0	1	17	3
<i>formulae</i>	2	0	0	0	2	2	3
messages	0	3	0	1	4	11	5
	4	7	1	1	13	76	22

B. Contents

Number of remarks on each subject

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	Totals	Totals (all speakers)	Totals (Tiberius, I-III)
International politics	0	0	0	0	0	11	0
Internal politics	2	2	1	1	6	23	17
Military affairs	0	0	0	0	0	6	2
Personal matters	2	5	0	0	7	36	3
	4	7	1	1	13	76	22

C. Speakers

Thirty-one speakers account for seventy-six speeches in *Ann.*, XIII-XVI, speaking (except for Nero) between one and five times each. For *Ann.*, I-III, the corresponding numbers are thirty-three speakers and eighty-three occasions. Nero speaks thirteen times, being the most frequent speaker in XIII and XIV, but nowhere making the major speech of the book.

Annals, I-III only have been used to provide a basis of comparison with XIII-XVI. The two sets of books are very close in total bulk, both deal with the accession and early years of a new Emperor, they show a similar proportion of dramatic speech to narrative, and they have a very similar number and range

D. Circumstances

Number of lines in each book

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	Totals	Totals (all speakers)	Totals (Tiberius, I-III)
<i>in castris</i>	0	0	0	0	0	52	14
<i>in proelio</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>apud populum</i>	9	0	0	0	9	74	15
<i>in senatu</i>	9	13	0	3	25	162	156
<i>in concilio</i>	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
<i>apud legationem</i>	0	0	0	0	0	23	0
<i>inter priuatos</i>	1	37	6	0	44	297	19
	19	50	6	3	78	620	204

E. Length and Form

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	Totals	<i>Ann.</i> , I	II	III	Totals
1. Total no. of lines	1027	1067	1232	520	3846	1442	1386	1238	4066
2. No. of lines of dramatic speech	141	241	146	92	620	266	162	272	700
3. % of 1 accounted for by 2	13.7	22.5	11.8	17.7	16.1	18.4	11.6	21.9	17.2
4. No. of lines spoken by Emperor	19	50	6	3	78	40	35	129	204
5. % of 2 accounted for by 4	13.5	20.7	4.1	3.3	12.5	15	21.6	47.4	29
6. No. of lines of 4 in <i>recta</i>	0	29	0	0	29	0	17	82	99
7. % of 4 accounted for by 6	0	58	0	0	37.2	0	48.5	63.6	48.5
8. No. of lines of 4 in <i>obliqua</i>	19	21	6	3	49	40	18	47	105
9. % of 4 accounted for by 8	100	42	100	100	62.8	100	51.5	36.4	51.5

of speakers. Within the framework of this general similarity, the differences in the Emperors' habits of speech are the more striking. Nero speaks just over half as often as Tiberius, and at rather less than half the length: he accounts for only one eighth of all the dramatic speech, as opposed to the amount between a quarter and a third which is allotted to Tiberius; he speaks more often on personal than on political themes, and he does this in a predominantly private context; instead of the steady crescendo of Tiberian speech,¹⁷ there is a sharp drop in Neronian speech after *Ann.*, XIV; and a far higher proportion of Nero's speech is in *obliqua*.

Now, some of these differences are caused by a fundamental difference in material. The stuff of Roman history is no longer political, but personal, and this is naturally reflected in the contents and circumstances of the dramatic speech. Nero is not in fact so central to his period as Tiberius was to his. The increased use of *obliqua*, too, is part of a pattern which is Tacitean rather than Neronian,¹⁸ so that it is possible to regard

¹⁷ See p. 9.

¹⁸ See *A. J. P.*, LXXXV, p. 293.



the dramatic speech of XIII-XVI as showing simply the historian's idiosyncratic use of a traditional tool of interpretation.

But it is also worth asking if Tacitus perhaps allowed Tiberius to speak at greater length, on Roman politics and in the Senate, for the simple reason that more such speeches existed. Is the sheer bulk of Tiberian speech an indication of its fundamentally genuine quality? This is not to suggest that even the senatorial speeches are *ipsissima verba* of Tiberius, or that Tacitus does not use Tiberian speech for conventional interpretative purposes. But if we subtract from the total of Tiberian speech the amount delivered *in senatu*, we find that he is left with only eighty-eight lines on fourteen occasions; and if a similar calculation is done for I-III only, and Tiberius is then allowed the amount of senatorial speech which Nero delivers, the answer is seventy-three lines on twelve occasions—a total significantly close to Nero's seventy-eight lines on thirteen occasions. That might have been sufficient to portray a character or to crystallise a situation. The inference is insistent that there is more Tiberian senatorial speech because more existed in the records. Tacitus is inverting (XV, 63) it and not inventing it.

Tacitus (and others) knew the speeches of Tiberius.¹⁹ Tacitus almost certainly used the *acta senatus*.²⁰ All that we are told of the rhetorical style of Tiberius²¹ suggests a dry, economical style which must have been congenial to Tacitus, and which could have been incorporated into his austere and concentrated Latin with less violent alteration than was necessary for the long-winded formlessness of Claudius. It seems a reasonably safe deduction that the senatorial speeches of Tiberius, as they appear in *Ann.*, I-VI, are largely based on Tiberian originals, and may even on occasion bear distinct traces of the original words.

Here one must tread very delicately. Dramatic speech used by an historian to aid his interpretation need be written in no style but his own. It will differ from the surrounding narrative, because rhetoric differs from narrative: but it may be the historian's rhetoric, and differences in vocabulary may be caused simply by the differing requirements of the *genres*. Even where the historian has the skill to differentiate his speakers in style

¹⁹ Cf. *Ann.*, I, 81; II, 83. Suet., *Tib.*, 24, 2; 28; 67, 3.

²⁰ See Syme, *Tacitus*, pp. 273-86, and references there.

²¹ *Ann.*, I, 11; IV, 31; VI, 8; XIII, 3. Suet., *Aug.*, 86; *Tib.*, 70.

as well as in substance, the characterising vocabulary may be his alone. All this must be admitted. But an examination of the vocabulary of the Tiberian speeches in the *Annals* suggests that it is not the whole answer.²²

The words that are interesting are naturally those of rare or limited appearance: and here we can distinguish various categories. First of all, there are the words which probably do belong to the historian's presentation of Tiberius, and not to Tiberius himself. These words are:

abdo I, 11 and VI, 46. With an abstract object, only once in the *Histories* and five times in the *Annals*. III, 64 and VI, 8 are also Tiberian contexts.

abstrudo III, 6. Also used of Tiberius I, 24. Two other examples only.

aspero III, 12. Six examples only in the metaphorical usage—three in the *Histories*, three in the *Annals*, all Tiberian. Cf. I, 72; II, 29.

deprecor I, 78; III, 54; IV, 41. In this meaning, nine examples, all in the *Annals*, seven in I-VI, all Tiberian contexts. Cf. I, 76; II, 50; III, 51; IV, 31.

oblique III, 35; V, 2 (both non-dramatic *obliqua*). Otherwise only at II, 55 and XI, 3.

obscurus I, 11. Of speech, only here and D., 33 and 42. Cf. *suspensus*.

obscuro I, 69. Four examples only in metaphorical usage. Cf. G., 34: *Ann.*, II, 82; IV, 31 (both of Tiberius).

occulo I, 11. Verb finite and metaphorical only here, *Hist.*, IV, 64 (a speech) and *Ann.*, III, 16 (a Tiberian context).

offensio II, 36; III, 24 and 54; IV, 38. Only in *Annals*; of twenty-nine examples, about twenty appear in Tiberian contexts.

perstringo V, 2 (non-dramatic *obliqua*). Once in *Dial.*, once in the *Histories*, six examples in the *Annals*, four of them in Tiberian contexts. Cf. I, 13; II, 59; IV, 17.

præcumbo I, 12. The only example in the metaphorical meaning in the extant works.

recondo I, 69. The finite verb appears only three times, all of Tiberius. Cf. I, 7; IV, 57.

rumpo I, 74. In the metaphorical usage and this meaning, only here and XIV, 49.

superbio II, 36. Only here and I, 19.

suspensus I, 11. Of language, only here and XI, 34. Cf. *obscurus*, and Suet., *Tib.*, 24 *suspensens*.

²² Cf. Syme, *Tacitus*, pp. 700-3, 719-34.

taciturnitas I, 74. Only here and XV, 54.

turbide III, 13. The only example of the adverb in the extant works.

These words help to form the picture of a morose, secretive, and sometimes violent man; they are interesting from the point of view of Tacitean technique, but their direct connection with Tiberius is doubtful.

Secondly, there is what one might call technical vocabulary, words which of their very nature are not in constant demand, words whose presence is significant only for their content. There is no special need for an Emperor or historian to be constantly mentioning e.g. *cunctio agrorum* (III, 73), *confarreo* (IV, 16), *annua designatio* (II, 36), *fetialis* (III, 64), or *repulsa* (II, 36; and I, 15, non-dramatic *obliqua*); so the fact that (with the exception of *designatio* at XIII, 21) each occurs only once and in a speech of Tiberius, is primarily an accident of subject-matter. *circulus*, too (III, 54 and *Ag.*, 43 only), probably belongs here. Its characteristic *nota uituperationis* (TLL) is very suitable to the Tiberian context, but is not a Tiberian invention.

The remaining categories are more rewarding. There is in the vocabulary of Tiberius' speeches a marked fondness for abstract nouns of a Ciceronian type.²³

adseueratio IV, 15. Seven examples, all in *Ann.*, I-VI, five of them in Tiberian contexts. Cf. II, 31; IV, 19, 42 and 52.

complexus IV, 8. Metaphorical use (*e complexu reipublicae*). So again only in *Ag.*, 36. This is the only example of the word in *Ann.*, I-VI. Cf. *Cic.*, *Sest.*, 53.

dubitatio IV, 40. Four examples, all in *Ann.*, I-VI, three of them Tiberian. Cf. I, 7; III, 41.

firmitudo III, 6; VI, 46. Six examples, four in *Ann.*, I-VI, three of them Tiberian. Cf. IV, 8.

imbecillitas IV, 8. Only here and XV, 56.

oblectatio IV, 14. Apart from *G.*, 33, only here and IV, 33—significantly close to the Tiberian speech. A favourite Ciceronian word.

obtestatio I, 12. The only example in the extant works.

peregrinatio III, 24 and 47. The only other example is in VI, 14.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 700.

precatio IV, 9. The only example in the extant works.

tranquillitas IV, 40. The only example in the major works.

Cf. *Ag.*, 40; *D.*, 38.

Nothing here is susceptible of proof, but the form and connotation of the words are suggestive. They are more Tiberian than Tacitean, and Tacitus may well be helping his portrait of Tiberius with words taken from the original speeches.

Compound verbs, too, are a conspicuous element in the vocabulary of the Tiberian speeches.²⁴

adtreco III, 52. Only here and at I, 62, also a Tiberian context.

coarguo III, 12. Only here, XIII, 20 and *G.*, 43. Part of a pattern of compound verbs.²⁵

commonefacio VI, 12. The only example in the extant works.

conformo IV, 8. The only example in the extant works.

compello (-are) II, 38. Here, at IV, 70 (context of a Tiberian message) and XVI, 27 only.

consurgo II, 38. Of a speaker, only here and XI, 5; *D.*, 6.

In the same context as other Tiberian rarities.

conterreo VI, 29. The only example in the extant works.

contrecto III, 12. Only here and at XIV, 35 (a speech).

A rare use with *oculis*.

denoto III, 53. Only here and *Ag.*, 45 (of Domitian).

deporto II, 26 (non-dramatic *obliqua*). In the metaphorical usage, only here and IV, 26.

detego III, 12. In the metaphorical usage, only twice in the *Annals*. Cf. XVI, 10.

diuidico III, 12. Only here, III, 69 (a Tiberian context) and *Hist.*, II, 29.

eloquor III, 65. Only here, IV, 31 (a Tiberian context) and *D.*, 36.

exonero III, 54. The only example in the *Annals*. There are two in the *Histories*.

exsatio II, 38. Only here and III, 17 (common talk about Tiberius).

indolesco III, 73. Three examples, all in *Ann.*, I-VI, two of them Tiberian. Cf. IV, 17.

perdomo III, 47. In the *Annals*, only here and at IV, 5.

perfringo II, 38. The only example of the metaphorical usage.

perfungor VI, 2. Five examples only, all in the *Annals*. This is its first appearance, and the only example in I-VI.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 701.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

perrumpo IV, 40. In the metaphorical usage, only here and at III, 15 (a Tiberian context).

pertempto VI, 20. The only example in the *Annals*, or with a personal object.

recido III, 53. The only example in the extant works.

subleuo III, 12. Only here and at XIV, 4 (in a different meaning).

suscenseo III, 12. The only example in the extant works.

transcendo III, 54. The only example in the metaphorical meaning, with the accusative.

Some of these verbs come very close together in the text, and the suggestion is strong that they represent a known characteristic of Tiberian language, and may even come from his own speeches.

There are some archaisms, too, which may be his own.

duint IV, 33. The only example in the extant works.

fungor with the accusative IV, 38. Only here and at III, 2.

potior with the accusative II, 33. Only here and at XI, 10.

proin III, 6. The form appears only here and at XII, 22 (a speech of Claudius). *proinde* is common. *proin*, which is common in Plautus, found in Terence, Catullus, Cicero (once, at *De v.*, I, 45), and Seneca, and absent from Caesar, Sallust, and the poets, may be colloquial. It seems certainly foreign to Tacitus.

proloquor III, 53. The only example in *Ann.*, I-VI. There are five examples in XI-XVI. It is found in Ennius, Plautus, Terence, and Varro, and is conspicuously absent from Caesar, Sallust, and the Augustan poets.

satias III, 54. There are four examples only, all in the *Annals*. Two are Tiberian (cf. VI, 38) and two Tacitus' own comments at III, 30 and XVI, 16. There is some affinity here. The word is in Attius and Plautus, but may have descended to Tacitus *via* Sallust (*Hist.*, II, 29 only) and Livy (XXX, 3, 8). Or he may have had it drawn to his notice in Tiberius' speeches.

The real rarities are of three kinds: usages which seem to be mainly Tiberian, ordinary words which appear only in his speeches, and out-of-the-way words making in a Tiberian speech their solitary appearance in the works of Tacitus. The usages are as follows:

adicio = *adhibeo* III, 6 only. Cf. Livy, XLI, 15, 3 with *curam*.

deficio = *inopia premor* II, 33 only.

excelsus used of things III, 53; IV, 40. Otherwise, only *D.*, 37 and *Ag.*, 4.

expeditum = *facile*, with infinitive III, 53. Only here and *Hist.*, I, 10.

hebesco used of men III, 69. Only here and *Hist.*, II, 77.

infimus meaning 'abject' I, 12. Cf. VI, 7, also a Tiberian context.

infringo used of men I, 47 only.

peres with abstract noun IV, 16. Only here and *Hist.*, I, 57.

reicio meaning 'refer' I, 47; III, 35. Cf. I, 26; III, 22 (Tiberian contexts). No other examples.

sepono ab meaning 'banish' III, 12 only.

uic and genitive IV, 37; VI, 21. Otherwise, only *Hist.*, III, 71.

Some of these may be accidental, some may be Tacitean highlighting of an important character. They remain interesting, and they may be significant.

Why should half a dozen perfectly ordinary Latin words appear in the *Annals* only in the speeches of Tiberius? They are:

atqui III, 54. Only here and *D.*, 41.

cotidie III, 54; VI, 6. There are two examples in the *Histories*, seven in the minor works.

desidero IV, 37. There are five examples in the *Histories*, four in the minor works.

peius VI, 6. The only example in the extant works.

postulata I, 25. Cf. III, 60 (Tiberian context).

seātiose III, 12; IV, 14. There is one example in the *Histories*, one in *Agricola*.

At VI, 6, *cotidie* and *peius* appear in a context which also has a rare phrase,²⁶ and whose genuine Tiberian quality is supported by its appearance in Suetonius too.²⁷ This lends plausibility to the view that some at least of the words under discussion have been incorporated from genuine Tiberian material.

Finally, the solitaires. All of these appear only once in the extant works, in or in association with a speech of Tiberius, and not very frequently elsewhere in Latin.

adseco VI, 13 (non-dramatic *obliqua*). TLL quotes in addition only Valerius Flaccus IV, 105 and four post-classical examples.

biroctium III, 71 (non-dramatic *obliqua*). TLL quotes in addition only Ammianus, Priscian, and Avienus.

concedo meaning 'die' IV, 38. This absolute use recurs

²⁶ *di . . . deaeque*: see section on solitaires.

²⁷ *Tib.*, 67.

- only in an obituary notice at XIII, 30. All other writers use with *fato*, *vita*, etc., as does Tacitus himself at I, 3; II, 71; III, 30; VI, 39; XII, 39; XIV, 51.
- degusto* VI, 20. Used metaphorically, as here, it is not unparalleled, but it is not common. Cf. Cic., *Tusc.*, V, 61; Quint., XII, 2, 4; Symm., *Orat.*, I, 15.
- demuto* IV, 16. Plautus, Cato, Tacitus, and later.
- di* . . . *deaeque* VI, 6. Quoted also by Suetonius.²⁸ The phrase seems to be an archaism—it is frequent in Plautus and Terence, and very rare in this precise form in intervening writers.
- efflagitatio* II, 38. In Cicero's correspondence,²⁹ Ausonius, 396, 1 and Symm., *Epp.*, IV, 49.
- gregalis* I, 69. There is a close parallel in Livy, VII, 34, 15, and the word is found with *miles* in Frontinus, *Strat.*, III, 9, 3.
- inreligiose* II, 50. Here and in Christian writers only, apparently.
- insatiabiliter* IV, 38. Twice in Lucretius (III, 907; VI, 978); once in Pliny (*Epp.*, IX, 6, 3); and post-classical.
- interfectrix* III, 17. Found later, in Hyginus e. g. (*Fab.*, 122, 2) and the Schol. Bern. on Virgil, *Ecl.*, VI, 79. In a jeering comment by the populace on a speech of Tiberius.
- interuiso* I, 69. Not common, and usually in a private context (with *domum*, *nos*, etc.). Here with *manipulos*.
- permodestus* I, 7. A Ciceronian word: not common outside his works.
- popularitas* III, 69. In Plautus (*Poen.*, 1041 only), but not in 'classical' prose or poetry.
- quinquiplico* II, 36. Apparently unique.

Solitarities are not in themselves necessarily significant. There are over twelve hundred of them in the works of Tacitus, and they range from accidentals like *duodeviginti* and *elephantus* to technical terms like *clausula* and *caiafracta*, from rarities like *inreligiose* and *quinquiplico* to common words like *ambulo* and *crudelis*. Tacitus' reasons for using them only once may be fascinating, but are not immediately relevant. But the Tiberian ones are relevant, especially in comparison with the Neronian ones. Using again *Ann.*, I-III only as a basis of comparison, we find the following results:

²⁸ *Tib.*, 67.

²⁹ *Fam.*, V, 19, 2; X, 24, 6; *Brut.*, I, 16, 1.

Book	<i>Ann.</i> , I	II	III	Totals	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	Totals
1. No. of solitaires in book	52	62	62	176	48	56	81	32	217
2. No. with direct reference to Emperor	7	5	9	21	5	5	11	4	25
3. % of 1 accounted for by 2	13.5	8	14.5	12	10.4	9	13.5	12.5	11.5
4. No. of 2 appearing in Emperor's speeches	3	5	7	15	1	3	2	0	6
5. % of 2 accounted for by 4	43	100	77.7	71.4	20	60	18.2	0	24

The really interesting figures are those under 4 and 5. Neither individual books nor the two blocks of books differ significantly in the number of solitaires which they contain, or which have direct reference to the Emperor. But they differ both in number and percentage of the solitaires which appear in the Emperor's speeches. Because more of the Tiberian solitaires come from Tiberius himself?

There is another straw in the wind. The two great speeches of Germanicus (I, 42 and II, 71) contain only three solitaires, none of them of any particular rarity or significance. The speech of Claudius at XI, 24 has two: neither appears in the existing portions of the Claudian Tablet but, as already mentioned, Tacitus would have had to make major alterations to the undistinguished vocabulary and diffuse style of that document. With Tiberian vocabulary he would have a greater affinity, and we may therefore with some reason postulate that the high proportion of Tiberian solitaires indicates a connection with Tiberius' speeches.

All this may seem somewhat inconclusive: arguments based on stylistic criteria tend to be so and, in spite of computers, will continue to be so; for statistics have to be assessed. The assessments made above may be questioned, but I hope that the figures provided and the reflections upon them may help to illuminate some corners of the problem of Tiberius, and of Tacitus' presentation of him.

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THE GODS INVOKED IN EPIC OATHS:

AENEID, XII, 175-215.

In her recent article, "An Analysis of *Aeneid*, XII, 176-211. The Differences Between the Oaths of Aeneas and Latinus" (*A. J. P.*, LXXXVI [1965], pp. 337-62), Froma I. Zeitlin holds to the traditional interpretation of XII, 197, the first line of King Latinus' oath: *Haec eadem, Aenea, terram mare sidera juro*. As she expresses it, "Ee says he intends to echo Aeneas. . . . *Eadem* is the key word. He promises to parallel Aeneas' invocation. . . ." (p. 342). That is, she takes *Haec eadem juro* as "I swear by these same powers," i. e., the deities whom Aeneas had invoked (176-82): sun, earth, Jupiter, Juno, Mars, springs, rivers, *aetheris alti religio*, and *numina* of the sea. This interpretation is that which I too adopted in my note, "Apollo and Sol in the Oaths of Aeneas and Latinus" (see note 8), having accepted the usual interpretation of commentators. Although Mrs. Zeitlin cites my note, she has not noticed H. J. Rose's note which appeared in the same journal six months later ("Apollo and Sol Again," *C. P.*, XXXVIII [1943], p. 261). There Rose, approving my conclusion that these lines do not show an identification of Apollo with Sol, objected that I had erred in accepting commentators' usual interpretation of *haec eadem* as "by these same powers"; and maintained that the phrase refers to the terms which Aeneas spoke. "And I swear, by [the gods he names], that we will observe those terms, come what may."

Rose's note convinced me that *haec eadem* in this line should be understood as inner object with *juro*, meaning "these same terms." For *jurare* can take two kinds of accusative: (1) direct object of the deity or sacred thing by which one swears; (2) inner object indicating the content of what is sworn. Instead of the direct object a writer may use *per* and the god's name (or noun indicating a sacred object) in the accusative: *Jovem juro* or *per Jovem juro*. Instead of the inner object a writer may use *in* with the accusative: *haec juro* or *in haec verba juro*; although the latter indicates oral repetition of the prescribed words of the oath, the former expression means essentially the same thing:

"I affirm these words under oath," whether another's form is exactly repeated or not. Rose cited *juravi morbum* (Cic., *Att.*, I, 1, 1): Aquilius, refusing to stand for the consulship, swore to sickness, i. e., he swore that he was sick. Cicero used the same idiom again in *Att.*, XII, 13, 2: *quod si erit durius, veniam et ipse perpetuum morbum jurabo*. The accusative plural of a neuter pronoun appears in *ubi quae jurare solebas?* (Ovid, *Fasti*, III, 485): Ariadne's question addressed to Bacchus is not so much "Where are the oaths that you used to swear?" (as Frazer takes it in his translation of the *Fasti*), as "Where are all the statements (of love and fidelity) that you swore were true?"¹

One difficulty, however, stands in the way of accepting Rose's suggestion. Nowhere else in Virgil's works and nowhere in the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors can one find an instance of *jurare* governing a double accusative. And in later Latin (in a search that could hardly be complete) I have found nothing more than two passages which approach such a construction, but hardly satisfy all requirements. Statius (*Theb.*, V, 329) has *concessum et multum cineres jurare sepultos*. We may call this *multum* an adverbial accusative; yet adverbial accusatives are accusatives of inner object. The meaning here is "to swear much oath (many an oath) by the dead." Silius Italicus (*Pun.*, I, 118) has a unique example of *jurare* governing an accusative of oath content and *per* with the deity's name, when Hannibal swears, *hanc mentem juro nostri per numina Martis*, "I swear to this purpose by the powers of our Mars." We could easily understand this sentence if the *per* were omitted; but as

¹ Cf. Stat., *Theb.*, IV, 396, *alium furorem juravi*; Sil. Ital., *Pun.*, II, 428, III, 83, IV, 733-4, XI, 24, *bella* or *proelia* (*jurare*). In Ovid, *Met.*, XIII, 558-9, Hecuba looks at Polymestor *falsa jurantem*, where *falsa* refers to the false content of his oath. See also the singular *falsum jurare* in Ovid, *Am.*, III, 3, 11, and *A. d.*, I, 635, both referring to false content, when the swearer asserts as true what he knows to be untrue (see Cic., *Off.*, III, 29, 108). Compare *cum calumniam jurasset*, Caelius ap. Cic., *Fam.*, VIII, 8, 3; and the phrase *bonam copiam ejurare*, "to declare bankruptcy," as in Cic., *Fam.*, IX, 16, 7. T. E. Page (on XII, 197) considers the deity's name with *jurare* to be cognate accusative: "The acc. is really cognate because the name of the deity forms the oath." This seems dubious to me; the god is an external object that the act of swearing affects.

it stands it is not an example of *jurare* with two accusatives. We should also notice that in all periods the similar verb *testari* is found with double accusative, as at Ter., *Hec.*, 476, *id testor deos*; and so one may resort to the argument from analogous construction. But *testari* is not analogous to *jurare* in all its constructions otherwise: whereas *jurare* may take the dative of the person to whom the oath is spoken, *testari* governs the accusative of the person to whom testimony is spoken.

Examples of case usage with *jurare* in extant Latin literature, therefore, do not offer wholly convincing support for *jurare* with double accusative. It is the usage of pronominal *haec eadem* as accusative plural neuter that does more to damage the accepted interpretation of commentators, which requires that in XII, 197, the phrase be taken as equivalent to *haec eadem numina*, followed by nouns in apposition. For in the works of Virgil and his contemporaries (including Cicero) *haec eadem* (from here on I mean only the accusative plural neuter as pronoun) commonly sums up the content of speech, thought, or knowledge which has been either made explicit or alluded to in the immediately preceding text. At *Ecl.*, II, 35, Corydon says to Alexis, *haec eadem ut sciret quid non faciebat Amintas?* He refers to skilful playing on the shepherd's pipe, the topic of the immediately preceding lines. Not very different is *Aen.*, XI, 132, *Dixerat haec unoque omnes eadem ore fremebant*. Here *haec* and *eadem* are objects of different verbs, but *haec* is understood with *eadem* in the second clause, and together they sum up the content of Drances' speech.

Cicero often uses *haec eadem* in this way. The phrase occurs twice in *Verr.*, II, 1, 23, 71, *Nunc cum . . . P. Tettius haec eadem se Lampsaci cognasse dixerit, . . . C. Varro . . . haec eadem ipsa se ex Philodamo audisse dicet, potestis dubitare . . . ?* Here it sums up knowledge or report as object of *cognosse* and *audisse*. It is object of *dicat* at *Verr.*, II, 4, 7, 15, *Quid mihi tam optandum, iudices, potest esse in hoc crimine quam ut haec eadem dicat ipse Heius?* Elsewhere in Cicero's works we find *haec eadem se audisse* (*Verr.*, II, 1, 10, 28), *haec eadem audire* (*Verr.*, II, 4, 59, 132), *haec eadem . . . timuisse aut cogitasse* (*Fort.*, 13, 29), *dicere haec eadem* (*Mur.*, 31, 66), *haec eadem . . . pertimescetis* (*Har. resp.*, 28, 62), *haec eadem locutus sum* (*Fam.*, X, 25, 3), *eadem haec agere* (*Fam.*, V, 12, 1). Caesar has one instance: *haec eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum*

mandabant, . . . (*B. G.*, VII, 17, 8): he refers to the soldiers' plea not to give up the siege of Avaricum.

In every example quoted *haec eadem* is object of a verb of speaking or of mental activity. In a few other occurrences *haec eadem* sums up actions or events, previously narrated or alluded to, as object of *facere*, as at Cic., *Phil.*, III, 12, 31, *haec eadem quacumque exercitum duxit fecit M. Antonius*. Compare *Fam.*, X, 32, 2, . . . *haec quoque fecit . . . eadem quae C. Caesar*; *Prop.*, II, 32, 45, *haec eadem ante illam jam impune et Lesbia fecit*.² All instances of accusative *haec eadem* which I have found (except *Lucr.*, I, 60) are pronominal and without a specific noun antecedent. No modified noun is understood (if it were, the phrase would really be adjectival), although if a Latin speaker were pressed to supply a noun, he would say *dicta*, *verba*, or *facta* according to circumstances. To supply such a noun as *numina* in the circumstances of *Aen.*, XII, 197, is extraordinary, to say the least.

Therefore, usage shows that *haec eadem juro* would ordinarily be taken as "I swear to these same terms," since *jurare* is a verb of speaking, and a statement of treaty terms, which *haec eadem*

² For other examples of *haec eadem* as object of verbs of speech or thought see *Plaut.*, *Capt.*, 296 (*h. e. confiteri*), *Cist.*, 651-2 (*h. sciat e.*); *Lucr.*, V, 376-7 (*confiteare h. e.*); *Livy*, XXXI, 3, 6 (*h. scribere e.*); *Ovid*, *Tr.*, V, 3, 48 (*h. e. rogare*). The nominative *haec eadem* comes to much the same thing in *Aen.*, IX, 301-2, where it sums up the content of promises. The only possible exception to the use of *haec eadem* as determined here is *Lucr.*, I, 60,

quae (rerum primordia) nos materiem et genitalia

corpora rebus

reddunda in ratione vocare et semina rerum

appellare suemus et haec eadem usurpare

corpora prima, . . . (58-61)

This is obviously different: *haec* is here a pronoun with an expressed noun antecedent, *primordia*: "and we also call them first bodies." It corresponds to *ego*, *me*, *tu*, *te*, *hunc*, or any personal pronoun used with the proper form of *idem*, when a second statement is made about the same person or thing, as *de eodem me* after *de me* at Cic., *Sest.*, 50, 107. That is, this is not the pronominal *haec eadem* which we have been discussing; it is rather a form of *idem* modifying a form of the pronoun *hic*, when *idem* may be translated *also* or *yet*. *Aen.*, XII, 197, is obviously not parallel to *Lucr.*, I, 60. As far as I can determine, *eadem* is used with *ista* and *illi* much as with *haec*; see Cic., *Fam.*, XI, 21, 1, *cui non eadem ista dixerit*; *Att.*, XV, 11, 1, *ego eadem illa repetivi*.

can be understood to sum up, has just preceded. No one, I am sure, would have taken it otherwise, were it not for the other accusatives in the same sentence. The case for Rose's interpretation is therefore strong; and if we interpret XII, 197, accordingly, we need not wonder why Latinus invokes different deities from those that Aeneas named. Still, we cannot conclusively establish that interpretation. Not only is the double accusative unprecedented, but Servius (*ad loc.*) understood the line as modern commentators do: *eadem autem bene dixit: nam pro mari ille fontes et fluvios posuit, pro sideribus solem*. The comment is very Servian and also revealing, and if correctly understood does not support Mrs. Zeitlin's thesis. Servius' sole ground for taking *eadem* thus is that Latinus invoked *mare* as the equivalent of Aeneas' *fontesque fluviosque*, and *sidera* as the equivalent of Aeneas' *Sol*. Apparently Servius thought that the force of *eadem* did not reach beyond these two correspondences. But he could have made a much more intelligent interpretation of the line on his assumption that *eadem* means "the same deities." He is surely wrong about *mare*, which must be the counterpart of Aeneas' *quae caeruleo sunt numina ponto* (182); and Latinus' *sidera*, though certainly including *Sol*, must also include *quae aetheris alti religio*. Yet we should observe that Servius, however faulty his explication may be, limits the application of *eadem* to line 197, and points to correspondences between the *numina* of that line and those that Aeneas named. So much is clear: however we interpret *haec eadem*, Latinus' *terram mare sidera* sum up powers and deities of Aeneas' invocation, and the correspondence between the two lists of invoked deities and powers goes no farther than that.³

³ Latinus' *terram mare sidera* is probably not meant to comprehend all the deities of Aeneas' prayer, but the powers of earth, sea, and sky that Aeneas has named; to this topic I return below. Is it possible to take *haec eadem* as fully adjectival, modifying the three nouns together as a kind of unit ("these same earth-sea-stars")? Perhaps parallels can be found of plural attributive adjectives so used (preferably the plural of *idem*). Adjectival *haec eadem* modifies a distant *sidera* in *Carmin. Lat. Epigr.*, 254, 8-9,

*haec eadem regina deum ni cuncta profundo
aere consurgens fulcres sidera, Juno.*

The phrase is better taken as neuter plural here, since Juno is addressed. This example may give some support to the conventional interpretation of XII, 197.

After line 197 Latinus names only Jupiter in common with Aeneas, and under the epithet *Genitor* rather than with Aeneas' *pater omnipotens*. Otherwise he calls on deities that Aeneas has not named: Apollo and Diana as *Latoniae genus duplex*, Janus, and underworld deities (*vinque deum infernam et duri sacraria Ditis*), to whom we may add the fire and powers of the altar which he touches: *tango aras, medios ignes et numina testor* (201). He does not include Juno and Mars, whom Aeneas mentioned, and does not explicitly call on springs and rivers. Since the lists are manifestly different, and since Latinus does not say that he is invoking only those powers that Aeneas named, there is obviously no need to find Aeneas' Sol in Latinus' Apollo implied in *Latoniae genus duplex*, especially since this phrase is connected to the foregoing by means of *que*, which appears to rule out apposition to *sidera*. In truth we need not expect Latinus to call upon the same gods, especially in Virgilian epic, which avoids the repetitions of Homeric epic and constantly seeks variety.

Virgil, of course, begins from the conventions of Homeric epic. The truce-making scene of *Aeneid* XII consciously reflects that of *Iliad*, III, 267-301, when Agamemnon and Priam strike a truce for a decisive single combat between Menelaus and Paris. There Agamemnon first prays to Zeus pater, Helios, rivers, earth, and underworld gods (apparently Hades and Persephone).⁴ He calls them to witness the truce terms and gives his reasons for naming them: Zeus, because he rules from Ida (*Ἰδηθεν μεδέων*), and can therefore watch and hear the proceedings; Helios, because he sees and hears everything from his position in the sky above the truce-makers; underworld gods, because they punish oath-breakers after death. He merely names rivers and earth, but his reason for doing so is obvious. The earth is present under the contracting parties' feet; the blood of the lambs, the oath-offerings, sinks into the earth; and one of Priam's two lambs is meant for Ge (III, 104). And rivers are not only near enough to be witnesses, but are powerful deities in the lands through which they flow. The river-gods are closely linked in a people's

⁴ The verb of 279 is *τινυσθον*, and, so far as I can learn, no manuscript has *τινυσθε*, although a papyrus shows what is apparently *τινυσται*, as in XIX, 260, where the subject is Erinyes: *Ἐρινύες αἱ θ' ὑπὸ γαίαν / ἀνθρώπων τίνυσται*. But in III, 278-9, the subject is *τὶ ὑπέρερθε*.

religious feelings with the land which they drain and irrigate. They are one with earth: Agamemnon calls on *καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ γαῖα*.

Aeneas' prayer contains clear echoes of Agamemnon's. As Agamemnon invoked powers of earth, sky, and underworld, with Zeus, the mighty guardian of treaties and compacts, as a fourth power, so Aeneas calls on powers of earth, sky, and sea—on sea rather than on underworld powers, for the Trojans have just crossed the sea to their new home, and their descendants will become a great sea power—with Jupiter, Juno, and Mars as additional powers. It is the tripartite world, and this is what Latinus expresses in *terram mare sidera*: *terra* for Aeneas' *terra* and *fontes fluvius*; *mare* for Aeneas' powers of sea; *sidera* for Aeneas' *Sol* and *quae aetheris alti religio*. Obviously Aeneas calls on these powers for the same reason as Agamemnon: they are the world constituents, at hand to witness the truce-making. His *terra* is not only the goddess Earth, but that land which is the object of his toils and sufferings, *quam propter tantos potui perferre labores*, the very land on which he now stands. He calls on Jupiter as special guardian of treaties and joins with him his wife and queen Juno, Aeneas' enemy, whom he must placate; and he calls on Mars, arbiter of war's fortunes; for war too is at hand.

Agamemnon called on deities primarily as witnesses of the terms of truce, which he then set forth, the consequences of either outcome of single combat between Menelaus and Paris. The witnesses should include those gods who watch over men's oaths; and Agamemnon included the underworld gods who punish *ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὁμόσῃ*; and he asked the invoked deities not only to witness the terms, but also to watch over the oath: *ὕμεις μάρτυροι ἔστε φιλάσσετε δ' ὅρκια πιστά*. But his speech is not the oath, and the *horkia* are properly the oath-victims that embody the sanctity of the oath to be taken. Agamemnon's speech is a prayer (*μεγάλ' εἶχετο χεῖρας ἀνασχών*); after his invocation he speaks the terms which oaths will seal. Likewise in *Aeneid* XII Aeneas prays (*precatur*) to deities and powers as witnesses of the terms of treaty. Then he speaks the terms: what will follow from either outcome of the combat between Aeneas and Turnus.

The oath-taking follows the king's prayer which contains

the statement of treaty terms. In *Iliad* III the Achaeans and Trojans individually (ὦδε δέ τις εἶπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε) and in unison spoke the oath, putting the contingent curse, the magical oath-formula, upon themselves as they poured libations: "May the violators' brains flow forth upon the ground like this wine." In doing so they called on Zeus and the other immortal gods (298-301) to punish the oath-breaker by making the contingent curse effective; they did not invoke them as witnesses of terms but as guardians of oaths. King Priam did not take oath in the name of his kingdom and people as we might expect him to do. He simply said that he would leave the battlefield at once, since he could not bear to watch his son in single combat with Menelaus; he then picked up the Trojans' slaughtered lambs and rode back to the city with Antenor.

In *Aeneid* XII it is King Latinus who takes oath for the Latins; Virgil transfers this role from the soldiers to the enemy king. It is Latinus who says *juro*. His oath has no Homeric precedent in an oath that Priam takes. The gods and powers that Latinus calls upon are not invoked as witnesses of treaty terms, but as guardians of the oath, punishers of violation. He then takes oath on the altar, saying *medicos ignes et numina testor*. Likewise at *Aeneid*, II, 154-6, Sinon, to lend credence to his story, testifies on the altar:

Vos, aeterni ignes, et non violabile vestrum
testor numen, ait, vos, arae ensesque nefandi
quos fugi vittaeque deum quas hostia gessi,

where *vos* is object of *testor*. He invokes sun (*ignes*), altar, and the instruments of sacrifice. The common meaning of *testari* is "bear witness," "depose." With such an object as *deos*, *numina*, *ignes*, it is commonly rendered "call to witness." Its meaning is rather "testify to," "depose to," and there follows an oath or deposition. Notice Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*, 68, 194: Sasia made sacrifices and prayers at night, *quibus illa etiam deos immortalis de suo scelere testatur . . .*; and Cicero goes on to say that the committer of such crimes cannot placate the gods with sacrifices. The meaning is not "she calls the gods to witness," but "she testifies to the gods about her crime." Latinus and Sinon testify to the altar and its *numina*, who hold their

statements in memory, ready to call on the divine guardians of the oath, if a breach occurs, to punish the perjurer.⁵

The altar is a different sort of witness from the gods of Aeneas' invocation, who witness the terms of treaty that are to be sworn to. It is a magical rather than a religious power, as befits the magical nature of the oath. The Achaeans and Trojans asked that the violators' brains spill out upon the ground like the wine that they poured upon it; and Latinus vows that the peace will endure, even if earth, sea, and sky, the three parts of the world that he has invoked, should run together and dissolve into primitive chaos (203-5):

. . . nec me vis ulla volentem
avertet, non si tellurem effundat in undas
diluvis miscens caelumque in Tartara solvat

and his word that he will keep his part of the bargain is as sure as that his kingly staff (*sceptrum*) will never sprout leaves again (206-11, echoing *Iliad*, I, 234-9). He can no more break his word than nature can run backward. In the *Iliad* the staff is Achilles' *hor'kos*, corresponding to Latinus' altar. Latinus' *sceptrum* is the magical symbol of the suspended curse like the

⁵ *testari* may take two accusatives. Notice Cic., *Sulla*, 12, 35, . . . *atque hoc vos, iudices, testor: mihi de memet ipso*, etc.: "And this I testify to you, judges, that, etc."; *Sulla*, 31, 86, *Quam ob rem vos, di patrii ac penates . . . testor integro me animo ac libero P. Sullae causam defendere . . .*: "Wherefore I testify to you, ancestral gods and Penates, that, etc." Ordinarily *testari* has accusative of the second-person pronoun and introduces a deposition, a statement of past or present events declared to be true. In XII, 201, it introduces a future statement of obligation, the oath of a contracting party. Not very different is Prop., II, 1, 37-8:

Theseus infernis, superis testatur Achilles,
hic Ixioniden, ille Menoetiaden.

As Butler and Barber say, Theseus and Achilles do not call Pirithous and Patroclus to witness: they interpret the lines to mean that Theseus bears witness of Pirithous (as loyal friend) to the shades below, and Achilles of Patroclus to men on earth. I would modify this to "Theseus in the lower world testifies to Pirithous, Achilles in the upper world to Patroclus." Such is a common use of *inferi* and *superi*; see *Aen.*, VI, 481. Although the substantives are masculine, they suggest the cosmic regions, and the persons literally denoted are obscured. The words are ablatives here; *testari* does not govern the dative of person to whom testimony is given; but the accusative.

wine of *Iliad* III: if Latinus should break his word, he would presumably expect to dry up like the staff.

In summary, then, Aeneas' speech, like Agamemnon's, is a prayer and a statement of treaty terms, which will be sealed by oaths; and he calls on gods to witness the terms. Latinus' speech, like that of the many Achaeans and Trojans, is the swearing of the oath.⁶ We may suppose that Aeneas takes oath too, after Latinus has sworn: this the poet can leave unsaid, as Aeneas joins with Latinus in slaughtering and offering the oath-victims. It is the oath-ritual that binds the parties most effectively.

Since Latinus' invocation of gods and powers has a different purpose from Aeneas' invocation we need not look for correspondences in the two lists of gods. And since the gods and powers are invoked as witnesses of treaties and guardians of oaths, Mrs. Zeitlin errs in saying that Aeneas "begins with two great generalities—the sun and the earth" (p. 339). They are not generalities but real persons, physically present at the oath-taking. To Aeneas and Latinus they are no less personal and particular than Jupiter and Juno, no less indeed than Turnus, Ascanius, and all the *proceres* who stand by. Likewise the springs and rivers that Aeneas invokes are not "vague abstractions paralleling Agamemnon's ποταμοί" (p. 341), which are not either. Nothing could be less abstract and impersonal than river-gods and spring-nymphs. And we must remember that the river or the spring is the deity in person, though his spirit is easily separable from his body. Mrs. Zeitlin says in the same

⁶ We should notice that epic oath-taking procedure differs from that which we find in actual treaties and contracts. In these all parties swore the oath in the same words and invoked the same gods. If the terms of agreement were brief, the oath might include them; but a long treaty prescribed the oath-text as one of its clauses; and the oath-text referred unmistakably to the treaty document. See the treaty of peace between Athens and Sparta (Peace of Nicias, 421 B.C., Thuc., V, 18, 9): ὁ δ' ἕρκος ἔστω ὅδε· Ἐμμενῶ τοῖς ἐνυθήκαις καὶ τοῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖςδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως. No gods are named, as they are in a treaty between Miletus and Heraclea-on-Latmus (Wiegand, *Milet*, I, 3, 150 = *S.I.G.*², 633, pt. xiii). Representatives of both cities take oath, Ἐμμενῶ τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις εἰς τὸν ἀπὸ χρόνον κτλ, by the same gods: Apollo Didymeus (patron god of Miletus), Hestia Bulaea, Zeus, Athena (patron goddess of Heraclea), and the other gods. For other examples see Michel 1-31.

sentence that Aeneas alludes "to the Tiber river god," who is surely not an abstraction.⁷

The central part of Mrs. Zeitlin's article (pp. 347-50) deals with *Latoniae genus duplex* of Latinus' invocation (198). Here she wants to interpret Apollo and Diana as sun and moon, and takes issue with conclusions that I had reached in my studies of Apollo and Sol in the Latin poets.⁸ Though she grants that Sol and Apollo are not the very same person, she nevertheless argues that Apollo had a solar character in the Latin poets and that in line 198 we find "an ironical substitution of Apollo for Sol. . . ." The substitution, if proper, would hardly be ironical; nor should inclusion of Latona's twin children be a "jarring note," as she calls it: "In the jarring note of *Latoniaeque genus duplex* he acknowledges the power of the sun expressed by circumlocution in the intrusion of another deity with solar associations, but whose effect is largely clouded over by his union here with his moon sister" (p. 350). She believes that ". . . Vergil meant the Roman reader to make a ready identification of the dual divinities, if not in religious cult terms, then on the basis of literary conditioning in Greek poetry" (p. 349). The "dual divinities" are apparently the two gods, Apollo and Sol. And since nowhere in Greek poetry is Apollo represented as a sun-god (aside from the Euripides fragment mentioned in note 15 and Callimachus, frag. 302 Pfeiffer, which show that the identification was unfamiliar), no Roman reader would be likely to catch an allusion to Sol in the phrase. Surely the identification, if made, would be "in religious cult terms," that is, in acts of worship. If the Roman reader considered Apollo a sun-god at

⁷ Again (p. 343) Mrs. Zeitlin refers to "the physical abstraction of Sol." Surely the sun is not in any case an abstraction, and the meaning of "physical abstraction" eludes me: Mrs. Zeitlin is not referring to an abstraction of physics. The sun as a heavenly body, it seems to me, is as concrete as anything can be, and as the god Sol is a person as well. In the same sentence Mrs. Zeitlin refers to "the metaphorical radiance of Apollo." Why "metaphorical"? Apollo is literally radiant, although his radiance has nothing to do with the sun.

⁸ "Apollo and Sol in the Latin Poets of the First Century B. C.," *T. A. P. A.*, LXX (1933), pp. 439-55; "Apollo and the Sun-God in Ovid," *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 429-44; "Apollo and Sol in the Oaths of Aeneas and Latinus," *C. P.*, XXXVIII (1943), pp. 137-8. See also my "The Garden of Phoebus," *A. J. P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 278-85.

all, he could address Apollo in cult—in prayer and sacrifice and hymn—as a sun-god, or address the sun and call him Apollo. What Mrs. Zeitlin apparently means is “if not in myth,” because Apollo is certainly not a sun-god in any narrative that we know, early or late.

Mrs. Zeitlin continues, “In this phrase, Apollo and Diana are given their Greek genealogy as children of Latona, in which context their cosmic association of sun and moon causes little difficulty.” The “context” appears to be the relation to Latona, but what did Latona have to do with sun or moon? I suppose that Mrs. Zeitlin is thinking of the Titaness Phoebe, mother of Leto (Hes., *Theog.*, 404-6), but she is not a moon-goddess either. Mrs. Zeitlin also says that Apollo and Diana “are by birth the twin children of Latona but, figuratively, the one simple mythological association they share is the cosmic aspect of sun and moon” (p. 348). It would be truer to say that this is the only “association” that they do not share until one reaches late syncretism. In all Greek mythology and art the twins are not represented as sun and moon, and in all Greek and Roman religion the twins are never worshipped as sun and moon.*

If scholars believe that Apollo was a sun-god or a light-god, they should offer evidence that he had this character in myth and cult—late philosophic interpretations do not count. Mrs. Zeitlin offers only (1) the lunar character of Diana in Latin poetry—but this is extremely infrequent and results from a common identification with Hecate; (2) the Latin poets’ use of *Phoebus* for

* Why does Mrs. Zeitlin say that the twins share this mythological association “figuratively”? If they were looked upon as sun and moon, the identification would not be “figurative,” as I understand the word; but Apollo and Diana would be names of the luminaries. Again “cosmic aspect of sun and moon” seems redundant, since what would a non-cosmic aspect of sun and moon be? Mrs. Zeitlin’s mode of expression is frequently faulty. For example, “(Fontenrose) concedes, however, that Phoebus is an epithet common to both (Apollo and Sol) and that Diana is definitely personified as Luna” (p. 347). I hardly “concede” what is plainly visible, that the Latin poets use the name *Phoebus* for either Apollo or Sol; I merely state the fact. And how can a person (Diana) be personified? The moon may be personified as Diana, but surely not Diana as the moon. Once again I must remind classical scholars that it behooves them to give attention to English style and to leave abstractese to others.

Sol—but they never call the sun-god Apollo or give him Apolline attributes or functions (see the articles cited in note 8); (3) a representation of the sun-god's chariot on the pediment of Apollo's Palatine temple. Mrs. Zeitlin considers the pediment figure convincing evidence that the Apollo worshipped in this temple was a solar deity, and insists that it is something more than sculptural ornamentation (p. 349 with note 26). But the setting sun (δύσις-ἡλίου) was represented in a pediment group of the temple of Apollo at Delphi (Paus., X, 19, 4), who was definitely not a solar deity: there is no evidence whatsoever that he was.¹⁰ At best Mrs. Zeitlin's arguments would support a Roman identification of Apollo with the sun, but they hardly do that either.¹¹

Why Latinus invoked Apollo and Diana remains a question, but certainly he did not do so because he meant them for sun

¹⁰ Yet some scholars, without the slightest evidence, insist that he was. For example, M. A. Levi, in *Political Power in the Ancient World* (New York, 1965), pp. 41-2, assumes as a matter of course that the Delphic Apollo was primarily a sun-god. Indeed, for Levi the Delphic Dionysus is also a solar deity, the Thraco-Phrygian sun-god. There is no evidence that either was; furthermore the conception of an originally Thracian or Phrygian Dionysus has been outdated since the decipherment of Linear B. Levi compounds his error when he asserts that the Delphic Apollo "was a Sun-god in whom the Phrygian-Thracian cult of Dionysos met the Achaean cult of Apollo. . . ." Whatever the character of the Delphic Dionysus, he never merged with Apollo. He was worshipped in the temple and represented on a pediment; but Leto, Artemis, and the Muses were also represented there. And was the cult of Apollo "Achaean"?

¹¹ In a footnote (26) Mrs. Zeitlin objects to my argument (*A. J. P.*, LXI, p. 433) that in Ovid's narratives Apollo's daytime actions are inconsistent with the sun-god's task of driving the sun-chariot all day, on the ground that this "is logic perhaps too relentlessly applied to the paradoxes of polytheistic religion." We are not dealing with religious conceptions, but with myths. Myths are stories, and the characters of a story must be distinct, and the narrative must have no conspicuous inconsistencies. The fact is that Ovid has no notion of Apollo as sun-chariot driver; e.g., in the story of Daphne, when the pursuing and pleading Apollo informs Daphne what sort of person is wooing her, he lists his offices of prophecy, music and song, archery, and medicine (*Met.*, I, 514-24), but makes no mention of the sun, which would have been a strong argument, as it was for Sol when he approached Leucothoe (*Met.*, IV, 226-32).

and moon. My original suggestion that he included them as special friends of the Trojans may be right; but it is also true, as Mrs. Zeitlin points out, that Latinus had already established a friendly relation with Apollo, having consecrated to him a laurel tree that stood on the site of Laurentum *primas cum conderet arces* (VII, 59-63). It is, however, a mistake to suppose that a god who supports one side in a war may not favor individuals of the other camp. Mrs. Zeitlin adduces "Diana's championship of Camilla, ally of the Latins, at the close of Book XI" (p. 347), as an argument against supposing that Apollo and Diana especially favor Trojans against Latins. That was Opis, not Diana; still it is true that Camilla had Diana's favor. Yet in the *Iliad* Poseidon, ardent supporter of the Achaeans, saved Aeneas from Achilles by removing him from the battlefield (XX, 290-352). Although Apollo favored the Trojans he helped individual Achaeans in the funeral games of Patroclus, as Meriones, to whom Apollo gave victory over Teucer in archery for having promised him a hecatomb, whereas Teucer had not (XXIII, 862-81). And obviously Apollo favored Epeius over Euryalus in boxing; for Achilles had said that he would give the prize to the man to whom Apollo granted endurance (XXIII, 660-1, ϕ δέ κ' Ἀπόλλων / δώη καμμόνῃην). Agamemnon, Nestor, and Achilles linked pro-Trojan Apollo with Zeus and Athena in expressing wishes: αἰ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπόλλων (II, 371, IV, 238, VII, 132, XVI, 97). And although Ares favored the Trojans, he grieved for his son, the Achaean Ascalaphus, whom Deiphobus killed in battle; and Ares even thought of avenging him (XV, 110-27). In spite of Ares' apparent hostility to them, Achaeans are called *θεράποντες Ἄρηος* (II, 110, VI, 67, VII, 282, VIII, 79, X, 228, XV, 733, XIX, 47).

Need we enter the misty realms of psychological mood in order to explain the choice of deities invoked in *Aeneid* XII? Perhaps Virgil simply distributed the necessary deities between Aeneas and Latinus to avoid repetition and to lend variety to the speeches. Somewhere Apollo and Diana must be mentioned as deities important to Trojans, Latins, Rome, and the Julian gens. Virgil placed them in Latinus' prayer, balancing the pair Jupiter and Juno, to whom Aeneas prays immediately after sun and earth. Let us look at the order of deities in prayer and oath.

Aeneas' prayer	Latinus' oath
Sol, terra	terra, mare, sidera
Jupiter (<i>pater omnipotens</i>) and Juno	Apollo and Diana
Mars	Janus
springs, rivers	underworld gods
<i>numina</i> of sky and sea	Jupiter Genitor

Here are balance and antithesis; and besides the powers of earth, sea, and sky, the great gods of early Rome are named: Jupiter as *pater omnipotens* and *Genitor*, Mars (addressed in the archaic form *Mavors*), Janus, Diana. To Diana is joined Apollo, first of Greek gods to be naturalized in Rome (unless we except Hercules), and long accepted as an Italian deity.

Mrs. Zeitlin, however, wants to fit deities of Latinus' oath to what she conceives to be Latinus' mood. Though Latinus is Sol's grandson and comes to the scene wearing a gold crown that represents the solar rays, he calls on powers of darkness and death (as she interprets them), as befits his guilty conscience and gloomy forebodings. Thus, says Mrs. Zeitlin, has Virgil "revealed Latinus' dark night of the soul" (p. 362). It is true that Latinus regretted having gone to war with the Trojans, and that at the beginning of Book XII he admitted a breach of good faith, when he tried to dissuade Turnus from entering single combat (29-31):

victus amore tui, cognato sanguine victus
conjugis et maestae lacrimis, vincla omnia rupi:
promissam eripui genero, arma impia sumpsi.

But how do matters stand when he takes oath? There will be single combat between Aeneas and Turnus, and this will decide everything. And whoever wins, Latinus cannot lose. If Turnus wins, the Trojans will retire to Evander's city, give up all claims to Latin lands, and never again make war on the Latins. If Aeneas wins, the Latins will not become subject to the Trojans; the two peoples will become one in lasting peace under the rule of Latinus; Aeneas wants no kingship for himself, but will become Latinus' son-in-law and live with his bride in the city of Lavinium, which the Trojans will build for him. So Latinus wins either way: he will be king and his people will prosper

in any event. The only unfortunate consequence cannot be avoided: he must lose either Turnus or Aeneas. Priam might have a "dark night of the soul," but not Latinus.

This interpretation of Latinus' mood as gloomy and fearful is Mrs. Zeitlin's reason for wanting to identify *Latonae genus duplex* with sun and moon, and, as we have seen, to find the sun "clouded over" by the moon in Virgil's phrase. For, she says, *Latonae* suggests Diana, who alone is called *Latonia* (but who else could be?); and Diana, of course, is the moon. Likewise she spends five pages (342-7) in an attempt to interpret Latinus' *sidera* as the night sky, coming to the conclusion that in the *Aeneid*, when Virgil uses "*sol* or *sidera* as metonymies for *caelum*, . . . *sol* implies day, while *sidera* bears the connotation of night" (p. 346). She has some difficulty with several passages, perhaps needlessly for III, 599 (Achaemenides' *per sidera testor*): there is no reason in the world why one should not testify by the stars in the daytime (though I would take *sidera* as simply *sky* here). In II, 153, Sinon lifts his arms *ad sidera* in broad daylight, but he "is consciously swearing a false oath," and so, it appears, is in character when he appeals to stars that are not there. However, *ad sidera* is Aeneas' phrase, not Sinon's, who opens with *Vos, aeterni ignes*, on which Mrs. Zeitlin comments that "the *ignes* have a proleptic force, referring to the events to take place that night, and, more specifically, to the signalling of the Greeks by Sinon with fire, and the utter destruction of Troy by fire." The Trojans were unfortunately not perspicacious enough, for, if Mrs. Zeitlin is right, Sinon was tipping his hand in this speech. She can, however, hardly be right. Sinon is plainly calling on the fires of the sun; this is his way of invoking Sol as witness of his oath (paired here with the altar and implements of sacrifice, and so a witness of the same character as Latinus' altar fires in XII, 201); and *ad sidera* means only "to the sky."

In fact, Mrs. Zeitlin's distinction between *sol* and *sidera* as words for *sky* cannot be convincingly made. She grants that in reference to Polyphemus' great height (*pulsat sidera*, III, 619-20) and to Venus' lifting Aeneas to heaven (*ad sidera caeli*, I, 259) (*ad sidera* is interchangeable with (*ad solem* and (*ad astra* (p. 342). This exception to the usual distinction occurs, she tells us, where these phrases "are used as metaphors of height . . . or of lofty aspiration (I, 259-30): . . ." This last,

however, appears to be a misinterpretation of Jupiter's words: he tells Venus that she will literally carry Aeneas to the heavenly bodies; after his death he will go to heaven to live among the gods.¹² Mrs. Zeitlin did not need to grant an exception here: the genitive modifier *caeli* shows that the phrase means either "to the stars of heaven," or, preferably, "to the luminaries of heaven," including the sun and moon.

Are *sidera* and *sol* distinctly contrasted in VI, 641, where the dead *solemque suum, sua sidera norunt*? One must keep in mind Virgil's frequent parallelism, his repetition of the same thought in different words. Here *sidera* includes *sol*; it is parallelism of part and whole. Mrs. Zeitlin also cites *testatur . . . sidera* (IV, 519-20), *per sidera juro* (VI, 458), *conscia sidera testor* (IX, 429), and tries to find the night sky in each (she is successful, of course, for IX, 429). It is, however, purely conventional to take oath by or to testify to *sidera*, as in Latinus' oath itself. The *sidera* include sun and moon; one swears by or testifies to the heavenly bodies, pointing to the sky and those bodies that happen to be present at the moment. For the sun is *sidus*, as in Ovid, *Met.*, I, 424, *aetherioque recens exarsit sidere limus*. Sun (or bright sky) is probably the meaning of *sidus* in *Aeneid*, XII, 451, *qualis ubi ad terras abrupto sidere nimbus / it mare per medium*. . . . There is no indication that Virgil means a storm at night; his sentence *riseris heu praescia longe / horrescunt corda agricolis* (452-3) suggests day, although not conclusively. The usage is not poetic only; we find it at Pliny, *N. H.*, VII, 60, 212, on the ancient Roman determination of *meridies*: *a columna Maenia ad curcerem inclinato sidere supremam pronuntiavit*; and notice Cicero's words (*N. D.*, II, 27, 68): (*Sol*) *solus ex omnibus sideribus est tantus*. . . .¹³

Mrs. Zeitlin not only neglects Virgil's use of the singular *sidus*, but does not adduce all occurrences of *sidera*. She omits V, 627-9, which is significant: Beroe speaks to the Trojan women,

¹² For Aeneas' apotheosis as Jupiter Indiges see Livy, I, 2, 6.

¹³ For *sidus* as *sun* see Tibullus, II, 1, 47; Ovid, *Met.*, V, 281. It is definitely the sky of day in Virg., *Georg.*, I, 1-2, *quo sidere terram / vertere*, since one does not plow at night. Here and elsewhere *sidus* is tropically a term for season or weather, but it denotes the sun or sky. See also *Aen.*, IV, 309: shipbuilding is done by day. Cf. *Aen.*, XI, 259-60.

cum freta, cum terras omnes, tot inhospita saxa
sideraque emensae ferimur, dum per mare magnum
Italiam sequimur fugientem et volvimur undis.

There is no suggestion of night sky here; there is more of day sky, since the ancients of earlier times did their sailing by day. But that is hardly the point in these lines: Beroe means that they have sailed over the whole world, seas and lands and (under) skies (*saxa* is expletive, suggesting the nature of land and sea traversed). This is the tripartite world, as in Ovid, *Met.*, I, 180, when Jupiter *concussit . . . caesariem cum qua terram mare sidera movit*. Here are the very words of Latinus which sum up the powers that Aeneas invoked. His *sidera* can mean only sky as one third of the world.

So when Mrs. Zeitlin (p. 349, note 26) says that my conclusions on Apollo and Sol in Virgil, as expressed in my article of 1939 (see note 8) "were determined without consideration of this allusion" (in XII, 198), which she considers to be evidence of identification, I not only admit that they were, but may add that I did not have to consider it. Virgil mentions Sol in XII, 176, and alludes to Apollo in XII, 198. The only connection between them is that both are mentioned in treaty-making on this occasion.

It is surprising how many classical scholars still insist on Apollo as Greek sun-god, in spite of Karl Otfried Müller and his successors (see note 10). For example, Mrs. Norwood, in an article on the unity of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, finds one unity which isn't there, since to show it she must identify Apollo with Sol.¹⁴ She sees Apollo as a unifying principle in Books I and II from the myth of Python to the myth of Aesculapius, interwoven with alternating images of moisture and heat. She needs Apollo for the heat and assumes that Phaethon's father is Apollo. But Phaethon's father is *not* Apollo: either he is Helios or a mate of Dawn or Day—Tithonus or Cephalus—defi-

¹⁴ Frances Norwood, "Unity in the Diversity of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*," *C. J.*, LIX (1964), pp. 170-4, especially p. 171. She speaks of "the monstrous snake Python who was slain by Apollo, god of the sun. Apollo then pursued Daphne, daughter of a *river-god*." See note 11 above: there is no indication whatever of a solar Apollo in *Met.*, I, 438-567.

nately a solar and non-Apolline figure.¹⁵ The sun-god who is Phaethon's father in Ovid's story is the same as the sun-god of three connected tales in *Met.*, IV, 169-270: the love of Mars and Venus, Sol's love for Leucothoe, and Clytie's love for Sol. The god of these tales drives the sun-chariot; Clymene, Phaethon's mother, is mentioned as one of his loves (204); and Leucothoe's death caused him most grief after Phaethon's (IV, 245-6):

nil illo fertur volucrum moderator equorum
post Phaethonteos vidisse dolentius ignes.

Apollo has nothing to do with these tales. The informer on Ares and Aphrodite was Helius Hyperion in Demodocus' song (*Odyssey*, VIII, 266-367). The story of Leucothoe (and perhaps that of Clytie) was known to Hesiod.¹⁶ Leucothoe was a princess of the east, where the sun rises; Clytie became a heliotrope. These are solar tales, proof enough that when Ovid calls Phaethon's father Phoebus he does not mean to identify him with Apollo.

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¹⁵ Hes., *Theog.*, 986-7; Diod., V, 23, 2; Paus., I, 3, 1; 4, 1; II, 3, 2; Apollod., III, 14, 3; Lucian, *Dial. Deor.*, 25. The only possible exception is Euripides *Phaethon*, frag. 781 Nauck, 11-13: Clymene, addressing Helius, blames him for destroying (ἀπώλεσας) her and their son, and adds, 'Ἀπόλλων δ' ἐν βροτοῖς ὁρθῶς καλεῖ / ὅστις τὰ σιγῶντ' ὀνόματ' οἶδε δαιμόνων. This is primarily a play on 'Ἀπόλλων and ἀπώλεσας: "Destroyer is your name because you destroyed us; anyone who knows the unspoken names of deities knows that Destroyer is the right name for you." It now seems to me that this passage has nothing to do with the later philosophic interpretation of Apollo as the sun (see *A. J. P.*, LXI, pp. 441-2). In any case τὰ σιγῶντ' ὀνόματ'(α) is enough to show that the sun-god was not called Apollo in the fifth century B. C. Apollo was still not recognized as a sun-god in the first centuries B. C. and A. D. E. g., in Cic., *N. D.*, II, 27, 68. and Plut., *Mor.*, 400d, the identification is patently not recognized outside learned circles. Both Cicero and Plutarch were Platonists, who accepted astral deities.

¹⁶ Hes., frag. 250 Rzsch, *av. Lact.*, *Narr. Met.*, IV, 5. Anon. West., VI, p. 348, has the story of Leucothoe without Clytie. These were probably separate stories at first, combined by Hesiod or Ovid or Ovid's source. Hyginus, 14, 20, mentions a son of Sol and Leucothoe. These are the only sources besides *Met.* IV.

FRIENDS OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE.

In a masterly article published some thirty years ago, Léon Gallet attempted to settle the vexed question of the meaning and content of the status *amicitia populi Romani*.¹ Basing his discussion on the central evidence of the *senatus consultum de Asclepiade Clazomenio sociisque* of 73 B. C.,² Gallet argued that this status carried with it as its essential content, for individuals and states alike, judicial and fiscal privileges of a high order. A conviction that some of Gallet's main conclusions are wrong prompts me to reopen the question. Though the analysis of the position of individual *amici* cannot be divorced from that of the position of states in *amicitia* with Rome, I shall here be primarily concerned with the grant of individual *amicitia* with which the basic document of the *senatus consultum* deals. It was Gallet's conclusion that such grants created a class of specially privileged provincials and that the constituent privileges of *amicitia* were employed by Rome to reward her supporters at a time when she was as yet reluctant to extend the citizenship generously in the Greek East as a reward. The question, therefore, is of vital concern for interpretation of the relationship between Rome and the ruling classes of the Greek world during the later Republic.³

¹ L. Gallet, "Essai sur le Sénatus-Consulte 'De Asclepiade Sociisque'," *Rev. Hist. de Droit Franç. et Étranger*, 4th series, XVI (1937), pp. 242 ff., 387 ff.

² Text in Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-8; *C. I. L.*, I, p. 110, no. 203; *C. I. L.*, I², p. 468, no. 588; *I. G.*, XIV, p. 247, no. 951; *I. T. E.*, I, p. 51, no. 118; C. G. Bruns, *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui* (7th ed., Tübingen, 1909), p. 176, no. 41; S. Riccobono, *Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani* (2nd ed., Florence, 1941), I, p. 255, no. 35. All references made below are to the Greek text. The best restoration of the fragmentary Latin text is to be found in A. Degrazi, *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae*, II (Florence, 1963), pp. 19-24, no. 513, who incorporates the new fragments first edited by C. Pietrangeli, "Frammenti del 'Senatus Consultum De Asclepiade' recuperati sul Campidoglio," *Bull. Com. Arch.*, LXIX (1941), pp. 109-12.

³ See Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 266, 282, 387, for the view that *amicitia* entailed judicial and fiscal privileges, and p. 233, for the view that *amicitia* was employed as a reward while Rome hesitated to extend the citizenship.

Any discussion of this question must, however, be prefaced by the warning that it has been the subject of involved controversy between two main groups, one holding that *amicitia* entailed definite fiscal and judicial privileges (notably Mommsen, Ferrerbach, and Gallet), the other holding that the status of *amicus* was merely diplomatic, or political, and that any concurrently held privileges of a fiscal or judicial nature derived from a separate and additional grant (notably Täubler).⁴ Although proposing to enter the lists as a champion for the latter cause, I would offer the general criticism that much of the argument on both sides takes an *a priori* approach to the scanty primary evidence, first establishing a general concept of *amicitia* then proceeding to read it into the basic inscription. I shall try to avoid such preconceived ideas, with the temptation which they occasion to read contentious theories into the evidence, and to treat the basic evidence objectively by subjecting it to a fresh analysis without viewing it from the start as the embodiment of any general theory of international law.

Accordingly, I must first stress the crucial point that despite the occurrence in the sources of a number of incidental references to individual *amici populi Romani* which afford no definite clue about fiscal and judicial privileges, we possess only one document (the *S.C. de Asclepiade*, etc.) which actually attests a grant of such privileges to individual provincials conjointly with the grant of the title *amicus*.⁵ The theory that *amicitia* regularly

⁴ See Th. Mommsen, *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1859, pp. 332-79; *Röm. Forschungen*, I (Berlin, 1864), pp. 319 ff.; V. Ferrerbach, *Die Amici Populi Romani republikanischer Zeit* (Strasburg, 1895), pp. 46, 70; E. Täubler, *Imperium Romanum* (Berlin, 1913), I, pp. 409 ff. The stages of the controversy are summarized by Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 270 ff., and by S. Accame, *Il dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto* (Rome, 1946), pp. 48 ff. I note that V. Chapot, *La province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie* (Paris, 1904), p. 39, n. 2, assumes that *amicitia* entailed exemption from tax. D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton, 1950), p. 236, claims that the privileges enjoyed by individual *amici* "are specified definitely" in the S.C. of 78 B.C., and interprets the fiscal and judicial arrangements made in this decree as the substance of a general grant, by which "a class of highly-privileged provincials was established."

⁵ For references to individual *amici*, see, e.g., *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 188, (= *O. G. I.*, no. 438); *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 291; *O. G. I.*, no. 439; Livy, XLIV, 16, 7; *Dic. Sic.*, XIV, 93, 5, with Livy, V, 28, 5, and Plut.,


involved such privileges must ultimately rest on this document, and any doubt cast on the connection between the grants made in it must, therefore, extend to the theory as a whole. The prime question to be answered is whether this inscription does, as Gallet and others have claimed, support the view that *amicitia* always entailed the privileges here conjoined with it, or whether these privileges can, in this crucial case, be recognized as distinct and additional grants.⁶

I here provide, for convenience of reference, a translation of those sections of the decree which treat the controversial grants:

- 9 Concerning this matter, the following decision was taken: that Asclepiades of Clazomenae, son of Philinus,
- 10 Polyskratous of Carystus, son of Polyarces, and Meniscus of Miletus, son of Thargelios and adoptive son of Irenaeus, be saluted as worthy men and friends;
- 11 the Senate and people of Rome regard their service as fine, courageous, and loyal to the service of our national cause.
- 12 Consequently, the Senate resolves that these men, their children and descendants, be exempt from all kinds of levies in their own cities and from the tribute. If any levies have been made
- 13 on their property since the time of their departure in the service of our state, these are to be returned and restored to them.
- 14 If any lands, houses or property belonging to them have been sold up since the time of their departure from their cities in the service of our state, these are to be fully restored to them without loss.
- 15 And if any legal deadline has expired since their departure from their cities in the service of our state, they are to suffer no detriment to their affairs on this account.
- 16 Nor are they to suffer for this reason any loss of their right to debts owed to them or loss of right to bring suit for recovery and exact them; and if any legacies have accrued to them or to their children,

Cam., 8, 5; Paus., VIII, 30, 3 (663); Plut., *Sulla*, 23, 2; Appian, *Mithr.*, 17, 114; Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, XIV, 194. Ferrenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff., provides a partial list of primary sources (mostly royal *amici*).

⁶ Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 404, 419, regarded the inscription as a coherent whole, an orderly exposition of the various privileges deriving from the central grant of *amicitia*. Täubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-11, saw it as a grant of *hospitium* with the fiscal and judicial grants added on as special rewards.



- 17 they are to have these, hold them in full possession, and enjoy full use of them. In the case of all suits for recovery brought by them, their children, descendants or wives, against another party, or any such suits brought against
- 18 them, their children, descendants or wives by others, they, their children, descendants and wives shall have the right to choose whether
- 19 they have the case judged in their own cities under local law, or before a magistrate of ours or Italian judges, or in the court of any one of those free cities which have steadfastly
- 20 remained in the friendship of the Roman people, so that trial concerning these matters is held where they choose. If any judgements
- 21 have been rendered concerning them in their absence, after their departure from their cities, these are to be completely null and void, and fresh trial without prejudice from these judgements
- 22 is to be held in accordance with the terms of the Senate's decree. If their cities have any public liability for money payments, they are not to be held liable for contribution to this payment.
- 23 Those of our magistrates who will be farming out the taxes of Asia and Euboea or imposing taxes on Asia and Euboea shall see to it that these men are not held liable for any payment.

We may first notice that most of the grants made in this decree obviously fall within the category of special rewards and hence cannot be interpreted as part of the regular content of *amicitia*. The three beneficiaries were Greek naval-officers returning to their home cities after a long absence in Sulla's service,⁷ and in order to ensure that their estates suffered no loss because of this service, the decree makes provisions which are clearly peculiar to the situation and needs of men of substance returning home after prolonged absence in disturbed conditions to set their affairs in order. Such provisions are found in lines 12 to 17, which assure the Greek veterans of the return of levies made on their property during their absence in

⁷The decree is dated to 78 B.C. by the consuls. The three Greeks served during the Social War or the Sullan invasion of Italy in 83-82 B.C., according to our interpretation of the "Italian War" referred to in line 7. See Magie, *op. cit.*, p. 1113, n. 10, for a summary of views advanced.

the service of Rome, restore to them all real estate sold up for forced tax payment during this same period, and revoke the expiry of legal deadlines affecting their recovery of debts or inheritances. In the same category we must set the ruling that legal decisions pronounced on their affairs during their absence are to be annulled and the cases retried (lines 20-22).⁸

Such provisions, peculiarly designed to remedy disadvantages which might befall the estates of rich men during long absence in wartime, cannot have formed part of any kind of general grant. Hence the decree cannot be simply taken as a statement of the constituent privileges of individual *amicitia*. The only terms of the decree which might conceivably have formed the content of such a grant are those which grant the three veterans, their wives, children and descendants, immunity from taxation (line 12) and the privilege of recourse at choice to their own city court, the Roman tribunal, or the court of any free city in *amicitia* with Rome (lines 17-20).⁹

However, the fact that these grants are separated from each other in the decree by others of a particular nature casts doubt on the theory that they are listed as forming the regular constituent privileges of *amicitia*. One would expect the decree to group these two privileges closely together if they formed the content of a regular status. The order in which the grants are enumerated in this document has further significance. The grant of the three-fold choice of judiciary (lines 17-20), with its pendant, the right of retrial under this new arrangement for any cases treated in their absence (lines 20-22), is situated between two blocks of arrangements which both concern financial matters. Thus, the grants comprise in order (1) hereditary fiscal immunity, (2) restoration of levies made on property during absence on service, (3) restoration of any real estate sold up during this period, (4) reversal of the effect of legal deadlines falling due during their absence, with consequent assurance of full title to reclaim debts or recover legacies which accrued during the same period, (5) the judicial privilege, with

⁸ See Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 413 ff., for the interpretation of line 14 as a forced sale by the authorities for tax payment. The *προθεσμία*, or legal deadline, of line 15 is akin to the modern "statute of limitation."

⁹ Ferrenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 46, seems to take all the grants indiscriminately as the consequence of *amicitia*.

the quashing of verdicts pronounced in their absence, and (6) a final fiscal exemption (lines 22-23).

This order of enumeration, which fails to list the financial and judicial grants in two clearly distinct blocks, is surely functional rather than inexplicably haphazard. Gallet did, indeed, observe that the list of grants is strangely ordered, but failed to grasp the significance of this. Merely noting that the granted privileges are enumerated "sans ordre," he oddly claimed that the apparently jumbled order supports his view that the decree is developing the consequences of a settled principle rather than listing a series of special privileges.¹⁰ This is implausible, since the purpose which Gallet assumed to lie behind these clauses of the decree could equally well have been carried out by orderly exposition according to topic.

Careful consideration of the order of the grants suggests a better explanation, namely that the judicial grant is deliberately thus located in order to form an integral part of the financial guarantee, to which it is subordinated as a subsidiary guarantee. If it is accepted that sections (2) to (5) (lines 12 to 22) have one overall purpose, namely to ensure that the veterans suffer no material loss because of their absence in Rome's service, it becomes clear that the judicial grant, sandwiched as it is between two clauses which treat financial matters, is not misplaced but a vital adjunct to the preceding financial guarantees. Hence the choice of judiciary is not an unlimited grant of a legal privilege for any kind of suit, but has the strictly limited object of affording special judicial facilities to aid the recipients in litigation aimed at recouping losses to their estates.¹¹

¹⁰ See Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

¹¹ G. I. Luzzato, *Epigrafia giuridica greca e romana* (Milan, 1942), p. 317, hints at this interpretation while warning against generalization from the grant. F. De Visscher, "Le statut juridique des nouveaux citoyens romains et l'inscription de Rhosos," Part II, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), pp. 29-59, at p. 44, and "La condition juridique des nouveaux citoyens romains d'Orient," *C. R. A. I.*, 1938, pp. 24-39, at p. 33, notes *en passant* the significance of the order, but continues to agree with Gallet's thesis that *amicitia* entailed permanent judicial privilege (see, e.g., *Ant. Class.*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 45, 55; *C. R. A. I.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 34); cf. Accame, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6. Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 246, misleadingly prints the text of the judicial privilege as a separate paragraph, breaking line 17 between his sections I and K.

If, moreover, the legal grant has such a subordinate role, we should expect it to be ancillary to the financial grant which immediately precedes it. This is precisely the grant which assures them of the right to claim all debts and legacies over which legal dispute and difficulty might have arisen during and because of their sustained absence. The very vocabulary employed in the judicial grant is indicative of this limited purpose, since the verb used to indicate the litigation for which, as plaintiff or defendant, the veterans and their families are allowed the choice of court, is *μεταπορεύονται* (lines 17 and 18). This word is surely employed in the same sense as in line 16, to designate, not litigation in general, but legal action for recovery of debts or property.¹² The decree is thus granting judicial guarantees which are well designed to ensure that the three Greeks can fully implement the immediately preceding grant by shifting suits for recovery of debt or property at choice to a fairer court. If this is so, the judicial grant is intended to support precisely those financial grants which are peculiar to the situation of men returning home after lengthy absence, and applies only to their peculiar difficulties over property. It cannot, therefore, form the basis for any generalization about the regular content of *amicitia*.

It may be asked why these veterans were allowed so wide a choice of judiciary if the judicial grant was intended merely to facilitate recovery of debts or property. The answer is that while they needed the reassertion of their legal right as plaintiff to initiate recuperatory action for recovery of their property, and as defendant to maintain it in face of legal challenge, they equally needed guaranteed access to unbiassed courts to make these rights really effective in practice. The very terms of the financial restitution imply that their property had suffered considerably by their absence in wartime and that the matter in-

¹² The same verb is used in the fifth Cyrene Edict (*S.E.G.*, IX, no. 8), lines 121, 122, 126, of legal action for recovery of *χρήματα*. In the Latin original of the S.C. (for which see Pietrangeli, *op. cit.*, p. 111, and Degrassi, *op. cit.*, p. 22), line 7 has the words *petere, exigere* for the legal procedure described in line 16 of the Greek text; line 8 of the Latin version has *ab altero petent* for the procedure described in line 17 of the Greek text. This surely refers to action for recovery, the term for litigation in general being *agere*. Cf., e.g., Gaius, *Institutes*, IV, 48 ff.

volved much controversy. Moreover, their position in their native cities may well have been undermined during their absence, while the endemic strife and intrigue of the Greek city is known to have led on occasion to malicious prosecution or, worse, to biased courts. The three Greeks, accordingly, needed the power to escape at choice to external courts should their local courts prove an instrument of intrigue, especially since their new fiscal immunity might further sharpen the acrimony of their local enemies.¹³ This is also, perhaps, the point of the stipulation that the external Greek city whose courts may be used at choice is to be a free city which has remained continuously in the *amicitia* of Rome (lines 20-21). This is no empty formula, and the Senate may have been seeking to ensure for the recipients, whose conspicuous service to Rome's cause would not endear them to all who viewed the outcome of the recent Mithridatic war with bitterness, the right of trial in a city with a clean record of loyalty to Rome.¹⁴

The extension of these judicial privileges to the children and descendants of the three veterans (lines 17-18) has also been taken as support for the view that these privileges form the content of an hereditary status of *amicus populi Romani* and cannot have a limited purpose. Thus, Gallet claims that particular privileges, as distinct from general status, could not thus be granted in perpetuity.¹⁵ However, a parallel for the grant of distinct, hereditary privileges of a fiscal and judicial order may be found in the edict of Octavian for Seleucus of Rhosos

¹³ For biased city courts under Roman rule, see, e.g., *S.I.G.*, no. 780, lines 30 ff. (Cnidus). I have discussed this subject briefly in a forthcoming article in *C.Q.* entitled "Verres and Judicial Corruption." For the Romans' experience of corruption within their own courts, see J. M. Kelly, *Roman Litigation* (Oxford, 1966), *passim*. Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 395, is surely wrong to deny that the S.C. offers an actual choice of judiciary. This is the clear implication of the wording. Cf. De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), p. 43.

¹⁴ Reference to continuity in *amicitia* as a description of steadfast loyalty is found also in, e.g., Cicero, *De Senectute*, 12, 41; *S.I.G.*, no. 646, line 7, and no. 747, line 52 (discussed further below); Riccobono, *op. cit.*, p. 117, no. 8, line 75. See De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), p. 41, for the origin of this employment of the court of another free city in Hellenistic practice. Cf. Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 399, who sees it as a distinction resulting from *amicitia*.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 403.

and his family.¹⁶ Here (lines 19-22; 53-59) a grant of immunity and a three-fold choice of judiciary is extended, in terms strikingly analogous to the grants of the S. C. of 78 B. C., to Seleucus, his children and descendants, together with the Roman citizenship. In this case also, the privileges constitute distinct grants which are hereditary in their own right, since they do not derive from the recipients' single hereditary status as new Roman citizens.¹⁷

There are, moreover, obvious practical reasons why the judicial privileges should have been extended to the descendants of the original recipients to accompany the hereditary financial guarantees which they were intended to support. Legal disputes over the debts and inheritances restored to the estates of the three veterans could not be expected to cease with their death and could foreseeably continue for several generations if, as the inscription implies, the sums involved were large enough. The heirs of the original recipients would require the same legal protection against the heirs of those who lost by the terms of the award, in case the latter revived litigation to recover their

¹⁶ Text in Riccobono, *op. cit.*, p. 308, no. 55; V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius*² (Oxford, 1955), p. 133, no. 301. Both these works omit the fragmentary lines 33 to 52. See also De Visscher, "Le statut juridique des nouveaux citoyens romains et l'inscription de Rhosos," *Part I, Ant. Class.*, XIII (1944), pp. 11-35, with the author's own text pp. 22-32 (omitting only lines 33-47). De Visscher provides an improved text (lines 53-72 only) also in *C. R. A. I.*, 1938, pp. 27-30. See also P. Roussel, "Un Syrien au service de Rome et d'Octave," *Syria*, XV (1934), pp. 33-74 (with complete text pp. 34-6), and *Ann. Ép.*, 1934, p. 217; F. Cumont, "Un nouveau document relatif au 'Ius Civitatis'," *Ant. Class.*, IV (1935), pp. 191-2; M. A. Levi, "La grande iscrizione di Ottaviano trovata a Roso," *Riv. Fil.*, LXVI (1938), pp. 113-28; G. I. Luzzato, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-321 (with complete text pp. 286-8); C. E. Goodfellow, *The Roman Citizenship* (Bryn Mawr, 1935), pp. 44 ff. For discussion of the date of the actual grant, see Roussel, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 ff. (41 B. C.); Levi, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-17 (35 B. C.); De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), pp. 29 ff. (41 or 36 B. C.).

¹⁷ See De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), pp. 38-9, and "Le régime des liturgies des nouveaux citoyens romains, d'après l'édit III de Cyrène," *C. R. A. I.*, 1939, pp. 111-20, for the view that the fiscal exemption granted in this decree was not the natural consequence of enfranchisement.

losses. Hence the judicial guarantee would be equally limited in application for the recipients' heirs.¹⁸

This interpretation of the intended function of the judicial privilege gains support from the location of the similar privilege in the Rhosos decree. In a formula which is closely analogous though different in detail, Seleucus and his family are also allowed a three-fold choice of judiciary, between the court of their home city, the court of any free city, or the Roman tribunal (lines 53-56). The close parallel afforded by this grant to the judicial grant of the S.C. *de Asclepiade*, etc. has often been remarked, together with the distinction that Seleucus and his family were allowed this choice only as defendants. This restriction on the judicial choice to defensive suits has always been explained by considerations of general equity. A grant of this judicial choice to Seleucus and his family (who also acquired the Roman citizenship) would, it is argued, have given them an unjust advantage in litigation and disregarded the Roman rule *actor sequitur forum rei*.¹⁹

It has not been observed, however, that here also the judicial grant may well have a limited objective and be closely adapted to the purpose of implementing the particular fiscal and financial grants which immediately precede it. Lines 33 to 52 are, admittedly, fragmentary, but the surviving fragments give no indication that Seleucus had the same need as Asclepiades to recover debts or property at law. Lines 48-52, which immediately precede the judicial grant, can be restored with fair certainty to reveal a grant of freedom from customs dues on goods shipped through frontiers for private use.²⁰ This grant, which accompanied freedom from local and Roman taxation,²¹ could have

¹⁸ Mommsen inserted *ἐκγένην* in line 18 of the S.C. so as to include descendants in the judicial grant. This reading, which subsequent editors have accepted, is certain, since the references in lines 17-18 to the *ἐκγονοί* as parties to lawsuits as plaintiff or defendant are sound. Cf., however, Degraisi, *op. cit.*, p. 22, n. 9.

¹⁹ So Luzzatto, *op. cit.*, p. 300, and De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), pp. 44-5; *C.R.A.I.*, 1938, pp. 33-4. The latter suggests that some minor differences between the terms of the two grants may be due to abridged copying in the Rhosos decree (*C.R.A.I.*, 1938, p. 33). Cf. Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 406, n. 1; Roussel, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-9.

²⁰ See De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIII (1944), p. 25 and XIV (1945), pp. 39-41.

²¹ See De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), pp. 36 ff., for identification of the taxes mentioned in this edict. I follow him in interpreting

led to attacks in the courts intended to deny the exercise of the privilege, to meet which Seleucus and his family would find access to unbiassed courts a valuable aid. Indeed, legal disputes over the interpretation of the clause exempting personal effects alone from dues can be readily imagined, in which Seleucus or his descendants after him would figure as defendants.²²

There are two further indications that the judicial privileges accorded in this edict of Octavian are ancillary to the fiscal grant rather than a general privilege without limitation. Firstly, the preamble to the edict mentions only enfranchisement and fiscal immunity as the substance of the reward (lines 10-11), an accurate description if the judicial grant formed part of the fiscal. Secondly, after listing this judicial grant, which is unparalleled as the accompaniment to an act of enfranchisement,²³ the edict returns to the question of fiscal privilege (line 65).²⁴ This again implies a continuity of purpose throughout.

The Rhosos edict may, therefore, provide a parallel for the interpretation of the judicial grant of the S. C. of 78 B. C. suggested above. Moreover, if Seleucus, when a Roman citizen, also received the privilege of a choice of court to bolster a grant of fiscal immunity, it cannot be argued that the award of even such a subsidiary judicial privilege was a right peculiar to

ἀνεισφορία as exemption from tax due to Rome, and *ἀλειτουργησία* as exemption from local tax, both in the S. C., line 12, and in the Rhosos edict, lines 20-22. So also M. Segrè, "Due lettere di Silla," *Riv. Fil.*, LXVI (1938), pp. 253-63, at p. 260, and (apparently) Magie, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

²² Cf. *Digest*, L, 16, 203, which tells how disputes of interpretation (*magna dubitatio*) could arise from the ruling of the *lex censoria portus Siciliae* which stated: *Servos, quos domum quis ducet suo usu, pro is portorium ne dato*. Note that the Rhosos edict (lines 63 ff.) threatens with a heavy penalty any city state or magistrate who seeks to interrupt the exercise of the privileges granted. Cf. Roussel, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-3. This is very suggestive of the recipients' need for guaranteed access to fair courts.

²³ Significantly, the specific grant of exemption from customs dues is also not paralleled before 83/89 A. D. See M. McCrum and A. G. Woodhead, *Select Documents of the Principates of the Flavian Emperors* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 110, no. 404, lines 13 ff.

²⁴ *ἐνεχυράσιον*, on which see Roussel, *op. cit.*, p. 61, n. 4; De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIII (1944), p. 34. The word refers to an improper seizure of security made to compel Seleucus or his family to pay taxes from which they had received exemption.

amici populi Romani. If this privilege figures in both documents as a support for other grants, it constitutes a grant which did not derive from any status but could be employed as an administrative device to reinforce financial privileges wherever granted. But for Asclepiades and his comrades, it must be remembered, the judicial grant supports financial guarantees which are clearly peculiar to their situation and not a stock content of *amicitia*.

If I have shown reason to believe that the judicial grant of the S. C. of 78 B. C. has a particular and subordinate function, and therefore does not constitute a general privilege deriving from the status of *amicus*, it remains to discuss the question of the fiscal privilege granted in the same decree. Did enrolment as an *amicus populi Romani* invariably carry with it for an individual immunity from taxation? Although this has often been assumed, no explicit connection is made in the inscription between the status of *amicus* and the grant of fiscal immunity, which immediately precedes a list of financial grants which are peculiar to the circumstances of the three veterans.

Here again, the location of the grants within the decree provides an important clue to its interpretation. The grant of immunity directly follows the Senate's declaration of grateful acknowledgement of the recipients' service in war (line 11), and is immediately introduced by the phrase $\delta\iota' \eta\nu \alpha\iota\rho\iota\alpha\nu$ (line 12). It is, therefore, clearly introduced as a reward for this service rather than as the content of any status. But such grants of immunity for deserving veterans are well attested in cases where, because the recipients were also granted the Roman citizenship, there can be no question of *amicitia*.²⁵ The grant to Asclepiades and his comrades, therefore, fits so recognizably into the pattern of veterans' rewards that explanation by reference to *amicitia* is unnecessary. The recipients' status as favoured veterans provides adequate explanation.

²⁵ See, e. g., Ehrenberg and Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 135, no. 302, lines 5 ff., also in Riccobono, *op. cit.*, I, p. 315, no. 56; *I. L. S.*, I, p. 387, no. 1977, also in *O. I. L.*, III, 2, p. 641, no. 5232, a veteran, *donatus civitate Romana viritim et immunitate ab divo Augusto*. The Rhosos edict itself affords another instance, immunity being granted lines 20-23; note also the explanatory clause beginning with *enel* (lines 12 ff.), which introduces the grants as a reward for faithful service in war. For discussion, see Roussel, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-54; De Visscher, *Ant. Class.*, XIV (1945), pp. 36-9. Cf. Josephus, *Bell. Jud.*, I, 194, and *Ant. Jud.*, XIV, 137, for Julius Caesar's grant of citizenship and immunity to Antipater.

This explanation is also the safer one, in view of the fact that the S. C. of 78 B. C. affords the sole case known to us of the granting of *amicitia* and fiscal privileges to individuals by one act. A general theory that *amicitia* was always accompanied by such privileges cannot safely be based on this one instance if it can be shown that immunity constituted a distinct grant which could be made either alone or in conjunction with the grant of a status which did not entail it. If this proposition can be proved, it follows that it is quite unsafe to infer that in the decree of 78 B. C. the grant of immunity is a constituent privilege of *amicitia* rather than such a separate and additional grant.

The simple grant of immunity alone, without either the citizenship or the status of *amicus*, is definitely attested by the series of such grants made to Greek artists,²⁶ while the fact that Roman citizenship could, according to the deserts of the recipient, be granted either with or without immunity²⁷ clearly

²⁶ For the grant of immunity to the "Artists of Dionysus" by L. Mummius, see *I. G.*, VII, p. 408, nos. 2413-2414, with Accame, *op. cit.*, pp. 2 ff., and G. Klaffenbach, *Symbolae ad Historiam Collegiorum Artificum Bacchiorum* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 24 ff. For Sulla's grant, see M. Segrè, *Riv. Fil.*, LXVI (1938), pp. 253-33, and C. Garton, "Sulla and the Theatre," *The Phoenix*, XVIII (1964), pp. 137-56. For the grant by Marcus Antonius, see Ehrenberg and Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 132, no. 300, also in F. G. Kenyon, "A Rescript of Marcus Antonius," *C. R.*, VII (1893), pp. 476-8, and *Ann. Ep.*, 1913, p. 13, no. 58. Cf. C. G. Brandis, "Ein Schreiben des Triumvirn Marcus Antonius an den Landtag Asiens," *Hermes*, XXXII (1897), pp. 509-22. For confirmation of their privileges by Claudius, see M. P. Charlesworth, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Claudius and Nero* (Cambridge, 1939), p. 11, no. 6; p. 12, no. 9. Cf. Poland, *R.-E.*, V, A² (1934), cols. 2473 ff.; W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*³ (London, 1952), pp. 114-15. For grants of immunity to individuals generally, see Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, III (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 750-1; Accame, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff., 42 ff.; M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941), p. 971. For examples of such grants, see Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 36, 92; Suet., *Tib.*, 49, 2. In Suet., *Aug.*, 40, 3, immunity is said to have been offered as an alternative to enfranchisement. Cf. F. Millar, in *J. R. S.*, LIII (1963), p. 40. These privileges may have been safeguarded by the *lex Iulia de pecuniis repetundis* of 59 B. C. (Cicero, *In Pis.*, 37, 90).

²⁷ This is expressly stated in the third Cyrene Edict, for which see J. G. C. Anderson, *J. R. S.*, XVII (1927), pp. 35-6; *S. E. G.*, IX, p. 13,

establishes that immunity was a distinct grant in its own right. Equally, the occasional grants of immunity together with Roman citizenship afford ample proof that immunity could be granted with a status which did not entail this or normally accompany it.²⁸ It is, therefore, safer to interpret the fiscal grant of the S. C. as another case of a distinct veterans' reward.

This same explanation will apply to the two further references in the primary sources which have been pressed into service to establish a close link between individual *amicitia* and immunity. The first is to be found in the *senatus consultum de Amphiarai Trophi agris* of 73 B.C.²⁹ In this decree, while confirming *inter alia* a decision of Sulla that the lands of the high-priest Hermodorus be exempt from taxation, the Senate refers to his status as *amicus populi Romani* in the following phrase: ἐκτὸς ἀγρῶν τῶν Ἑρμοδῶρου Ὀλυμπίου υἱοῦ, ἱερέως Ἀμφιαράου, τοῦ διὰ τέλους ἐν τῇ φιλίας τοῦ δήμου τοῖς Ῥωμαίων μεμενηκότος (lines 51-52). Mommsen, here followed by Gallet, interpreted this phrase as a simple reference to the high-priest's status as an *amicus* made to indicate the ground for the grant.³⁰ But the inclusion of the words διὰ τέλους in the descriptive phrase suggests that it is no mere assertion of status but a specific reference to the

no. 8; Ehrenberg and Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 141, no. 311, with the emendations of J. E. Oliver, "On Edict III from Cyrene," *Hesperia*, XXIX (1960), pp. 224-5. Here, Augustus rules that enfranchised Greeks are entitled to immunity only if this was expressly added to the grant of citizenship. Cf. De Visscher, *C. R. A. I.*, 1939, pp. 111-20; A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford, 1939), p. 213; G. W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford, 1965), p. 89. For the numerous *diplo-mata militaria* which grant veterans the franchise without immunity, see *I. L. S.*, I, pp. 389 ff., nos. 1986 ff., and III, 2, pp. LIII ff., nos. 3052 ff.; *C. I. L.*, III, 2, pp. 843 ff., III, suppl. I, fasc. 3, pp. 1955 ff., and XVI *passim*. Cf. Sherwin-White, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff. See *J. R. S.*, LI (1961), pp. 65-70, for a recent addition.

²⁸ See above, note 25.

²⁹ Text in *I. G.*, VII, no. 413; *S. I. G.*, no. 747; Bruns, *Fontes*, p. 180, no. 42; Riccobono, *Fontes*, I, p. 260, no. 36; F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton, 1926), p. 276, no. 18.

³⁰ Mommsen, "Der Rechtsstreit zwischen Cropos und den römischen Steuerpächtern," *Hermes*, XX (1885), pp. 268-87, at p. 275. Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 256, states "il décide qu' Hermodore, en sa qualité d'ami du peuple romain, est libre de toute redevance; l'*amicitia* entraîne l'immunité." Cf. Ferrenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

conspicuous loyalty of Hermodorus in the recent Mithridatic War.³¹ Accordingly, if the phrase is intended as an explanation of the granted immunity, it is used to point to service worthy of reward rather than to a status entailing privilege. Hence the immunity is more probably a separate grant bestowed as a reward for this service after the fashion of the immunity granted to veterans with distinguished records.

The second reference occurs in Diodorus Siculus, who records a grant of public *hospitium* to one Timasitheus of Lipara in 396 B.C. for services to Rome, followed in 252 B.C. by the grant of liberty and immunity to his descendants when the island was taken from Carthage by Rome.³² Ferrenbach and Neumann, interpreting this as a case of individual *amicitia*, assumed that the immunity granted to the descendants of Timasitheus derived from their inherited status as *amici*.³³ There is, however, no explicit causal link in the text between the status granted to Timasitheus and the fiscal immunity of his descendants. Rather, the grant of immunity is presented as a second stage of the Roman reward, not as the consequence of the first, and it reads as a separate grant made to the family of a remembered benefactor in further recognition of his action. Diodorus does not say that these provincials received immunity as their right by virtue of an inherited status but simply records the immunity as a separate gift. But such separate gifts of immunity are, as I have shown, well attested as marks of Rome's special favour.

My argument so far has been mainly negative and concerned to show that our evidence concerning the individual *amici populi*

³¹ The suggestion that Hermodorus had remained loyal during this war is made in *S. I. G.*², II, p. 430, n. 25 to no. 747. See above, note 14, for other cases of commendation of loyalty by reference to *amicitia*, especially Cicero's description of the loyalty of a Tarentine during the Hannibalic war in *De Senect.*, 12, 41: *qui in amicitia populi Romani permanserat*.

³² Diod. Sic., XIV, 93, 4-5, with Livy, V, 28, 2-5 (quoted above, note 5). Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 405 (cf. also pp. 273 ff.), is probably right to discount this as a case of *amicitia* of the later, developed type, and to insist on the distinction between *hospitium* and *amicitia*.

³³ See Ferrenbach, *Die Amici Populi Romani*, p. 74; K. J. Neumann, *R.-E.*, I (1894), cols. 1832-1833. Cf. also R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5* (Oxford, 1965), p. 620.

Romani does not support the inference that this status always entailed fiscal and judicial privileges. It is, however, improbable that the status was an empty one, and the evidence which we possess does indicate that it was regularly attended by distinctions of a diplomatic and honorary order. Thus, the inscriptions record that individual *amici* acted as a recognized group in concert with political groups and participants in various festivals to honour benefactors of the Asian Koinon.³⁴ This points to their possession of a certain diplomatic prestige. Moreover, the literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that all individual *amici* were, on the Senate's instruction, entered on a formal roll,³⁵ that they received permission to set up a commemorative bronze tablet on the Capitol and to offer sacrifice to the Roman state gods,³⁶ and that they received public hospitality from the

³⁴ *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 188 (= *O. G. I.*, no. 438), line 4; *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 291; *O. G. I.*, no. 439. Cf. Magie, *Roman Rule*, p. 1064, n. 48.

³⁵ See, e. g., the *S. C. de Asclepiade*, etc., line 24. Cf. Livy, XLIV, 16, 7, where Onesimus the Macedonian is said to have been entered on the *formula sociorum*. It has been disputed whether this *formula sociorum* was a roll distinct from the *formula amicorum*, as held by Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-1, and P. C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic* (Cambridge, 1908), pp. 40-2, or is simply a variant designation of the same list, as held by E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958), p. 12, n. 4, and Neumann, *R.-E.*, I, col. 1832. The latter view seems more probable. Livy's terminology is loose in this respect, as shown by L. E. Matthaei, "On the Classification of Roman Allies," *C. Q.*, I (1907), pp. 182-204, at 186-7. Magie, *op. cit.*, p. 960, n. 76, also holds that Livy's terminology is inexact and that Onesimus was in fact enrolled on the *formula amicorum*. Cf. the designation of Hermodorus in line 17 of the Oropus inscription (above, note 29) by the phrase: *δοῖς πρότερον ὑπὸ τῆς συνκλήτου σύμμαχος προσηγορευμένος ἔστω*. This also is presumably a reference to *amicitia*. Even if two distinct lists existed, individuals other than monarchs would be out of place on a list of *socii* proper, and references to such individuals as being enrolled on a *formula sociorum* should therefore be taken as allusions to the *formula amicorum*.

³⁶ Cf. line 25 of the *S. C. de Asclepiade*, etc. Some of these details are, admittedly, based on generalization from this one case, but the closely parallel treatment of ambassadors of states in *amicitia* lends probability (see below, note 39). See Gallet, *op. cit.*, pp. 401 f., for discussion of these formal privileges. I have not adduced the evidence for royal *amici* since their position was obviously analogous to that of states, rather than individuals, in *amicitia*.

Roman state.³⁷ The right of embassy to the Senate should probably be included among their privileges.³⁸ Such honours are of a purely formal or diplomatic nature, not akin to such substantive grants as fiscal immunity or free choice of judiciary, and as such they were shared by individual Greeks in the capacity of ambassadors of states in *amicitia*.³⁹

Here again, the order of the grants of the S. C. of 78 B. C. may yield a final clue. The consuls are requested to enter the three Greeks on the roll of *amicitia* in line 24 of the decree, and this instruction, which comes later than the grant of both the fiscal and the judicial privileges, is immediately followed by the award of the 'diplomatic' privileges (lines 25-28). This close sequence suggests that it was these last privileges, if any, which were the regular accompaniment of individual *amicitia*.

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³⁷ See lines 25-3 of the *S. C. de Asclepiade*, etc., with Livy, XLIV, 16, 7 again. For this hospitality, the *locus lautique* of Livy, see Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, I, 1^a, p. 540; III, pp. 597 and 1151 f.; R. Leonhard, *R.-Z.*, VIII (1912), col. 2497.

³⁸ Cf. lines 26-28 of the S. C.

³⁹ Entry on the roll and sacrifice: cf. Livy, XLIII, 6. The bronze tablet: *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 33, col. b, lines 20, 23. Cf. Polybius, III, 26, 1. Sacrifice: *I. G. R.*, *ibid.*, lines 17, 22; *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 1028, line 12; *O. G. I.*, no. 441, lines 32, 123. Hospitality: *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 1028, lines 11 f.; *I. G. R.*, IV, no. 33, col. b, lines 25 f.; *S. I. G.*,^a no. 674, line 69; *S. I. G.*,^a no. 705, lines 64-5; *O. G. I.*, no. 441, line 88; Livy, XLIII, 6; cf. Polybius, XXI, 18, 3. Embassy right: *O. G. I.*, no. 441, lines 64-5, and 127-8. Gallet, *op. cit.*, p. 282, follows Mommsen in regarding these honours paid to envoys of states in *amicitia* as constituting a grant of personal *amicitia* to them also. I prefer the view of Täubler, *Imperium Romanum*, I, p. 408, n. 1, that they received these honours only as representatives of their states.

POETIC TENSIONS IN THE HORATIAN *RECUSATIO*.

If we recall the original positive function of the Greek Muse as source of truth and poetic inspiration, it is startling to see her appear in Horace, *Odes*, I, 6, as a negative influence, imposing restraint and reluctance.¹ The Muse forbids: *Musa vetat*; and in obedience to the Muse's command, the poet must curb his heroic impulse and graciously decline the task of glorifying Agrippa and Augustus (I, 6, 5; 9-12):

nos, Agrippæ, neque hæc dicere . . .
conamur, terues grandia, dum pudor
inbellisque Iyræ Musa potens vetat
laudes egregii Caesaris et tuas
culpa deterere ingeni.

In her restraining role, of course, this Muse is merely a component of the *recusatio*, that class of poem which refuses intractable or uncongenial themes for alleged reasons of inability, disinclination, or humility. We are now very familiar with this literary *topos*, which is at least as old as Callimachus and which was commonly exploited in Augustan Rome.² It is possible, in fact, that familiarity may breed critical contempt. The Horatian poetic demur may be dismissed casually as a stereotype, as a trite Hellenistic convention; it may be underestimated, too, as a facile imposture, a transparent use of irony to perform the task that is ostensibly declined. Conventional and ironical as the *recusatio* may appear, we should ask to what extent the restraining Muse suggests a distinct Horatian attitude. How are we to explain the poet's repeated adoption of a self-depreciatory *persona*? It is my view that Horace uses the *recusatio* to depict a unique and ambivalent poetic stance, so as to underscore tensions that are artistically real and rhetorically consistent.

¹ This inversion of the Muse's role is examined by Steele Commager, *The Odes of Horace* (New Haven, 1962), pp. 2-16, "The Descent of the Muses": see especially p. 7 and n. 11.

² See Walter Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom: Die Nachfolge seines apologetischen Dichtens in der Augusteerzeit*, *Hermes*, Einzelschr. XVI (Wiesbaden, 1960); and Wendell Clausen, "Callimachus and Roman Poetry," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, V (1964), pp. 181-96.

Horace is clearly not independent of Hellenistic tradition: the conventions of Alexandrian poetic apology strongly influence his stance, as can be seen from Walter Wimmel's thorough study, *Kallimachos in Rom.*³ In *Odes*, I, 6, for example, the restraining Muse is merely a refinement of the warning Apollo who appears in the prologue to Callimachus' *Aitia*—more accurately, perhaps, as a conflation of this warning Apollo and the slender (*λεπταλέη*) Muse that the Alexandrian poet is urged to cultivate.⁴ Conventional, too, is the recurring Horatian contrast in scope between the miniature and the magnificent, the cameo and the colossus⁵—a contrast reminiscent of the Hellenistic *Stilkampf* between Callimachus and his grandiloquent rivals. Tradition, then, is highly relevant; but more revealing is Horace's unique employment of the legacy of Callimachus.

Similarly, I do not mean to belittle the significance of facetious irony in these *recusationes*. Even though Horace insists seriously in the *Ars Poetica* (28-40) that no task should exceed the poet's ability, we must never take too literally an allegation that he has the will without the strength (*cupidum . . . vires deficient*, *Sat.*, II, 1, 12-13; *si quantum cuperem possem quoque*, *Epist.*, II, 1, 257). Horace never wrote epic, it is true; but I doubt that he lacked confidence in his technical ability to achieve the grand style. That the protests of deficient strength are ironical can be seen by their juxtaposition with passages that prove the ability and virtually fulfil the heroic request. It is a technique that Steele Commager relates closely to the *praeteritio*, that transparent gambit of the Roman law-court.⁶ So Horace denies his competence and then proceeds to soar (*Sat.*, II, 1, 12-15); another time he gives us a dazzling glimpse of the heroic and then undercuts the display by humbly saying, in effect, "I'd write this way, if only I could" (*Epist.*, II, 1, 250-7).⁷ *Sat.*, II, 1 and *Epist.*, II, 1 show early and late examples of this irony; other instances abound in the reticent odes (e.g., I, 6;

³ See note 2.

⁴ Callimachus, *Aitia*, I, 1, 21-4; cf. Horace, *C.*, IV, 15, 1-4 and *Sat.*, I, 10, 31-5 (Quirinus), and see Wimmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-41.

⁵ For this Horatian contrast, see below on the "antithesis of scope."

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁷ For a clear analysis of this technique in *Epist.*, II, 1, see E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 327-8.



II, 12). The ironic self-effacement is delightful and ingratiating whenever it occurs. However, I repeat that we are oversimplifying Horace if we read the *recusatio* merely as literary sham or mock-modest pose.

If the *recusatio* is more than conventional feigned humility, what tensions does it represent?

It is no longer novel to suggest that Horace, the critical advocate of simplicity, propriety, and *mediocritas*, was a poet of unsettled temperament and troubled principle. Described by a recent writer as "the most neurotic of neurotic poets,"⁸ he was subjected to continuous strain between the opposing forces that shaped his literary attitudes and thus moulded his satiric and lyric *personae*. The basic conflict was one painfully common among the Augustan poets: it may be described as the pull between Callimachus and Caesar.⁹ Hellenistic society had established the autonomy of art and the personal liberty of the artist; while cherishing this triumph of the private ego, Horace's generation of poet was so conditioned by war-weariness and (in varying degree) so lured by the promise of the Principate as to feel a deep-rooted need for public expression.¹⁰ The danger of self-compromise was obvious; yet there was an earnest desire for a rapprochement between the self and the state, a search for formulae that could give voice to public enthusiasm without loss of personal integrity.

The primary tension, then, was one of attitude: individualism versus commitment. Within this poetic ambivalence there can be seen subordinate tensions of esthetic judgment or taste, which in turn illuminate other personal conflicts. Virtually all the esthetic tensions can be seen distilled into the brilliant oxymoron of the Agrippa ode: "I am slender, the task is huge" — *tenues grandia* (I, 6, 9). It is by ringing changes on this note of contrast that Horace is able to develop the ambivalence of attitude that I have mentioned. We see here an antithesis of artistic scope, of poetic style, and of generic purity. Not

⁸ W. R. Johnson, "The Boastful Bird: Notes on Horatian Modesty," *C. J.*, LXI (1966), p. 272.

⁹ Cf. Wimmel, *op. cit.*, p. 3: "Kallimachos und Octavian sind die wirklichen Gegnerfiguren im neuentbrannten Drama des 'Stilkampfes'."

¹⁰ See C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 169-71.

merely a statement of taste or competence, the phrase *tenuēs grandia* represents as well a subtle comment on the strain between tranquillity and heroism, between private seclusion and public glory.

The antithesis of scope has already been mentioned; it was a traditional dictum that the genre limited in size is more challenging than the huge and diffuse undertaking. Horace echoes this view when he speaks of his "small fields" (*parva rura*), linked in *Odes*, II, 16 to the thin breath of inspiration and contrasted with the vast herds and lavish wealth of *Grosphus* (II, 16, 37-40):

mihi parva rura et
spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenæ
Parca non mendax dedit et malignum
spernere volgus.

The poet is fascinated with the paradoxical problem of adapting great matter to small measure. In *Odes*, III, 3, 72, he says ironically that the adaptation is impossible without a resultant thinness or *tenuitas*: *iesine . . . magna modis tenuare parvis*.

The antithesis of poetic style is more complex. In the *Ars Poetica*, Horace states the dilemma facing the literary craftsman who values propriety of style or seeks an *aurea mediocritas* in mode of utterance (*A. P.*, 27-8, 31):

professus grandia turget;
serpet humi tutus nimium timidusque procellæ. . .
in vitium ducit culpæ fuga si caret arte.

What is the art that can save the bold poet from bombast and the cautious poet from banality? Of the two extremes, Horace is more outspokenly critical of bombast, as we see from his attack on the poet who is *turgidus* or *pinguis* (*Sat.*, I, 10, 36-7 and *Sat.*, II, 5, 40-1). In this respect he is the doctrinaire Callimachean, traditionally inclined to prefer restraint to hyperbole. Still, if we can assume that Horace was not content always to creep, we must conclude that he sought the art that would allow graceful flight. I feel that he found a partial solution in the *recusatio*, with its peculiar stylistic tension between *tenuitas* and *gravitas*. Protected by this pose against the charge of excess, he could experiment in the idiom of the grand style. Secure in his nest, the would-be swan could risk a few hesitant wing-beats.

But the *recusatio* forestalled the complaint of grandiloquence: we hear repeatedly of the poet's slender resources, and thus we are assured by the epithets *tenuis*, *levis*, and *parvus* that the flight is merely tentative.¹¹

An explicit contrast in the *recusatio* is between heroic and non-heroic ethos, associated with the contrast in form and manner between epic and non-epic genres. Exaggerating his avowed belief in the exclusive purity of literary genres (*A. P.*, 73-88), Horace succeeds in creating an implied tension between the life of heroic achievement and the life of tranquillity. In the *Satires* and *Epistles* (*Sat.*, II, 1; *Epist.*, II, 1), the generic contrast is between epic and *sermo*; in the *Odes* (especially I, 6) it is between epic and lyric.

What is the hallmark of the epic in Horace's imagination? It is partly a question of scope and style, the antitheses that we have seen between *magna* and *parva*, *grandia* and *tenuis*. But it is also a matter of ethos. A key epithet is *fortis*; in fact, fortitude may be considered the stock quality of the epic hero in Horatian poetry.¹² Epic itself is called *forte epos* (*Sat.*, I, 10, 45, where Varius is hailed as its master); by implication we see Cæcilius as *iustum et fortem* in *Sat.*, II, 1, 16; Agrippa will be described by Varius as *fortis et hostium victor* in *Odes*, I, 6, 1-2; and Jullus will sing the return of *fortis Augusti* in *Odes*, IV, 2, 43. Another heroic quality, whether in victor or vanquished, is ferocity, applied to Agrippa's soldiery (*ferox*, *C.*, I, 6, 3), to Numantia (*ferae*, *C.*, II, 12, 1), and to the conquered Sygambri (*ferocis*, *C.*, IV, 2, 34). Strength, bravery, savagery: the qualities are predictable and consistent.

Violent epic attributes are not appropriate to the pedestrian Muse of satire (*musa pedestri*, *Sat.*, II, 6, 17) and are quite incompatible with the Muse of the unwarlike lyre (*inbellisque*

¹¹ *tenuis*: *C.*, I, 6, 9; II, 16, 38; 20, 1; *Epist.*, II, 1, 225, and *C.*, III, 3, 72 (*texuere*); *levis*: especially *C.*, I, 6, 20 and II, 1, 40; *parvus*: especially *C.*, II, 16, 37; III, 3, 72; 25, 17; IV, 2, 31; and 15, 3.

¹² *Fortis* is used of Ulysses in *Sat.*, II, 5, 20 (*fortem hoc animum tolerare iubebo*), Tæcæ in *C.*, I, 7, 30-1 (*O fortes peioraque passi/mecum saepe viri*), Agamemnon's predecessors in *C.*, IV, 9, 25-6 (*vivere fortes ante Agamemnona; multi*), Diomedes in *Sat.*, I, 5, 92 (*a forti Diomede*). The heroic Regulus cries "*erit ille fortis / qui perfidis se credidit hostibus . . . ?*" (*C.*, III, 5, 32-3), and Cleopatra is endowed with stoic *fortitudo* in *C.*, I, 37, 26.

lyrae musa potens, C., I, 6, 10). In more senses than one, the antonym of *fortitudo* is *tenuitas*. The Muse, it is true, may have given the lyric poet the right to sing of gods and Olympic victors as well as love and wine (A. P., 83-5):

Musa dedit fidibus divos puerosque deorum
et pugilem victorem et equum certamine primum
et iuvenum curas et libera vine referre.

But only the amatory and convivial gifts are acknowledged in *Odes*, I, 6, as the heroic is either banished to the realm of epic or parodied by its erotic parallel (I, 6, 17-20):

nos convivia, nos proelia virginum
sectis in iuvenes unguibus acrium
cantamus vacui, sive quid urimur,
non praeter solitum leves.

There is an illusion, therefore, that Horace's stance is anti-heroic, even pacifistic. Yet just as we see elsewhere his high regard for the magnanimity of a Regulus or a Cleopatra and his admiration for the Augustan settlement, so do we see in *Odes*, I, 6 a wistful glance at the splendor of Diomedes and a yearning for that which is rejected. Here is another facet of Horace's ambivalence.

An aberration from the usual pattern of lyric-epic antithesis can be seen in *Odes*, II, 12, where the poet begins with the standard rhetorical contrast of the *recusatio*. We are told of *longa bella* (a phrase suggesting both epic scope and heroic ethos), and we are given an unusually rich sequence of martial adjectives (*ferae, durum, purpureum sanguine, saevos, domitos*); obviously this material cannot be fitted to the soft measures of the lyre (*mollibus citharae modis*). Who, then, will be the substitute-poet, the proper epic bard to assume the rejected request? Why not Maecenas, the very author of the request! But Maecenas is no poet. Well, then, let him do the job in prose chronicle: *tuque pedestribus / dicis historiis proelia Caesaris, / Maecenas, melius. . .* This is a colorful variation on the theme, but the loss of the epic contrast necessitated by the flattery of Maecenas weakens the tension of the poem.¹³

¹³ Fraenkel (*op. cit.*, p. 221) condemns the poem for a different reason, its unsatisfactory "fusion of heterogeneous elements."

Probably the most significant tension in Horace's *recusationes* is not the contrast between satire and epic or lyric and epic, but that between personal lyric and heroic lyric. Again we can refer to the oxymoron *tenuis grandia* and speak of "low" or "slender" lyric as opposed to "high" lyric. Horace actually uses the contrasting phrases *leviore plectro* (C., II, 1, 40) and *maiore plectro* (C., IV, 2, 33), as if to refer to two distinct modes of poetic song. From Horace's references to *ioca* (C., II, 1, 37) and *iocosa lyra* (C., III, 3, 69), as well as his fondness for the metaphor of the *ludus poeticus*,¹⁴ the reader may assume that he is establishing a dichotomy between trivial or flippant verse and serious lyric poetry. This is not the case: Wagenvoort has shown that *ludere* is strictly a relative term in Latin poetry and that Horace in particular uses it for his earlier poems of commencement and growth as opposed to the developed lyrics of his maturity.¹⁵ In other words, Horace's lyric *plectrum* is lighter or greater depending upon the majesty of his subject and the sonority of his tone. In the terms of his own metaphor, "slender" lyric follows the industrious course of the bee, "high" lyric the soaring flight of the Pindaric swan.

One of the *recusatio* poems, *Odes*, IV, 2, is built upon this lyric contrast. To the suggestion of Jullus Antonius that Horace should celebrate Augustus in the grand style of Pindar, the poet replies that his own lyric mode is less soaring than the inimitable Pindar's, and that Jullus himself should write the triumphal poem, so that Horace may add a humble voice from the crowd.¹⁶ We see from the central stanzas that Horace's thin

¹⁴ Horace's many uses of the word *ludere* include references both to satire (*Sat.* I, 10, 37, *haec ego ludo*) and to lyric (C., I, 32, 2, *si quid vacui sub umbra / lusimus tecum*).

¹⁵ H. Wagenvoort, "Ludus Poeticus," *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion* (Leiden, 1956), pp. 30-42.

¹⁶ There is no doubt that the chief contrast of the poem is between the two lyric modes. But *pace* Fraenkel (*op. cit.*, p. 437, n. 2), it is possible that Jullus Antonius, the *maiore poeta plectro*, is being urged to write an epic *Triumphus*. The request to Horace was for a Pindarizing epinicion; but it would not be the first time that Horace had suggested a change in genre (cf. C., II, 12, to Maecenas). We do have evidence that Jullus was an epic poet (Ps.-Acr., "*heroico metro Diomedias XII libros scripsit egregios, praeterca et prosa aliquanta*"); see Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.*, p. 395.

type of lyric is so far from being merely a playful trifle that its chief characteristic is *labor*—the meticulous effort to produce *operosa carmina* that are limited but flawless. The Matine bee does not rise like the Theban swan, but prefers to work among the sweet thyme, in the moist cool glades of the Sabine countryside. This is an ironic *persona*, of course, but behind the irony lies an esthetic conviction and a profound distaste for pretentious lyric bombast. Though Horace feels awe-struck admiration for Pindar, there is more than a hint of ambiguity in the simile of the rain-fed mountain stream, of the Pindar who "seethes and rushes, enormous, profound of speech" (*fervet immensusque ruit profundo / Pindarus ore*, *C.*, IV, 2, 7-8).¹⁷ The true scale of values is revealed by the final image, the juxtaposition of Jullus' grandiose tribute to Caesar (ten bulls, ten cows) and Horace's tasteful offering—a delicate brindled calf, exquisitely described.

I have referred continually to Horace's ambivalence of poetic outlook. I mean, in part, the very real dilemma confronting the Augustan lyric poet. Was it necessary for a modern sophisticated Roman to sing always to the lighter quill (*leviore plectro*)? Did the heritage of Callimachus place insuperable obstacles in the path of the would-be *vates*? If one felt the desire to assume a public sacerdotal voice, must this be suppressed because a neo-Pindar would be a tasteless anachronism?

Horace's resolution of the dilemma was to seek ways of expanding the boundaries of Roman lyric so as to permit a new Alcaeus, if not a new Pindar. One approach was the fiction of the personal Dionysiac experience, the private conversion in the secluded glade: *Bacchum in remotis rupibus*, *C.*, II, 19; *Quo me, Bacche*, *C.*, III, 25. Here the shaded forest, the *gelidum nemus* of *Odes*, I, 1, offered an inviolate sanctuary in which the poet might enjoy an ecstatic madness (*amabilis insania*, *C.*, III, 4, 5-6) and thus raise his public voice. Another technique was to emphasize the link with Alcaeus, who (unlike Pindar)

¹⁷ Although I agree with Brink (*op. cit.*, p. 159, n. 2) that this stream metaphor is outwardly laudatory, the swollen river seems at least unconsciously reminiscent of Lucilius' muddy torrent (*cum flueret lutulentus*, *Sat.*, I, 4, 11); note also Horace's smiling glance at the Pindarizing Titius in *Epist.*, I, 3, 9 ff. Horace does, of course, attempt the Pindaric on occasion (e. g., *C.*, I, 12), but it is not a congenial style.

reconciled the heroic with the personal, who was equally adroit as committed public spokesman (*ferox bello . . . inter arma*) and as relaxed lyric individualist (*C.*, I, 32, 5-12). In moments when he was not restrained by *pudor*, Horace was fond of stressing his Alcaic achievement (e.g., *C.*, III, 30; IV, 3; *Epist.*, I, 19). I believe that his pride may derive less from the technical virtuosity of the adaptation than from the spiritual triumph of reuniting private and public utterance to the measures of the Roman lyre.

However, if the dilemma was partially solved, Horace never abandoned his practice of exploring the tension. We have seen already that at least two *recusationes* belong to his latest poetry (*Odes*, IV, 2 and *Epist.*, II, 1). A closely related technique—virtually the mirror image of the *recusatio*—is the mock retraction, where a soaring flight is brought to earth by a stern command to the wanton or stubborn Muse (*musa procax* or *pervicax*):

sed ne relictis, Musa, procax iocis
Caeae retractes munera neniae;
mecum Dionaeo sub antro
quaere modcs levioze plectro. (*C.*, II, 1, 37-40)

non hoc iocosae conveniet lyrae.
quo, Musae, tendis? desine pervicax
referre sermones deorum et
magna modis tenuare parvis. (*C.*, III, 3, 69-72)

In the normal *recusatio* (e.g., *C.*, I, 6), it is the Muse who applies the restraint; here the Muse herself must be shown the impropriety of her ambitious song. A similar inversion of the ambivalent stance is the tendency to undercut an extravagant posture by means of an intentional incongruity. This is surely the poet's aim in *Odes*, IV, 3, where it is implied that Horace is the dumb fish to whom the generous Muse has given the voice of the swan (IV, 3, 19-20):

o musis quocumque piscibus
doratura cygni, si libeat, sonum. . . .

It may be his method also in the notorious metamorphosis of bard into swan in *Odes*, II, 20, where the phrase *biformis vates* seems to mock the corporeal poet who is about to soar on "unfamiliar and unsleander feather" (*Non usitata nec tenui*

pinna).¹⁸ In this case, the heroic bard is ironically earthbound, for all his grandiose pretensions; in the *recusatio*, the slender poet had shown an irresistible tendency to soar, for all his reticence and the Muse's restraint.

There would be some truth in the view that the *recusatio* was a transitional phase in Horace's growth to maturity, an attempt to swell the thin note of *sermo* or lyric by testing the sonority of Alcaeus' *barbitos*. Yet we must realize that the process was not a chronological continuity: the fact that Horace continued in his maturity to exploit the *topos* of poetic reticence suggests that the restraining Muse had become a permanent feature of his *persona*.¹⁹ Though he had learned to live with the conflicting drives of self and state, Horace was never altogether comfortable in the feathers of the swan: beneath Melpomene's laurel crown there can often be seen on his face the smile of depreciating *pudor*.

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¹⁸ In a different sense, E. T. Silk speaks of *C.*, II, 20 as an inverse *recusatio* in "A Fresh Approach to Horace. II, 20," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 255-63. Steele Commager hints at the ambiguity of *biformis* (*op. cit.*, p. 313, n. 7); W. R. Johnson goes so far as to call the poem "Horatian hoax" (*op. cit.*, p. 275 and n. 8).

¹⁹ The last poem of the *Odes* (*C.*, IV, 15) makes use of the warning Apollo, one of the standard conventions of the type (see above, note 4). But it is significant that *C.*, IV, 15 is the only poem of this type in which there is no tension between public heroism and the private ego; here, in fact, the *Pax Augusta* replaces Horace's private personality as the antithesis of brash heroism.

THE ETYMOLOGY IN EURIPIDES, *TROADES*, 13-14.

ὁ γὰρ Παρνάσιος

- 10 Φωκὲς Ἐπειός, μηχαναῖσι Παλλάδος
ἐκύμον' ἵππον τευχέων ξυναρμόσας,
πύργων ἔπειψεν ἐντὸς ὀλέθριον βρέτας·
13 ὅθεν πρὸς ἐνδρῶν ὑστέρων κεκλήσεται
Δούρειος Ἴππος, κρυπτὸν ἀμπισχὼν δόρυ.

13, 14 damnavit Burges

Burges' removal of *Troades*, 13-14 has found fairly wide acceptance, most influentially in the texts of Wecklein and Murray. The chief dissenter is Léon Parmentier, who leaves the passage unexcised in his and Henri Grégoire's Budé edition. He defends the lines in his article in *R. E. G.*, 1923, pp. 46-9, where he revives and elaborates the theory (at least as old as Barnes) that the etymology of Δούρειος Ἴππος refers by implication to a colossal bronze statue of the Wooden Horse on the Acropolis. A wooden horse is mentioned by Aristophanes at *Birds*, 1128, and the scholast to the passage maintains that Aristophanes is thinking of the statue on the Acropolis (though the text certainly does not necessitate such a reference). The *Birds* was produced in 414, the year after the *Troades*, so why, argues Parmentier, should we not have in the *Troades* yet another reference to Strongylion's masterpiece (for it was identified as his work when the base of the statue was discovered in 1840)? He adds a quaint twist to his interpretation when he suggests that Athenians discussed the propriety of a bronze statue of a wooden horse, and that Euripides, in tacit reply to such objections, remarked that the horse wasn't an *equus ligneus* at all, but an *equus hastatus*! Parmentier's general position (though not, I suspect, the more extreme part of it) was accepted by Eugene O'Neill, Jr. in his extensive comments on the prologue to the *Troades*.¹ By conjuring up the vision of Strongylion's statue, Euripides was able to give his audience "a concrete picture of just what the fatal device looked like." Parmentier's view has recently been supported from quite a different angle by Dietmar Korzeniewski in an article which makes much of symmetrical writing (Parallel-

¹ "The Prologue of the *Troades* of Euripides," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXII (1941), pp. 299 f.

komposition) in the prologues of Euripides.² In his view, 1-22 is balanced by 23-44, each section containing 22 lines. If we remove 13-14, the two sections would no longer be so exactly balanced. This broad correspondence is broken down into detail as follows: 1-14 (= 3 + 4 + 7) ~ 23-35 (= 3 + 4 + 6), 15-22 ~ 36-44. The subjectivity of such pattern-making can be readily seen by comparing Korzeniewski's pattern with that of Walther Ludwig, who sees two narrative sections that—if we excise 13-14—total 30 lines sandwiched between the structural supports at the beginning (1-7), middle (23-27) and end (45-47) ± that total 15 lines, exactly half the length of the narrative section.³

However this may be, the burden of proof is on those who excise, and we must scrutinize what can be said against rather than for the passage. The standard objection seems to be the awkwardness of the Greek. This, for example, is the approach that Fraenkel takes.⁴ But von Arnim has already defended the syntax of the loosely appended *κρυπτὸν ἀμπισχὸν δόρυ* by referring to the equally loose but clear *ὄτι γάμους ἐψεύσατο* at *Ba.*, 31.⁵ Others object to the frigidity of the content, which was already remarked on by the scholiast *ad loc.* (*ψυχρῶς ἡτυμολόγησε τὸν ἵππον ἀπὸ τῶν δοράτων*). But we do not have to look far in Euripides to find equally frigid etymologies. A more profitable course is to ask whether or not the lines are Euripidean in the sense of conforming to Euripides' general practice of etymologizing, and more particularly to his practice in the prologues. For we will find, curiously enough, that Euripides etymologizes in one fashion in the prologues, in another throughout the episodes, and in still another at the exodes.

The etymologies that are easiest for us to appreciate are those of the episodes. They are always filled with dramatic irony, and often come at the climax of a scene. Typical is the example in the *Bacchae*, where Teiresias says in his parting words to Pen-

² *Philologus*, CVIII (1964), pp. 55 f.

³ *Sapheneia, ein Beitrag zur Formkunst im Spätwerk des Euripides* (Diss., Tübingen, 1954), p. 39.

⁴ *Zu den Phoinissen des Euripides* (Bayerische Akademie, Sitzungsberichte, 1963), p. 1C.

⁵ Hans von Arnim, *De Prologorum Euripideorum Arte et Interpolatione* (Diss., Greifswald, 1882), pp. 40 f.

theus not to bring *penthes* into his house (367 ff.). Later in the play the stranger god Dionysus brings a violent dispute with Pentheus to a head by claiming that he does not even know who he is (506). Pentheus replies by giving his name in full: "I am Pentheus, the son of Agave and Echion." To that Dionysus replies that he has a suitable name to come to grief with. It is evident that Pentheus carries his fate with him in his name (cf. also 1113). To use the classification of the *Cratylus* (384D), his name is his not only by convention, νόμος, but also by nature, φύσει. So in the *Phoenissae* Antigone exclaims (1494): ὦ Πολύναικες, ἔφνε ἄρ' ἐπώνυμος.

None of the etymologies of the prologues and the epilogues have this kind of dramatic punch. The reason is obvious: the emotional climate in which they occur is that of a calm didacticism. In the prologues, the etymologies most frequently explain something about the fate or the person of a character in the play. Telephus, in his self introduction (*Tel.*, 13), says that the Mysians called him Telephus because he had settled τηλοῦ . . . οἰκῶν. In the *Helen*, Theonoe's name is connected with her knowledge cf τὰ θεῶα (13), and in the *I. T.* Thoas is so named for his swiftness of foot (32). In the prologue to the *Phoenissae* Jocasta gives two etymologies: the name "Oidipous" is related to his swollen ankles (26) and, more allusively, the name Antigone refers to the fact that she was "born before" Ismene (57-8). In the *Antiope* the heroine is said to have called one of her sons Zethus because she "sought" (ἐζήτησε) relief in childbirth, and the other Amphion because he was born ἀμφ' ὀδόν (frs. 181, 182 N.). If the etymologies don't refer to a character in the play, they refer to an ancestor or connection of his. So in the *Mel. Soph.* the etymology of a person who perhaps does not appear in the play, Melanippe's mother Hippo, caps a digression or that same woman's extraordinary transformation into a chestnut mare (14-22).⁶

The other main type of etymology in the prologues is that of a place which is named after a character in the play or one of his ancestors and which invariably serves, directly or indirectly, to glorify him. In the *Mel. Soph.* Melanippe boasts that Aeolia

⁶ But her obvious importance in the play (frs. 482, 484, 488 N.) supports Denys Page's view (*Select Papyri*, III [London, 1942], p. 119) that she appeared at the end to save the day for Melanippe.

is named after her father Aeolus (6). In the *Andromache* the Thetideion is named after Thetis (20), who herself appears at the end as a *dea ex machina* (indeed line 20, . . . Θειδείου ἀδῶ θεᾶς χάριν νυμφευμάτων prefigures the opening words of her epilogue speech at 1231 ff.:

Πηλεῦ, χάριν σοι τῶν πάρος νυμφευμάτων
ἤκω Θέτις λιπούσα Νηκῶς ἑόμους).

In the *Archelaus*, Danaus is said to have caused the Pelasgians to change their names to Danaans (fr. 228 N.). This glorification of Danaus is relevant to the play because it adds stature to his descendant, the Temenid Archelaus who is the hero of the play. In the *Phrixus* (fr. 819, 7 ff. N.) Agenor, the ancestor of Ino, numbers among his sons Cilix, who gave his name to Cilicia, and Phcenix (alias Cadmus), who gave his name to Phoenicia.

In keeping with the general practice of the prologue, none of the etymologies refer to people or events which lie in the future beyond the limits of the play.⁷ This future is the proper sphere

⁷ I notice that in his edition of the *Hippolytos* W. S. Barrett prints Jortin's emendation ἐνομάσσωσιν for the ὀνόμαζεν of the MSS in the quasi-etymology at line 33 as follows:

[Φαίδρα] καὶ δὲ Κύπριδος ἐγκαθέλτατο
ἔρωτ' ἔρωτ' ἔκδημον, Ἰππολύτῳ δ' ἐπὶ
τὸ λοιπὸν ὀνομάσουσιν ἰδρῶσαι θεάν.

He considers the emendation as "certain" and quotes in support of it *I. T.*, 1451 f., *Hel.*, 1674, and *Her.*, 1320 f. He does not realize the significance of the fact that all his parallels come from the epilogues and therefore militate against rather than support the future ὀνομάσουσιν here. Jortin's emendation only emphasizes how out of place a reference to the future beyond the limits of the play is in the prologues. Barrett quite rightly notes the characteristic presence of τὸ λοιπὸν in the *aitia* of the epilogues and in the *aition* here. He is not, however, right in implying that τὸ λοιπὸν goes better with a future than with a past verb. It means "henceforth," and has any specific starting point in view, whether this be in the past, the present, or the future. It is admittedly rare with a past verb, but cf. *Heraclid.* 996 and Sophocles, *O. T.*, 795.

Whether ὀνόμαζεν itself can stand is a different matter. The verb might suggest that Phaedra publicizes her love from its inception, instead of keeping it a secret. But ὀνομάζειν need not imply "publicly proclaim"; it may simply mean "name in prayer," "invoke." This, at least, is its approximate meaning at *T. G. F.*, 912, 3 N. (cf. *Ba.*, 529): σοὶ τῷ πάντων μεδέοσι ζῆν / πέλανόν τε φέρω, Ζεὺς, εἴτ' Ἀλδης / ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις . . . ["whether you prefer to be invoked as Zeus

of the etymologies of the epilogues, which are exclusively eponymous in nature. They are all *aitia* which explain how a character in the play will give his name to a place, a tribe or a nation. So the Oresteion in Arcadia will be named after Orestes (*El.*, 1273 ff., *Or.*, 1646 f.) and Helene in the Thracian Chersonese will be named after Helen (*Hel.*, 1670 ff.). In the *Heracles* Theseus promises that some sanctuaries will be named after Heracles (1328), while in the *Antiope* (74 ff. Page) Lycus is instructed to hurl the bones of Dirce into the spring of Ares, out of which there will flow a stream named in her honor. As might be expected, the *Ion* is replete with etymologies which explain the origin of the pre-Peisistratean tribes (1575), the Ionians (1537), and of the Dorians and the Achaeans (1590). Even the etymology in the *I.T.* (1453 ff.) explaining the cult name Tauripolos, which was given to the image of Artemis at Halae in Attica, commemorates, at least in part, a character in the play. The first part of the epithet is referred to the land of Tauris, from where the image came, but the last part, *-polos*, is connected with the future wanderings of Orestes over Greece. Finally, in the *Hecabe* the infuriated Polymestor says that Hecabe will be metamorphosed into a dog and give her dog's name (1272) to the territory where she dies.

All the etymologies in the epilogues occur in a formal expository speech given by a *deus ex machina* or in its functional equivalent.⁸ For Theseus in his speech at *Her.*, 1313 ff. has

or as Hades"). Barrett translates his text at 32-3 as follows: "And men shall hereafter name the goddess as established over Hippolytos." I see no reason why we should not keep the MSS reading and translate "Henceforth he kept on naming (invoking) the goddess as established over Hippolytos." If this sounds out of character for the Phaedra we know in the play, we must admit that the establishment of the shrine itself is equally out of character, and is brought in by Euripides largely to satisfy his passion for *aitia* (see Barrett's commentary). In any case, whatever the original text may have been, an emendation to *δρῶντων* raises more problems than it solves.

⁸ *Ion*, 1553 f., *El.*, 1238 ff., *I.T.*, 1435 ff., *Hel.*, 1642 ff., *Or.*, 1625 ff., *Antiope*, 64 ff. (Page), *Her.*, 1313 ff., *Hec.*, 1259 ff. We can also presume that the exodus of the *Ἀλκμήων ὁ δὲ διὰ Κρόνου* contained an *aition* mentioning the foundation of Amphiloehian Argos by Amphiloehus at the suggestion of an oracle. Likewise the *Archelaus* contained an *aition* on the origin of the place name Aegae (in Macedonia) from the αἴξ or goat that guided the young Archelaus to the site (Hygin. *ap.* Nauck, *T. G. F.*, p. 42^r).

much the same authority as a *deus ex machina*, and Polymestor at *Hec.*, 1259 ff. takes on the stature of a prophet. The prophetic element is common to all the etymologies in the epilogues, and this is reflected in the language, particularly in the use of *κεκλήσεται*, a word that occurs in an etymological context in no less than five epilogues, and in four of these at the same position in the line.⁹ Another characteristic word in these prophecies is *ἐπώνυμος*, which is found in five passages.¹⁰

Clearly the etymology at *Troades*, 13-14 is different from all the other etymologies in the prologues. Unlike them, it refers to the future beyond the limits of the play. Unlike them, also, it refers to an inanimate object which has no connection with any character in the play or his ancestors, or for that matter with any individual, but only with the armed force, *δόρυ*, as a whole. In its almost formulaic use of *κεκλήσεται* at the end of the line it resembles the etymologies of the epilogues. But it differs from these, too, in the fact that it does not refer to a character in the play. We conclude that it fits nowhere, least of all in the prologues. It is because this etymology breaks the strict pattern of Euripides' practice elsewhere rather than because of its poor Greek or poor taste that it should be rejected as perhaps a "learned" interpolation of indeterminate date.

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⁹ *Hec.*, 1271, *Her.*, 1330, *El.*, 1275, *Hel.*, 1674, cf. *Or.*, 1646. These parallels support the reading of V against P's *κληθήσεται* at *Tr.*, 13.

¹⁰ *Ion*, 1577 *ἐπώνυμοι* . . . *ἔσονται*, *El.*, 1275 *ἐπώνυμος* . . . *κεκλήσεται*, *Or.*, 1646 *κεκλήσεται* . . . *ἐπώνυμον*, *Antiope*, 77 (Page) *ὡς ἂν* . . . *δνομ' ἐπώνυμον λάβη*, *I.T.*, 1454 (*βρέτας*) *ἐπώνυμον γῆς Ταυρικῆς πόγων τε σῶν* . . . Cf. also *Hec.*, 1271-2 *κεκλήσεται μορφῆς ἐπαδόν* and *Her.*, 1329-30 *ταῦτ' ἐπωνομασμένα σέθεν* . . . *κεκλήσεται*.

PROPERTIUS, II, 24 A.

Tu loqueris cum sis iam noto fabula libro.

It will be assumed in this paper that the elegy printed by Butler and Barber as 24 A is a self-contained poem; the points at issue will not be affected, whether it is or not. Full and thoughtful discussions of the poem in its orthodox interpretation may be found in: J. P. Enk, *Ad Propertii Carmina Commentarius Criticus* (Zutphen, 1911), pp. 146-50; *idem*, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber II* (Lugdunum Batavorum, 1962), pp. 306-8; D. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 110-12. Since these are familiar to specialists in Propertius, and readily accessible to others, there is no point in recapitulating them here. The contention of this paper is that the poem represents Propertius as reacting against Cynthia's indifference by amusing himself with casual pick-ups, and claiming to be perfectly content with them.

The first four verses should be assigned to an assumed interlocutor;¹ *tu loqueris* probably, though not necessarily, refers to the end of the preceding elegy: "You talk about promiscuity, when your book (a best-seller, by the way) presents you in great detail as a faithful lover?" *Cui* (vs. 3) is better taken as a relative, with antecedent *tu*, than as interrogative, "You, the sort of person that would not quail at hearing. . . ." In verse 4, W. S. Anderson has suggested that the first *aut* should be *sit*; I suggest that *sit* should be read for both. Surely the relations of *pudor* and *reticentia* are consequential, not disjunctive, and the verse means, "Anyone that has the instincts of a gentleman would not talk about his love affairs." The first four verses, then, I take it, mean, "What sort of talk is this from you, who have publicized your unique devotion to Cynthia, being the

¹ It would be tempting, especially if the poem is to be taken closely with Elegy 23, to imagine that verses 1-4 are spoken by a girl, or a couple of girls, that Propertius has picked up on the Sacred Way—"What do *you* want with us, when everybody knows about you and Cynthia?" It is a strong argument against this, that such girls are thereafter in the poem referred to in the third person, not the second; but in such a rapid poet as Propertius it is not necessarily a conclusive argument.

kind of person that doesn't worry about polite conventions of reticence?"

Verses 5-16 contain Propertius' answer. "It's all Cynthia's fault. But the fact is, I find this way of life such a saving that I don't mind her perfidy." In verse 5, either *tam*, or, with Beroaldus and the *deteriores*, *iam*, will make sense. In the lack of a specific reference for *tam*, *iam* makes better sense, in the colloquial meaning of *quod si iam* = 'but if in fact.'² In verse 6, *nequitiae caput* need not imply a comparative rating, still less anything like leadership. Marklanc, no feeble Latinist, considered it a periphrasis for *nequam*, a somewhat slangy periphrasis, perhaps, as is appropriate in this context.³

The *infamia* invoked in verse 7, is, of course, nonsense. Rome in the twenties was not so puritanical as all that. It is incredible that Virgil thought he was exposing Gallus to universal obloquy in depicting him as an amatory poet and a forsaken lover. Horace did not strike Tibullus from his list of friends. Valgius Rufus did not fail to become consul. Propertius himself apparently gained access to the circle of Maecenas precisely by publishing amatory verses. Horace retained the friendship of Augustus in spite of all confessions of amatory frailty and repulse. Indeed, when that witty man, the Emperor, gave Horace the *ius trium litterarum*, it is at least a fair guess that he believed the poet, though a bachelor, had earned the award. The pose Propertius strikes here is nonsensical, but it seems to have been an acceptable pose, or even a normal convention. Perhaps, too, in Perugia Propertius had been brought up in a stricter provincial code, and carried it over. Horace, *Od.*, I, 27 suggests that it was bad form to name names, publicly; but Horace himself made lavish use of pseudonyms. In any case,

² Lucretius, a good authority for polite colloquial usage in Latin verse, several times has *quod si iam* in the same sense as our "Now if —" to introduce a supposition, or *si iam* = "if in fact." See III, 766, V, 125; I, 386, 968, II, 974, and cf. I, 625, 758, II, 314, 426, 430, 447, IV, 185, V, 632. The same use of *si iam* occurs in Cicero, e.g. *De Or.*, I, 50, 218; 58, 246 and 250.

³ See the note to II, 18, 86 in the younger Burman's posthumous edition of 1780; and compare *putidum caput*, *App. Verg.*, *Catalepton*, 6, 2, and the Plautine objurgations, *periuri caput*, *Rud.*, 1099; *scelerum caput*, *Bacch.*, 829, *Mū.*, 454, *Rud.*, 1098, where no particular primacy is in question, but simply something like 'perjury incarnate,' etc.

the pleasure of notoriety as a poet was more than ample compensation for any infamy one might incur as one of Rome's thousands and thousands of lovers.

The collocation in verse 8 of *nomine* and *verba* suggests a play on words. *Verba dare* does not mean simply 'to deceive.' It is to give words instead of deeds; or, of cash, to cheat someone of his due, to fail to pay one's debts. This, in view of the emphasis on money matters that pervades the whole poem, makes it likely that the image in *nomine* is the bookkeeping image, of a ledger heading. One might toy with emendations of *quamvis*: e. g. *ureret et quavis*; or *ureret et quovis nomine*; or *ureret, et quovis nomine verba darem*; but none of these seems unquestionably superior to all other readings, though the third is syntactically easier than some. In any case, the general sense seems clear: if Cynthia were more compliant, there would be less publicity.

Verses 9 and 10 furnish additional justification for finding a commercial metaphor in *nomine* and *verba darem*: *viles* certainly means 'cheap,' and the *quare* must look back to some mention or suggestion of expense. The Romans took seriously the expense of the profligate life, and did not hesitate to say so. The comedies are full of examples. Cicero's *Pro Caelio* provides admirable indication of the almost parallel emphasis on damage to reputation and to property:

- 18, 42 *Parcat iuventus pudicitiae suae, ne spoliēt alienam, ne effundat patrimonium, ne foenore trucidetur.*
 43 *quorum partim rimia libertas in adulescentia, partim profusa luxuries, magnitudo aeris alieni, sumptus, libidines nominarentur.*
 19, 44 *At vero in M. Caelio . . . nulla luxuries reperietur, nulli sumptus, nullum aes alienum.*

The same atmosphere dominates verse 10. *Num tibi causa levis* is not an anxiously solemn, but a sarcastic question. No one, particularly no respectable Roman, can think that expense does not matter. Whatever the difficulties, *parcius* here must mean 'more inexpensively.' Enk (*Comm. Crit.*, p. 147), contending that *parcius* must equal *minus*, approvingly quotes Belling to the effect that the adverb *parce* may be used only when *parcere* can be asserted of the subject of the verb. This is not a very helpful formulation. One might argue that the inex-

pensive young ladies can certainly be said to be more sparing, more considerate, financially; but presumably it is meant that the 'sparing' must be limited to the activity denoted by the verb. This may be lexicographically unimpeachable; but is it credible in Augustan Rome, or in any class-conscious society, that a man's social standing should be the higher, the lower is the social standing of the women he notoriously consorts with? In fact, we have good evidence that for Rome in that period this was not so, the evidence of Horace, *Sat.*, I, 2, 58-9: *est cum meretricibus, unde fama malum gravius quam res trahit*. Propertius and Horace are in full agreement here—the voice of experience, we may assume, in both cases—"they do your reputation no good, but they're comparatively easy on your purse." The very success of Belling's argument tells against it; for *parcius* should then imply not merely 'less,' but 'deliberately less,' as it does in the quotation from Horace, *Od.*, I, 25, 1. *parcius iunctas quatunt fenestras*, etc. adduced by Enk in his edition of Book II. If Propertius had wanted to say *minus* he could quite easily have worked it into the line (he uses it eleven times, *parcius* nowhere else); but if he wanted to say 'more cheaply,' how was he to do it? *Minoris* he could not use if he wished to keep *infamant*; *vilius* he would not wish to use immediately after the *viles* of the preceding line.

There is no need to postulate a lacuna at this point. What follows has nothing to do with Cynthia. We underrate her tastes if we think the cheap, vulgar presents enumerated here have anything to do with her style and standard of living. They are not what a Cynthia demands; they are all the *viles* ask. We are meant to picture Propertius walking along the Sacred Way, flaunting his *nequitia*, with a girl on each arm, Phyllis perhaps on one arm, Teia on the other; as they walk, the girls are attracted by the flashy trinkets in the shops, and want him to price them. Of course, as Enk insists, *poscere* does not equal *emere* (though if *cupit poscere* equals *cupide poscit*, it was inconsiderate of Propertius not to write *et cupide . . . poscit eburnos*). These, we may be sure, were not fixed-price establishments; bargaining was the rule. He is to make an offer. Doubtless the girls would be pleased if he bought, but they have no hold on him; it's always worth trying, though, and they want to make what they can out of the encounter.

With this interpretation, *et* cannot stand in verse 11; we must, with Lachmann, read *haec*. To balance this, we might read *haec* also at the beginning of verse 13; but this would not suffice to make the line satisfactory. *Iratum* sounds extravagant for whatever annoyance Propertius might have felt at being pestered to buy these cheap presents, whoever asked for them, and it is in flat contradiction with verse 15. Why should he lose his temper? What does one expect in such circumstances? And what sane woman chooses a time when a man is already in a bad temper to pester him for gifts? *Iratum* must go. I suggest: *et cupit haec tantum*. This not only balances the previous *haec*, but disposes of the difficulty of the isolated *modo* of verse 11. *Tantum* responds to *modo*. "This one asks only . . . this (other) one merely. . . ." The one *cupit* will serve for both the parallel phrases, each consisting of two members and each filling a distich. The gifts in verses 11 and 12, the fan and the ball, are linked by a common dependence on *manibus habere*; this linkage eases the dependence of both lines on the postponed *cupit*. Once we get rid of the far-fetched idea that Cynthia throws Propertius into a passion of anger by a preposterously expensive request for ivory dice or other cheap gifts, it is not necessary to have recourse to Enk's ingenious interpretation of *iam* as 'into the bargain.' The common meaning 'now' is quite adequate.

In verse 15, the second *si* should be retained. Propertius cares nothing about these trivial expenses, and just as little, now, about Cynthia's cheating. In short, "The hell with Cynthia; this is the life."

Most of those who have struggled with the poem seem to betray a suspicion that they are at best waging a valiant combat against the probabilities of language and of human nature. This interpretation, at the price of one or two mild emendations, hopes to present a lively and plausible situation. It may seem like a great deal of trouble to take over a very slight poem; but if it helps to relieve Propertius of a charge of owl-eyed solemnity, and restore him to a credible humanity, the trouble will not have been wasted.

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THE WORD *ιωή* IN HOMER AND HESIOD.

There is something puzzling about the meaning and behavior of the word *ιωή* in epic poetry. It is usually translated as "loud sound," "roaring" of the wind or of a blazing fire, etc. Boisacq¹ derives it from **μφωσά* but Frisk² and others tend to agree on the onomatopoetic *ίω* as the parent form.

I venture to suggest that the meaning which is usually given to the word *ιωή* does not seem appropriate in all the passages in which it occurs. In fact, in half of the cases found in Homer and Hesiod the meaning "loud sound" seems to me unacceptable. A close examination of the lines in which the word *ιωή* occurs shows that difference in meaning is also accompanied by difference in prosodic behavior.

Let us turn our attention to the pertinent Homeric passages and see whether certain questions can be raised regarding the commonly accepted meaning and derivation of *ιωή*:

- I *Πρῶτον ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆα Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντον
ἐξ ὕπνου ἀνέγειρε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ
φθεγξάμενος· τὸν δ' αἶψα περὶ φρένας ἤλυθ' ἰωή*
(*Il.*, X, 137-9)
- II . . . ἀγχίμολον δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ δῖος ἰφορβός
στήτην ἐρχομένω, περὶ δέ σφεας ἤλυθ' ἰωή
φόρμιγγος γλαφυρῆς . . . (*Od.*, XVII, 260-2)
- III Ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀπὸ σκοπιῆς εἶδεν νέφος αἰπόλος ἀνὴρ
ἐρχόμενον κατὰ πόντον ὑπὸ ζεφύροιο ἰωῆς
(*Il.*, IV, 275-6)
- IV Πολλὸν δὲ τρόφι κῦμα κυλίνδεται, ὑψόσσε δ' ἄχνη
σκιδναται ἐξ ἀνέμοιο παλυνπλάγκτοιο ἰωῆς
(*Il.*, IX, 307-8)
- V Ὅρσεο, διογενὲς Πατρόκλεις, ἱπποκέλευθε,
λεύσσω δὴ παρὰ νηυσὶ πυρός δηΐοιο ἰωῆν
(*Il.*, XVI, 126-7)

In cases I, II *ιωή* clearly means "sound," the sound of the human voice and that of the lyre respectively. In *Il.*, X, 137-9

¹ *Dict. Étymol.*, s. v.

² *Etymol. Wōrt.*, s. v.

the participle *φθεγξάμενος* leaves no doubt as to the nature of *ῥῳή*. It is a *φθόγγος*, the articulate sound of human voice. In *Od.*, XVII, 260-2, we can be absolutely sure that it is the sound of the musical instrument. Incidentally, the proximity of Nestor to Odysseus in the first case does not require that Nestor speak loudly. Again, there is no reason why the sound of the lyre should be thought of as unusually loud; the expression *ἀγχίμολον . . . στήτην* makes it clear that both Odysseus and his companion stood close to the singer. Very interesting is also the use of the verb *ἤλυθε* which may be telling us something about the Homeric man's concept of sound as something which travels or flies as in the case of *ἔπεα πτερόεντα*. In cases III, IV, V, however, the form *ῥῳή* may not, as I hope to show, mean "sound," or "noise." The use of the English word "blast" in translating the last three examples is both convenient and confusing. Let us, for the sake of the argument, adhere to the meaning "noise," perhaps loud noise in this case. Then, let us ask ourselves whether it stands to reason to think of the "loud noise" of Zephyrus as driving a cloud forth (III) or of the "loud noise" of the wind as scattering the crest of a wave into foam. It is, however, in case V where, in my opinion, it is obvious that *ῥῳή* cannot possibly refer to noise. If we are to accept the usual rendition of *ῥῳή*, *λεύσσω πρὸς . . . δῆϊτοιο ῥῳήν* should mean *I see the "roaring" of the destructive fire*. This seems a highly unlikely expression, particularly in the light of the careful use of verbs which mean "to see" in Homer. The verb *λεύσσω* means "to see" and, when governing a direct object, it is followed by a word which denotes something which can be seen or gazed upon (cf. *Od.*, VIII, 200; XXIII, 124; *Il.*, I, 120; V, 771; XVI, 127; XIX, 19). According to Bruno Snell the verb means "to see something bright" and "connotes certain sensations experienced in the act of seeing, particularly in the seeing of specific objects."³ *Εἶδεν* in *Il.*, IV, 275 and *λεύσσω* here definitely suggest direct visual and not auditory perception.

There is another reason which might prompt one to suppose that not only the meaning but also the origin of the form *ῥῳή* in cases I, II, is different from that of the supposedly same form in cases III, IV, V. This other reason is the absence of elision and

³ Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Harper Torchbook, 1960), p. 3.

the resultant hiatus in all three cases in which the word does not seem to mean "sound." It is indeed possible that this is not a mere coincidence. I feel that Monro's statement that the -ο of -οιο is not subject to elision is too categorical a statement since the later ending -ου may indeed, when found in the arsis of a dactyl and before vowel, stand for an original οι'(ο).⁴ Hiatus is tolerated in Homer, but in a great number of instances an initial ϝ is involved. It is not inconceivable to assume that an initial digamma of a form (ϝ)ιωή is responsible for the non-elision of the final short vowel of *ξεφύροιο, πολυπλάγκτοιο, δηττοιο*. Now *ιωή* as a derivative from *ιώ* does not possess an initial ϝ, but the form *ιωή* may stand for two different words deriving from unrelated sources (cf. the English word "limb").

It is possible that the form *ιωή* in III, IV, V has nothing to do either etymologically or semasiologically with the same form in I, II. The short vowel hiatus should lead us at least to suspect an initial ϝ. Now there is the word *ιωκή* which is found in precisely the same part of the line after an unelided short vowel in II., V, 521 and 740. This word is obviously related to *ϝώκω*, a form found in a Corinthian inscription (Schwyzer, *Dial. Gr. Ex. Epigr.*, 122, 9). *ϝώκω* is related to Gr. (ϝ)ἵεμαι, (ϝ)ἵς, Latin *vis*, and Skr. *√vī* "enjoy," with semantic development from "rush with force toward." The meaning of *ϝώκω*, which stands to *διώκω* as (ϝ)ἵεμαι does to *δίεμαι*, is "to press forward," to "pursue," and *ιωκή* properly means "pressing forward," "pursuit," "drive," "thrust." I am inclined to think that *ιωή* in III, IV, V is a word which is related to *ιωκή* and has the same origin and meaning. According to Frisk the κ in *ϝώκω* is an "erweiterung wie in *ἐρύκω*. . . ."⁵ It is not unreasonable to postulate a form **ϝωέω* to which (ϝ)ιωή would stand as *ἐρωή* does to *ἐρωέω*. A digammated form (ϝ)ιωή: **ϝιωέω* would be older than (ϝ)ιωκή but would have the same meaning and ultimately the same derivation. If my conjecture be correct, (ϝ)ιωή would mean essentially what (ϝ)ιωκή means and would have no etymological or semasiological connection with *ιωή*: *ιώ*. The possibility that, for example, *ἀνέμιο ιωή* stands for an original *ἀνέμοιο ιωκή*

⁴ See D. B. Monro, *Homerio Grammar* (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 349; and P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* (Paris, Klincksieck, 1958), p. 194.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, s. v. *διώκω*.

cannot be dismissed altogether, but since *ιωκή* is found elsewhere there is no reason to press the point that, as time passed, the singers replaced a less familiar form with the better understood *ιωή*: *ιώ* by associating the wind with noise and ignoring the contextual semasiological discrepancy and the unusual prosodic behavior of the form.

At this point we should take a look at the prosodic behavior of *ιωκή* and its related forms *ιωχμός*, and *-ιωξίς* in Homer and Hesiod. In *Il.*, V, 521 and 740, οὔτε *ιωκάς*, κρύεσσα *ιωκή*, we may attribute non-elision to an initial *ϕ*. The metaplastic accusative of the word found in *Il.*, X, 601 fails to show a *ϕ* effect. ἀν' *ιωχμόν* in *Il.*, VIII, 89 and 128 and ἀσπέτον *ιωχμοῖο* in Hes., *Th.*, 683 show no digamma effect. *-ιωξίς* occurs only in the compounds *προῖωξίς* and *παλῖωξίς* (*Il.*, XII, 71; and XV, 69 and 601; also Hes., *Asp.*, 154). Neither compound excludes a *ϕ*. The *-ι* is considered long *metri gratia* (Liddell-Scott, s. v.), but it is possible that *προῖωξίς* is an analogical formation on *παλῖωξίς* and that the long *-ι* in the latter goes back to a form **παλιϕῖωξίς* with disappearance of intervocalic *ϕ* and subsequent lengthening because of contraction. Had *ιωξίς* been an undigammated form at the time of compounding, we should have a form *παλινῖωξίς* just as we have *παλινόρσος* (*Il.*, III, 33). This explanation of the vowel length here may not be necessary since the root from which the form seems to have come so frequently exhibits a long vowel (cf. Gr. (*ϕ*)ῖς, L. *vis*). The lines in which the related *ἔμαι* occurs in Homer are many. It does show the long radical vowel and frequently, though not consistently, its prosodic behavior justifies us in assuming an initial *ϕ* as in οἴκαδε ἱεμένων (*Il.*, II, 124; cf. also *Od.*, XXI, 72).

A digammated form (*ϕ*)*ιωή* < √*ϕι* would account for the short vowel hiatus in *Il.*, IV, 276; XI, 308; XVI, 127 and would make much better sense in terms of meaning and even imagery. Its meaning would neither denote nor connote sound but, rather, "force," "drive," "thrust," a meaning found in the related forms already mentioned, including *ἔμαι* (cf. *Il.*, XII, 274, ἀλλὰ πρόσσω ἔσθε). Professor Lattimore translates ὑπὸ ζεφύροιο *ιωῆς* with "before the drive of the West wind," and ἐξ ἀνέμοιο πολυπλάγκτω *ιωῆς* with "before the force of the veering wind's blast." These renditions are, of course, accurate and not at variance with my hypothesis. This is remarkable in view of the

fact that standard dictionaries render *ῥῳῆ* in a way which implies only sound and, to my knowledge, there has been no suggestion to the contrary (cf. Frisk's *Etym. Wört.*, s. v.: Schall, Geschrei, Getöse, Gebrause). Lattimore translates *Il.*, XVI, 127 with "I see how the ravening fire goes roaring over our vessels." I presume that in this case *ῥῳῆ* was taken to mean "roar" and was applied to fire as the qualifying adjective "roaring." I think that here, too, *ῥῳῆ* cannot signify any sort of sound. It has already been mentioned that *λέσσω* governs the accusative of a noun which stands for something that can be seen. A "roar" cannot be seen and it seems that what we have here is a reference to the visual perception of the fire "pressing forward." Therefore, I suggest that we render the line with "I do see the consuming fire thrusting forward upon the ships"; "advancing" might be another word for *ῥῳῆ* here.

Our word occurs in Hesiod's *Theogony* in line 682. In lines 681-3 we read:

... ἔνοσις δ' ἵκανε βαρεῖα
 Τάρταρον ἡμέροντα, ποδῶν τ' αἰπεῖα ῥῳῆ
 ἀσπέτου ῥῳχοῖο βολάων τε κρατερῶων.

There is no doubt that *ῥῳῆ* here means sound. *ἵκανε* . . . *ῥῳῆ* is very much like *ἤλυθ'* *ῥῳῆ* in conveying the idea of traveling sound. Further, *ῥῳχοῖο* in line 683 militates against a form with the same basic meaning in the preceding line. *ῥῳῆ* here obviously refers to the din produced by the stamping of feet and the onrush (*ῥῳχμός*) of missiles. Yet, although there is no initial *ρ* in *ῥῳῆ* < *ῥῳ* we have a short vowel hiatus. It is not a notion of "illicit" hiatus but, rather, the fact that short vowels rarely remain unelided when found before another vowel that prompts me to suggest an extant variant reading as the more probable one. Besides Hermann's reading which is given above, we also have a reading *αἰπεῖα τ' ῥῳῆ* which is found in the *Etymologicum Genuinum* under *ἔνοσις*. If this be the better reading, then, in Homer and Hesiod in the three cases in which *ῥῳῆ* signifies "sound" of some kind there is elision of the preceding short vowel. Conversely, in the three cases in which it means "drive" "onrush," "thrust" there is no elision but, instead, hiatus of the kind in which an initial *ρ* is involved. It may be interesting to note in passing that in the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius, III, 703-9:

ὄρω δ' ἰωή
 λεπταλέη διὰ δώματ' ὀδυρομένων . . .

where the word refers to the cry of lamentation we have elision.

In view of the above, I propose that we treat ἰωή <ἰώ as a completely different word from (ϝ)ἰωή in both meaning and derivation. Further, I suggest that (ϝ)ἰωή and (ϝ)ἰωκή have essentially the same meaning and are both derived from the same ultimate source, the root $\sqrt{\text{ϝ}i}$, the former through *ϝιωέω and the latter through ϝιώκω.

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REVIEWS.

OTTO SEEL. *Weltdichtung Roms. Zwischen Hellas und Gegenwart.*
Berlin, Argon Verlag, 1965. Pp. 527.

This book is rather hard to describe. Like its immediate predecessor—Seel's 1964 *Römertum und Latinität*—it is both a work of popularization, obviously aimed at the non-specialist, and an attempt to develop a rather unusual thesis of particular concern to Latin scholars. Broadly speaking, Seel is a defender of Latin (here especially of Latin poetry) as the very essence, so to speak, of the great classical tradition that is not only the root but the living substance of all genuine culture today. This is not just because Rome occupies the chronological interim between Greece and ourselves but because Rome and Latin have a unique applicability to modern as well as pre-modern men. As Seel sees it, the Latin language and the 'style' of Latin literature (Latin poetry especially) lack the 'patina,' the historical encrustation and distance, of Greek—they are in this sense timeless, accessible, usable—and this is why Latin poetry is, unlike Greek, universal or world poetry (*Weltdichtung*) and is also so much more than a mere heritage from the past,—rather indeed a 'hidden' force at work, often unconsciously, in much of the most important and original modern literature. Whereas Greek poetry is highly individualistic and compounded of individual geniuses, Latin poetry has a common 'style' that counts far more than any single individual or individual style. In this, according to Seel, its force really consists. Greek literature may be greater but Latin is more accessible, influential, contemporary.

This is a most interesting thesis. Obviously its validity depends not only on the definition of the main concept (Roman 'style') but on its application to both Roman and modern literature. In other words, can such an idea be made sufficiently concrete? Is it possible to show exactly what the common element in Roman style is and how this element really operates in modern literature? Here I must admit that Seel (as I read him) does not put up the evidence that warrants affirmative answers to these questions. His numerous examples are not, as I see it, anything like this kind of evidence. There is also much vagueness, much unsupported or at least very unclear generalization. In part, this is because of the popular slanting of the book: though he often gives the Latin of his numerous translations (many his own and often very felicitous), he cannot, in the nature of the case, give us much close verbal analysis or 'style' in its most definite sense. Moreover, he has so much to cover (practically all Latin poetry, not to mention its later influence) and can take so little for granted (for the book is directed to the general public), that he is often confined in effect to *obiter dicta*, interesting *obiter dicta* to be sure but far, far short of convincing evidence or proof.

But these considerations, broadly true as I think they are, indicate the limits rather than the value or interest of Seel's book. His

thesis and his development of it point up the issue, the true 'problem' of Latin literature. They raise the salient questions, above all the great question of the identity—the really characterizing quality—of Latin literature or poetry. Moreover, I think Seel is clearly right in holding that there is a special relationship between the Romans and ourselves of a sort that does not exist between ourselves and the Greeks. His particular thesis does not, I think, really explain this relationship but it certainly brings it out as it has not been brought out before. In this review all I can do is to mention some of the more interesting points of his argument and then dwell a little on their fruitfulness for further discussion and research.

He starts with a consideration of Rome's chronological position between us and the Greeks (*Rom zwischen Hellas und Gegenwart*). Here he raises the very important question of the meaning of history or tradition. Is Latin poetry important only in an historical sense (that is, has its force been already expended in the production of modern literature) or does it have present meaning, still exert effective influence? Here, after some interesting reflections on historicism and anti-historicism, traditionalist and modernist, he makes the point that the tradition of Latin poetry (unlike Greek) is the product, not of a few great names but of many, lesser—second and third rate—figures. Present day scholars may 'rediscover' a new Horace, Virgil, or Ovid (as in Hermann Fränkel's 1935 *Ovid*) but these discoveries, even if true, are not really part of the tradition of Roman poetry: this is a manifestation of the Roman essence itself (p. 35), of the Roman *style*, which is really an impersonal or supra-personal creation. And, according to Seel, even the greatness of the great authors consists not in their departure from but their fulfillment of the traditional style: Tacitus is not so much different from as better than the *Historia Augusta*; we can neither take him as another Suetonius nor neglect the things that are common to both. What is important and living (even today) is the common style, not 'original' developments of it.

Then follows a section (pp. 57-104) on Roman influence and its Latin character (*Römische Strahlung und lateinische Prägung*). Here after a somewhat ambiguous discussion of Rome's universality or world-embracing character (*Welthaltigkeit und Weltoffenheit*)—Rome according to Seel, combines open frontiers, receptivity to the world, with roots in its own earth—he develops one of his major themes,—the difference between Greek individualism and Roman discipline. Between the Greek individual and the universal (*das Ich* and *das Universale*, p. 75) there were, as Seel sees it, no intermediate steps. But in Rome (unlike Greece) the *family* is paramount: there is a gradation of orders up to the whole community or commonality of Romans. Hence the 'fugitive' quality of Roman individualism and the relative importance of tradition, of Roman as opposed to private feelings. Seel here makes good use of the famous parable of Menenius Agrippa (the state as a living, indivisible body) and particularly of Livy's comparison of Alexander with the Roman people: the sheerly individual, in other words, against the organic whole. But *Roman* is not necessarily *Latin*: Latin literature is certainly, in one of its major aspects at least,

modelled on Greek. Romanizing is thus in no sense Latinizing and Latin literature cannot, therefore, lay direct claim to Roman reality. In fact, Latin literature is often imitative and classicizing or traditional in a quite pejorative sense. But Seel sees nonetheless an interaction—assisted by the open frontiers of Rome and the very 'fluidity' of the Latin language—that makes Latin and Roman and Greek combine in a unique *world* literature. Latin in virtue of its Roman and organic origin—its lack of hard and fast individualism—was thus the natural source of a common or supra-individual, supranational poetry.

The next section on Republican poetry is the longest of the book (pp. 105-278). It is prefaced by an extended discussion (105-27) of Roman development and of the mixed or conservative-progressive character of Roman society (*Entwicklung, Entfaltung, Bewahrung*). Here Seel comes back to the problem of the Roman social order. He contrasts the rampant individualism of Hellenistic society with Roman discipline: despite the power of such individuals as the Gracchi, Sulla, etc. and all the rest down to Cæsar and the Third Century A. D., the Roman norm, the Roman discipline in some sense held. But Rome was nevertheless no Sparta. Sparta produced no poetry after the Lyscurgan reform. Despite the obvious anti-intellectualism of much Roman society and the non-Roman provenience of most Latin literature, there was, nonetheless, no Spartan repression but instead a real—if often uncertain and half-hearted—patronage of literature of which the Scipionic circle of the mid-Second Century is just one example. Seel explains this pivotal fact in terms of the dichotomy: organizational and organic (*Organisatorische* and *Organische*). The Spartan state was just an organization based on governmental edict (*das starre Reglement*); Rome was an organic society and state. (We shall revert to this point later on: it is, it seems to me, a very good instance of how Seel generalizes without explaining.) Seel then applies this Roman 'organicism' to the problem of individualism once again. It explains why Roman poets had no 'development' in the modern sense (like e.g. Hölderlin and Goethe): they were simply not individuals enough to have a development. This is why, for example, Horace could alternate between styles—the *Odes* and *Satires-Epistles*—until the very end of his life or why the style of Tacitus' *Dialogus* is so unlike his *Histories* or why Seneca was both a serious moralist and the author of the *Apocolocyntosis*. The Roman poet had no personal development, no continuity of mood or rôle,—at least to the degree or in the sense that a modern poet has. Nor had he any real sense of history: his past was really contemporary with his present, as we can see for example in Livy's use of early Roman history. Hence the transcendence, the atemporality or eternity of Roman ideas, and hence also their contemporaneity. Here also the Roman language made a great difference: it was not like Greek a finished language but a very active one that always forced its user to refashion, repossess his own ideas. To Seel, Greek poetry and art are aesthetic wholes that can only be contemplated passively whereas Roman poetry at least is a working tradition that must be used. It is on this that its whole meaning as *world-poetry* depends.

I cannot go into Seel's discussion of Plautus and Terence, of

Lucretius and Catullus in any detail. I cannot see that he really proves his general points,—especially that of the super-individual, world-poetical ‘style.’ But he makes a number of good observations. He makes much of Plautus’ use of language and strongly urges his artistry (the artfulness indeed explains the Plautine naturalism). He treats Terence, in the now usual fashion, as a serious dramatist rather than a writer of comedies. He makes a wise distinction between modern Plautine and Terentian scholarship (the new Menander finds, plot studies metric, stage technique, etc.) and the actual and very considerable influence of the plays. “Hardly anywhere,” he rightly says, “is the direct continuity (i.e. of Roman poetry) so clearly visible as in comedy” (p. 169). Even Seneca’s tragedy is only a poor second. But how does this influence (on Hroswitha, Molière, Shakespeare and so many others) constitute a ‘style’ in Seel’s sense? Was it the unique Latin artistry of Plautus that was copied or the language of Terence? Or was it, as Seel seems to imply, their comic spirit, the very poetry that they transmitted? Seel ascribes their present-day neglect to the “searching and uncertain” mind of the present generation. Never again, he admits, can they expect the “naïve and spontaneous” acceptance of a Hroswitha or a Luther but they remain something that is still a “fundamental part of our own being” (*fundamentaler Bestandteil unseres eigens Wesens*). Again, what does this really mean?

He is, I think, very good on Lucretius. Much that he says is more or less the common property of modern Lucretian scholarship: that is of course inevitable. But he writes well on the old problem of the apparent contradiction between the elaborate pseudo-science and the splendid poetry. Lucretius, as he sees him, is trying to replace the dualism of matter and spirit by a new monism of “spiritual matter and materialistic spirituality.” He does not ‘demagize’ (*entzaubern*) the world, like a modern scientist, but rather sees it as magic all through. The science, as most scholars now agree, is very much subordinated to the ‘religious’ aim, the attempt to answer the problem of happiness or rather to find happiness in this peculiar kind of atheistic-magical cosmology. On the poetry itself, Seel makes a number of happy observations: the contrast of books; the miniature painting; the way Lucretius presents, not describes, his sensuous scenes; the empathy of his animals. Seel does not see any important direct continuity of influence deriving from Lucretius but finds his major significance in the fact that he for the first time gives us a structure of knowledge—knowledge of oneself and one’s world—in virtue of which all the details become a visible, coordinated unity. Epicurus did not do this, for his materialism was warped by a very personal, self-conscious humanity. Lucretius alone lived in an utterly non-human, amoral cosmos and only found feeling, a sort of humanity or substitute-humanity, in the world of animals and of matter. Here Seel may be right—I have tried to give his views accurately—but again I fail to see how his interpretation helps us to understand Lucretius’ poetry as part of a common style or tradition. Seel’s criticism—which is often very good—does not really fit his thesis. We shall presently come to the reason for this.

His discussion of Catullus chiefly concerns the so-called problem

of the 'two Catulluses': the pure lyricist of the shorter poems and the 'precious' Alexandrian of the long *Peleus-Thetis* (64). This problem bothers Seel because it has only been 'solved'—in his view—by the very recent studies of such men as Weinreich and Klingner: here, therefore, is a misunderstanding not just of the 19th Century but of the last 2,000 years! For there is no doubt that the famous Catullus is the lover of Lesbia and the elegist of his dead brother, not the author of the long 64. But Seel reasons that Catullus, for all that, has not really been misunderstood (he still belongs to the common Latin 'style'); we have only added another dimension to our comprehension of his craftsmanship. I cannot but think that Seel has here dodged the real literary-critical problem. Klingner may have shown that the *Peleus-Thetis* is more of a work of art than had been thought (in any event the Alexandrians whom Catullus followed prided themselves on their variety, their mastery of several styles; they were very good poets who could be simple as well as 'precious' in our sense) but this recognition does not require us to exalt it above the Lesbia poems or to make no distinctions of poetical merit and value. In fact, Klingner's analysis of 64 is not really literary-critical so much as it is technical and explanatory of the author's design. The hexameter of Catullus was as yet far from the perfection of Virgil's or even Ovid's, whereas his hendecasyllables and elegies were evident masterpieces. If Catullus had written the *Orpheus-Eurydice* of the 4th *Georgic*, there would have been no problem. And the parallel is a good one since the technical balance and virtuosity of the *Aristaeus* (and enclosed *Orpheus*) as well as of the *Georgics* as a whole have been also misunderstood to much the same degree as the *Peleus-Thetis*. But for all that, few throughout the ages have doubted the literary merit of the *Orpheus*, though here too Klingner and others have shed a good deal of new light.

In dealing with the Augustans (pp. 279-377 for Virgil and Horace; he groups Ovid and the elegists with the post-Augustans) Seel at last encounters the full problem of 'classical' poetry. If Horace and Virgil are not in the 'style,' there is indeed no such thing at all. Seel starts by recognizing that Augustan poetry comes from a vast variety of heterogeneous sources (especially Hellenistic) and seethes with imported and inherited motifs and *topoi*, but he thinks that this is largely superficial. The 'depths' of Latin, especially Augustan poetry, reveal a fundamental unity of style. For one thing, he stresses the prosaic, realistic character of Latin poetry. The Greeks drew a great distinction between poetry and prose: not so the Romans. This is really rooted in the very nature of the Latin language. It is not primarily, a language adapted to sensuous description of tangible things: it is rather functional, ambiguous, many-leveled. This is why Latin poetry requires a definite form and content if it is not to disintegrate into nonsense. In this respect, Seel thinks that Cicero's classicism was justified: poets should eschew the incoherent novelty and adopt the coherently traditional. Nevertheless, Latin had to 'mature' before it could make full use of a 'classical' form and content. Here Seel employs T. S. Eliot's famous definition of the *classical* as the *mature*. Virgil was *the classic* of the west because he wrote

in an era of linguistic, poetical, and cultural maturity. But the essential element in this maturity was, of course, Rome itself, the Roman idea come to full self-consciousness, Roman *humanitas*. Augustanism, from this point of view, is Hellenistic culture given Roman solidity and feeling.

Yet Seel has difficulty in approaching Virgil from this point of view. He has to deal with the famous alienation from Virgil (*Virgil-Fremdheit*) that prevailed in Germany until about the first third of the present century. Yet he does not (to my mind) succeed in explaining it. It is easy for us to see (here Richard Heinze, whom Seel most strangely does not mention, was the true founder of the modern and almost certainly correct interpretation of Virgil) that Virgil gave a completely Roman cast to the Homeric model. (Seel himself shows quite admirably how Virgil came to adapt Homer to a new type of hero.) But if this is so, how came so many (especially Germans) to misunderstand the *Aeneid*, to think of Virgil as only a second-rate Homer? They can hardly be said to have turned their backs on an attested fact, since in reality our present understanding of Virgil is a relatively recent phenomenon, not anticipated by the Renaissance or the Middle Ages or, seemingly, by antiquity itself. Seel only saves Virgil for the common 'style' by the curious device of denying him originality. Virgil's greatness, he declares, consists in his representativeness, *not* his originality (p. 328). Aeneas incarnates, as it were, Roman and Augustan *pietas*. Even if so many did not understand him, his real meaning was nonetheless 'hidden' in the 'style,' the tradition of Latin poetry. In one sense, of course, Seel is here stating a truism: in another, he seems to me to be standing the very concept of originality on its head. To renew an obsolete or very obsolescent genre by such a prodigious rethinking of all its ingredients was in its way a feat of originality such as no other (Latin, Greek, or modern) culture can show. One can, of course, make a good case for denying Virgil the sort of 'originality' to be found in Homer, Aeschylus, Shakespeare, or Goethe. But Seel, as I understand him, is not making such a case. It is true that Virgil's 'Romanism' is paramount and that he is in this sense representative, but all authors are in some sense representative of their age and its ideas. The best have the happy facility of summing up their age, of expressing its values, problems, etc. and their bearing on human nature itself. That Virgil was not, like some, in revolt against the official ideology does not really affect the problem. Revolt and conformity are alike 'representative' of their time. The real problem of Virgil's originality is one of his *poetical* creativity,—his ability to mould language, create character, produce effects. On this it seems to me Seel says little, except indeed to dwell on a number of well-known passages (like *lacrimae rerum*) and to make remarks (some quite felicitous) on Virgil's feeling for nature (in the *Eucolics* and *Georgics*), his love of the Italian land, etc. But there is no real literary criticism, no attempt to analyze the language, the characterizations, the narrative, etc.

As for Horace, Seel is likewise interesting and likewise unable to make him conform to the overall thesis of the book. Seel starts by commenting on three sides or aspects of Horace: the jovial epicurean; the moralist; the Roman patriot. He attempts to recon-

cile them in terms of the famous phrase of Nietzsche: *feierliche Leichtsinn* which can perhaps be rendered in English as 'levity in the grand style' or 'festive wit.' Horace raises his private or personal experience to the level of public truth and general validity. He passes with apparent ease from hortatory moralizing to humorous self-deprecating, from the Pindaric ode to the Lucilian *sermo*. He mixes the incompatibles; he is solemn and humorous at one and the same time. How is such a man to be assimilated to the 'classicism,' the maturity that Eliot and Seel find in Virgil? Seel is here very doubtful (p. 376): "Horace's specific greatness lies, at one time, in his art: at another time, in his upright, sensible and exemplary humanity." This may be true but it does not, I think, help us much. But Seel at any rate sees the problem: the very fact that Horace does not fit the mould is interesting and suggestive.

In his chapter on the elegists, Ovid, and the Silver Age (Laurel and Silver Roses), Seel diverges from the usual definition of the Augustan Age (though he recognizes the futility of sharp temporal limits), and sees the elegists and Ovid as a sort of post-Augustan phenomenon,—not really exemplars of the high classical style. Virgil and Horace correspond to the great monuments—e.g., the Altar of Peace; the others to the intricately decorative silver-work of Hildesheim and Boscoreale. Roman elegy, of course, did have a common style (as everybody recognizes, though here again Seel might have said a word for Richard Heinze) but how is one to account for Ovid's *Metamorphoses*? Seel does not, but assumes (incorrectly, I think) that he is to be treated as an elegist since he after all returned to elegy in the *Fasti*. (This I doubt: the relative dating of *Fasti* and *Metamorphoses* is uncertain and a few bits of the *Fasti* were revised at Tomis but in general I think the *Fasti* preceded the *Metamorphoses*.) He quite misunderstands Ovid as I see it. Though he stresses his skill, craftsmanship, and elegance, he sees him as 'lacking in depth,' a mere transmitter of Greek material without deep understanding or feeling (p. 397). There is no need to argue the point here (cf. my recent book on Ovid). Suffice it to say that however un-nineteenth-century Seel's conception of Virgil may be, he makes amends in his picture of Ovid. Here Goethe could have helped him for Goethe really did appreciate the sensibility of Ovid, as for example in his memorable translation of the "Last night in Rome." Ovid of course was no Virgil or Horace but his rise from elegy into his own kind of epic was one of the most unusual and yet characteristic expressions of high Augustan art and feeling. On the Neronian figures—Lucan, Petronius, Seneca, Persius—Seel says little that is new. He does realize the great effort of these men to withstand the 'Ciceronianism,' the rhetorical *gleischaftung* that was to end or all but end original Latin poetry in the next century. He recognizes the true pathos of Lucan and, though he finds some poetry in Seneca's tragedies, he is not at all concerned to 'rehabilitate' them. He knows and says that Seneca is a great writer only in his prose.

What then is the truth (or is there truth?) in Seel's thesis? Has Rome really left us a common 'style' of poetry that can be called world or universal poetry? It is easy to show that Seel has not proved his case. For one thing, the actual ratio of influence to

original merit among authors is hardly compatible with it. Latin comedy, Ovid, Seneca's tragedies, to some extent elegy and the Virgilian pastoral have had the most evident and massive effect on later writers. The *Aeneid* was influential but the nature of its influence is certainly most curious: there are the epics of Silius Italicus and Valerius Flaccus and Statius (not mentioned by Seel!) and there are the Renaissance Latin epics (e.g. Petrarch's *Africa*) and the vernacular epics of Dante and Milton (Seel quite ignores Milton) and others of less importance (though a word should be said for Tasso and Camoens and even Klopstock and Robert Bridges). Here it is certainly a question whether Virgil did more harm or more good. Richard Bruère has shown, I think, very effectively that Ovid did Statius as much good as Virgil did him harm and a large chapter of recent English criticism concerns the danger of the latinity (really Virgilianism) of Milton's epic style. In any event, the case is not altogether clear; but it is quite clear, I think, that the post-Virgilian epic was based on a very considerable misunderstanding of Virgil and certainly a decided inability to imitate him. As for Lucretius, Catullus, and Horace, the direct influence was at best modest: the didactic epic had little future (Lucretius greatly affected the *Georgics* and this perhaps was his major contribution to the poetic 'style') and it is hard to see that the better lyricism of the moderns owes much to the Latin lyric. Horace, of course, was widely read but are there really so many good Horatian poets (Ronsard and Pope excepted)? In satire Horace and Juvenal did play a considerable rôle, but it is also quite limited.

What of course is the case is that Roman poetry was prolonged in the Latin poetry of the Middle Ages and Renaissance and that a vast stock of miscellaneous motifs, expressions, metres, and ideas was passed on to the vernacular literature. This is clearly the truth behind Seel's thesis of the common Latin 'style' of modern poetry. But this is a very different thing from 'style' or tradition, conceived as the product of a succession of great poets, each contributing his peculiar insight and sensibility to the main stream. And this is certainly *not* the kind of thing we do in fact find: what exert the influence are either inferior productions (like e.g. Seneca's tragedies) or extrinsic misunderstandings (as e.g. of most of the major authors); these really played a much more vital rôle than the Latin poetry Seel emphasizes in this book. For the most part, I think, Seel both understands and writes quite admirably about Lucretius, Catullus, Horace, etc. but these are not the Latin poets that really influenced Europe. It is all very well to talk, as Seel does, about a 'hidden' influence, but only when and if one recognizes that this is not the kind of influence we mean when we talk of feeling the greatness of Virgil or Horace. Historical influence is one thing; literary history and literary criticism are quite other matters. Seel seems to me to have confused the two. If he has not (and if it is really true, as he also says, that it was the second or third rate poets who actually transmitted the 'style'), then I can't see that the bulk of his book has any real point. For it was precisely the good, the major, the important things in Lucretius, Catullus, Virgil, etc. that were lost sight of in the long line of second and third rate imitations that winds its weary way from Silius Italicus

to the poets of the medieval 'ages' of Virgil and Ovid, of the Renaissance, and of the latter-day English Public School. As for the Latin language, it may in one sense be the active, functional entity that Seel describes but is this true of latter-day Latin verse,—of the neo-Latin epic and the elegy that is for the most part a cento of tags constructed according to a rigid standard of versification derived from Ovid? And is it true of most *vernacular* poetry?

Nevertheless, there is truth in the idea that Latin poetry has a meaning for us which Greek poetry has not. While Seel's theory does not (as I have intimated) account for this, it raises the issue, it presents us with the problem. The whole conception of *Welt-dichtung Roms* may be a chimera (I think it is) but Roman poetry nevertheless does have a message for this world. Seel at the very least invites us to discover what it is.

The event, of course, which classicists and indeed all educated men have had to take into account, is the rediscovery of Greek in the Renaissance and especially in the 19th century. Greek poetry came back to western Europe with the 15th Century but the general acceptance of Greek among the educated was both slow and restricted. It was only in the 18th century that Winckelmann, Lessing, Bentley, Porson, and others provided the scholarship and the enthusiasm which made Greek literature really accessible to educated men. Its main impact really coincided with the romantic movement: both together led to a decided reaction against Latin. In a sense, Latin paid a penalty for the 'Ciceronianism' and rhetorical formalism ('neo-classicism') that had set in after the second century: but, in any event, the sudden rediscovery of the great Greek poets would have had a profound effect. It was completely evident that Latin was a secondary literature dependent for its models and indeed for its very existence on its Greek predecessor. The originality of Rome in law, government and practical affairs was evident enough. Its literary originality was in the nature of things much less clear. Modern Latin scholarship—and here the names of Leo and Richard Heinze are certainly preeminent—has finally and painfully revealed this originality, though even here there is much to be done (witness e.g. Seel's own view of Ovid). Yet it cannot, I think, be said that Latin has yet emerged from the long shadow of Greek—especially so far as the general educated public is concerned.

There is, it seems to me, no way of changing or ignoring this piece of recent cultural history. Seel, as I read him, seems to feel that in a sense one can do just this,—that there is a 'hidden' Latin heritage, a 'style'—which, despite the overt reaction against Latin, is still at work, and is even somehow identical with the greatness of Latin literature which he, as a modern Latinist reaping the fruit of Leo, Heinze, Klingner, and the rest, can now desecry. There is some truth here, I think—that is to say, great authors such as Lucretius, Virgil, and Horace are really self-authenticating and do 'come through' even when the critics and scholars quite fail to understand or articulate the values they unconsciously feel. But this failure is itself a sign of the times: real appreciation needs and demands a good reason for its existence.

Speaking very generally, Latin literature and specifically Latin poetry have I think an appeal to moderns (as in a sense they have

had to pre-moderns) that Greek literature and poetry do not, even though there is not now and never has been any point in denying the original greatness of the Greeks,—the sense in which Homer, Aeschylus, Pindar, and others are so much more original and creative than the Latin poets. But where I feel the Latins are unique—where indeed there is something like a unique ‘style’ in Seel’s sense—is in their ability to see themselves and human nature from within, in their subjectivism, their psychological depth and self-awareness, their sense of history. By and large, I can see no true indication of this in all of Seel’s book. His contrast of Greeks and Latins is largely based on a contrast of Greek individualism with Roman discipline and community-consciousness. He always looks at the super-individual or ‘collectivist’ aspect of Latin poetry in order to posit its uniform or at least common ‘style.’ But in fact this contrast quite distorts the real problem. No one can doubt the reality of Roman *discipline*, of the Roman moral consensus, of the embeddedness of the primitive Roman in family, law, and state. In contrast, the Greeks were ‘individualistic,’ except indeed when forced into collective behavior by a rigid regime like that of Sparta. But it is also true that Rome somehow produced its own individualism, an individualism that is much closer to our own. No Greek that I know of has left a record of his personality such as that of Cicero. No Greek poet is as personal, as self-revealing as Catullus or Horace. This is no accident. Romans wanted to preserve personal records as Greeks did not and in any event, Greeks did not write in a comparably personal way.

Obviously, I cannot document all this in a book review: I have tried in fact to deal with the subject elsewhere. The point I want to make here is that Roman poetry really is much more modern—much closer to us—than Greek poetry in this personal, human way, this area which I may call self-consciousness, inner feeling and inner dialogue. And I think that despite his thesis, Seel has clearly seen this: it is especially evident to me in his account of Lucretius’ most un-Roman and yet also Roman ‘isolation’; he is at least aware of it as a Greek would not be. As for Virgil: is Aeneas not aware of his Romanness, his unique relation to past and future destiny, his personal reaction to this destiny, the sense in which he, despite himself, must be the bearer of a history? When we get to this dimension of Roman poetry, we discover something that is quite un-Greek.

I have been, as will be seen, critical of Seel. But the very length of this review may indicate how valuable his book really is. In my view, he raises fundamental issues: the nature of the Latin influence, what it means to us, why it is what it is. The very wrongness of his answer, if I may say so, sets us quite furiously to think. Finally, it must not be forgotten that the bulk of his book is often written despite, even against his thesis. In his accounts of Lucretius, Catullus, Virgil, Horace, he is usually highly perceptive and is looking at the poetry itself. To sum it all up: the book is perverse but very interesting.

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BROOKS OTIS.

BROOKS OTIS. *Ovid as an Epic Poet*. Cambridge, The University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv + 411. \$12.50.

I should imagine that Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is the most difficult major poem that the Graeco-Roman world has bequeathed to us. Precisely because of this, the literary critics have neglected it, seeking out the easier, more exciting areas of epic, drama, and lyric poetry, abandoning Ovid's poem to the mercies of source-hunters and the moralists who, like Augustus, disapprove of this frivolous, amatory anti-Augustan. The difficulty of the poem is due largely to its Alexandrian-Neoteric qualities, but not exclusively so. Had Ovid confined himself to the scope of most such Alexandrian poetry, he might have caused critics some anguish in assessing his tone and intention—as they feel with Callimachus and his followers—, but at least the general structure of the work as an “epyllion” or a narrative Apollonian epic would have been transparent. As it is, Ovid chose to produce (if we ignore Silius Italicus) the largest poetic work surviving to us after Homer's epics, what, by Callimachus' epigrammatic creed should have been the greatest evil, and he compounded his sin by apparently abandoning proper structural principles and loosely stringing together one story after another in a vague chronological scheme. What is the critic to do with such an incoherent mass? Most have preferred to leave it alone. Now at last, however, a distinguished critic has grappled with the basic problems of Ovid's masterpiece, to give us a readable and sympathetic interpretation of the work and to challenge the old handbooks with an entirely new structural description that makes of Ovid one of the most ingeniously sophisticated poets the world has seen.

Since Otis develops a thesis in this book, it seems best to summarize his argument before proceeding to estimate the individual strengths and weaknesses of this important study. We know that Ovid began work on the *Met.* about 1 B. C. and around the same time started to compose the *Fasti*. Both of these poems represented a departure from the amatory elegiac poetry which had occupied Ovid's attention before then (apart from the now-lost tragedy *Medea*), and Otis assumes, as do most critics, that Ovid had grown restless with elegy and was seeking new challenges to his genius. Nobody yet has demonstrated that the *Fasti* is prior to the *Met.*, but it is not unreasonable to adopt an evolutionary scheme and so treat the former as the first stage in the move from amatory elegy (for Ovid continued to use elegiac meter in the *Fasti*), the *Met.* as the definitive poetic advance into a new world of “epic.” Can we gain some insight into Ovid's intention by means of this evolutionary scheme? Yes, if we can assess the main qualities of the elegiac genre and of Ovid the elegiac poet. Otis, therefore, devotes the first part of his study to what he calls “the limitations of the elegist.”

Although, as Otis ably shows, Ovid had achieved astounding results with the long established elegiac conventions, the very nature of the meter and the material of elegy imposed an intolerable curb on his abilities. One could be witty, naughty, and urbane, enjoyable qualities in a sophisticated aristocratic society; one could hardly use elegy to create a major or serious poem. We must suppose, then, that Ovid at 40 became unhappy with what had

heretofore contented him, and determined to produce a major work. It was not possible for him merely to alter the tone of elegy and still employ the elegiac meter in which he had demonstrated such mastery, for there is something intrinsically "small" and emotionally slight in elegiac meter and what it forces on the poet. Here, Otis starts from the observations of Richard Heinze on the distinctions between Ovid's style in the *Fasti* and *Met.*, a monograph which has exerted incalculable influence, mostly good but partly bad, on readers of Ovid since 1919. Taking three poetic treatments of Hercules' battle with Cacus, *Aeneid*, VIII, 185 ff., Propertius, IV, 9, 1-20, and Ovid, *Fasti*, I, 543-78, Otis emphasizes the special features of the epic treatment and summarizes the limitations of elegy as follows: "It lacked the continuity, scope, seriousness and force of epic" (p. 35). Because of the formalized use of elegiac couplets by the Romans, the very meter created a jerky effect, constantly interrupting continuity. As Ovid discovered his talent for narrative and his dramatic abilities, the elegiac genre became too restrictive for him. To gain that amplitude for narrative and the chance for magnitude, he chose for his expansive *Met.* the epic hexameter.

Having defined what Ovid rejected and why, Otis describes in his next chapter what Ovid planned to do in the *Met.* The plan is indicated by the poet's own phrase, *carmen perpetuum*: he aimed to produce a "continuous song." That phrase, however, represents the Latin equivalent of a Callimachean phrase, and, since Callimachus pointedly rejected the single continuous epic, Ovid seems in opposition to the great Alexandrian. On the other hand, he did not intend to create a martial, heroic epic like the Homeric poems to which Callimachus alluded; his subject matter lacks the very continuity which a single narrative theme such as the *Iliad* would have provided. What, then, is this Ovidian continuity? Otis insists that Ovid planned "a single narrative whole" in a special sense. The chronological continuity from Creation down to Ovid's own day, while obvious, is too superficial to satisfy. More important is the stylistic continuity: the epic meter, diction, and narrative. Otis reviews Heinze's comparison between Ovid's two treatments of the Rape of Proserpina in *Fasti* and *Met.*, to show that Heinze correctly distinguished between elegiac and epic styles, but incorrectly attributed to Ovid's epic style the seriousness found in epic poets like Vergil. What Ovid actually created in his "epic" Rape of Proserpina was "a quite delightful human comedy." In his attempt to define that Ovidian stylistic unity, Otis then develops a series of comparisons between Ovid and Apollonius, Ovid and Callimachus, Ovid and the Neoterics, Ovid and Vergil. Still, even if Ovid did achieve a unified narrative style and a meter that hurried his audience along without interruption, what difference did it make if the poem as a whole consisted of a series of separate stories?

To answer that objection, Otis launches forth on his important thesis: the *Met.* is a meticulously planned poem, whose balanced, symmetrical structural units enabled Ovid to develop his themes and progress ingeniously towards his goal. Four Sections should be distinguished, to each of which a principal subject may be assigned:

I	<i>Met.</i> , I, 5-II, 875	The Divine Comedy
II	III, 1-VI, 400	The Avenging Gods
III	VI, 401-XI, 795	The Pathos of Love
IV	XII, 1-XV, 879	Rome and the Deified Ruler

Each Section has its own unity, but each Section forms part of the greater unity which is the whole poem. In the Divine Comedy, Ovid exhibited the lighter, amorous, side of the gods and did not especially engage his audience's feelings with the objects of the gods' humorous passions. Metamorphosis itself is not serious, often being a temporary disguise, as for Io and Callisto. In the second Section, the gods avenge deeds which often do not strike us as worthy of such drastic vengeance. Our sympathies are engaged for the human victims of divine spite, and metamorphosis frequently helps to promote this sympathy. Toward the end of this Section, Ovid depicts characters like Arachne and Niobe who knowingly, not ignorantly, anger the gods. They deserve their punishments, and yet they are so passionately involved in their blasphemies that metamorphosis tends to be, more than mere punishment, a cosmic recognition of their passions. Minerva pities Arachne and transforms her into a spider so that she may continue to display her talent weaving; Niobe becomes a stone without any express divine intervention, to weep her passionate misery forever. In the dramatic character of Niobe and her "self-created" metamorphosis of escape, Ovid effected his transition to the next Section, where he studied human beings struggling with their own passions, causing their own suffering. For heroines like Myrrha or Scylla, metamorphosis proves to be almost the only escape from their intolerable situations. However, heroes can earn their escape in a different manner, by achieving such noble feats in life as to be transformed "upward," not "downward" into beasts, plants, or the like: they may become gods. To this theme and its Augustan application, Ovid devoted his final Section, following the heroic career of Aeneas and the founders of the new Rome, Caesar and Augustus. On the basis of this structural and thematic analysis, Otis says: "The *Metamorphoses*, in short, is really a *carmen perpetuum*, a blend of continuity and change, of epic uniformity and un-epic variety, of specious transition and careful progression. It is above all a work of art" (p. 89).

Roughly put, this is the thesis which Otis presents in the remainder of his study. Five chapters are used to amplify the brief analysis of the poem's structure which I have taken from Chapter 3. The chapters correspond to the four major Sections, except that Otis divides his treatment of the Pathos of Love into two parts, the first dealing with the principal elements of the whole Section, the second concentrating exclusively on the story of Ceyx and Alcyone in Book 11 and on the new Ovidian attitude toward love that there emerges. In the space of 215 pages allotted to these five chapters, Otis brings out many of the finer nuances of his analysis, arguing for what he calls the "law of symmetrical progression" (p. 86) in Ovid's artistic structure, and demonstrating conclusively his thorough mastery of the poem. Then, in a final chapter, he brings out a more general estimate of the *Met.* and offers an explanation for its considerable successes and partial failure, for its basic



ambiguity. There remains an invaluable Appendix of 50 pages, in which Otis has collected painstaking studies of the sources of 17 major tales for the benefit of all who wish to continue his work.

Although I cannot and would not deny my admiration for Otis' sensitivity to Ovid's achievement and for the skill with which he has for the first time assessed the poet's intention in numerous passages, I must admit that he does not convince me by his thesis. Long ago, Croce described one of the fundamental critical errors as the "fallacy of generic forms." By that phrase, he meant the error of which we are all on occasion guilty, when we apply a label to a piece of literature, then deduce from the label the qualities of the poetry or prose under discussion. Instead of letting the work account for its category or genre, we force it to conform to the category which we have imposed on it. Otis, I suggest, has let his reading of Ovid become somewhat distorted by applying the title "epic poet" to him.

The fallacy really goes back to Richard Heinze, who made the egregious error, one which Otis ably rejects, of attributing to all epic a seriousness of purpose, and then wilfully misread the stories of the *Met.*, such as the Rape of Proserpina, in the firm conviction that they *must* be gravely impressive. Otis understands Ovid better; he knows that the poet could exercise a light and humorous touch in his hexameters, that the divine apparatus in the *Met.* lacks the grandeur which Vergil assigns it in the *Aeneid*, that the more obvious "epic devices" frequently function to promote epic parody. Realizing that the common hallmarks of epic were either neglected or twisted by Ovid, Otis selects a different attribute by which to define "epic." This is "continuity," narrative continuity. He shows, quite convincingly, I agree, that the elegiac couplet more or less compelled Ovid and its other Latin practitioners to write in jerky, often padded units of two lines, whereas Vergil in the *Aeneid* and Ovid in the *Met.* employed the hexameter to develop spaciouly and in apt proportions the narratives which they had to tell. But if we grant that Ovid did something new when he adopted the hexameter, that he did produce admirably continuous narratives, some of which are serious, some not, have we really made Ovid an "epic poet"? What about all the characteristics which were so markedly successful in Ovidian elegy and were accordingly transferred without difficulty to the hexameter? Where does that humor come from? Where have we seen epic parody before? Where do we find first such common devices of the *Met.* as witty repetitions, apostrophes to the characters, asides to the audience, parenthetically sly comments? In Ovid's elegy, of course. Or consider the speeches which Ovid liberally interspersed in his narratives. Short speeches are, as Heinze observed, highly characteristic of elegy: in the *Met.* Ovid frequently resorted to short speeches which he casually tacked on to his narrative, blithely interrupted with a *dixit* or *ait*, then smoothly blended with the subsequent narrative without the customary formulaic line. Even in the longer speeches, where he found himself potentially in a congenial epic situation, Ovid preferred to employ the short cola, the wit, and the rhetoric learned in elegy to altering his style towards that of Vergil. Thus, although the first long speech of the *Met.*, that of Jupiter among the assembled

gods, may well abound in "epic" qualities to support its conventional epic setting (Ovid is, of course, exaggerating his "epic" here), the speech of Apollo that appears soon after (I, 504 ff.), breathlessly delivered as he pursues Daphne, exhibits the jerkiness and wit of "elegy," presumably to fit the patently erotic situation and the urbane tone that Ovid wanted here.

One might raise the same reservations about the Ovidian hexameter. It is undeniably different from elegiac meter, but what inferences can be made from this difference depend, in the end, upon one's perspective. If one chooses to emphasize that generic label, then one claims, with Otis, that the new aspects of Ovid's meter make him "epic," that the very decision to adopt hexameter was a choice for epic. If, however, one admits the close resemblance between the two meters—Ovid was not, after all, moving from lyric to hexameter, as Horace did in 23 B. C.—, if one considers, moreover, that the hexameter had already been employed with versatility for satire as different as Lucilius' and Horace's, for Vergilian bucolic and a style that was *nolle atque facetum*, it might be safer to weigh both the differences and the similarities of Ovid's two meters before drawing conclusions. For my part, I do not find that the "continuity" of Ovidian hexameter inheres in long flowing periods, liberal enjambement, versatile use of internal pauses, artful interlocking of phrases across the limits of lines; in short, I miss in Ovid the techniques which establish Vergil's hexameter as a supreme vehicle for his epic purposes. To go back still another generation, Ovid did not seek the kind of continuity in the hexameter which Lucretius employed to keep his argument surging over the barriers of individual lines. Lucretius is far more "epic" than Ovid. Again and again, one catches Ovid composing in terms of the hemistich, exactly as he had done so ably in his elegiac meter.

Consider for instance this description of Sicily which introduces the Rape of Proserpina in V, 346 ff.

vasta Giganteis ingesta est insula membris
 Trinacris et magnis subiectum molibus urget
 aetherias ausum sperare Typhoea sedes.
 nititur ille quidem pugnatque resurgere saepe,
 dextra sed Ausonio manus est subiecta Peloro,
 laeva, Pachyne, tibi, Lilybaeo crura premuntur;
 degravat Aetna caput; sub qua resupinus harenas
 eiecat flammamque ferox vomit ore Typhoeus.

It appears that Ovid invented this description as a means of introducing Pluto for the Rape, and Heinze leapt to the assumption that Ovid did so to give his "epic" story a properly "epic" beginning. I would maintain that it is pseudo-epic, exploiting some epic techniques in a special way, so as to color the whole passage with a carefree quality. Let me summarize the metrical elements here. Although the passage is about a giant struggling under a mountainous mass, Ovid kept the rhythm fast and tripping. Dactyls outnumber spondees; lines 4, 5, 6, and 7 all have 3 dactyls in the first four feet; a single elision in line 1 blends quite ordinarily the two parts of the verb *ingesta est*. There is no significant enjambe-

ment except in line 7. The first 7 lines use the central caesura; the eighth has a normal variant. (Caesurae are indicated by special spacing in the lines.) To appreciate what Ovid did here, one might compare Vergil's analogous description of Sicily's giant in *Aen.*, III, 578 ff. Vergil is "epical," is "continuous," but did Ovid aim for either quality? The Ovidian hexameter, then, exhibits a preference for short sense-units, lines that are end-stopped, tripping dactyls, and relatively rare elision, all of which, I dare say, might be construed as qualities that better approximate those of Ovidian elegy than those of Vergilian hexameter.

Continuity serves as a thematic word for Otis, because he wishes to apply his interpretation of *carmen perpetuum* at every level, from meter, through style, to actual structure and the general plan of Ovid's poem. Another word which frequently appears in conjunction with "continuous" is "symmetrical." Thus, "epic narrative is continuous and symmetrical" (p. 24). "Ovid's narrative in the *Metamorphoses* has (unlike all elegiac and neoteric narrative) the symmetry, elevation and other characteristics of epic" (p. 65). He calls the narrative of Vergil that deals with Cacus an example of "symmetrical completeness." Now, according to the dictionary, "symmetry" has a precise meaning: "similarity of form or arrangement on either side of a dividing line," or "correspondence of opposite parts in size, shape, and position." In his examination of the Cacus-scene of *Aeneid*, Otis nowhere shows how it is "symmetrical." Nor do I think that it can convincingly be shown. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Greek and Roman poets accepted Otis' rule for symmetrical narrative as binding. Vergil tended to be symmetrical, but that was his own aesthetic preference. Neither Homer in the *Iliad*—though perhaps in the *Odyssey*—nor Apollonius in the *Argonautica* has ever struck critics as a model of proportionality. Lucan's epic would not be regarded as symmetrical. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that Ovid rebelled against Vergilian symmetry as much as against other hallmarks of his predecessor.

Otis apparently offers Ovid's narrative of Scylla as an example of symmetry (p. 64). In his brief analysis, he fails to justify the term, for he does not even designate the structural divisions. Were I called on to define the structure of the narrative in VIII, 1-151, I might hazard the following analysis:

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| 1-10 | Introduction to the siege of Nisus' city by King Minos. |
| 11-22 | Scylla, who enjoys climbing a tower and surveying the combatants. |
| 23-80 | Scylla falls in love with Minos and soliloquizes about her dilemma (44-80). |
| 81-103 | She betrays father and city to Minos, who spurns her treacherous love. |
| 104-142 | Abandoned by Minos, she produces the standard speech of the <i>deserta</i> . |
| 142-151 | She leaps into the water after him, and metamorphosis ensues. |

There is no central division in this narrative. Although we find two long speeches in roughly equal proportions (37 and 34½ lines

respectively), they are both embedded in scenes which do not correspond in the least. The whole story falls into three quite uneven portions: 1. onset of love (1-80); 2. drastic action for love (81-103) 3. violent reaction after failure (104-51). Symmetry does not help as a critical term for this story, nor does the story suffer in the least because it seems negligent of symmetry.

It was necessary to take issue with these preliminary points, because implicitly Otis' major thesis depends upon them. He wishes to make narrative continuity in his terms, despite what Callimachus plainly meant, a definitive quality of all epic; and he wishes to add to it the concept of symmetry. Then, when the larger structural analysis follows, the repeated critical terms will carry some authority. He opens Chapter IV in this manner: "The first section of the poem has an obviously symmetrical structure" (p. 91). Similarly, the structure of the next section is "quite clear and very symmetrical" (p. 128). Section 3 is also a "symmetrical whole" (p. 170), and the final section exhibits "an obvious and pleasing symmetry" (p. 279). I fear that symmetry for Otis connotes the careful planning he attributes to written epic. Two questions are in order, however: 1. Do the sections in fact manifest the symmetry attributed to them by Otis? 2. Is there any reason why we should expect Ovid to hold to an aesthetic creed demanding symmetry?

To answer our first question, let us look carefully at Otis' analysis of Section III, which appears on page 168. It is generally agreed that Ovid achieved his greatest poetry of the *Met.* in this central part of the work, from Book 6 through 11, and Otis makes the ambitious attempt to account for this success by tracing out an artful structure and a consistent theme. The theme is the "pathos of love." Otis' analysis may be schematized as follows:

VI, 401-674	Philomela-Procre-Tereus	Episode I of amatory pathos
675-721	Transition to Medea	
VII, 1-403	Medea frame	Love and human miracles of rejuvenation 403 lines ¹
404-868	Cephalus frame	Divine miracles of repopulation and love 465 lines
VIII, 1-151	Seylla	Episode II of amatory pathos
152-82	Cretan interlude	
182-235	Daedalus-Icarus	Paternal grief
236-59	Perdix	
260-IX, 272	Central Panel	Meleager and Hercules epics surrounding theodicies of Philemon and Erysichthon
IX, 273-323	Galanthis	
324-446	Dryope	Maternal grief
447-665	Byblis	Episode III of amatory pathos
666-X, 297	Miracles of Piety (Iphis and Pygmalion)	framing homosexual loves 429 lines

¹ Otis assigns the Medea frame 450 lines, thus making it seem similar in size to the Cephalus frame. He can do so only by including the 47 lines from the end of Book 6 which have nothing to do with Medea.

X, 298-502	Myrrha	Episode IV of amatory pathos
503-XI, 193	Miracles of Impiety (Atalanta and Midas) framing heterosexual loves	429 lines
XI, 194-795	Ceyx-Aleyone and end-pieces	Episode V of amatory pathos

This structure is, as Otis says, a "symmetrical whole": a central panel framed first by parental grief, then by two episodes of amatory pathos, then by pairs of large complexes,² then finally by two more impressive episodes of amatory pathos. However, is that Ovid's structure or rather the way Otis has analyzed it? We must not be predisposed to accept the authority of an elaborate diagram. Otis believes that there are precisely five episodes of amatory pathos, placed in a climactic order at strategic intervals. Although Scylla receives less attention from Ovid than either Cephalus or Medea and but a few lines more than Atalanta, Otis discards the first two as "quite different." Yet he admits that Medea really announces the technique of amatory soliloquy, that Procris-Cephalus go through a marital crisis that is full of passion and patently anticipates Ceyx-Aleyone. The destructive passion that Althaea feels might also be regarded as integral to this section. Moreover, it is a legitimate question whether "amatory pathos" dominates Ovid's telling of Philomela's and Proene's misadventures. I for my part would prefer a less symmetrical structure that would accommodate as many as eight episodes, less neatly spaced, that dealt with passion, pathos, or what Otis himself once called monomania.³

Because he regards his chosen 5 episodes of amatory pathos as the basic frame upon which everything else in the section depends, Otis must account for what he calls the "minor contrast episodes," that is, the Medea and Cephalus "frames" and the Miracles of Piety and Impiety. First, he uses the magic of numbers: Medea has 450 lines—an error, for she has 403—, Cephalus 465; Miracles of Piety and Impiety each have precisely 429 lines! One may well suspect that Otis started with the numbers, then made the frames conform. Why stop Medea at 403 when she is mentioned as late as 424? Why force Cephalus into the "frame" at 404 when he in fact first appears at 495? It was Otis, not Ovid that wanted symmetry. To get his first 429 lines and his Miracles of Piety, he wrenches Iphis away from Byblis, where Ovid designed a contrast, and compels her to serve with Pygmalion as a frame for an interrupted sequence of Orpheus' tales. I do not quarrel with the title in this case; it does seem to me that the search for a contrasting title in the next artificially created 429 lines has lead Otis to ignore Ovid. The impiety of Atalanta is the slightest component of her story; the impiety of Midas is non-existent, for his fault is *stoliditas*. The story of Venus and Aconis in fact frames that of Atalanta, so her part in the frame of miracles is illegitimate. Orpheus' tales and

² Whereas, however, the Cephalus and Medea frames are juxtaposed, themselves framed by Philomela and Scylla, the Miracles of Impiety and Piety are interrupted by the episode of Myrrha. The symmetry is far from exact.

³ *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 217 ff.

death, which Otis arbitrarily interrupts, end at XI, 84, and Ovid makes Midas quite distinct. I agree that Midas is even more sharply separated from what follows, but that does not compel us to make him part of a "frame."

The third portion of this artful structure is what Otis calls the "central panel." A glance at the scheme will show how Otis has defined this panel and its centrality. It falls not quite at the center of the section, but it is framed by episodes first of parental grief, then of amatory pathos; it itself appears to have its own coherence, with juxtaposed theodicies framed by heroic, epical situations. As soon as one examines details, however, problems arise. To call the Daedalus-Icarus story one of paternal grief is debatable; to entitle Dryope's fate maternal grief is distortion due presumably to that fatal search for symmetry. There can be no question that Ovid did intend to juxtapose his stories of rewarded piety and impiety in Philemon and Erysichthon, but that is standard practice with him; Byblis and Iphis, Arachne and Niobe, Daphne and Io all illustrate the pairing of similar episodes. The fact that such a pair occurs at this point is no more significant than the location of the Byblis-Iphis pair at the end of Book IX. To justify his panel, Otis argues for the crucial importance of the Meleager-Hercules sequence which "frames" the theodicies. He claims that the two episodes are epic-tragic and both of "very similar construction" (p. 194). A closer look does not support the neat categories of epic and tragic, and the proportions in the two tales do not correspond at all. Consider Hercules: Hercules *vs.* Achelous—trivial adventure, well beneath epic level; Hercules' suffering and apotheosis—indigestible mixture of epic (the Nessus affair), tragedy (Hercules on Oeta), trivial story (metamorphosis of Lichas), and epic (Jupiter in council with gods), the combination of which creates a highly ambiguous tone. Otis sees a parallelism of theme in Meleager and Hercules which I find not at all cogent, and those differences which he mentions are treated by him as part of a thematic development. "The two episodes thus form a unity," he concludes (p. 198), a "unity" which seems neither demonstrable nor necessary.

The importance of the central panel for Otis' thesis lies in its promotion not only of desired symmetry, but also of what Otis understands as the Augustan theme of the poem. Similarly, he finds in Section II a central panel involving the adventures of Perseus, that is, the exploits of an epic hero. Both these central panels were subtly preparing, according to Otis, for the final section on Troy and Rome, where apotheosis of Roman heroes functions as an important theme. I grant that Ovid does re-use the subject of apotheosis first employed with Hercules, but I wonder whether it is any more important than the much more frequently employed situation of the ravished maiden or the moral dilemma caused by *amor*. Otis himself must confess that Ovid failed to accomplish the goal which Otis assigned him: "Ovid's failure to make sense of the apotheosis [of Hercules] is terribly evident" (p. 335). I should be tempted by that observation to consider whether Ovid was in fact trying to make sense of the apotheosis. The way he juxtaposes his ambiguous reference to the *gravitas* of Hercules (IX, 270-3) and the almost comic *gravitas* of Alemene (287), the implicit contrast between the

hero's grotesque *dolores* and hers (289), might well suggest that he had no serious intention at all at that stage, hardly anything so ambitious as an Augustan epic.

If, then, we are justified in questioning the symmetry of Ovid's sections, the very existence of the central panel and its Augustan purpose, we might raise the second, more fundamental question: Should we expect Ovid to hold an aesthetic creed that valued symmetry? We all know that Vergil sought and achieved a very significant symmetry. It can also be shown that Horace, particularly in his neatly trisected odes, balanced related themes about a meaningful fulcrum or center. The elegies of Propertius' Book I seem to have been composed with some attention to symmetrical units of thought. In art, too, Classicism appears to have rejected the exuberant experimentalism of the 2nd century and early 1st century B. C., in order to place emphasis upon order, balance, strict proportionality. Looking at such evidence, many critics generalize and assume that *all* artists, sculptors, architects, and writers valued and sought a symmetry which was Augustan. But as Otis himself notes, the Hellenistic emphasis in poetry—and this applies to art also—fell on asymmetry. In his most "Augustan" elegies, those of Book IV, Propertius forsakes his earlier symmetry, even in so public and supposedly monumental an effort as his commemoration of Actium, IV, 6. "Augustan" Horace did not apparently feel that symmetry was a necessary element of his *Ars poetica*. Ovid, despite his commemorative purposes, did not utilize symmetry for the writing of the *Fasti*, at the very time when he was working out his structure for the *Met*. In wall-paintings, the exuberant late styles were being used; Hellenistic scenes of erotic action were valued often by the same owner who hired another artist to paint strictly Classical panels; and Hellenistic statues were being bought for gardens and porticoes quite as often as noble 5th century Athenian copies.

The Augustan period saw a great meeting of Classicistic and Neoteric (or Hellenistic), with public monuments often belying the true state of affairs. The Forum of Augustus or the *Aeneid* represents one pole; Horace illustrates the fruitful blending of each influence, the priority of one, then the other; and Ovid, I suspect, proves the power of Hellenistic principles of structure. There are, to be sure, stories where Ovid ably exploited symmetry; I think, for example, of the neatly divided tale of Cephæus and Procris. There are others where strict proportionality and exact centering were far from the poet's intention, and he still produced excellent poetry. We have glanced already at Scylla. Compare the stories of Daphne (I, 452 ff.), Io (I, 588 ff.), or Pyramus and Thisbe (IV, 55 ff.). No symmetry used, none needed.

We may have a clue as to Ovid's broad aesthetic principles in a number of stories where two kinds of art are being contrasted and judged. The story of Proserpina in Book V is part of a lengthy song which the Muses produced in competition with the Pierides. It is a rambling structure, which allows Calliope, the Muse who should know most about epic poetry, to drag in almost anything (V, 341-661) and to stray far from her subject. When the nymphs award Calliope victory over the Pierides, we might wonder why. Was it because Calliope defended Olympian deities against the

Pierides, or was it in fact because her desultory, asymmetrical song constituted the kind of "epic" structure which Ovid himself chose for his *Met.*?

In his very next story, Ovid probably gave an even clearer indication of his aesthetic ideas on structure. Challenged by Arachne to a contest in weaving, Minerva produced a tapestry which Ovid described at length. In the center of twelve gods, six on either side, Jupiter presides over a dispute between Minerva and Neptune. First, Neptune performs a miracle in order to establish his claim upon Athens. Then, Minerva brings out of the earth the olive. We may reasonably assume that, just as the judging gods are symmetrically arranged around Jupiter, so the disputants are disposed on either side of the center. To complete the symmetry, Minerva wove for each corner an admonitory panel to show what happened to others who challenged gods; and then she framed the whole in a border of olive leaves. The goddess produced a perfect piece of Classicistic art, structurally balanced and thematically grandiose, in support of the established order. Arachne on the other hand wove a swirl of divine figures in unedifying situations, one god after another gratifying his lust for a human woman. There is no apparent structure to the tapestry, which consists of nine affairs of Jupiter, six of Neptune, four of Apollo, and one each of Liber and Saturn. Juxtaposed as they apparently are, they have a cumulative effect, much as Baroque paintings do by contrast with neatly arranged masterpieces of Raphael. One might expect Arachne to meet her fate in the way that all fools do who challenge gods, her vain claims exposed as sheer delusion and the artistry of Minerva triumphantly vindicated. Here, however, I suspect that Ovid deliberately twisted the original version in order to make his point: the tapestries, different though they be, are alike masterpieces, and not even the envious eye of Minerva can discern faults in Arachne's work and so seize the victory (VI, 129-30). Victory goes to the power of the goddess, not to her art. In at least one story, which he carefully shaped for that purpose, Ovid affirmed his own artistic breadth. Symmetry is no prerequisite to Ovidian art; a set of loosely ordered tales can form a masterpiece.

The whole *Met.* lacks the articulating features that so mark the symmetrical masterpiece, the *Aeneid*. Instead of using the books to round off his symmetrical units, Ovid created thematic and narrative bridges from one book to the other. Meanwhile, was he, as Otis argues, composing quite different and obvious structural units within the books? None of this ingenious hypothesis seems necessary. It is not in the definition of *carmen perpetuum* or the Callimachean phrase to which it may go back—is Horace also referring to Callimachus in *Ode*, I, 7, 6?—that a poet must contrive a symmetrical structure. Continuity, as Otis correctly observes, is the main aspect of *perpetuum*, and continuity does not necessarily entail symmetry. All of us, I think, feel that the *Met.* is a poem that does move, although we may not be sure where it is taking us or whether indeed it is supposed to take us anywhere; few of us, I fear, feel that Ovid intended to or did in fact create the ingenious structure Ovid imagines, and we do not see that the poem is improved thereby.

In conclusion, for all his sensitive appreciation of Ovid, Otis does not succeed in demonstrating his thesis.⁴ To call Ovid in the *Met.* an epic poet raises more questions than it answers, and to treat as a radical departure Ovid's choice of the hexameter instead of the elegiac couplet, of a cleverly interrelated series of short stories instead of separate short elegies, is to ignore the continuing influence of the poet's long training in elegy. If we must call Ovid an epic poet, we must recognize the essentially unique nature of the *Met.*, not attempt to force on it qualities perceived in the *Aeneid* or other epic poems. Not only were the poetic trends of Ovid's day complex, but the aesthetic ideals also varied from one artist to another. Where one poet preferred symmetry, another might well choose asymmetry: each creed had its validity, if artistically applied. Thus, Vergil enhances the sense of control and order in the *Aeneid* by his masterful use of symmetry; and Ovid gives his poem its sense of spontaneity, its freedom of movement, its felicity in apparently chance repeated motifs partly by means of a loose and casual structure. Otis does his greatest service in interpreting the *Met.* when he shows how elegantly Ovid does employ recurring motifs. Few will believe in Otis' generalized "law of symmetrical progression," but many will admire his acute insight into the artistry of the poet in particular stories. Finally, the extent of Augustanism in the *Met.* remains a question. Otis argues that Ovid intended an Augustan development, but failed because of his instinctive aversion to the authoritarian aspects of the Augustan regime; that Ovid tried to prepare for the developments in Section IV by his ingenious use of central panels of epic-heroic contents in Sections II and III. I have little doubt now that someone will be moved to make a cogent case for the opposite position: that Ovid viewed the Augustan present as a decline from the freer days of his idealized world of mythology and so used the sharp hiatus between the two worlds to point up the emotional emptiness of official Rome. Hercules and the other bloodless, emotionless Roman heroes who were apotheosized deserved that dubious fate; to be plunged into a company of lecherous, vengeful, unjust, utterly emotional deities who, according to the majority of stories in the *Met.*, tended to be subhuman rather than superhuman. Such might be an extreme argument, and it could be attractive because of its prejudice in Ovid's favor. In any case, it is not hard to predict that Otis' challenging arguments will stimulate much fresh and beneficial study of the *Metamorphoses*. For this alone, all Latinists owe him a debt. Even more, however, any reader of this book, though disagreeing with its major thesis, must admit that he closes it having acquired a sharper appreciation of Ovid's genius. I know I did.

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⁴It is precisely because Otis has concerned himself with something more than merely superficial analysis that his study is vastly richer than the German structural analysis which appeared at the same time: see W. Ludwig, *Struktur und Einheit der Metamorphosen Ovids* (Berlin, 1965).

JACQUES TRÉHEUX. *Études sur les inventaires Attiques*. Paris, Éditions E. de Boccard, 1965. Pp. 85; 7 figs., 3 pls., and one tip-in (facing p. 61). (*Annales de l'Est*, publiées par la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de l'Université de Nancy. *Mémoire* No. 29: *Études d'Archéologie Classique*, III.)

This is a skilfully argued and convincing presentation of revised texts of the Attic records of sacred treasure from the late fifth and early fourth century B. C. The first and major contribution is to fix the dates of the *traditiones*, I. G., I², 254,¹ 255, and 255a, to 409/8, 408/7, and 407/6. This last text has been generally dated to 405/4 because of reliance on a supposed secretary-cycle of the Treasurers of Athena, as seemed to be demanded by the demotic of the secretary Λευκονοίης of the phyle Leontis (line 327). In reverse order, therefore, the cycle was held to be continuous from 411 down to the end of the century and beyond. Attempts to restore I. G., I², 255a (lines 323-331 in the *Corpus*) in such a way as to bring this about led to a series of unsatisfactory solutions, in which this reviewer also had some part, all of which Tréheux takes up, one by one, and rejects. The key word in his own restoration is ταῦτα,² at the beginning of line 323, followed by the name of the archon of 407/6, Antigenes. The length of line is a stochedon 45; the secretary from Leukonoion³ belongs in 407/6; and there was no cycle of secretaries operative before 406/5 at the earliest, perhaps not until 403/2 when there is sufficient evidence to justify the assumption of a cycle.⁴

By a happy coincidence the restoration of I. G., I², 255a made by the late Bert H. Hill was published posthumously in *Hesperia*, XXXV (1966), p. 345, giving results almost identical with those obtained by Tréheux. Among other things, both scholars assumed that the rectangular cutting in one letter-space in line 330 was an erasure and not a mark of punctuation. Epigraphically, it could be either, and both interpretations have been argued. But, as Tréheux remarks (p. 37), "Je demande, en présence d'un 'rectangle profondément gravé,' sur quels indices on peut distinguer une *rasura* rectangulaire d'un signe rectangulaire de ponctuation." He would have been helped here by the observation that the text contains a number of marks of punctuation elsewhere and that they are all the normal three dots (:) in vertical alignment.⁵ Hence in line 330

¹ The date is now made certain by a new reading from the stone by Pierre Charneux (pp. 11 and 38).

² See especially p. 31.

³ The name of the deme is now known as Leukonoion rather than Leukonoe (p. 21, n. 3; p. 33). Cf. A. E. Raubitschek, *Dedications*, p. 116, No. 112 = *Αρχ. Δελτίον*, XI (1927-1928), p. 132, No. 7. Tréheux cites this reference.

⁴ See W. S. Ferguson, *The Treasurers of Athena* (1932), p. 9.

⁵ These occur in line 323 (after ταμία:), in line 324 (before Φλιππος), in line 325 (before Μενέστρατος), in line 328 (before Ἀντιφών), in line 328 (before Χαριάδης), and in line 331 (before the numeral). Hill did not record the first and the last two of these, but he recorded the others and restored similar punctuation also in line 325 (after Προ-σ[πάλτιος]), in line 326 (after Φλυεύς), in line 327 (after Κριεύς), and in line 331 (before and after the numeral "one" for the golden crown).

the normal punctuation should have been the three dots, or, if a strong break had been needed, emphasis could have been gained by increasing the number of dots, as was done, for example, in *I.G.*, I², 374, lines 116 and 271, of the preceding year in the Erechtheion accounts. The rectangular cutting in line 330 would be quite abnormal for punctuation in its present context and may almost certainly be taken, as by Tréheux and Hill, as an erasure which does not interrupt the sense of the text.

Tréheux recorded only the punctuation in line 324 and restored two dots before and after the numeral for "one" after the golden crown of line 331 (p. 33). His restoration gave no punctuation and numeral only one space: ἐκ τῷ Πρόνε[ο χορὶς στεφάνο χρυσὸ :! : σταθμ]όν; Hill's restoration gave two spaces to the punctuation and numeral: ἐκ τῷ Πρόνε[ο πλὴν | στεφάνο χρυσὸ :! : σταθμ]όν. Tréheux made his choice of the preposition between *χωρίς* and *ἐκτός* and did not consider *πλήν*, though this is, in fact, the almost certain restoration. In the index of *I.G.*, I², *ἐκτός* does not appear at all and *χωρίς*, though it appears, is always used as an adverb and not as a preposition. The use of *πλήν* as a preposition is amply attested. If one wishes to hold the numeral and its punctuation (before and after) to one space, as seems reasonable in view of the fact that nowhere else in the inscription does the punctuation occupy more than the space between letters, then the use of *πλήν* can be retained by restoring ἐκ τῷ Πρόνε[ω rather than ἐκ τῷ Πρόνε[ο, i. e., ἐκ τῷ Πρόνε[ω πλὴν στεφάνο χρυσὸ :! : σταθμ]όν τούτω: ΔΔΔ†††III. The choice of the scribes between *Πρόνεως* and *Πρόνεος* in these inventories of the Pronaos was apparently quite arbitrary: *Πρόνεως* in *I.G.*, I², 232, 234, 241, 242, 244, 247, and 250; *Πρόνεος* in *I.G.*, I², 237, 238, 239, 248, 253, and 255 (line 303). There was variation even within a quadrennium, e. g., as between *I.G.*, I², 248 and 250.

Tréheux has defended beyond question the use of ἀρχαντες in line 323 to define the treasurers of the year of Antigones (pp. 22, 35). The treasures from the Pronaos were handed over to the Hellenotamiai by the Treasurers of Athena near the end of their term of office, after Hekatombaion 1 when Kallias became archon (line 329) but before the Panathenaia when their own term of office expired. The date by archon and by Council in lines 328-330 does not define the term of office of the Hellenotamias Chariades and his fellows. It merely defines the point in time when the "paradosis" took place. In 407/6 B. C. the year of the archon and the year of the Council were coterminous,⁶ so there is no ambiguity here such as might have been the case earlier in the century. Both Kallias and the Council belonged to 408/5 B. C. But the terms of office of Treasurers and of Hellenotamiai ran to the Fanathenaia.⁷ The Treasurers, therefore, who made the "paradosis" were the treasurers of 407/6, and the Hellenotamiai who received the offerings were their contemporaries, the Hellenotamiai of 407/6, both of them at the time of the transfer near the end of their terms. It is not correct, in the present reviewer's opinion, to say that "les trésoriers

⁶ *I. A. P. A.*, XCV (1964), p. 208.

⁷ *I. A. P. A.*, XCV (1964), p. 212.

d'Antigénès (407/6) ont remis aux Hellénotamiai de Callias (406/5) la totalité des offrandes . . ." (p. 31). The correct interpretation is that the treasurers of 407/6, near the end of their tenure, handed over to the Hellenotamiai of 407/6, also near the end of their tenure, all the offerings defined by ταῦτα in line 323, at a time shortly after Callias had become archon, in the month of Hekatombaion, and shortly after the new Council, designated by its first secretary, had come into office simultaneously with him.⁸ The dates define παρέδοσαν; the Hellenotamiai are not defined as τοῖς ἐπὶ Καλλίῳ ἀρχόντος.

Many of the Hellenotamiai (20 in number) of the year 407/6 are known from the text of *I.G.*, I², 304B,⁹ but until now no member of the college (two from each phyle) has been known from Erechtheis. *I.G.*, I², 255a gives the name of one of them as Χαριάδης Χαρτίον Ἀγρυλῆθεν. This name should be added to the roster published in Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I (1939), p. 570, and there deleted under the year 405/4. Chariades had been epistates of the Erechtheion in 409/8 and was destined to be one of the Treasurers in 404/3 (pp. 24-5, n. 6).

In the restoration of the text the name of the secretary in line 327 can be read as [Θράσυλλος Γν]αθίο Λευκονοιεύς, provided only that *hois* be written as *oīs* without the *daseia*. Other possibilities are discussed by Tréheux (p. 33, where *infra* is a mistake for *supra*). The *daseia* was irregularly added to the preposition ἐν (i. e., *heν*) in lines 283 (409/8) and 303 (408/7), and there is no assurance that *hois* was not written *oīs* also in line 281. Indeed, it is a conceivable, even probable, hypothesis that the occasion for the deep rectangular erasure in line 330 was an initial Cockney spelling of ἐκ as *hek* and then the desire to make a correction of it by removing the *daseia*. This Thrasyllus was first cousin of the Thrasyllus (*P.A.*, 7335) who lost his life in the Sicilian expedition, both being grandsons of Mneson of Leukonoion.¹⁰

The second section of Tréheux's study deals first with *I.G.*, II², 1370 + 1371, the preamble of which he restores with normal formulae. This is convincingly done, even to the restoration of ἀγραφα (originally suggested by Ferguson) in line 6 before παραδέξάμενοι. The drawing on p. 44 illustrates the exigencies of space, but the text is not stoichedon and precision in making restorations based on exact space available cannot be expected. It is not clear how the text now established is to be reconciled with the suggestions of Woodward¹¹ that in 404/3 there were, in certain circumstances, separate

⁸ It is a matter of no great consequence whether the *lacuna* in line 330 is filled with a name *plus* demotic or with a name and *πρῶτος* (pp. 29-30). Hill restored *πρῶτος*, and Tréheux was similarly inclined.

⁹ The readings in this inscription have been improved by W. K. Pritchett, *B.C.H.*, LXXXVIII (1964), pp. 455-87, and one hopes that further improvements will be made as he continues his study of the stone.

¹⁰ For the *stemma* see Kirchner, *P.A.*, 5935, as expanded by A. E. Raubitschek, *Dedications*, pp. 116-17.

¹¹ *Hesperia*, XXXII (1963), pp. 146-8, 152-3, 155.

boards of treasurers for Athena and for the Other Gods respectively. The moot question of how and when the title of the joint board should, or should not, be restored needs further clarification. Both Woodward (*loc. cit.*) and Tréheux (p. 65) have been aware of the difficulties.

The third and final section of Tréheux's study deals with a new fragment of *I.G.*, II², 1383. The position in the stele assigned to *I.G.*, II², 1403, by Tréheux on the basis of his calculations and restorations was found by actual test in the Museum at Athens to be correct, only a slight rectification of the *lacuna* between the text of the new fragment and that of *I.G.*, II², 1403b being necessary. The argument remains instructive, a valuable example of sound epigraphical procedure, to the result of which the actual joining of the stones gives welcome confirmation.¹²

The printing and proof-reading have been carefully done, and the finished study is a joy to have. The photographs (two by Jean Bousquet) are excellent. Indexes of inscriptions studied, of proper names, and of Greek terms are added, along with a general index of subjects. One sentence seems to this reviewer contradictory. In arguing that objects of silver and gold on bases are not weighed but that when unencumbered are weighed, Tréheux quotes an example from a Delian catalogue (p. 49): 'Εν τῷ Εἰλεθνιαίῳ βατιάκῃ ἐμ πλινθείῳ ἢ ἀνέθηκε Κλεαρχίς· φάλη ἔκτυπα ἔχουσα Περσῶν πρόσωπα, Κτησουλίου ἀνάθημα, ὀλκὴν· 62 δι., noting that "Le premier vase est fixé sur une base et le second indépendant; le premier est pesé, le second ne l'est pas." Ought not the second to count as weighed, and the first unweighed?

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JOHN M. MOORE. *The Manuscript Tradition of Polybius*. Cambridge, The University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii + 192; 3 pls. \$8.00. (*Cambridge Classical Studies*.)

It was only yesterday (1961) that Professor Pédech wrote: "L'histoire du texte de Polybe devra un jour être tentée d'après l'examen des quelques 77 manuscrits qui représentent la tradition" (Budé ed. of Polybius, XII, p. xi), and now such a study has been made and published. J. M. Moore explains in the Preface that the present work is "an expurgated version" of his Ph. D. thesis at Cambridge University. Instead of "some 77 manuscripts" the author lists nearly 100 that have preserved a part of the text of Polybius. He has not, however, examined all the Polybius passages in all the manuscripts, because, as he says: "To undertake a complete collation of all these manuscripts would have been not merely a task of enormous size, but one which would not be justified by

¹² Anyone who has worked with the Athenian Tribute Lists will recall a similar example of instructive epigraphical method published by our dean of epigraphists Marcus N. Tod in *B. S. A.*, X (1903-1904), pp. 78-82.

the results" (p. xiii). That the task would be an enormous one may readily be granted without, however, accepting his corollary that it would not be worth doing. How can we possibly know until it has been tried? When, as in the present study, selective collation is decided on, the reader should be told very clearly what the basis of the selection has been. Moore explains: "For this purpose a carefully selected list of over six hundred passages was prepared in each section of the tradition, and these passages were collated" (p. xiii). In choosing these passages (over eighteen hundred in all as there are three sections of the tradition) various criteria were used, including: indications furnished by earlier editions of Polybius; the presence of a particular passage in the largest possible number of manuscripts in the same section; and the overlap between manuscripts in different sections (pp. xiii-xiv). And all this makes very good sense. Nevertheless it is to be regretted that in adapting the dissertation for the press this list of passages should have been omitted. At the very least an index should have been provided for the passages from Polybius that are specifically cited.

The organization of Moore's study is governed by the three groups of manuscripts that preserve the bulk of what remains of the text of Polybius: those containing Books I-V (Chapters 1-3); those based on the *Excerpta Antiqua* (Chapters 4-8); and those derived from the Constantine Excerpts (Chapters 9-15). These groups of manuscripts are discussed in Parts I, II, and III, divided into chapters as indicated above. Part IV is reserved for some general observations about the whole tradition (Chapter 16) and concludes with an Appendix dealing with assorted manuscripts whose Polybius excerpts are too brief to fit into the tripartite tradition.

Part I begins with a brief chapter on "The Previous Editions of Polybius," in which Moore also points out the shortcomings of earlier discussions of the manuscript tradition. He is somewhat captious in his criticism of Büttner-Wobst (p. 7), and less than generous in his references to Schweighäuser's monumental edition of Polybius. Of the latter we read: "He mentions, albeit unsatisfactorily, more manuscripts than any other study," or: "Schweighäuser, apart from the inevitable limitations of the period in which he was writing, shows in his introduction that he also uses the same false principles" (i. e. as Büttner-Wobst and Hultsch) (p. 8).

But with Chapter Two the real merits of this book become apparent for the first time, when Moore steps down from the rostrum and takes us into the scriptorium, where he is completely at his ease. The format of this chapter and of most of those that follow is a simple one: first the manuscripts are discussed in chronological order, next their readings of the selected passages are compared to establish the relationship between the manuscripts, and from time to time as the argument proceeds partial stemmata are introduced, usually being combined into one stemma at the end. For the first section, that is for the "Manuscript Tradition of Books I-V," there are only seventeen manuscripts, ranging from the tenth century all the way down to the sixteenth. Each manuscript is considered separately and its characteristics summarized. In determining probable dates watermarks are used wherever possible (this will not help with vellum, for example), and then this result is checked against

the palaeographical evidence. When the two fail to agree exactly, the author states his own conclusions and his reasons for reaching them. Usually handwriting is more eloquent than a watermark, partly because not all watermarks have been classified. More important is the fact that paper may be used many years after its manufacture, while writing is individual and it has strict chronological limits. An example of what can be attempted through palaeography is the very first manuscript mentioned in the first section, A or *Vaticanus Gr. 124*. This manuscript is signed by "Monk Ephraim," but no date is given. However, other manuscripts of his are known and dated. Therefore the attempt has been made to determine the date of MS A by deciding which of the others it most closely resembles, establishing Ephraim periods as it were. The author shows commendable caution in refusing to accept the exact date of 947 as confirmed by such evidence (pp. 10 f.). Another aspect which is always taken into consideration when possible is the history of each manuscript. Could the manuscript have been geographically accessible to the scribe who is thought to have copied it, and in the period when this is assumed to have taken place? Then there are the problems that arise through missing pages, by change of handwriting in the body of the manuscript, by marginal corrections or supplements to the text in a variety of hands, by lacunae in the text (sometimes occurring in a whole series of manuscripts) and so on.

But the greater part of each chapter is concerned with the actual comparison of the readings, that is with statistics. For the reader (as well no doubt as for the author) this is a test of endurance. But if the argumentation is to have any meaning the evidence must be understood and verified. Your reviewer took pains to check the multitude of references to the text of Polybius made by Moore and failed to find a single reference which was incorrect. And that is truly a remarkable performance, for which not only the author but also the editorial staff of the Cambridge University Press deserves high praise.

It would be tedious to summarize all the arguments of this closely reasoned book, but some of the conclusions may be given.

The evidence points to the fact that as late as the time of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (944-959), in whose reign the Constantine Excerpts from the historians were made, virtually the whole text of Polybius was still extant (p. 176). Of these Excerpts only six out of the original fifty-three titles have reached us more or less intact, and in these there is not a great deal of overlapping (p. 129). The *de Legationibus Romanorum ad Gentes*, for example, would be limited in terms of relevance from using much from Polybius that would also be of interest to the compiler of the *de Virtutibus et Vitiis*. Therefore, the fact that the Constantine Excerpts in our possession contain no passages from Books XVII, XIX, XXVI, XXXVII, and XL, need not mean that those books had already been lost.

Assuming, then, that the full text of Polybius was still available in the tenth century, why do we not have it to-day? As Schweighäuser demonstrated one hundred and seventy-five years ago, the manuscripts which give extracts from the first eighteen books of

Polybius all give the same extracts from the same books. Therefore he called the original source collection from which our manuscripts are all derived the *Excerpta Antiqua*. Moore accepts this title (p. 55), though Pédech makes it seem likely that the original title may well have been *Epitome* (Budé Polyb., XII, p. xxxvi). But our manuscripts no longer contain excerpts from Books I-V, which are always preserved *in toto* when they are included at all. Moore divides up the *Excerpta Antiqua* manuscripts into three groups: those containing excerpts from Books VI-XVIII, Books VII-XVIII, and Books VI, XVIII, and X respectively. These represent three stages of deterioration, but all are derived from a common parent, the hyparchetype of the *Excerpta Antiqua*, I-XVIII, which Moore places considerably before 1000 A.D. in his stemma (p. 73). For the shortened VI, XVIII, and X version he says only that it was "current at least from the fourteenth century,"—while he implies that the VII-XVIII selection came still later (p. 177). Why no excerpts from Books I-V? Moore argues that Byzantine interest in "the history of empires" and especially in that of Rome (p. 176) was responsible. But why should that interest lag after Cannae rather than Zama? Surely this can be explained only as one of the accidents of survival. Someday (εὐφύμει τοῦτό γε), we may have only the first four books intact, because that is where Volume 2 of the Loeb edition ends!

While the author accepts the view that the hyparchetypes of the three main lines of our tradition go back to a single archetype, this is not original with him nor does he examine it in detail (pp. 172 f.). He is much more interested in the relationship between the individual manuscripts: whether descended from Gemelli or directly from a common parent; whether related by contamination, so that an older manuscript may have been emended in the margin as the result of corrections made in the text of a later manuscript (perhaps even a direct descendant of the earlier one); or whether no direct relationship does exist. He has been especially resourceful in suggesting hypotheses to explain the present state of the evidence, the most elaborate of which is his explanation of what he calls the "Italian Tradition" and the "Byzantine Tradition" (p. 32). The former, while it derives from A and B (manuscripts originally in Constantinople) was continued by B2-5, which were all copied in Italy. The Byzantine Tradition manuscripts include C2, Z2, D, E, and J. In addition to a careful analysis of each of the manuscripts (including an attempt to differentiate as Büttner-Wobst had not done between the various marginal hands), Moore makes it seem most likely that the hyparchetype of the *Excerpta Antiqua* derives from the Byzantine Tradition (p. 171). The stemmata of Moore (see especially those on pp. 40, 73, 88, 104, and 171) give some measure of the advances he has made in detail over the standard stemma in Büttner-Wobst (Vol. II, p. lix).

The Constantine Excerpts cannot be dealt with in the same way as Polybius I-V and the *Excerpta Antiqua* because, as Moore points out, four of the six titles reach us with only one manuscript to represent each. He also argues convincingly that the other two go back to a single exemplar (p. 128). His discussion of these titles (the *de Legionibus Gentium ad Romanos* and the *de Leg-*

ationibus Romanorum ad Gentes) may be summarized in part, both for its intrinsic interest and as a fair example of the author's procedure.

The "single exemplar," according to Moore, was Escorial MS I64, which was destroyed in the fire of 1671. Fortunately a certain David Colvill visited the Escorial some fifty years before the catastrophe and took careful notes about the manuscripts he examined. His description of I64 proves that it contained the two *de Legationibus*. Now the first mention we have of this important document is in a letter written in October of 1573 by Augustinus, Archbishop of Tarragona, in which he observes that he has just been given permission to have the manuscript copied. Then in 1591, as Moore and others maintain, this copy found its way along with other manuscripts from Augustinus' library into the Escorial, and in good time to be destroyed along with its parent in 1671. For this we have two bits of evidence, one negative. There is a list of the manuscripts of Augustinus that did *not* go to the Escorial in 1591, and our manuscript is *not* listed; and there is also an entry in the Escorial catalogue of 1600 listing a three-volume copy of the *de Legationibus*. And now we meet a captivating figure, Andreas Darmarius of Epidaurus, a man who copied manuscripts to order and who also had a staff working under him. He is known to have done work for Augustinus on other occasions as well as the one we are considering, and Moore argues vigorously that the nine manuscripts we still have containing the *de Legationibus Gentium*, or the *de Legationibus Romanorum*, or both are the work of this enterprising copyist and his assistants. And here the time element becomes important, as these manuscripts have to be dated very close together. According to Moore, despite the fact that Augustinus' letters show he was in a great hurry for his manuscript copy of I64, Darmarius determined to make another copy for himself (no doubt he knew from experience how difficult it was to obtain an entrée to the Escorial library), so as soon as he had copied the manuscript he turned his copy over to the staff for recopying. When that had been done, and not before, the Archbishop received the treasure for which he had been waiting. Meanwhile Darmarius made another copy of the *de Leg. Gent.* (Moore's MS X, now in Milan, signed with Darmarius' name and the date of 24 August, 1574) from the first part of his own copy of both titles, and while he was doing this an assistant was busily transcribing the *de Leg. Rom.* (and *this* manuscript is a hypothetical one). The reason for assuming an extra set of manuscripts is the necessity of accounting for the similarities and the differences between the readings in a sixteenth century Trinity College manuscript (hitherto neglected) and other texts of the *de Leg. Rom.* We are reassured, however, by a bit of testimony about that prodigious copyist, Darmarius. He is known to have copied a 312-page manuscript (20 lines to a page) in four days (p. 159)! Too bad he and his school were not active in the tenth century, when there was so much more of the text to be saved, but this was not a happy century for survivals. There is nothing to show that the elaborate Constantine Excerpts were copied or even made use of between the tenth (or early eleventh) century and the sixteenth (p. 137).

In conclusion it must be said that Dr. Moore has written a most useful book. Critics may not accept all his inferences, but no one can complain about being misled. The evidence is presented fully and clearly before the author introduces his own speculations. There are four excellent plates. Two of them, in the fine tenth century hand of Monk Ephraim, help clarify Moore's argument about the relationship between A and the assumed archetype. The reader sees at a glance the problems raised by the lacuna on both pages (p. 172). A detailed Index of Manuscripts, and a useful General Index, where the reader can run down individual references to these manuscripts under their Sigla, are also included.

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EMANUELE CASTORINA. *La poesia d'Orazio*. Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1965. Pp. 315.

In a work which might be more aptly titled "*La vera poesia d'Orazio*" Castorina develops two main points, each demonstrated at length and frequently. First, Horace as man and as poet is an Epicurean throughout his life, though never as a theoretical philosopher. Second, only in that poetry in which he presents ideas or subjects that derive from his own experience and in which his involvement is deep and personal does Horace really succeed. The principle on which these convictions are based is stated gnominically on p. 171, "*Tutto è vera nella vera poesia*"; "*vera poesia*" here is to be understood as that part of Horace's poetry that attains a high level of beauty, tone, and thought because the technical mastery of the writer is supported by a sense of involvement with or commitment to his subject. Perhaps the principal weakness of a book that otherwise shows an intimate and effective (as well as admiring) knowledge of the poet is Castorina's tendency to make nearly every passage examined support the *epicureismo* of Horace and to press nearly interminably at the *vera poesia* thesis. Exceptions are admitted and explained, often justified. Castorina presents an extensive survey of European scholarship on Horace (with confusingly generous excerpts throughout the book to illustrate the views of others), detailed and well-documented critical examination of some hexameter and much lyric verse, and interpretations based on the premise (p. 9) that above all one must understand the man to achieve an understanding of his poetry. With this intent he divides his work into three sections: (1) Horatian criticism (both *of* and *by* the poet), (2) Horace's poetry, and (3) the anti-Horace. But by the rejection of a very large part of the hexameter poems as "true poetry," Castorina is writing on the lyrics, and essentially on the "best lyrics."

Both main points emerge in a long discussion of Horace's esthetics, and in particular of his position with relation to the literary theories current in his day, notably those of Neoptolemus and Philodemus.

Granting that Horace derives his *ars poetica* in the main from Neoptolemus' Aristotelianism, Castorina endeavors to show that in part through the influence of Philodemus' breadth of view Horace has himself developed a literary esthetic that takes him beyond his Aristotelian background and in the syncretic atmosphere of the 1st-century places him not far in position from the Platonic Theodorus of Gadara and indeed from the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*. There is general concordance between the latter and Horace's expressed ideas, Castorina suggests in detail, and the two with Neoptolemus agree on a balance of importance between *ars* and *ingenium*; he further interprets Aristotelian thinking (because of its "modernism") as accepting this concept. Horace, owing much to these predecessors, and to his neoteric models as well, has developed a modern esthetic of his own which has much that is original. And inasmuch as he values *ingenium* highly and rightly assesses his own, Horace must be accounted as heir to the *neoteroi* not only in *ars*, but for the *ingenium* that with it produces in his poems of love and sadness his *vera poesia*.

When Horace seems to stray from the Epicurean path, Castorina has several possible explanations, among them: Stoic and Epicurean thinking have undergone a syncretism by the 1st century B. C. that allows for the confusion; Horace may be introducing something from Stoicism eclectically, and often on a joking level; an occasional Stoic precept is not objectionable in a poet who uses Epicureanism so fundamentally as his way of life; poems usually interpreted as revealing "conversion" (e. g., *C.*, II, 13; I, 34; 35) do not—they are either jokes or reflect only a symbolic religion in neoteric fashion. Poetry is Horace's only religion. The consistent melancholy he sees pervading Horace's work from *Epod.*, XIII to *C.*, IV, 7 is the element to which Castorina turns constantly as an incontrovertible sign of the Epicurean poet. *C.*, I, 11 is the true Horace: it reveals not an opponent of Epicurus, but a weak follower; *nefas* is to be interpreted as poetic and purely in the human realm; the contradiction between ideological conviction and sentimental weakness in all his poetry is here most clearly evident. Indeed love and sadness are the two notes of pure Horatian poetry. The only certainty seems to be that love is inconstant—but no less strongly felt because of this conviction.

Castorina enters the unending discussion on the "reality" of Horace's loves in two ways. Theoretically he reminds us that love poetry can be of two types—about a woman, or about woman in general. Practically he notes that biographical details in Horace are usually accurate and that women mentioned more than once are consistently portrayed. He seeks in detailed examination to prove the reality of a number of the Horatian ladies, particularly those in the "most beautiful poems." Real are: the Neaera of *Epod.*, XV and *C.*, III, 14 (they are probably the same Neaera); the Lycia (probably one) of *C.*, I, 8; 13; 25; III, 9; Lyce in III, 10; IV, 13 (don't doubt the reality of the lady or love because she appears in the framework of an Hellenistic *τόπος*, e. g. a *παρὰ κλαυσίθυρον* such as III, 10); Cinara in *C.*, IV, 1; *Epist.*, I, 14, 33; 7, 25 ff., who is real, but shows no personality traits, and should probably be identified with Glycera in *C.*, I, 30; III, 19 (but not with Tibullus' Glycera

in *C.*, I, 33); Licymnia (Terentia) in *C.*, II, 12. Lalage is a symbol in *C.*, I, 22, an ingénue in *I.*, 5. And so it continues. In effect, the *personae* of the poet in the lyrics are reduced to two, the biographically sincere and the uncommitted craftsman. Argument of this sort will please or irritate as it persuades or fails, and since it is well-travelled ground to the reader of Horace the reaction is likely to be quite definite. Castorina's conclusion is that Horace's failure to express wild passion in his verse is a failure of the fully realized poem, not of the emotional inspiration that produced it. There is emotional sincerity and depth in some of the love affairs, and moments of spontaneity and passion that rival those of Catullus and Propertius.

When he turns to Horace *poeta civile* Castorina is again handicapped by having to argue in detail some of the most discussed passages in Horace. To him the requirement for understanding the civic poetry of Horace is in distinguishing between loyalty to Rome and to Augustus. Horace is first of all a Roman and an innate Epicurean. His distrust for the religious and mystical led to disagreement even with Vergil and certainly could not allow acceptance of the mystical tone of the Augustan regime. Where he seems to accept or to be in accord with the regime it is the anti-Horace writing, the public Horace who finds it necessary to conform and whose encomium is false by its very excessiveness. Far from being detached from politics, Horace is much involved—but his interest is Rome and not the man who controls her. These points are used in a long analysis of the civic poetry wherein the equation warmth/involvement/sadness = true poetry is the principal criterion for judgment. Of *Epod.*, VII, IX, and XVI only IX is truly poetic, because it has a warmth and drama (like *C.*, I, 37) and is beset with the sadness of the moment. The other two are undoubtedly sincere but forced and amateurish (Horace, incidentally, is the younger and more obscure, hence the imitator of Vergil's *Eclogue* IV). Dismissed as unpoetic are *C.*, I, 2; 12; 21; III, 24. I, 14 leaves doubts because the literary quality persists. II, 1 draws a *non liquet*. IV, 4; 5; and 15, show the conflict between the human art of the real Horace and the forced tone of the anti-Horace. The pervading humanity and the rejoicing at the freedom from fear show the real Horace in I, 37. In the Roman Odes Castorina finds 1 and 4 most successful as poetry because they are most personal, 2 and 6 least successful, and 3 and 5 mixed in tone and effect. These judgments reflect the subjective nature of a good deal of Castorina's argument wherein *sento* or *non sento* must play a large role, as witness the emotional evaluation (pp. 288 ff.) of *C.*, III, 30 ("tutta poesia," with the thought much elaborated) and the rejection of the *Carmen saeculare* beginning "Nel Carme Secolare non sento nulla di tutto questo."

For Castorina the important element in the art of Horace is its humanity, its derivation of its material from the emotion and experience of the poet himself. Only when these surround the dominant themes can *ars* succeed. The poet lived the Epicurean life, but naturally rather than dogmatically. His commitment to Rome could not overcome his lack of belief in the future—only the joy of the moment is real, and his poetry comments on those joys—with friends or lovers—viewed in the shadow of life's melancholy.

An author who attempts to examine both the literary theory and the practice of Horace is ambitious and courageous. He is also in danger of failure, especially when the presentation is quite personal and replete with comparable subjective views of other critics. A good deal of forcing is evident in many of the interpretations, and even in the finding of "an ample enough systematic coherence" in Horace. Castorina may well convince some in his restatement of the thesis of Horace's continuous basic Epicureanism. His familiar anti-Caesarian Horace will find acceptance. I doubt that as many will follow him in his vision of the emotional and intensely involved poet of love and sorrow. And to persuade this, I believe, is the purpose of the book.

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KLAUS BRINGMANN. Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1965. Pp. 113. DM 18. (*Hypomnemata*, Heft 14.)

There are few surprises in this Marburg dissertation, least of all for one who has read Paul Cloché's posthumous *Isocrate et son temps* (Paris, 1963). Writing in 1962, Bringmann had no access to that book and Cloché's earlier works do not even appear in his bibliography, but it is striking how often the two authors agree on Isocrates' political aims and ideas. It must be admitted, however, that of the two works Bringmann's is the more compact, more learned, and better organized.

Bringmann sets out to analyze Isocrates' political ideas, both foreign and domestic, as a whole and to determine, without reading between the lines, their basic principles and the changes, if any, that occurred in them. In so doing he assails three old ideas, which he complains are still prevalent in Germany (they are common elsewhere as well): that Philip's ideas and program were those of Isocrates, that the orator changed from a supporter of the polis to a champion of monarchy, and that he first upheld and promoted Athenian expansion on the sea only to turn later against the idea of empire.

First Bringmann examines the panhellenic program of the *Panegyricus* and concludes that Isocrates' chief concern was the creation of harmony and prosperity among and in the Greek states, which could best be brought about by the war with Persia. He points out that in the *Philippus* this harmony is still paramount, but that Philip and Alexander were not interested in this but rather in their own power. Next Bringmann successfully attacks the theses of Wilamowitz and Buchner that in this speech Isocrates was primarily concerned with promoting the Second Athenian Confederacy and the old empire, respectively. He explains the sophistic defence of the fifth-century empire, on the grounds that its domination was less harsh than that of others, as necessary for Athens' claim to a share in the hegemony, but he rightly insists that Isocrates was basically opposed to *πλεονεξία* in anyone.

In the *Plataicus* it is the *πλεονεξία* of the Thebans which needs attacking, and it is thus that Eringmann interprets the speech, which he dates to 373. He refuses to see in it any tendencies either pro-Timotheus or pro-Callistratus, but rather a general statement that Athens should champion the freedom and autonomy of all Greek states. It is a presentation of what Athenian policy should be to keep her claim to hegemony in a new situation, which is why Persia is left aside. Bringmann does admit that Isocrates is supporting Callistratus' anti-Theban policy in the *Archidamus*, but when this failed and was supplanted by Timotheus' imperialism, Isocrates fell silent until the Social War discredited the latter. Then he came forth with two major works, *On the Peace* and the *Areopagiticus*. Bringmann dates these in 355 and 354 respectively, refuting at length Jaeger's claim that the latter appeared before the end of the war. He shows that the tendencies in both are the same. The attacks on the League and the Empire are no complete change of mind; now it is Athenian *πλεονεξία* which must be chastised. Only by respecting the freedom and autonomy of all can Athens keep the goodwill of the Greeks and by arming keep peace and rebuild prosperity. The *Areopagiticus* is the other side of the coin; the *πλεονεξία* among the Athenians themselves, represented by the demagogues, can best be checked by the "ancestral constitution" and a moral reform led and guarded by the Council of the Areopagus. Isocrates' ideas are those of a conservative in the tradition of Theramenes.

In his discussion of the *Philippus*, Bringmann stresses that Isocrates saw Philip as a potential leader and benefactor of free and autonomous Greek states and that the orator's aim was still harmony and prosperity among the Greek states, best attained by a Persian War; now there was the added advantage of diverting the Macedonian's energies and ambitions from Greece. There follows a discussion of Isocrates' attitudes toward monarchy, in which Bringmann easily refutes the idea that he thought of Philip as a king for the Greeks or even the leader of a league with strong central political authority. Isocrates did, however, recognize the advantages of the single strong leader in war, as is shown by his earlier appeal to Dionysius of Syracuse. In the *Nicocles*, written in 374/3, Bringmann rightly refuses to see any basic preference on Isocrates' part for tyranny but rather an attempt to convince an existing tyrant to rule with virtue, in a manner approved by the upper classes.

The Isocrates who emerges is a man with basic conservative principles, favoring a government and foreign policy run in the interests of the upper classes and believing that prosperity could be brought about by the freedom and autonomy of all the Greeks. But he is also an orator, ready to interpret the past in the manner most suited to the present argument, a trait which is hard on his commentators. With this picture I can find no quarrel; Bringmann's case is well argued. My only complaint is that the *Panathenaicus* is not discussed; there Isocrates seems to have become more conservative, although probably not enough so to upset Bringmann's description of him as a Theramenean. Yet I cannot recall that this speech is even mentioned; there is no index.

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ÉDOUARD DELEBECQUE. *Thucydide et Alcibiade*. Aix-en-Provence, 1965. Pp. 250. (*Centre d'études et de recherches helléniques de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences humaines d'Aix*, 5.)

Professor Delebecque's major interest is the identification of Alcibiades as an informant of the historian Thucydides. His method is a close analysis of Book VIII. "Le présent ouvrage est un livre sur un livre. Il est né de la lecture attentive du livre huitième et ultime de l'histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse écrite par Thucydide. Ces pages suprêmes piquent en effet la curiosité puis provoquent la recherche par la complexité des actions, enchevêtrées plus qu'ailleurs, à l'approche du dénouement, par les étrangetés de la structure et par la mutilation dernière puisque le volume antique est amputé de sa fin" (p. 5).

Part I, "Les lois de la composition (V, 26 à VIII)," is a detailed introduction in which Delebecque emphasises the complexity of the subject chosen by Thucydides, distinguishes between what Thucydides himself knew or had seen and what he drew from many sources, and presents the historian's chronological method, the division of the year into winter and summer, as a means of maintaining clarity in a narrative that depended perforce on testimony drawn from many persons and places.

The second part, "Alcibiade et le livre VIII," is the core of the study. Delebecque proceeds chapter by chapter, summarising the contents. He identifies a "récit ancien" and a "récit nouveau." To the latter he assigns chapters 45-53, 63 (section 3)-77 and 81-82. In these chapters of the "récit nouveau" Alcibiades is the protagonist and they form, so to speak, a "seconde histoire . . . plus homogène." The useful table on p. 192 illustrates Delebecque's convictions.

In Part 3, "Alcibiade et l'œuvre de Thucydide," Delebecque urges that books V (after the Peace of Nicias) to VII reveal evidence of rewriting and additions in several passages concerning Alcibiades. The final chapter draws together Delebecque's conclusions. Only Alcibiades could have supplied Thucydides with the material for the "récit nouveau" of book VIII and for the obvious supplements found in earlier books (e.g., Alcibiades' relationship with the Spartan Endios). The meeting between the two men ("un long entretien," p. 233) could not have occurred before 407 or after 404; Delebecque assigns it to 406/5, after Alcibiades' last exile. Moreover, he assigns it to Thrace, where the historian possessed property and Alcibiades established himself. Thucydides then revised his work in the light of the new information that he had extracted. This is why the Alcibiades of the earlier books seems so different from the Alcibiades of book VIII.

A "Chronologie sommaire de Thucydide et Alcibiade" (the latter's return to Athens is placed in 408) is appended, along with a brief bibliography. The "Carte de la guerre d'Ionie" is well executed. There is no index but in compensation a minutely detailed "Table des matières" is provided.

Delebecque's thesis is itself attractive and he marshalls his arguments impressively; in fact, the reader on occasion finds the long summaries of Thucydides' text somewhat tiresome. I am convinced

that the meeting actually took place; but the author is inclined to interpret in his own favour evidence that is at least uncertain. In VIII, 86, 4 Thucydides delivers a famous judgement: καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτον τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἑλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελεῖσαι. Where MS B reads πρῶτον the other MSS have πρῶτος. Delebecque (pp. 175, 227), without discussion, adopts πρῶτος and translates: "Avant quiconque à ce moment-là, et mieux que quiconque, (Alcibiade) rendit service à la cité." Delebecque takes this as great praise ("un jugement cette fois entièrement favorable"), expressing Thucydides' revised opinion of Alcibiades. I believe, on the other hand, that πρῶτον is right and that the sentence is a scathing comment on Alcibiades' career and character (cf. *Phoenix*, XIX [1965], p. 40, n. 30).

Delebecque (pp. 33-4) takes the beginning of winter and the beginning of spring in Thucydides as precise dates astronomically, following Pritchett and van der Waerden and ignoring the contrary view of Meritt. Not all will agree that "tout ce qui appartient au récit récent est du meilleur Thucydide" (p. 193). Plutarch (*Alcibiades*, 16, 4-5) rather than Hatzfeld should be cited for Alcibiades' participation in the treatment of Melos. I question whether Nicias should be called an oligarch (p. 206). To write that a state was forced into the Confederacy of Delos in 426 (p. 211) is an anachronism.

I note a few errors in a well-edited book: false accents on pp. 218 (n. 5) and 240 (n. 1), "Il" for "Ils" on p. 228, errors in dates under A. W. Gomme on p. 245.

I have enjoyed reading this book, which I find most persuasive. Delebecque has many attractive ideas. His ardour at times, I think, causes him to lose sight of Thucydides' history as a whole; in particular, he seems to admire Alcibiades and he believes that eventually Thucydides did too, whereas my own opinions are the opposite. This does not cast doubt on his conclusions. He announces that he will edit book VIII according to the principles of composition here enunciated. To this we look forward.

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ALEXANDER GIANNINI. *Paradoxographorum Graecorum Reliquiae*.

Recognovit, brevi adnotatione critica instruxit, latine reddidit.

Milano, Istituto Editoriale Italiano, 1965. Pp. 432. L. 9,000.

(Collana diretta da Raffaele Cantarella, *Classici Greci e Latini*, Sezione Testi e Commenti, 3.)

The editor of this new and critically up-to-date edition of the scattered remains of the *Paradoxographi Graeci*, written under the auspices of his distinguished teacher, R. Cantarella, is himself no novice in the field of paradoxography. Previously Giannini had published two substantial articles on the subject, to which he refers

somewhat obscurely (but see Preface, p. 9) under the symbols "P. G. I" and "P. G. II." These are, respectively: I, "Da Homero a Callimacho, Motive e forme del meraviglioso" on pp. 247-66 of *Istituto Lombardo Acad. di Scienze e Lettere, Rendiconti*, XC VII (1963);¹ and II, "Da Callimacho all' età imperiale" in *Acme*, XVII (1964), pt. 1, pp. 99-146. The user of Giannini's new corpus of *Paradoxographi Graeci* will probably find it necessary, in order to understand what the editor is doing with certain authors and the classification of them, to make an excursion into "P. G. II."

The most comprehensive edition of the *Paradoxographi Gr.* which had previously been published was that of A. Westermann (Brunsvig, 1839); and it is by comparison with that old edition, which was very thorough for its time, that one may best see what advances have been made in the new edition before us. Giannini has taken account of many improvements made in the old texts by scholars since Westermann's time, and three new texts of some length are included which were first published between 1871 and 1913, all three compiled by anonymous authors in antiquity, namely: the *Paradoxographus Florentinus* (Giannini, pp. 315-29, *De Aquis*); the *Paradoxographus Vaticanus* (G., pp. 331-51), and the *Paradoxographus Palatinus* (G., pp. 353-61). A list of the critical commentaries and new editions, of which the editor has made use, is given on pp. 11-12.²

The main part of Giannini's corpus, pp. 7-361, consists of a short preface followed by the texts of thirteen different authors, only seven of which are continuous texts transmitted from antiquity in one or more MSS. These (nos. 5, 9, 15, 17-20) are arranged in a chronological order together with the fragments of six other authors, and the testimonia about them, beginning with Callimachus, the first whom we know to have written a book entirely about *paradoxa*. Following p. 361 there is a fourfold Appendix, given to notices about (A) *Opera Dubia*, including Ephorus and Theopompus among others; (B) *Opera Aliena*; (C) *Incerti Auctores*, four in number; (D) *Auctores Seriores*, Aelian to Psellus.

A literary-historical arrangement of all the texts in this corpus, according to authors, has been necessary in order to explain the sources of our knowledge about many obscure ancient writers and the scattered fragments of their books; but an *index rerum* is indispensable for all readers whose primary concern is with the substance of these *mirabilia*, rather than the literary history, and no such index was supplied by Westermann. By giving us two such indices, Giannini has made the material of the paradoxographers for the first time easily accessible. If a scholar wants to know what the paradoxographers had to say e. g. about αἰγες or ὄρα, without reading through many pages of text, he will quickly find it in

¹ With the exclusion of Ephorus and Theopompus, who are discussed as possible forerunners of Callimachus in *Acme*, pp. 100-5.

² In this connection special attention may be called to O. Keller's *Rerum Naturalium Scriptores Graeci Minores* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1877) in which four of the most important of the paradoxographers are critically edited: Antigonus, Apollonius, Phlegon, and the *Par. Vaticanus*.

Giannini's *Index Rerum Notabilium* (pp. 400 ff.), under the letters *a* and *ω*, arranged under such subheads as *animalia*, *plantae*, *metalla*, and *varia*. If what one seeks is information about types of things, such as *mirabilia de aquis*, *de animalibus*, *de plantis*, *de homine*, *de locis*, with subdivisions under each heading, one will look into the editor's index called *Mirabilia in Partes Descripta* (pp. 427 ff.).

Latin translations of the longer Greek texts (Ps. Aristotle, Antigonus, Apollonius, Phlegon, Par. Florent., Par. Vat., and Par. Palat.) have been added for the first time by Giannini in the book before us.

All in all, this new corpus of the *Paradoxographi* is a reliable source book, marking a long advance in our knowledge of the subject since Westermann.

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H. P. L'ORANGE. *Art Forms and Civic Life in the Late Roman Empire*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 131; 67 pls. \$5.00.

By printing this small but richly illustrated volume, a translation of L'Orange's *Fra Principat til Dominat* (Oslo and Stockholm, 1958), the Princeton University Press has benefited all students of the Late Empire who do not read Norwegian—and we are probably a majority. These five chapters provide a welcome distillation of ideas which the author, Professor of Classical Archaeology in the University of Oslo and Director of the Norwegian Archaeological Institute in Rome, has been meditating for many years, beginning with his *Studien zur Geschichte des spätantiken Porträts* (1933).

His thesis, more precisely indicated by the new English title, is that art and architecture in the third century significantly reflect the political and social transformation of that period, when the Principate collapsed in anarchy and a restoration of order was bought at the price of submitting to the iron discipline of Diocletian. His general subject is not a new one but he skilfully traces its ramifications, and it is a triumph of synthesis when he helps us to sense a relation between government controls and an artist's vision of mankind. He shows us how, in architecture, the classical formula of column and architrave, with exquisite decorative detail, yielded place to the arcade, with vast, plain wall-surfaces broken only by repeated arches; how, in pictorial relief, social crisis was mirrored by an "anarchy of form" that under the new regime made way for simplified compositions characterized by symmetry, stereotypy, symbolism, and the cramping of the subject by its framework; and how, in portrait sculpture, features formerly rendered with a sensitive concern for individuality, so as to depict even a fleeting emotional tension, surrendered at the end to a stylized mask with its distant gaze "fixed upon eternity." The ruler became a *deus praesens*, a Jupiter or a Hercules, and the members of the Tetrarchy were made to look alike because all were types of the divine. The

artist began to think of society at large as composed not so much of human beings as of a mass of *capita* which he need not bother to individualize. And of course there is much more: it is not easy to condense what the author has expressed so trenchantly.

In his recapitulation he seems to shift ground a bit, writing that art and society evolved and "devolved" in parallel paths, so that it is to some degree a coincidence when the one reflects the other. In both spheres anarchy clamored for a renewal of order, and in both the solution was a "massive simplification" and a "mechanical crystallization." Is the term "devolution" a cautious substitute for "decadence"? We should have liked to learn more fully whether these processes marked a decline or merely a change. For architecture, it may be, the question does not arise, but it could be argued that a sculptor's art declines when he loses pleasure in the tactile qualities of his materials and retreats from the often complex beauties of nature to abstractions that could be rendered as effectively in an easier medium. And must we believe that the eyes of a bust like that in the Cairo Museum (fig. 61) are actually contemplating eternity? Would it not be as fair to say that they have a blank stare devoid of meaning, because the artist could do no better?

ROGER A. PACK.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

LUDWIG HUEER. *Religiöse und politische Beweggründe des Handelns in der Geschichtsschreibung des Herodot.* Tübingen, 1965. Pp. 210. (Inaugural-Dissertation.)

This dissertation, by a pupil of Wolfgang Schadewaldt, is carefully thought out and offers clear and well-argued answers to the questions which it poses. The author grants the pious faith of Herodotus in dreams, signs, and oracles, but shows that the characters in his history are rarely, if ever, entirely dependent on such supernatural guidance in making their decisions. He is anxious to refute the view held by some critics that Greeks in the earlier part of the fifth century felt themselves to be mere puppets of the gods and that Herodotus was no different in his view of human history. His fire is directed in particular at the dissertation of W. Stahlenbrecher, *Die Motivation des Handelns bei Herodot* (Hamburg, 1953).

He proves his point satisfactorily, but does not go on to ask what his conclusion means. Thucydides records fewer portents and oracles, but he offers one striking example of an Athenian general altering his plans and delaying his departure from Syracuse solely because of an eclipse, though his professional training must have rebelled against the decision. This does not mean that Thucydides was more superstitious than Herodotus or that he is recording the events of a more superstitious age, but simply that he saw no reason to doubt the current version of the incident. He tells us how careful he was in sifting what his informants told him, and complains that

his predecessors, including presumably Herodotus, were less critical. To what extent, in discussing the motives assigned to historical characters, can we distinguish between the historian's sources and his interpretation of them?

Huber claims that he can make the distinction, but his argument is not altogether convincing. In discussing the decisions of Greek and foreign statesmen with respect to peace and war, he can show that Herodotus recognizes only a limited number of grounds for action. And he concludes that the constant recurrence of these categories must be due to Herodotus himself, not to his informants or the prevailing opinion of his time. This means that he does not consider it pertinent to consider the accuracy of Herodotus in depicting the ethical and political thought of his age or the generation preceding him.

There are indeed occasions when he seems to regard Herodotus as a creative literary artist, who is as free to manipulate his characters and the events which he describes as though he were a writer of fiction. Quite properly he wants to emphasize some of the characteristics of Herodotean style which recall Homer, but one argument which he offers is totally illegitimate. He suggests that just as in the *Iliad* the *κόλως μάχη* of Book V-II acts as a prelude to the greater battle scenes which follow, so in Herodotus the Scythian expedition of Darius serves as a kind of "antechamber" to the central part of the structure—the great expeditions against Greece. But Herodotus cannot have the credit for the order of events as they are recorded; diligence in recording what he has learned must not be confused with the art of literary composition. This is the kind of error into which students are liable to fall, when they try to apply to historical works the technique of criticism which they have been encouraged to use in analyzing the work of poets.

This dissertation has been photographically reproduced from typescript, and it is no part of a reviewer's task to complain of misprints in this kind of publication. But there is one item, from the bibliography, which will give readers of this Journal special delight: "Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship."

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

M. AMIT. *Athens and the Sea: A Study in Athenian Sea-Power.* Brussels, Latomus, 1965. Pp. 150. 225 Belg. Fr. (*Collection Latomus*, LXXIV.)

In 1962 Amit published an article in *Athenaeum* on the sailors of the Athenian fleet. With some verbal adjustments, it forms the core of the present work, bulked out by a chapter on the political activity of Athens' maritime population, by a dozen-odd very brief sections (the longest is eight pages, and most run two to three) on ships, naval training, the people engaged in trade, the Peiraeus, etc., and by twelve miscellaneous appendices.

The original article largely repeated Rachel Sargent's funda-

mental study "The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare. II: In Warfare by Sea," *C.P.*, XXII (1927), pp. 264-79, with one exception: Sargent discussed, where relevant the sailors of city-states other than Athens; Amit does not, and as a result sidesteps some crucial problems.

If the article has little of significance to offer, the new material has even less. Of the two dozen-odd topics Amit takes up, not one is treated in any depth; throughout we are given some cursory handbook-style paragraphs supported by a random smattering of citations from ancient authors. He can discuss the Arsenal of the Peiraeus without citing any literature later than 1383; he can discuss *emporoi* and *naucleroi* without showing the slightest awareness of the complex meanings of those terms and the literature that has grown up about them; he can settle the age-old problem of the oarage of the trireme ("That seems the solution to the 'Trireme-problem,'" he sums up on page 102) with a series of pronunciamentos accompanied by a batch of citations even more haphazard than usual. The nadir is reached in the seven and one-half line paragraph portentously entitled "Life-Span of the Triremes" (p. 27) which, without citing a single reference, informs us that the "Naval lists" reveal an average life from twenty to thirty years; every reader, I take it, is expected to know offhand that the "Naval lists" are *I. G.*, II², 1607-32 and that the figure (twenty, not twenty to thirty) was worked out by W. Kolbe in *Ath. Mitt.*, XXVI (1901), pp. 386-97.

The appendices read as if the book was intended for elementary school children. E.g., No. III, exactly three-quarters of a page long, reveals in effect that the Athenians fished; No. IV, exactly one page long, reveals in effect that the Athenians transported passengers over water; No. V, just over two pages long, reveals in effect that the Athenians had trouble with pirates. At times Amit writes downright nonsense: he describes (pp. 15-16) merchant ships as if every one ever built had twenty oars; he tells us (p. 55) that "the Greeks . . . mostly lived in a land of islands, gulfs and capes"; he assures us (p. 16) that "the building of warships was one of the principal responsibilities of the Council of the Five Hundred"; he talks (p. 61) of fifth-century Athenian "capitalists" who hire out "slave gangs," have "investments in metal and textile workshops," and sell "abroad the products of their plantations."

How the *Collection Latomus* came to publish such a book is beyond me.

LIONEL CASSON.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

LOUIS DEROT and MONIQUE GÉRARD. Le cadastre mycénien de Pylos. Rome, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1965. Pp. 196; 10 pls. L. 5,000. (*Incunabula Graeca*, X.)

Linear B tablets bearing the ideogram *120 GRANUM are the most numerous in the Pylian archive, and are among the most interesting. Everyone is agreed that they have to do with land

division, and that there are two types of land, *ki-ti-me-na* and *ke-ke-me-na*, both of which are divided up, in whole or in part, and assigned to individuals who then either hold it as their own property (*e-ke ko-to-no*) or hold it conditionally from someone else (*e-ke o-na-to pa-ro X*). This much is agreed, but opinions differ as to the remaining details and the words expressing them.

The work under review sets out to establish by study of the texts the contextual meaning of those terms as yet little understood, and then by comparison of all terms with words which occur in later Greek and earlier in Indo-European, to establish the linguistic relations and the exact linguistic form of the Linear B word. It is, thus, something of an etymological dictionary of a portion of the Linear B vocabulary, that portion which has to do with land division. It is also, unfortunately, something of a disappointment.

The informed reader will scarcely credit that the asterisked forms *ἐντόριος 'enclave' and *σπαράπεδος 'précaire' once existed; and that ἐνάλιος could ever have meant 'dans l'indécision'; that *si-ri-jo* can be an early form, or an early spelling, of classical σκίρος; that Greek ever possessed a word *δαιαγγελός 'messenger extraordinaire.' If the authors really expect us to believe in these forms, they will be greatly mistaken; if they do not, one wonders why they made these identifications. Such uncontrolled jeux d'esprit should be discouraged.

A number of procedural shortcomings can be discerned. 1) The authors are ever ready to desert what is known or reasonable for less certain interpretations. On Un718.2: *o-wi-de-ta-i do-so-mo* they read: ὁ ρίδε ταῖς δοσμῶν 'qu'il a fixé pour eux comme contribution.' But there is no word divider in *o-wi-de-ta-i*, and it must be treated as one word, however it is to be interpreted. 2) They play etymological games on the basis of French equivalents. ρίδε in the passage quoted can mean 'fixé,' not because any such meaning is attested for this word in Linear B or in Greek, but because one can say in French: 'voyez si cet habit vous va' in the sense of 'decide.' The same tendencies lead to the translation of *e-mpa-ri-jo* as 'dans l'indécision' (< ἐν and ἱαλος 'transparent stone'), a translation which ignores the names Ἐνώ Ἐννείας. But none of these suggestions would have been made had two other considerations not been operative. 3) The authors seem to feel that we know a great deal about Linear B and specifically the landholding texts, and that the scholar's task is simply that of filling in the few lacunae remaining in our knowledge, that is, explaining all terms, regardless of how outlandish the results. This is simply not true: we know in fact rather little about Mycenaean society, and only painstakingly and gradually are learning more. Wild surmises do not help, and it is far better to admit ignorance than to build castles of clay tablets. 4) But perhaps the most serious defect of the authors' approach is their seeming inability to judge what is and what is not likely, as we shall see in a more extended discussion of one section.

On one of the land tablets (Ep704.4 = Eb321) occurs the entry: *ki-ri-te-wi-ja e-ko-si o-na-to*. This entry is unique in that *e-ko-si* (plural) occurs instead of *e-ke* (singular) only here. The authors decide that *ki-ri-te-wi-ja* represents **kritewjai*, nominative plural feminine of an adjective of obligation in -τέος 'qui doit être dis-

tingué, mis à part,' a form that would appear later on as *κριταί > *κριταί. The context does not demand this word and this meaning, but it does not exclude it either. Nor indeed is the formation impossible taken by itself, although it violates Mycenaean spelling rules, at least according to the formulation of some, according to which the continuation of earlier *wy should appear written as j, as in *i-je-re-ja* (≡ *hierewya*) = *ίεραα*; and it introduces phonological difficulties later on where we should expect to find at least some trace of a spelling with -et- beyond Hesiod's *παρεών* (*Th.*, 310). But we may grant that neither of these objections invalidates the proposed identification: taken together they do at least urge caution in building upon it. *ki-ri-te-wi-ja* occurs also on An607.1: *me-ta-pa ke-ri-mi-ja do-ge-ja ki-ri-te-wi-ja* which serves as heading or introductory formula to a list of women, all introduced by *do-ge-ja*. *Do-ge-ja* in the past has been taken to be a name, but the authors treat it as a feminine noun in -e-ja to a masculine noun in -e-u, a noun seen by them in the personal name *do-ge-u* of KN B804.4. *Do-ge-u* (= **dokweus*) then developed to **δοκεῖς* (the irregular phonology is handled by dissimilation of labiality: /k^w . . . w/ > /k . . . w/) which is the noun lying behind *δοκέω* 'watch closely.' *Do-ge-u*, and hence *do-ge-ja*, means 'guetteur, épieur, surveillant.' *ke-ri-mi-ja*, by the authors' fiat and in defiance of the spelling rules, becomes **κέρμαι*, an adjectival derivative of an unattested noun **κέρμος*, the Homeric misunderstanding of which is *κέραμος* 'jug,' in the sense of prison (*Iliad*, V, 387). The heading of An607 thus reads in Greek letters: *Μέταπα· *κέρμαι *δοκεῖς *κριταί* which interpreted means: 'Metapa: surveillantes de prison, privilégiées.' Of this interpretation the authors say (p. 143): "Il est assurément étonnant qu'un texte évoque l'existence, à l'époque mycénienne, d'une prison et plus précisément, sans doute, d'une prison de femmes." It is indeed.

Of course there are a few good things in the book, among them being some criticisms of earlier views and the chapters on slavery (save for occasional etymological flights). But these features are not sufficient to redeem a book that is otherwise ill-conceived and methodologically unsound.

WILLIAM F. WYATT, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

CARL ROEBUCK. *The World of Ancient Times*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966. Pp. xxv + 758; about 300 illus.; 22 maps. \$11.50.

Carl Roebuck, author of *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (New York, 1959) and other excellent works concerning the history and archaeology of the ancient world, has produced a clear, well-balanced, well-illustrated textbook suitable for college students and adult education.¹ In *The World of Ancient Times*, which has no footnotes,

¹ Perhaps one should deprecate the construction "different than" which disturbs a reader on pp. 303, 340, 363, 611, and 675.

Roebuck assigns 170 pages to the Ancient East with an introductory chapter on prehistory; the section on Rome, pp. 417-726, carries the reader through the fourth century after Christ. Having used it in a course with fifty-eight serious adults in the evening college, the reviewer recommends it.²

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

REIN FERWERDA. La signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin. Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1965. Pp. vii + 214.

The purpose of this Amsterdam doctoral thesis is to collect and classify the various passages in the *Enneads* where Plotinus uses metaphors and images and to comment on his usage. The collection is very thoroughly done and scholars who want to know where and how often Plotinus uses metaphors of light, of fire, of the sun, and many others, will now be able to turn up the relevant passages with ease. Ferwerda has prefixed each of his main sections with a discussion of what Plotinus' predecessors had made of similar material and of how he uses it himself. His general conclusion is that in the *Enneads* images are simply images and that Plotinus does not allow them to affect his basic patterns of thought.

Some of the analytical work is done rather more cursorily than one would have wished and far-reaching conclusions are occasionally drawn too hastily (see especially pp. 192-3). On the other hand the author often quotes the opinions of modern scholars on rather trivial or obvious matters which do not deserve documentation. Nevertheless it is good to have Dr. Ferwerda's book as a most helpful work of reference.

JOHN M. RIST.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, TORONTO.

² Boghazköy (not Boghazkoy) is now called Boğazkale. On p. 268 *strategos autokrator* is erroneously given as the title of the *στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀνάρχων*. Read *Dyscolus* for *Dysculus* on p. 407, "Emona" for "Emana" on p. 607, "ex-consuls" and "ex-prætors" for "consuls" and "prætors" on p. 574. On p. 573 a famous phrase in Edict I at Cyrene is mistranslated. The Battle of Ipsos should be dated in 301 B. C., not 302 as on p. 366. On p. 603 the sestertius is erroneously equated with twelve *asses*. On p. 501 the *indæo* in the formulary procedure is mistaken for a magistrate. On p. 608 it is going too far to say that most of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire had become Roman citizens before 212 A. D. On p. 671 the creation of the *res privata* should no longer be attributed to Septimius Severus. These slips and certain typographical errors could easily be corrected in a second edition.

WILLIAM M. CALDER III. Index Locorum zu Kühner-Gerth. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965. Pp. 164.

The number of Greek passages cited in the *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* of R. Kühner and B. Gerth is close to seventeen thousand by a very rough count based on entries per column, number of columns per page, and number of pages in the index here under review. In preparing this index Professor Calder has performed a service which must have entailed prodigious labor for him but which at the same time is of immense value to all serious students of Greek grammar and literature, for, if a given passage in a classical Greek author happens to be one of the great number cited in Kühner-Gerth, the index will quickly enable the student to locate the passage, to ascertain how Kühner-Gerth have classified it in relation to its construction, and to find other instances of the same construction.

The few Latin passages scattered through Kühner-Gerth fill about one page and a half of the index, and the passages from German literature are not indexed, although occasionally the grammar has cited an interesting parallel to a Greek construction: so, for example, Goethe's *von ihren Schwestern die beste* beside Tacitus' *ceterorum Britannorum fugacissimi* and Thucydides' πόλεμον . . . ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων (Kühner-Gerth, I, pp. 23-4).

The book contains a dedication to Sterling Dow, who encouraged the preparation of the index, a preface, and a list of corrections.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

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
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WHOLE NO. 354

ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ IN THE TRIBUTE QUOTA LISTS.

There are twenty-four occurrences of the word ἐπιφορά, or abbreviations of it, in the extant fragments of the Attic tribute quota lists, all appearing in Lists 15 through 25 for the years 440/39 through 430/29. The word invariably appears at the end of a line which records the payment of a very small sum of money to Athena, and this line always appears next after the line which records the normal amount of tribute. The generally accepted explanation of the nature of this payment is that it was a penalty drawn by Athens from a state which had paid its tribute late. This interpretation goes back ultimately to Böckh, was refined by Nesselhauf, and given great elaboration at the hands of Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor.¹ In this paper I shall reexamine the traditional explanation and then enquire whether some other meaning cannot be found for the word, because the current interpretation does not cover all the facts.

Nesselhauf argued that since the word was used in a Delian inscription of the third century to mean a fine imposed for late fulfilment of a contract, it had the same meaning in the earlier Attic inscriptions. The fact that Thucydides, a contemporary Athenian, used the word to mean a voluntarily given sum of

¹ A. Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (3rd ed., 1886), II, p. 396; H. Nesselhauf, *Klio*, Beiheft XXX (1933), pp. 51-2, 73; B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I, pp. 450-3. Hereafter cited as *A. T. L.* The hypothesis has won considerable support, as by R. Meiggs in a review of *A. T. L.*, I in *E. H. R.*, LV (1940), p. 106, and by H. B. Mattingly, *Hist.*, X (1961), p. 151.

extra pay was curtly dismissed. "The allies," said Nesselhauf, "had no motive for voluntarily paying extra amounts." He did, however, take notice that these payments began in the same year as the Samian war, and that they were then paid almost exclusively by Ionian states. But he rejected the inference that the payments might therefore have been voluntary contributions of the allies or commutations to money of troops levied by Athens for this war, because, he said, *epiphora* for one year could be paid in the year following, as was actually done in 429 by [Pyge].² This could not happen, he thought, if the payment was a contribution, but it could if it was the final installment of a fine levied against a city the previous year. Of course, this interpretation overlooks the possibility that a state might decide upon a voluntary contribution too late in one year to have it recorded at Athens in the quota list for that year.

That the word denoted a fine for lateness was not universally accepted, however. Tod, writing, it is true, before Nesselhauf's explanations were published, was hesitant to accept the conclusion that the word meant a fine. He defined *epiphora* as "a small additional charge, the nature of which is not yet clear."³

The authors of *A. T. L.* accepted Nesselhauf's basic arguments and went on to advance an explanation of the differing amounts of *epiphora* known to have been paid. These sums varied between a thirtieth and a sixth of the normal tribute. This led Meritt and his colleagues to the conclusion that the fractions of the tribute could always be expressed as multiples of a sixtieth part of the tribute. They then inferred that since the multiples attested on the stones were 2, 5, 6, and 10 we should envisage a system of penalties for late payment based on the ten 10-day periods falling between the celebration of the City Dionysia at Athens (by which time the tribute should have been paid) and the end of the lunar year. Thus, a city paying late in the second decade of days would be fined 2/60ths of her normal tribute, one paying in the fifth decade 5/60ths, and so on.

This explanation is certainly ingenious, but in fact it rests on nothing but false inference. The idea that the *epiphora* paid is always a certain number of 60ths of the *phoros* is a fact,

² List 25, I, 45-6.

³ M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I², pp. 54-5. Hereafter cited as *G. H. I.*²

but it is a matter of no consequence. Sixty is a number factorable by a great many smaller numbers, by 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, and 30. The Greeks, like ourselves, thought in terms of large, simple fractions. That is, the words "fourth," "fifth," and "sixth" were all concepts frequently used, and used, of course, in connection with finances. Examine the evidence of the quota lists themselves. Most cities paid a simple fractional amount of one talent, like 1,000 drachms (a sixth of a talent), 1,500 drachms (a fourth), 2,000 (a third), and so on. Since 6, 4, and 3 are all factors of sixty, these tributes are all some number of sixtieths of a talent. (The talent itself was sexagesimal, being divided into sixty minas of 100 drachms). In like manner, any amount of *epiphora* that is a simple, common fraction of the tribute will also automatically work out as some multiple of sixtieths of the *phoros*. The authors of *A.T.L.* seek to find in this some sort of meaningful "general relation."⁴ But they seem to me simply to have hit upon a phenomenon of Greek arithmetic thinking, and upon nothing else. Their deductions are irrelevant deductions. They certainly do not rest upon any explicit evidence.

Furthermore, since the hypothesis of the authors of *A.T.L.* is interwoven with the functioning of the Athenian calendar, it is weak. In the Hellenistic period we know that the Attic lunar calendar was sometimes regulated in ways that would seem violent today. Months were sometimes protracted several days beyond their normal twenty-nine or thirty days. To compensate for this a following month would be shortened.⁵ It is true that we do not know that this was being done in the fifth century, but we have so very little evidence for the working of the festival calendar in the fifth century that it would be rash to assume that such alterations were not being made. And if they were, it is impossible to see how the Athenians would ever have hit upon a scheme of ten 10-day periods, when there might not have been 100 days remaining in the lunar year. The burden of proof in this matter rests on Meritt and his colleagues, and they have not discussed the implications of calendric manipulation at all.

⁴ *A.T.L.*, I, p. 450.

⁵ B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Year* (1961), pp. 172-5, 207-8; W. K. Pritchett, *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone* (1963), pp. 330-54.

There is also one piece of problematical evidence that no monetary penalty was imposed for late payment, at least before 447 B. C. In *A. T. L.* a line in List 7 is restored as the rubric $M[\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\ \Delta\iota\omicron\nu\rho\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\alpha]$. The sums paid by the cities coming under this rubric are normal, and show that, if this line is correctly restored, no penalties were collected. There are, furthermore, late payers almost certainly recorded without remark or evidence of penalty at the ends of Lists 5, 9, and 10.⁶

There is one good *prima facie* reason for thinking that *epiphora* in the lists does not signify a fine. If *I. G.*, I², 66, the Decree of Cleinias, is correctly dated to *ca.* 447 B. C., as it appears to be, then we should expect to find at least a few payments of *epiphora*-penalties in the immediately succeeding years. Cleinias set up a detailed system for the collection of arrears and late payments. Four men were chosen by the Boule right after the Dionysia to sail "with fast triremes" to the then four tribute districts and exact whatever money was owed. But the first evidence of *epiphora* comes in the quota list for 440/39, eight or so years after the Decree was enacted by the Athenian *demos*. And the Lists for 443/2 and 442/1 are exceptionally well preserved.

There is, finally, one decisive objection to this current explanation of the meaning of the word. If the lists record the states in order of payment the whole case that the word means a fine falls to the ground. And Nesselhauf and the authors of *A. T. L.* believe that the order of names is the order in which the cities actually paid at Athens.⁷ I believe that in this they are correct, and, additionally, that, after the appearance of the geographical districts on the list for 443/2, within each district the order of names is still the order of payment. It is certain that there is no other discernible system. The cities are not listed alphabetically, by size, by the amount of their *phoros*, by region, or in a similar arbitrary order in successive years. Thus, in 443/2, the first city listed for the Hellespontine Dis-

⁶ *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 12-14, 30, 35-6; F. A. Lepper, *J. H. S.*, LXXXII (1962), p. 32, who agrees with *A. T. L.*

⁷ The interpretation is quite old and, apparently, unchallenged: K. Beloch, *Rh. Mus.*, XLIII (1888), p. 106; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 1, pp. 74-6, n. 1; H. Nesselhauf, *Elio*, Beiheft XXX (1933), p. 41; *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 12-14, 30, 39.

trict is Palaepercote, which is approximately 31st in 442/1, fifth in 441/0, and second in 440/39. Neapolis is first for the Thracian District in 443/2, sixth in 441/0, and 25th in 440/39. Such examples could be prolonged indefinitely.

Cities paying *epiphora* never come at the bottom of their district panel, which they would have to do if they paid late. In List 15 for 440/39, eight states make the supplementary payment, and I list them here with their rank in parentheses. Ionia has Myrina (12th), Cyme (13th), Pitane (14th), Notium (15th), Dioseritae (16th), and Astyra (17th) out of a total of 28 cities. The Hellespont has Dardanus (14th) and Lamponcia (15th) out of 29 or 30 names altogether.

List 16, for 439/8, which is not well preserved, shows four Ionian *poleis* paying *epiphora*: Astyra, Cyme, Myrina, and Pitane. Their names occur in the middle of a list of thirty states. To spare the reader, I shall give no more details from the subsequent lists, but shall simply assert what can easily be determined by inspection: that in no case does a city contributing *epiphora* come in last place in its panel, and that in every case where a city makes such a payment, it is followed by at least one city which did not contribute *epiphora*. Therefore, the word cannot mean a penalty for lateness.

If, then, *epiphora* was not such a penalty, what was it? In literature the word has many specific meanings in respect to medical, rhetorical, grammatical, oratorical, and gustatory matters, but in general it has to do with something over and above normal. In a financial context Liddell and Scott define it as "donative, extra pay," and cite Thucydides, VI, 31, 3; Diodorus, XVII, 94, 4, and Polybius, V, 90, 4 as examples. In the case of the quota lists they say, with Tod, that it means an "additional payment of *phoros*." They say, too, that it can also mean a fine paid by a contractor for failure to execute work within a stated time, but the examples given for this meaning are Hellenistic and non-Attic.

It certainly was not a common word in the classical period. It does not appear in Homer, nor the tragedians, nor in Aristophanes. It was not used by Lysias or Isocrates. It does appear on two Athenian inscriptions of the late fifth century, *I.G.*, I², 64 and 97, but both stones are so badly mutilated that the meaning of the word cannot be deduced from the context. In

I.G., I², 64 the word is actually restored. In the quota lists it appears in the genitive singular, as is certain from List 25, I, 46: [Πυγε]λῆς ζῆτες ἐπιφορᾶς, "The Pygelana, from last year's *epiphora*." Its only sure context for the fifth century is in Thucydides, who uses it when he is describing the preparations of the Athenians for the attack on Syracuse. "The trierarchs," he says, "offered extra pay (ἐπιφορᾶς, acc. pl.) in addition to that provided by the state to the *thranitae* and the rest of the crews."⁸ Thus, the meaning of the word in the fifth century at Athens, in view of the impossibility of the quota lists employing it to mean a fine, and in view of Thucydides' usage of it, ought to be "voluntary payment" by one person or institution to another. *Epiphora*, therefore, stands in the same relation to *phoros* as *epidosis*, "voluntary contribution," does to *dosis*, "payment."

There are also geographical and historical arguments in favor of this meaning. If *epiphora* really was a penalty, one would expect to find the guilty states much more divided among the districts of the Delian Confederacy than in fact they are. There is no case at all of one of the Insular states paying, and of only one Carian state. One would expect *a priori* that more cities not on the coast, like those up-country in Caria and Chalcidice, or simply far-distant states, like Phaselis and Perinthus, to have been more likely to be late if only because the journey of their envoys was harder or longer. But the overwhelming number of cases, 21 out of 24, occur in the Ionian and Hellespontine Districts. Thirteen, nearly half, are Ionian. This geographical distribution is suggestive. If *epiphora* is paid voluntarily, it may be a sum of money given to Athens by the states to attract attention to themselves, perhaps because of some danger from Persia or another enemy, or, perhaps, to reassure Athens of their loyalty, or, simply, slightly to increase Athena's war chest. Some such motivation is suggested by the fact that of the eight Hellespontine cities known to have provided the supplementary payment, seven lie on the Asiatic side of the straits. It is also suggested by the fact that there is only a single Carian state which pays *epiphora*, and it was the island

⁸ Thuc., VI, 31, 3; this is R. Warner's translation of the passage. The word is defined by E. A. Bétant, *Lewicon Thucydideum* (1961), s. v., as *extraordinarium stipendarum*.

Chalce. Athenian rule was far from popular in the interior of Caria, where there was some pro-Persian sentiment. The only other two cities known to pay it are Haeson and Stageira of the Thracian district, and these cities also were near a dangerous frontier at the time they made their payments, as we shall see. In short, when states paid *epiphora* there was nearly always danger nearby, and, conversely, when local conditions were quiet, they made so such payments. That is the real general relation between these payments. Also, when two or more cities of the same district paid in the same year, they were almost always grouped together in one or more clusters, and were listed at Athens usually one right after another. That suggests concerted action.

Let us therefore examine the geographical situation of these states in an historical context. In the spring of 439 six cities of the Ionian District paid *epiphora*. They were Astyra, Dioseritae, Cyme, Myrina, Notium, and Pitane.⁹ In the same year Dardanus and Lamponeia of the Hellespontine District made similar payments.¹⁰ The possibility that these states were making voluntary contributions to Athens because of the fear of Persian attack is certainly there. In the summer of 440 Samos revolted, and she did so with the assistance of Pissuthnes, Persian satrap of Sardes. This man had made an alliance with certain Samians exiled the year before at Athens' behest, collected a force of 700 mercenaries, and secretly sent them over to Samos. With their help, Samian oligarchs and anti-Athenian elements overcame the Athenian garrison which at the time was established on the island, and sent them back to the custody of Pissuthnes on the mainland. With that, the island revolted from Athens and despatched a squadron of five ships under Stesagoras to the Levant to implore the intervention of the Persian fleet. Rumors swept the Aegean that he had succeeded, and the news that Samos had revolted reached Athens simultaneously with the report that the Phoenician ships were indeed under way for Greek waters.¹¹

At the same time there was trouble at the northern end of

⁹ List 15, I, 18-25; II, 7-10.

¹⁰ List 15, I, 40-4.

¹¹ Thuc., I, 115, 3-116, 1, 3; Diod. Sic., XII, 27, 3-5; Plut. *Per.*, 25, 4.

Athens' frontier with Persia where Byzantium joined Samos in the revolt,¹² and it will have seemed possible, no doubt, that Persian support might also be expected there.

Now all this actual and reported activity of the Persians was nothing new to the Greeks of this time. To them it meant that, even though the Peace of Callias had been sworn, once more Persian intrigue was afoot. There had been a fair amount of experience of it in recent years along the eastern shore of the Aegean. Erythrae had been in revolt from Athens in or before 454, and the treaty made in 453/2 in settlement of this rising stipulated that the Erythraeans in future would have no dealings with their pro-Persian exiles.¹³ Miletus had twice been in rebellion, and we should no doubt understand, as some scholars have said, that these uprisings had been effected with Persian support or encouragement. Miletus had returned to her allegiance to Athens only as recently as 443 or 442.¹⁴

The eight cities paying *epiphora* form three loose geographical groups. Myrina, Cyme, and Pitane were all close together, and they appear in that order on the quota list. They also lie within a few miles of Erythrae, and, therefore, they may have feared that the Erythraeans were considering rebellion again. If the authors of *A. T. L.* are right in locating Dioseritae near Notium, then we have another case of close geographical connection between two towns just to the southwest of Colophon. A faction of Colophenians had probably plotted with agents of the Great King in the past, for the city almost certainly paid no tribute to Athens between 450 and 447, and certainly did receive a series of new regulations from her about that time. Colophon was to revolt from Athens with Persian support in 430.¹⁵

¹² Thuc., I, 115, 5; *I. G.*, I², 943.

¹³ *I. G.*, I², 10 + 11 + 12/13a, as revised by *A. T. L.*, II, D 10 = G. F. Hill, *Sources for Greek History* (3rd ed., rev. by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes, 1951), No. 26. Hereafter cited as *HandH²*. See, too, G. de Ste Croix, *Hist.*, III (1954), p. 9.

¹⁴ *I. G.*, I², 22, as revised in *A. T. L.*, II, D 11 = *HandH²*, No. 30; A. J. Baur, *Phoenia*, VIII (1954), pp. 142-7; J. P. Barron, *J. H. S.*, LXXXII (1962), pp. 1-6; *A. T. L.*, III, p. 256.

¹⁵ Colophon is missing from quota lists 5, 7, and 8, and, according to *A. T. L.*, probably should not be restored. *I. G.*, I², 14/15 = *A. T. L.*, II, D 15 = *HandH²*, No. 49 contains the Athenian regulations. All this is well explained in *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 53, 282. The revolt of 430 is in Thuc., III, 34, 1-2.

The last of the six Ionian cities was Astyra. She was located on the Aegean, the northernmost city of the Ionian District. Her action in paying *epiphora*, therefore, should be considered along with that of the two southerly Hellespontine cities who also paid the supplement this year. Astyra was 45 miles from Dardanus and 25 from Lamponcia. All three were within 40 miles of Sigeum, an important member of the Confederacy strategically located at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Sigeum had been honored by Athens in 451/0 for her excellence, probably for resisting the Persian satrap of Dascylium in some way.¹⁶

These eight cities represent one third of the known payments of *epiphora*. They made them in the year of the Samian War and of Persian involvement in the Aegean. As the war with Samos ended, however, and the Persian menace receded, so too did supplementary payments decline.

Athens rather rapidly controlled the revolt in the north around Byzantium and the attendant disturbances in the Thracian District, and by spring, or late spring, 439 had compelled Samos to surrender after a siege of nine months. But as the year wore on there were continuing troubles to the south in Caria. Thirteen cities, which had paid *phoras* at the Dionysia of 439, did not do so in the spring of 438, and they disappear from the quota lists.¹⁷ By this time, indeed, no less than forty states, all small and mostly located in the mountainous interior of Caria, had ceased, from about the time of the Peace of Callias, to pay tribute. All these continuing defections had now become so numerous that the still loyal states in this region were added to the Ionian District for administrative purposes, and the Carian District was abolished. Therefore, the year 439/8 was a time of uncertainty for Ionia, and in the spring of 438 there were four more instances of the payment of *epiphora* from Ionia: Astyra, Cyme, Myrina, and Pitane.¹⁸ All four had paid it the year before. Dardanus and Lamponcia, in the more easily paci-

¹⁶ *I. G.*, I², 32, as revised by B. D. Meritt in *Hesp.*, V (1936), pp. 360-2 = *HandH²*, No. 28; *A. T. L.*, III, p. 206, r. 55.

¹⁷ Lists 15 and 16; the thirteen states are Bargylia, Chalctor, Euro-mus, Calynda, the Carians ruled by the Dynast Tymnes, Cindye (absent also in 441/0), Lepsimandus, Mydones, Mylasa, Narishara, Parpariotae, Pladasa, and Thasthara.

¹⁸ List 16, I, 18-19, 21-6.

fied north, did not make the payment, apparently, nor did the two states near Colophon. List 17 for the next year, 438/7, is terribly mutilated. It contains no evidence of supplementary payments, but it does show that by then Astyra had stopped contributing *epiphora*.¹⁹ List 18 is entirely lost.

List 19 for 436/5 records another instance, and turns our attention to the Thracian District. In that year Haeson, a state on the mainland just to the southeast of the turbulent Kingdom of Macedonia, paid her tribute and a sixth additional.²⁰ The next year Stageira of the same district paid her tribute and a twelfth additional.²¹ These two contemporary cases are the only ones known of supplements coming from this area.

What is known of the relationship of Athens and Macedonia at this time? It was a period of some confusion and tension, although Athens was able gradually, but only temporarily, to patch up a false friendship with King Perdiccas.²² The reconstruction of the history of these years is made difficult by our scanty evidence, which is mostly epigraphic and hard to interpret. In 435 Haeson paid 1,500 drachms *phoros* and 250 drachms *epiphora*. In 434 she paid her regular tribute and nothing additional. Two other towns, however, Othorus, probably not far north of Haeson, and Pharbelus, possibly in the interior of Chalcidice between Lake Bolbe and Stageira, paid tribute, but were designated on the stone as "Unassessed." Stageira simultaneously made her only known payment of *epiphora*. Now, there is some evidence that at this time Athens had military forces nearby. First, there is the likelihood that Othorus and Pharbelus would not have paid without the persuasive or supporting effect of Athenian troops in their neighborhood. Second, the account of the funds spent on the Propylaea during this year contains two sums of money which had been voted to two generals, each of whom had an army (or fleet) under command. Neither Glaucon nor Proteas, the two, spent the entire sum voted him, and the surplus was transferred to the Epistatai of the Propylaea. It is not certain that either of these military forces was operating on the borders of Mace-

¹⁹ List 17, III, 3-4.

²⁰ List 19, VI, 27-8.

²¹ List 20, VI, 17-18.

²² Thuc., I, 62, 3; cf. *I. G.*, I², 71 = *A. T. L.*, III, p. 313, n. 61.

donia, but it is quite possible, and we know of only one other region where soldiers might have been required.²³ That will be dealt with below.

My interpretation of all this is that in 433/5 Haeson, fearful of Macedonian encroachment, paid *epiphora* to Athens. She, already alert to danger in the north, acted to defend her interests and her allies there, and sent a force which operated near Othorus, which then paid 400 drachms, and around Pharbelus and Stageira. Pharbelus paid in 1,000 unassessed drachms and Stageira her *epiphora* to support Athens against Perdiccas. In 434/3 Othorus and Pharbelus were entered in the quota lists for the first time in a new category, "Cities which took the initiative in getting themselves assessed."²⁴ Thus, in a time of troubles, we have two voluntary supplements of tribute, and, contemporaneously, two payments of tribute by two unassessed cities, which subsequently volunteered to continue to pay. This voluntarism strikes me as quite similar to giving a supplement to the tribute willingly.

Our attention now shifts back to Asia. In 435/4 Paesus, at the northern entrance of the Dardenelles, made a single payment of *epiphora*, amount unknown, and sent in her tribute of [1,000] drachms.²⁵ It appears that once more there was some sort of fear of trouble with Persia. For one thing, two states which had paid regularly in the past, Lamponeia and Neandrea, about eighteen miles apart, made no payment at all. Second, it is to this year that we should probably date the founding of the Athenian colony of Astacus at the eastern end of the Propontis.²⁶ This may have been intended to serve as a local bastion. Perhaps one of the two armies mentioned in *I. G.*, I², 365 was employed here at the same time as the other was active near Chalcidice.

In the next year, 434/3, three other Hellespontine cities paid

²³ The "Unassessed" cities: *A. T. L.*, List 20, IV, 31; VI, 23-5, 31. The generals: *I. G.*, I², 365 = *A. T. L.*, II, T 72-72F = *HandH*², No. 65.

²⁴ For this translation of this rubric see F. A. Lepper, *J. H. S.*, LXXXII (1962), pp. 28-9; cf. N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* (1959), p. 324, n. 3.

²⁵ List 20, IV, 27-8.

²⁶ *Str.*, XII, 4, 2 (563). The date is from *Diod. Sic.*, XII, 34, 5. See, too, *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 288-9, n. 68.

epiphora. Lamponaia was one, although Neandreia was not. A plausible explanation of the former's paying is that she gave money to Athens as reassurance of Lamponaia's loyalty to the empire. Daseylium, the second *polis*, was some 60 miles from Astacus, and Calchedon, the third, only some 48, and the frontiers of these two states were much closer together than that.²⁷

In 433/2 Lamponaia paid again (her third payment altogether), and was joined by Limnae, a town on the western shore of the Gallipoli peninsula. I cannot explain the latter's action. It is known, however, that Athens had sent out an army (or fleet) this year, under the command of Archena[utos]. The campaign this man undertook was certainly not made in connection with the operations near Cecyrea, for we know the names of the six generals involved there.²⁸ From Ionia came the *epiphora* of Grynium and Pitane.²⁹ In 432/1 Chalce, an island-state off the Carian coast, paid a supplement.³⁰ There is no explicit evidence of Persian activity during these two years, but in view of Athens' undoubted preoccupation with Greek affairs, and of what occurred in 430, such may have existed or have been suspected.

By 430 B. C. Athens had gone to war with Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies, and the Persians then became active again, this time with successful results. In May/June of that year they succeeded in gaining control of Colophon by connivance with a pro-Persian faction in the city. The redoubtable Pisistratus again furnished soldiers and appointed a certain Itamenes to lead them against the Greeks. A part of the population remained loyal to Athens, however, and fled from their homes to Notium.³¹ That *polis* had loyally paid *epiphora* in the spring of 431. The situation in Ionia in the early summer of 430 continued tense, for according to the records of tribute made in the following spring, six cities, led by Erythrae, directly up the coast from Colophon, were listed as having furnished pay

²⁷ List 21, IV, 3-5, 7-13.

²⁸ Lamponaia: List 22, II, 13-15. Limnae: II, 25-6. The generals are from Thuc., I, 45, 2; 51, 4; I. G., I², 295 = Tcd, G. H. I.², No. 55.

²⁹ List 22, I, 56-61.

³⁰ List 23, I, 54-6.

³¹ Thuc., III, 34, 1-2.

directly to Athenian commanders on the scene.³² And it was in this context that Pygela, not far to the southeast of Colophon, made a payment of *epiphora* for 431/0. It was not recorded at Athens, however, until this same following spring of 429,³³ because, I believe, it was sent off around June, 430, in the aftermath of the crisis at Colophon, and so arrived at Athens too late to be recorded with the other income of the year 431/0.

After 429 no other payments of *epiphora* are known to have been made: I shall comment on this presently.

Thus, these peculiar supplementary payments can be shown, I think, in almost all cases, to have been made only when the states involved were confronted with a dangerous situation. Since *epiphora* cannot mean a penalty for lateness, since the amounts paid are too small for some major crime, and since Thucydides does use the word to signify a "voluntary contribution," it also means a "voluntary contribution" in the quota lists. The states which paid it must, therefore, have been friendly to Athens (or wished to appear so), at a time when a common danger was felt to threaten the Confederacy. This is a fair interpretation of our admittedly meagre evidence. Of course, in Athens' eyes the amounts of *epiphora* given were very small. Lamponeia, for example, paid an additional 100 drachms in 439, only enough to provide pay for ten hoplites for ten days. But then Lamponeia's normal tribute was only 1,000 drachms, and in Lamponeia itself a surcharge of ten percent would not seem small.

Since these payments of *epiphora*, then, are not penalties assessed by Athens, we have no sure evidence *in the quota lists themselves* that Athens ever collected punitive sums for some sort or other of transgression by her allies. I am sure, however, in view of the Decree of Cleinias, that penalties were probably in fact exacted. We know that Samos had to pay an indemnity for her revolt.³⁴ But that indemnity was not recorded in the quota lists among the first fruits given Athens by loyal states, possibly to maintain a fiction that the alliance was still an enthusiastic union of Greeks. Possibly, first fruits could not be offered the goddess under direct compulsion. It is certainly true

³² List 25, I, 59-66.

³³ List 25, I, 45-6.

³⁴ Thuc., I, 117, 3; A. T. L., III, pp. 307, 327 and n. 7; 334-6.

that in the lists of the 430's, which show the greatest development of the kinds of rubrics and classifications of tribute payments, there is no indication of a grouping of states under a heading like "After Dionysia" or "Penalties Exacted." Arrears were certainly accepted by Athena, but, then, arrears are not penalties.³⁵

In his discussion of the word, Nesselhauf, as noted earlier, said that the allies had no motive for making voluntary payments.³⁶ But this is not true. The whole purpose of the naval league was to protect the states in Asia against Persia, in part with a fleet, in part by building up a war fund. Athenian rule, by this time, no doubt appeared arrogant and high-handed to many Greeks, but are we really to believe that *all* the Greeks in Asia would have preferred to exchange it for the government of Persia? I am sure that was not so. Some, no doubt, like the faction at Colophon, did, but we must regard them as a minority, for only Colophon, of all the states of Ionia, rebelled and admitted Persian troops to her territory, at this time at least. Most of the cities, I think, preferred Athenian rule as the lesser of two evils.

Most of the states in the Confederacy were quite small and weak, and it is these states which paid *epiphora*. Only once did a large *polis*, Calchedon, with a tribute of nine talents, pay a supplement. While the small states may have feared or hated Athens, they no doubt feared and hated Persia and their large Greek neighbors too. Priene, for example, became an object of dispute between Samos and Miletus.³⁷ For such small cities the choice was not between sovereign freedom or subjection to Athens. The choice was between subservience to Athens, to some other Greek state, like Mytilene, Chios, or Samos, or to the Great King. And, furthermore, to exchange Athenian control for some other could occur only at the cost of war. To maintain a peaceful status quo itself no doubt seemed desirable to many Greeks.

Most states, I think, preferred Athenian rule as the least painful choice. A majority of the governing circles in a few, even, may actually have welcomed the unifying effect of the

³⁵A. T. L., III, 44, 257.

³⁶H. Nesselhauf, *Xlio*, Beiheft XXX (1933), p. 51.

³⁷Thuc., I, 115, 2.

Confederacy, and have shared Athens' pan-Hellenic and other ideals. And these are the ones who, I think, made the voluntary payments. These were intended to show the willingness of the states to support Athens with their money, as Segesta did in 415.³⁸ Or the payments might be regarded, if one prefers a more cynical view, as attempts to bribe Athens, as a sort of Hellenic baksheesh.

An interpretation asking us to believe in Greek generosity between states will strike some people as unlikely. But there was such a thing as Hellenic generosity. In 480 B.C., Croton, in distant Italy, manned a trireme and sailed her to Hellas for the war against Xerxes' hosts. If the *Idiōtai* rubric really means that some private citizens in a few other states voluntarily paid a *phoros* to Athens, we have a list of other cases. Within Athens herself, there was willing public spirit. Cleinias furnished his own ship and paid his own crew during the campaign of Salamis. In 415 certain trierarchs gave *epiphora* to their oarsmen to encourage them in their work. In the 440's and 430's a number of individuals gave voluntary contributions of money for the completion of the Parthenon and Propylaea. And, after war had broken out against Sparta, other Athenian citizens made voluntary gifts to the state.³⁹

If my interpretation is right, we have evidence of Athenophilism in the empire during the 430's, the last years of the Age of Pericles. But, with the onset of a war around the Peloponnesus that was not of the allies' making nor in the allies' interest, and, after the *phoros* was raised in 430, and again in 428, it became so burdensome that, since no more supplements were given Athens, the states must have felt no longer willing to contribute *epiphora*. As time went on, and the tribute was again increased drastically in 425, and as Athenian rule grew harsher and bloodier, in Ionia and along the Hellespont even the coming of the Mede began to be regarded with less anxiety than before.

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³⁸ Thuc., VI, 6, 2-3.

³⁹ Croton: Hdt., VIII, 47. Cleinias: Hdt., VIII, 17. Trierarchs: Thuc., VI, 31, 3. Parthenon and Propylaea: *I. G.*, I², 348, 65-6; 363, 27-8; 366, 20. Contributions: Plut., *Ale.*, 10, 1; Diod. Sic., XIII, 2, 2.

LACTANTIUS AND THE GOLDEN AGE.

One method of clarifying the ambivalent attitude of Christian Latin authors toward pagan literature and culture is to analyze the complex way in which an early apologist handles a pagan literary theme.¹ Lactantius' treatment of the Golden Age in his *Divinae Institutiones* provides some insight into the Christian's appreciation of his own pagan literary background, and the limitations imposed on that appreciation by his newly found faith.

From the outset we must bear in mind Lactantius' aim and method in composing the *Divinae Institutiones*.² Schooled in rhetoric and familiar with the literary tastes of his day, Lactantius was aware that an unembellished style found no congenial audience among his pagan contemporaries.³ To appeal to the educated pagan⁴ and to compensate for the dearth of apologists who were *idonei peritique doctores* capable of defending Christianity *ornate copioseque* (V, 2, 1), he adds his own

¹ Among the numerous works dealing with the Christians' approach to pagan literature may be mentioned G. L. Ellspermann, *The Attitude of the Early Christian Writers toward Pagan Literature and Learning* (Cath. Univ. of America Patristic Studies, LXXXII [Washington, 1949]); W. Krause, *Die Stellung der frühchristlichen Autoren zur heidnischen Literatur* (Vienna, 1958); and H. Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers and the Classics* (*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*, VI [Göteborg, 1958]).

² See R. Pichon, *Lactance* (Paris, 1901), pp. 55-7, 74-5, 191-8. Also consult Br. Alban, "The Conscious Role of Lactantius," *C.W.*, XXXVII (1943), pp. 79-81 and J. Stevenson, "Aspects of the Relations between Lactantius and the Classics," *Studia Patristica*, IV, pt. 2 (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, LXXIX [Berlin, 1961]), pp. 497-503.

³ *Div. Inst.*, V, 1, 14-21. After noting that many reject the Scriptures because of their unpolished style, he adds (V, 1, 17), *adeo nihil verum putant nisi quod auditu suave est, nihil credibile nisi quod potest incutere voluptatem: nemo rem veritate ponderat sed ornatu*. Throughout this paper I have used S. Brandt's edition of the *Divinae Institutiones* (*C.S.E.L.*, XIX [Vienna, 1890]).

⁴ V, 1, 11: *ob eamque causam volui sapientiam cum religione coniungere ne quid studiosis inanis illa doctrina possit officere ut iam scientia litterarum non modo nihil noceat religioni atque iustitiae, sed etiam prosit quam plurimum si is qui eas didicerit sit in virtutibus instructor, in veritate sapientior*. Cf. I, 1, 10; III, 1, 2; IV, 5, 2.

apology to those of Tertullian, Minucius Felix, and St. Cyprian.⁵ Significant for our purposes here is the apologist's criticism of St. Cyprian. Although the learned bishop of Carthage was *ingenio facili copioso suavi et . . . aperto* (V, 1, 25), he erred in his defense of Christianity by appealing to the Scriptures in which the pagans did not believe. In arguing with Demetrianus Cyprian ought first to have cited the *humana testimonia*, i. e. the evidence of philosophers, historians, and poets, in order to defeat his opponent with the latter's own *auctores* (V, 4, 4-6).⁶ By correcting this neglect of pagan evidence, Lactantius envisions the start of another polemical pattern in the struggle against false religions and philosophies (V, 4, 7-8).⁷

In this context and especially in view of Lactantius' treatment of the Golden Age, it is important to understand the apologist's attitude toward the pagan poets. For him the poets were not *mendaces et sacrilegi*, inventors of completely fictional accounts. Their proper task was to add *venustas ac lepor* to the events which they recorded *cum officium poetae in eo sit ut ea quae vere gesta sunt in alias species obliquis figurationibus cum*

⁵ For a brief but helpful analysis of Lactantius' predecessors in the Latin apologetic tradition see Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-55, 178-90. Though Pichon includes Arnobius in his study, we must remember that Lactantius never mentions the rhetorician of Sicca, and it is questionable whether he was familiar with Arnobius' *Adversus Nationes*. On this latter point see G. E. McCracken, *Arnobius of Sicca, the Case against the Pagans*, I (*Ancient Christian Writers*, VII [Westminster, 1949]), pp. 48-51.

⁶ See Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-9, 79. Although Lactantius speaks explicitly here only of the philosophers and historians, it is clear from what follows (V, 5, 1) and from the apologist's practice throughout the *Divinae Institutiones* that the poets, though less trustworthy than the philosophers (cf. I, 5, 15), also serve to validate the Christian position. Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-2, sees in this appeal to the opponent's *auctores* an effort at objectivity on the part of Lactantius and one of the many links between the apologist and Cicero.

⁷ P. Monceaux (*Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, III [Paris, 1905], pp. 319-20) has emphasized Lactantius' dependence on his predecessors despite his criticism of them (cf. *Div. Inst.*, V, 1, 22-3; V, 4, 3). Throughout his study of the *Divinae Institutiones* (pp. 309-39) Monceaux is considerably more skeptical of Lactantius' contribution to Christian apologetics than is Pichon. His incisive analysis makes it difficult to overlook the apologist's limitations. See especially pp. 312-13 and 335.

decere aliquo conversa traducat (I, 11, 24).⁸ This function is particularly applicable to the mythical accounts of the gods which Lactantius interprets euhemeristically.⁹

The value of poetic truth, however, is measured in terms of its approximation to the truth found in Scripture.¹⁰ Commenting on the remarks of the pagan poets concerning the resurrection of the body, Lactantius says (VII, 22, 4), *quamvis igitur veritatis arcana in parte corruperint, tamen ipsa res eo verior invenitur quod cum prophetis in parte consentiunt: quod nobis ad probationem rei satis est*. The critical question for each concrete instance in which the evidence of Scripture and that of the poets converge will, of course, be the precise meaning of *in parte*.¹¹ It is this question that we must attempt to answer in regard to Lactantius' use of the myth of the Golden Age, a myth which figures rather significantly in his discussion of the salvific history of man.

For Lactantius, that history is essentially one of moral regeneration, a point that is constantly reinforced by the marked ethical tone of the *Divinae Institutiones*.¹² The moral shortcomings of polytheism demonstrate the falsehood of pagan worship,¹³ and only the return of what Lactantius variously calls

⁸ See Lactantius' entire discussion of this point in sections 23-36, and compare *Epitome*, 11, 1; 12, 3. Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-45, has a useful summary of Lactantius' dependence on individual poets.

⁹ See, for example, I, 8, 8; 11, 17; 13, 8; 15, 2. On Lactantius' euhemerism consult the excellent study of J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie* (Paris, 1958), pp. 438-43. Cf. also Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-7. In *T.A.P.A.*, XCVI (1965), pp. 439-48, I have tried to show how Lactantius differed from his teacher Arnobius in his appreciation of the poet's function regarding the myths.

¹⁰ Lactantius' use of Scripture in the *Divinae Institutiones* is quite limited. Consult Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-207.

¹¹ Ellspermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-7, mentions some of the areas in which the prophets and the pagan poets concur.

¹² For a discussion of Lactantius' "morale philosophique" as a new contribution to philosophy and to Christian apologetics see Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-51. Also consult S. Prete, "Der geschichtliche Hintergrund zu den Werken des Laktanz," *Gymnasium*, LXIII (1956), pp. 490-5 and Monceaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-4.

¹³ IV, 3, 2: *et ideo non est illa vera religio iudicanda quia nullis iustitiae virtutisque praeceptis erudit efficitque meliores*. Like other apologists before him, Lactantius also criticizes pagan rituals as morally corrupt. See, for example, I, 20.

humanitas, iustitia, or pietas,¹⁴ i. e. worship of the one true God, can restore the order intended by the Creator and eliminate vice. Interior moral perfection is the heart of the new religion (VI, 1, 14): *nihil enim sancta et singularis illa maiestas aliud ab homine desiderat quam solam innocentiam quam si quis obtulerit deo, satis pie, satis religiose litabit*. The ethical dimension of Lactantius' polemic is fundamental to an understanding of his work and his treatment of the Golden Age.

G. Boas¹⁵ has amply demonstrated the inconsistencies in Lactantius' varied descriptions of man's primeval state and his fall from grace. The decline of the Golden Age which is outlined in Book V of the *Divinae Institutiones* finds no place in the biblical account of man before the Deluge which Lactantius describes earlier in Book II. Taken as they stand, these two descriptions might well lead us to agree with Boas that Lactantius "apparently kept the two stories in separate compartments of his mind."¹⁶

In a larger sense, however, Lactantius' biblical account of man's degeneration includes the post-diluvian events outlined in Chapter 13 of Book II.¹⁷ Here the fate of Cham after his sin against Noah is important. Cham flees to Arabia and begets a race that grows up ignorant of the one true God (II, 13, 7): *haec fuit prima gens quae deum ignoravit quoniam princeps eius et conditor cultum dei a patre non accepit maledictus ab eo*.

¹⁴ III, 9, 19: <sed> *ipsa humanitas quid est nisi iustitia? quid iustitia nisi pietas? pietas autem nihil aliud quam dei parentis agnitio*.

¹⁵ *Essays on Primitivism and Related Ideas in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore, 1948), pp. 33-41. In her book, *Political Thinking and Social Experience. Some Christian Interpretations of the Roman Empire from Tertullian to Salvian* (Christchurch [New Zealand], 1964), p. 61, E. A. Isichei calls Lactantius' "incongruous fusion of two incompatible theologies . . . a good example of his inconsistent and uncritical eclecticism." Cf. also G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform. Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1959), p. 140, and A. Luneau, *L'histoire du salut chez les Pères de l'Eglise* (Paris, 1964), pp. 229-34.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁷ In this description Lactantius at least indicates that the pagan accounts concerning early man are not entirely out of mind. After depicting Noah tilling the earth and planting the vine, he remarks (II, 13, 4), *ille enim non modo Liberum sed etiam Saturnum atque Uranum multis antecessit aetatibus*.

. . . As a result of this ignorance the Chanaanites, as well as other Israelites who subsequently left their homeland, turned to the worship of false gods including such things as the elements of nature and powerful kings.

Though Lactantius points to these events primarily as evidence of the historical priority of monotheism (II, 13, 13), we must bear in mind that for the apologist polytheism is the source of all evil (V, 8, 11): *universa igitur mala quibus humanum genus se ipsum invicem conficit iniustus atque impius deorum cultus induxit*. And since the rise of polytheism is an important factor in Lactantius' analysis of the decline of the Golden Age,¹⁸ it seems that the story of Cham, as part of the larger picture of man's fall from grace, must be considered when we contrast the biblical and mythical versions of that fall.

A more important reason, however, for looking beyond the historical discrepancy between the idyllic state of Adam in the Garden of Eden and the just reign of Saturn is found in Lactantius' own remarks. Although he speaks more than once of the Golden Age as an actual historical period in the past, his comments in Book VII where he discusses the return of this age are most telling (VII, 24, 9-10):

Denique tum fient illa quae poetae aureis temporibus facta esse iam Saturno regnante dixerunt. quorum error hinc ortus est quod prophetae futurorum pleraque sic proferunt et enuntiant quasi iam peracta. visiones enim divino spiritu offerebantur oculis eorum et videbant illa in conspectu suo quasi fieri ac terminari. quae vaticinia eorum cum paulatim fama vulgasset, quoniam profani a sacramento ignorabant quatenus dicerentur, completa esse iam veteribus saeculis illa omnia putaverunt. quae utique fieri complerique non poterant homine regnante.

Under these circumstances it seems that the historical incompatibility between the pagan description of the decline of the

¹⁸ As Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-9, has pointed out, Lactantius' insistence that the decline of the Golden Age was due to the advent of polytheism is a new element in the traditional pagan theme. Pichon's remarks are confined mostly to the philosophical-theological dimension of Lactantius' treatment of the Golden Age. My concern is the apologist's literary handling of the theme in light of his expressed purposes in the *Divinae Institutiones*.

Golden Age discussed by Lactantius in Book V and the fall of man in the Garden of Eden outlined in Book II are of secondary moment in the apologist's mind. His handling of the theme of the Golden Age must be governed by a principle of unity other than the historical. That principle will become evident only when we have examined the changing adaptations of the myth at various points in his argument.

The first reference to Saturn and the Golden Age appears in chapters 11 through 15 of Book I where Lactantius employs euhemeristic arguments to disprove the divinity of the pagan gods. He appeals to the testimony of poets and historians that Saturn's kingdom was an earthly one,¹⁹ and he suggests reasons why Saturn was deified.²⁰ This approach is consonant with the purpose of the first two books of the *Divinae Institutiones*. The only way to persuade the pagan of the truth was first to disprove his errors.²¹ For Lactantius, as we have seen, this involved the repudiation of polytheism, a task to be accomplished partly by demonstrating the created nature of the pagan divinities. In the case of Saturn this included momentary acceptance of the Golden Age as an historical period, and Lactantius speaks of it in these terms.

It should be noted, moreover, that ethical considerations play a part in Lactantius' argument here. Though *iustitia* is a characteristic mark of the Golden Age, Saturn is said to be singularly lacking in this virtue (I, 12, 1-2):

Iustus in regno fuit. primum ex hoc ipso iam deus non est quod fuit; deinde quod ne iustus quidem fuit sed impius non modo in filios quos necavit, verum etiam in patrem cuius dicitur abscidisse genitalia, quod forsitan vere acciderit.²²

As we shall see, this statement hardly coincides with what the apologist says in Book V of the *Divinae Institutiones* when his purpose has shifted a bit. For the present, however, the deified

¹⁹ I, 13, 8-14.

²⁰ I, 11, 17 and 15, 1-6.

²¹ I, 23, 8. Cf. II, 19, 1.

²² Here Lactantius uses the term *iustus* in a very specific sense. Though *iustitia* embraces all the virtues, it is especially associated with *pietas* and *aequitas* (cf. V, 14, 9), both of which are found wanting in Saturn according to Lactantius' description here.

ruler's moral failings support Lactantius' euhemeristic position, and for this reason they are called into play.

Book V of the *Divinae Institutiones* contains a fairly detailed treatment of the Golden Age. In considering Lactantius' use of the theme, we must keep two points clearly in mind. The first is the apologist's stated purpose in this part of his work (V, 5, 1): *nunc reddenda est de iustitia proposita disputatio. quae aut ipsa est summa virtus aut fons est ipse virtutis*. . . . Basically *iustitia* means worship of the one true God on which depends all moral perfection. Secondly, it should be noted that in Book V Lactantius expressed in clearest terms his concern for producing an apology that would appeal to the educated man of his day.²³ Specifically, it is here that he criticizes St. Cyprian for failing to employ pagan sources in his defense of Christianity.

Lactantius takes the opposite tack. He believes that the pagan poets preserved the tradition of the Golden Age in order to teach men *quid sit iuste vivere* (V, 5, 2). Far from being complete fiction, this tradition is to be taken *pro vero* in that it depicts man's original state of moral perfection that was a corollary to monotheism. It is primarily the ethical purpose rather than the euhemeristic one which now guides the apologist's treatment of his theme. The assumption remains unchallenged, nonetheless, that the Golden Age was an historical period in the life of man on earth.

The fundamental point in Lactantius' analysis is that *Saturno regnante* polytheism had not yet come into existence (V, 5, 3): *deus utique colebatur*. The result of this was the reign of harmony and virtue within man and among men. It is wholly in personal ethical terms that Lactantius interprets the poets' description of conditions in this initial stage. Disputes, wars, and armaments did not exist *cum nemo insidiaretur* . . . *nemo quicquam concupisceret* (V, 5, 5). Vergil's description of the common possession of goods (*Georgics*, I, 126-7) is taken *more poetico* to reflect the personal generosity of men toward one another.²⁴ Ovid's *flumina iam lactis, iam flumina nectaris ibant*

²³ Cf. notes 2 and 3. Lactantius' concern extends also to the Christians of his time (V, 1, 9): *nutant enim plurimi ac maxime qui litterarum aliquid attigerunt*.

²⁴ The significance of this ethical interpretation is emphasized when Lactantius explicitly states that the passage is not to be taken in the more obvious sense of holding things in common (V, 5, 7).

(*Met.*, I, 111) is a figurative way of expressing the prosperity resulting from the largess of the wealthy to the less fortunate.

The same moral considerations underlie Lactantius' description of Saturn's dethronement by Jupiter. *Iustissima virgo* fled the earth *cum iam populus vel novi regis metu vel sua sponte depravatus deum colere desisset regemque pro deo habere coepisset, cum ipse (Juppiter) propemodum parricida exemplo ceteris esset ad violandam pietatem. . .*²⁵ Vergil's lines from the *Georgics* (I, 129-30) which describe the providential work of Jupiter are wrested from context and made to serve the apologist's purpose (V, 5, 10):

'Ille malum virus serpentibus addidit atris/
praedarique
lupos iussit,' id est odium et invidiam et dolum hominibus
insevit ut tam essent quam serpentes venenati, tam rapaces
quam lupi.²⁶

The advent of polytheism meant the rise of *cupiditas, omnium malorum fons*, a fact which accounts for the increasing quest for personal gain, the suppression of others, the use of force, and the growth of vainglory. The rule of Jupiter became a tyranny in which he drew men to an idolatrous worship of himself. *Nec iam quicquam ex antecedentis saeculi pio atque optimo statu mansit, sed explosa iustitia et veritatem secum trahens reliquit hominibus errorem ignorantiam caecitatem* (V, 6, 10).

Thus, in terms that were intelligible to an educated pagan audience, Lactantius describes man's fallen state and need for regeneration. In moral terms, and in moral terms alone, his

²⁵ V, 5, 9. Underscoring this ethical outlook is Lactantius' insistence that *virgo* could not have fled to the realm of Jupiter as stated in Cicero's *Aratus: quomodo enim poterat in eius regno residere aut commorari qui patrem regno expulit, bello persecutus est, exulem toto orbe iactavit* (V, 5, 10). Cf. V, 6, 11.

²⁶ For Vergil's treatment of the Golden Age see I. S. Ryberg, "Vergil's Golden Age," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 112-31 where additional bibliography can be found. The relation between polytheism and the growth of societal enmities, which Lactantius emphasizes here (V, 5, 13-14), is intelligible in terms of the twofold aspect of *iustitia* outlined by the apologist in VI, 10, 2: *sed tamen primum iustitiae officium est coniungi cum deo, secundum cum homine. sed illud primum religio dicitur, hoc secundum misericordia vel humanitas nominatur. quae virtus propria est iustorum et cultorum dei quod ea sola vitae communis continet rationem*. Cf. V, 6, 12 and *Epit.*, 20, 3.

description here reflects the fall of Adam and the rise of polytheism outlined in Book II. Though his acceptance of the Golden Age as an historical period in the past contributed nothing to a consistent and chronologically integrated account of man's early state, the overriding consideration here, it seems, was man's moral degeneration. This was an essential point which he believed the pagan poets retained in their account of the Golden Age. What is significant in his own analysis of the truth preserved by the poets is the emphasis on monotheism and man's personal responsibility for his own moral condition. The latter element is even more evident when Lactantius discusses another theme familiar to his audience, the return of the Golden Age.

The restoration of the Golden Age is fundamentally dependent upon a restoration in the moral order which is itself predicated on the return of monotheism (V, 7, 1-2):

Sed deus ut parens indulgentissimus adpropinquante ultimo tempore nuntium misit qui vetus illud saeculum fugatamque iustitiam reduceret. . . . rediit ergo species illius aurei temporis et reddita quidem terrae, sed paucis adsignata iustitia est, quae nihil aliud est quam dei unici pia et religiosa cultura.

Because the return of *iustitia* has not completely destroyed evil, the advent of Christianity, of which he speaks here, is only the *species* of the Golden Age.²⁷ Yet it is no less real, in the ethical sense, for the individual (V, 8, 3):

Estote aequi ac boni, et sequetur vos sua sponte iustitia quam quaeritis. deponite omnem malam cogitationem de cordibus vestris, et statim vobis tempus illud aureum revertetur quod aliter consequi non potestis quam si deum verum colere coeperitis.

The personal aspect of this restoration is underscored by Lactantius' statement that the temple of the one God is not made of stones or clay but is man himself who bears God's image, a

²⁷ V, 7, 10. The positive aspect of this partial restoration lies in the fact that virtue is discerned only in the presence of vice and is perfected in adversity. Good is recognizable only when contrasted with evil. On this point see the remarks of Boas, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-41, and compare *Epit.*, 24, 11. Cf. also Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19.

temple adorned *non auri et gemmarum donis corruptibilibus sed aeternis virtutum muneribus* (V, 8, 4).²⁸

Still, in rather specific terms Lactantius outlines the social implications of the return of monotheism. Wars and disputes would cease when all men recognized the bonds that united them as sons of the one God; the anticipated punishment of malefactors by an omniscient God would put a stop to intrigues; fraud and rapine would cease to exist when men learned to prefer the things of heaven to those of earth; knowledge of God's punishments, the virtue of continence, and a more equitable distribution of wealth would hold in check the excesses of carnal desire.²⁹ He concludes (V, 8, 8-9):

Quam beatus esset quamque aureus humanarum rerum status si per totum orbem mansuetudo et pietas et pax et innocentia et aequitas et temperantia et fides moraretur! denique ad regendos homines non opus esset tam multis et tam variis legibus cum ad perfectam innocentiam dei lex una sufficeret, neque carceribus neque gladiis praesidium neque terrore poenarum cum praeceptorum caelestium salubritas humanis pectoribus infusa ultro ad iustitiae opera homines erudiret.

The dominant ethical tone in this description is reminiscent of Lactantius' analysis of Saturn's reign earlier in Book V. Although the limited restoration of the Golden Age in the lives of individuals may be considered part of the larger historical fulfilment anticipated in Christ's second coming, it appears that at this point in his argument Lactantius is considering the Golden Age only in its personal and ethical, not its historical dimension. In Book VII, where he takes up the theme once again, a new emphasis is present.

Lactantius clearly states his purpose in the opening chapters of the last book of the *Divinae Institutiones*. He takes up the theme of the *divinum praemium beatitudinis perpetuae* in order to show that the sacrifices made in the pursuit of virtue are not in vain (VII, 1, 5): *ut aequae clarum sit et futura praesentibus et divina terrenis et perpetua brevibus esse anteponenda*. . . . The accomplishment of this moral purpose necessarily de-

²⁸ Cf. H. Koch, "Der 'Tempel Gottes' bei Laktantius," *Philologus*, LXXVI (1920), pp. 235-8.

²⁹ V, 8, 6-7.

mands a somewhat different approach in his treatment of the Golden Age. Central to Lactantius' view here is his chiliasm.³⁰ Prior to the establishment of a new heaven and a new earth the millennium will come in which the powers of evil will be held in check, and the *iusti* in consort with Christ will rule over the *gentes*.³¹ The idyllic conditions ascribed by the pagan poets to the past will actually come into existence in a future historical period when the substance rather than the *species aurei saeculi* is at hand.

Lactantius' description of conditions in this Golden Age is markedly different from what we have already seen. He no longer interprets the physical aspects of the period in allegorical, ethical terms. The brightness of the sun and moon, the spontaneous fecundity of the earth, the mountains dripping with honey, and the rivers of flowing milk are spoken of here as physical realities that in some way reflect the victory over evil that has been accomplished (VII, 24, 7): *mundus denique ipse gaudebit et omnis rerum natura laetabitur erepta et liberata dominio mali et impietatis et sceleris et erroris*. The reconciled enmities usually associated with the return of the Golden Age are included in the apologist's account. The lion and the calf, the wolf and its prey, the serpent and the babe now live harmoniously. Vergil³² and the *Sibylline Oracle* are cited as witnesses

³⁰ On this point see the important studies of F. Cumont, "La fin du monde d'après les mages occidentaux," *Rev. Hist. Rel.*, 1931, pp. 64-93 and J. Daniélou, "La typologie millénariste de la semaine dans le Christianisme primitif," *Vigiliae Christianae*, II (1948), pp. 1-16. Cf. also Pichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-9, 211-12.

³¹ VII, 24.

³² *Eclogue* IV, 38-41; 28-30; 42-5; 21-2. The order of the citations is not quite the disparate mélange that R. Waltz ("Sur le 4^{me} Bucolique de Virgile," *L.E.O.*, XXVI [1958], p. 14) suggests. In his description of conditions, Lactantius, after mentioning the brightness of the sun and moon, speaks of the spontaneous fecundity of the earth including the honey, wine, and milk which will flow freely. Then he discusses the marvels that occur in the animal world. It is this two-fold division, including some of the details, that is reflected in the citations from the fourth *Eclogue* which do not follow the order of the poem. In citing the *Sibylline Oracle* to reinforce his point, Lactantius reverses the order, speaking first of the animal world and then of the spontaneous fecundity of the earth (VII, 24, 12-14). Cf. Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. 89, n. 2.

to these physical realities that will exist in the fullness of time.

At this juncture Lactantius reminds us once again why he appeals to the pagan *suctores* (VII, 25, 1):

Haec sunt quae a prophetis futura dicuntur quorum testimonia et verba ponere opus esse non duxi quoniam esset infinitum . . . praeterea ut ea ipsa quae dicerem non nostris sed alienis potissimum litteris confirmarem doceremque non modo apud nos, verum etiam apud eos ipsos qui nos insectantur veritatem consignatam teneri quam recusent agnoscere.

This is a commonplace which Lactantius shares with Christian apologists before and after him. What has not been sufficiently noted, it seems, is the specific form of polemical pragmatism that characterizes his treatment of the Golden Age throughout the *Divinae Institutiones*. In his euhemeristic attack on polytheism in Book I he accepts the myth as the initial stage in man's history. Here he attempts rather briefly to show that Saturn's reign was an earthly one, and he raises the question of Saturn's *iustitia* in an effort to disprove his divinity. In Book V, where *iustitia* in its fundamental and applied senses is the theme, the historical validity of the period remains but is overshadowed by the ethical-allegorical understanding of the poetic descriptions of physical phenomena during the *aureum saeculum*. In Book VII, where Lactantius discusses the fulfilment of the Christian revelation, a more literal interpretation of the poet's words prevails; now, however, with reference to an historical period in the future rather than the past.

The ethical element, to a greater or lesser degree, is an important part in all these transformations. Whether it be the moral character of Saturn, the virtues that characterized the Golden Age in the past, or the moral regeneration that is a prerequisite for the Golden Age to come, this theme is always prominent in Lactantius' writing.

There is, then, a unity as well as a disparateness in Lactantius' treatment of the *aureum saeculum*. His disregard for historical consistency is no small defect. In his own mind, however, it seems to have been justified by his deliberate aim of leading his reader to Christianity by degrees (V, 4, 6):

Nam sicut infans solidi ac fortis cibi capere vim non potest ob stomachi teneritudinem, sed liquore lactis ac molli-

tudine alitur donec firmatis viribus vesci fortioribus possit, ita et huic³³ oportebat quia nondum poterat capere divina, prius humana testimonia offeri, id est philosophorum et historicorum, ut suis potissimum refutaretur auctoribus.

In line with this principle it seems that Lactantius' aim was gradually to transform the *humana testimonia* concerning the Golden Age through the touchstone of the Christian faith. For him the way in which the poets reveal truth *in parte* was not a constant. It was relative to the polemical exigencies of an evolving argument of the Christian position.³⁴

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³³ I. e. Demetrianus, Cyprian's opponent, about whom Lactantius is giving this advice.

³⁴ The author wishes to thank the American Philosophical Society and the Research Foundation of the State University of New York for their generous assistance in making the research for this paper possible.

AENEID V AND THE AENEID.*

In Memoriam K. F. C. Rose

Like the Eighth Book of the *Aeneid*, *Aeneid* V is one of the episodic books of the epic. The central action of the *Aeneid* progresses even less in this book than it does in *Aeneid* VIII. As a result, whatever scholarly attention the fifth *Aeneid* has been able to attract has centered around the date of its composition, and the verdict of most scholars has been that this part of the epic seems to be a superfluous, late, and ill-fitting appendage within the over-all design of the *Aeneid*.¹ More recently, interest has focused on the poetic, inherent unity of this book.² Valid as these analyses may be, Book V cannot be considered merely as a self-contained unit; since it is episodic and also one of the longest books of the *Aeneid*, the answer to the critics' question about its necessity must be sought in its relation to the epic as a whole. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to show how *Aeneid* V is integrated into the epic, how it is related to the theme of the *Aeneid*, and why Sicily was chosen as its setting.

The fact that Vergil makes Aeneas land in Sicily twice has often been criticized as awkward. For this still influential opinion, it may suffice to quote the remarks of H. Nettleship:³

* The following works will be cited by the author's names only: A. Alföldi, *Die trojanischen Urahnen der Römer* (Basel, 1957); M. Monaco, *Il libro dei ludi* (Palermo, 1957); B. Otis, *Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1964); V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (2nd ed., Vienna, 1964); M. C. J. Putnam, *The Poetry of the Aeneid* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1965); R. D. Williams, *P. Vergili Maronis Liber Quintus* (Oxford, 1960); W. Wimmel, review of Monaco, *Gnomon*, XXXIII (1961), pp. 47-54.

¹ A survey of scholarly opinions is given by Monaco, pp. 1-24; cf. Williams, pp. xxiii-xxx.

² See especially Putnam, pp. 64-104. Putnam, in my opinion, somewhat overstates the importance of the Palinurus episode for the unity of the book, and his definition of the unifying theme of *Aeneid* V as "the necessity of sacrifice through suffering" (p. 65) is not always applicable.

³ "The Story of Aeneas' Wanderings," *J. Ph.*, IX (1880), p. 46. The article is not listed by Monaco or Williams. For a well-put argument,

It is difficult to suppose that so awkward a combination as this can have entered into the original plan of the *Aeneid*. As things now stand it might occur to the reader that the fifth *Aeneid* would naturally have followed the third, as the sixth might naturally have followed the fourth. Vergil had not, probably, at the time of his death, harmonized the Sicilian and Carthaginian episodes in a manner satisfactory to himself.

A closer look, however, at the description of the Trojans' two arrivals in Sicily suggests that they were carefully designed to contrast with and thus to complement each other. In Book III, by virtue of the efforts of Palinurus, the Trojans are able to avoid the dangers of Scylla and Charybdis (III, 554-67). Vergil here follows his Odyssean model, with one important exception: Anchises, and not Aeneas, who is the counterpart of Odysseus, remembers the earlier prophecy about these *monstra*. According to a pattern of landing which R. B. Lloyd has so perceptively analyzed for Book III,⁴ the Trojans then land in Sicily *fessi*, and also *ignari* (III, 568-9).

Even up to this point only the landing in Book V is rather different. Although the fifth *Aeneid* heralds his return to Anchises, Aeneas also is about to come much more into his own. The increasingly active role he will play from now on is emphasized at the very beginning of the Book (V, 1-4):

Interea medium Aeneas in classe tenebat
certus iter fluctusque atros Aquilone secabat
moenia respiciens, quae iam infelicis Elissae
conlucent flammis.

He holds his way *certus*, and not *ignarus*. Again there is a storm, again the Trojans ships are *fessas* (29), but now the Trojans are not helplessly exposed to the workings of the storm, but of their own choice change their course to Sicily. Again Palinurus is singled out, but now, in contrast to III, he turns to Aeneas for advice and follows it. This is the first detailed illustration of Aeneas' living up to his characterization in V, 1 ff. It has rightly been noted that these introductory lines are

different from mine, against this view, see R. B. Lloyd, "*Aeneid* III: A New Approach," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), p. 149, n. 53.

⁴ Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

symbolic,⁵ but, I believe, not so much for Book V as for Aeneas' development in the central triad of the epic, where he changes from one who formerly was *multa cunctantem* (IV, 390) to a man who confidently can say: *ego poscor Olympo* (VIII, 533). The result of his command to Palinurus is swift and auspicious (V, 32-4):

haec ubi dicta, petunt portus et vela secundi
intendunt Zephyri; fertur cita gurgite classis,
et tandem laeti notae advertuntur harenae.

In *Aeneid* V, the landing of the Trojans in Sicily thus is associated with a certain mood—*laeti*.⁶ This is what differentiates this arrival from most of those described in III and groups it with the antithetical Trojan landings in Libya (I, 157-79) and Italy (VII, 1-36),⁷ and with their first landing in Sicily in Book Three. The description of these four landings is not merely factual, but evokes a certain atmosphere. And within the framework of the antithetical landings in I and VII, the Sicilian landings in III and V form the same deliberate antithesis themselves.

The Sicilian locale of which the Trojans catch sight first is Mount Aetna. Like the landing site in I, that in III is forbidding, sinister, and threatening (III, 570-7):

portus ab accessu ventorum immotus et ingens
ipse: sed horrificis iuxta tonat Aetna ruinis,
interdumque etram prorumpit ad aethera nubem
turbine fumantem piceo et candente favilla,
attollitque globos flammaram et sidera lambit,
interdum scopulos avulsaque viscera montis
erigit eructans, liquefactaque saxa sub auras
cum gemitu glomerat fundoque exaestuat imo.

Aside from the thematic parallels with the hostile shore in I, 159-68, the similarity between this description and that of the

⁵ Pöschl, pp. 80-2; cf. K. Büchner, *P. Vergilius Maro. Der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 352.

⁶ This mood is sustained throughout Book V, where the occurrence of words connoting joy is most frequent; see P. Miniconi, "La joie dans l'Enéide," *Latomus*, XXI (1962), pp. 565-8. Cf. VII, 36; III, 524.

⁷ For a detailed analysis of the landings in Books I and VII, see V. Buchheit, *Vergil über die Sendung Roms* (Heidelberg, 1963), pp. 173-87; cf. Pöschl, pp. 245-50.

Cacus monstrum in Book VIII is remarkable.⁸ Not by coincidence are the Trojans said to endure *immania monstra* (III, 583) during their first night in Sicily. More specifically, Vergil also gives the reason for the ominous behavior of the mountain (III, 578-82):

fama est Enceladi semustum fulmine corpus
urgeri mole hac, ingentem insuper Aetnam
impositam ruptis flammam expirare caminis,
et fessum quotiens mutet latus, intremere omnem
murmure Trinacriam et caelum subtexere fumo.

There can be little doubt about the symbolic meaning of this description. As the winds, who personify disorder in Book I, are shut in the cave of Aeolus, with the *moles* of the mountain superimposed on them (I, 60-2)

sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris
hoc metuens molemque et montis insuper altos
imposuit

so Enceladus/Typhoeus, whom Vergil in VIII explicitly associates with violence personified, i. e. *Cacus*,⁹ is held in check by the *moles* of Mt. Aetna. Nor is this symbolic use of Aetna unprecedented. For already in the *Georgics* the activity of the volcano is singled out as one of the portents of that disharmony and disorder which threaten the young ruler Octavian. *Aeneid*, III, 570 ff. is an expansion and reworking of the passage from the First *Georgic* (I, 471-3):

quotiens Cyclopum effervere in agros
vidimus undantem ruptis fornacibus Aetnam,
flammarumque globos liquefactaque volvere saxa!

The connotations are the same in both poems. There is no such description in the *Odyssey*; Vergil's model was the First *Pythian Ode* of Pindar the purpose of which was to celebrate the foundation of a new city. Such a new city, Acesta, is founded in Book V and thus, in spite of all its deliberate gloominess, the first landing in Sicily already anticipates the happier achievement

⁸ See F. J. Worstbrock, *Elemente einer Poetik der Aeneis* (Münster, 1963), p. 76 and n. 111.

⁹ See G. K. Galinsky, "The Hercules-Cacus Episode in *Aeneid* VIII," *A. J. P.*, LXXXVII (1966), p. 38 and n. 45.

of the second in Book V. Furthermore, it is important to note that the landing near Mt. Aetna and the Cyclops episode are stops which Vergil added to the traditional landing places of Aeneas. Tradition knew of Aeneas' putting ashore near Drepanum or Eryx. Vergil makes very brief mention of this at the very end of Book III (707), but not until after the lengthy description of the Achaemenides episode and the periplus of Sicily. The impression of gloom, violence, and hostility that was created by the Aetna passage still prevails: the Trojans put ashore at Drepanum's *inlaetabilis ora* (III, 707). A consistent mood is thus sustained, and this gives additional testimony to the unity of Book III.

More significant, however, is the fact that just as the Aetna episode is not told by Vergil for its own sake, but is part of a larger symbolic framework, so the function of the Achaemenides story can be properly understood only against the backdrop of the Sinon story in II, and as an anticipation of future events in the epic.¹⁰ This episode has often been criticized for its reliance on that of Sinon, but it is, in fact, a rather different recasting of the latter, just as the second Trojan landing in Sicily in V is a different recasting of that in III. Whereas Sinon betrays his true intent by blaming Fortuna because she *mendacem fingit* (II, 79-80) and Priam merely looses his chains after Sinon has told most of his story, Achaemenides from the outset is portrayed as a man who deserves one's pity (*miser-*

¹⁰ Most scholars, especially J. W. Mackail, *The Aeneid of Virgil* (Oxford, 1930), Appendix B, have considered the Achaemenides episode as "unessential"; cf. R. D. Williams, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Tertius* (Oxford, 1962), p. 181: "But while Vergil may have felt uncertain whether the episode was a proper part of the fabric of the poem, we may still admire it as a stitched-on piece of brilliant colours. It is a passage of rhetorical and grandiose writing, detached from the immediate world of human experience . . . This was the kind of writing the Silver Age loved . . . The boxing match in *Aeneid* V is another such episode." The only dissenting voice is that of R. B. Lloyd, "Aeneid III and the Aeneas Legend," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 397 f., who demonstrates that the story is a short epyllion the focal point of which (639-40) "brings us to full circle to the words of Polydorus' ghost at the beginning of the book," and thus contributes to the unity of Book III. I doubt that this is the more important function of the episode, nor is it "narrated in good part for its own sake." On the boxing match, see below.

anda, 591). Without any questions, and before he has yet told his story, he is accepted by Anchises, who all but concludes a treaty with him (III, 610 f.):

ipse pater dextram Anchises haud multa moratus
dat iuveni atque animum praesenti pignore firmat.

The danger which confronted him is essentially the same as the peril the Trojans had faced the day and night before in the form of Mt. Aetna. Achaemenides was threatened by another *monstrum ingens* (III, 658; cf. *immania monstra*, 583) whose habitat is a murky cave and who *iacuit sanie eructans* (631 f.), just as Mt. Aetna *avulsa viscera montis/erigit eructans* (575 f.). The connection between these two descriptions is close and intentional; another form of *eructare* occurs only in one other passage in the *Aeneid*.¹¹ This equation between mountain and man is expressed somewhat later even more clearly by the phrase *Aetneos fratres* (678). Finally, while the Vergilian Cyclops has all the atrocious characteristics of the Homeric one, he affects the surrounding countryside with far greater fright than his Homeric model. Homer is content with a graphic description of the Cyclops' reaction to his blinding (*Od.*, IX, 395 f.):

σμερδαλέον δὲ μέγ' ὄμωξεν, περὶ δ' ἔαχε πέτρῃ,
ἡμεῖς δὲ δέισαντες ἀπεσσύμεθ'.

Vergil, by contrast, does not dwell on the blinding of the Cyclops, but stresses his hostile pursuit of the Trojans and Achaemenides (III, 672-4):

clamorem immensum tollit, quo pontus et omnes
contremuere undae, penitusque exterrita tellus
Italiae curvisque immugiit Aetna cavernis.

Italy and Sicily both live in horror of this monstrous enemy. Even more vividly than in the list of Sicilian towns at the end of the book Vergil here is intent on bringing Italy into a close connection with Sicily.

The Cyclops episode is concluded by Aeneas' repeating the words with which Achaemenides had introduced himself (613):

¹¹ VI, 297, where it is used, significantly enough, for the description of Acheron. Cf. *evomit* in the Cacus story (VIII, 253) and the remarks of E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro. Aeneis Buch VI*, p. 115, n. 1.

comes infelicis Ulixi (691). Such repetition in the Homeric manner is extremely rare in the *Aeneid*, nor is it used without a purpose. For the truth of Achaemenides' story was immediately illustrated by the appearance of the Cyclops (*vix ea fatus erat . . . , cum . . .* 655), and the Cyclops, the traditional enemy of the Greeks, soon also became the enemy of the Trojans. Although Achaemenides introduces himself as a former enemy of the Trojans, the primary purpose of the story is to establish a definite link between Greek and Trojan heroes; the episode prepares for the second half of the epic, Book VIII in particular, where Greeks and Trojans will face another common enemy.¹² This is why Aeneas now purposely agrees with Achaemenides and sympathetically calls Odysseus *infelix*, whereas Odysseus formerly was known as *pellax* (II, 90), *durus* (II, 7), *dirus* (II, 261, 762), and *saevus* (III, 273). In Book II, Sinon, catering to the feelings of the Trojans and especially of Priam, called Odysseus *scelerum inventor* (II, 164) and emphasized that (II, 97-8)

hinc semper Ulixes
criminibus terrere novis.

The honest Achaemenides, however, whose story reverses that of Sinon, presents Odysseus as a righteous man who cannot tolerate the crimes committed by a *monstrum* that does not abide by human conventions (II, 626-9):

vidi atro cum membra fluentia tabo
manderet et tepidi tremerent sub dentibus artus—
haud impune quidem, nec talia passus Ulixes
oblitusve sui est Ithacus *discrimine* tanto.

In order that he might mete out just punishment, Odysseus has to be goaded into action and be beside himself, just as Aeneas *insidiis subactus* (XI, 494) is goaded into *furor* and *ira* (XII, 946) over the breach of the *foedus* and thus has to kill Turnus, and just as Hercules in Book VIII is prodded into a frenzy (*furens animis*, VIII, 228) after his inhuman (*semihomo*, VIII,

¹² For a different interpretation, see Worstbrock, *op. cit.*, p. 75: "Die Begnadigung des Feindes ist die symbolische Überwindung der griechischen Welt." But the historical background of the Sicilian setting has to be taken into account; see below for details.

194) enemy, who indulges in cannibalism like the Cyclops (*semperque recenti/ caede tepebat humus*, VIII, 194 f.) left nothing *inausum/ aut intractum sceleris dolive* (VIII, 205 f.).

This final portrayal of Odysseus in the *Aeneid* ought to make one sceptical about the assertion that the Romans, as early as the fifth century B. C., chose *pius* Aeneas as their ancestor over the more worldly-wise, shrewder, and less sacred Odysseus.¹³ In fact, the literary tradition before and even after Vergil is at pains to stress Aeneas' skilful and deliberate use of his mind,¹⁴ whereas of all Homeric heroes, it is precisely Odysseus whose piety is set most strongly in relief by the poet.¹⁵ Odysseus was never placed in any antithesis to Aeneas; already Hellanicus knew of the two heroes coming to Italy together, and of the foundation of Rome by both.¹⁶

The periplus of Sicily forms the last part of Book III. Since this was not part of the traditional Aeneas legend, Vergil

¹³ So, for instance, F. Bömer, *Rom und Troia* (Baden-Baden, 1951), pp. 47 ff.

¹⁴ For example, Aeneas is called *βουλευφόρος* more often than any other character in the *Iliad*. *νήπιος* Achilles is contrasted with *δαίφρων* Aeneas (*Il.*, XX, 264, 267). Lycophron calls him *βουλαις ἀριστος* (*Alex.*, 1235). Hector fights Achilles because of his own *ἀτασθαλίῃσιν* (*Il.*, XXII, 104) and *ἄσβεστον μένος* (*Il.*, XXII, 96), whereas Aeneas is pushed into the fight with Achilles by a god. The opposition between Aeneas' deliberation and the foolish and reckless behavior of Achilles and Hector is worked out as carefully as that between Odysseus and his companions in the *Odyssey* prologue. Flavius Philostratus (ed. Kayser), II, p. 316 writes that the Trojans called Hector their "arm," and Aeneas, their "mind," and contrasts the wisdom of Aeneas with the raging of Hector. Vergil's contemporary Dionysius stresses Aeneas' *μηχάνημα*, *λογισμός*, and *νοῦς* (I, 46, 2), which are contrasted with the Greeks' failure to come up with a successful stratagem: *οὐδὲν προεμηχανῶντο* (I, 46, 3).

¹⁵ Aside from the Doloneia, see *Odyssey*, I, 66 f., and the remarks of W. B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme* (2nd ed., New York, 1963), p. 28. Significantly, this trait of Odysseus was emphasized much in the literary tradition: see Stanford, pp. 184, 190, 200, 208, 213, 230.

¹⁶ *F. G. H.*, 4 F 84 = D. H., I, 72. For a discussion, see E. D. Phillips, "Odysseus in Italy," *J. H. S.*, LXXIII (1953), pp. 57 f. and the bibliography listed there. For further similarities between Odysseus and Aeneas, see Stanford, *op. cit.*, p. 136, who makes the correct observation that Aeneas is more impressive in destiny than Odysseus. But it should be made clear that this applies only to the hero as we know him from Vergil,

no doubt intended it as a tribute to Sicily or, as R. D. Williams has put it so well, "he associates the destiny of Italy with its nearest neighbor (as he does in Book V)." ¹⁷

Before turning to Book V, let me summarize briefly what we have found out about the first Trojan landing in Sicily. It is entirely original with Vergil and, through imagistic parallels, it is integrated into a symbolic context that goes well beyond Book III. It is not an isolated episode, which exists for its own sake, but it is related to other parts of the epic. It is precisely because the symbolic function of the episode is what really matters, I believe, that the poet is little concerned with *Realien*, such as the consistency of his chronology or the actual existence of a harbor near Mt. Aetna. Like Libya in Book I, Sicily is a hostile and threatening shore for the Trojans in Book III. They are united with the Greeks in the face of a common peril, a common monstrous enemy, and the destinies of Sicily and Italy are linked. We will see the purpose of this soon, after discussing the role of Book V.

The fifth *Aeneid* introduces the central and most important triad of the epic. There frequently is the tendency to divide the *Aeneid* too rigidly into triads and/or an Odyssean and Iliadic half; it is often overlooked that the poem also is a *carmen continuum*. Only a recent study ¹⁸ has revealed the extent to which Odyssean models were used for the second half of the *Aeneid*. Similarly, while Book V—the most "Iliadic" Book of the "Odyssean" half—signals Aeneas' turning away from the past of Troy and Dido and his progressively increasing orientation in Books V to VIII toward his Roman mission, it also is firmly linked to the preceding books, IV in particular. This is evident from its very first line: *certus* is a reminiscence of *certus eundi* in IV, 554. ¹⁹ Aeneas is explicitly said to look back (*respiciens*, V, 3) to the conflagration in Carthage, which is the symbol of Dido's fatal love and the fulfilment of her prophecy: *sequar atris ignibus absens* (IV, 384). Now Aeneas indeed sees

¹⁷ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

¹⁸ G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen, 1964). Odyssean motifs are concentrated especially in *Aeneid* VII and VIII, which is an additional argument in favor of the tripartite structure of the epic.

¹⁹ So, rightly, Monaco, p. 41. Note also the contrast with *incerti* in III, 7.

fervere litora flammis (IV, 567), and Dido's invocation (IV, 607)²⁰

Sol, qui terrarum flammis opera omnia lustras

has come true with grim irony. Furthermore, Ascanius, the leader of the Trojan youth in that most Roman game, the *lusus Troiae* (V, 571-2)

Sidonio est invecus equo, quem candida Dido
esse sui dederat monimentum et pignus amoris.

This recalls the boy's ride on horseback when he was hunting with Dido (IV, 156 ff.), and the connection between these two passages has to be taken into account before Ascanius' role in V is too narrowly related to his appearance in Book IX.²¹

Throughout Book V—and the examples given here are by no means exhaustive—Vergil deliberately utilizes earlier motifs and subtly recasts them in order to illustrate the different turn of events and the change from the past to the future, which is the central theme of the middle triad that links and is part of both the "Odyssean" and the "Iliadic" half. Trojan-born Acestes, who had been characterized simply as *bonus* in I, 195 and whose wine had provided some cheer for the Trojans after their shipwreck, now (V, 40 f.)

gratatur reduces et gaza laetus agresti
excipit, ac fessos opibus solatur amicis.

Riches from the Orient, *Troia gaza*, were proverbial, and their loss was singled out in the descriptions of the shipwreck off the Libyan coast (I, 119) and the Greek conquest of Troy (II, 763). It was with similar riches, *Tyrio murice* in particular, that Dido successfully catered to Aeneas (IV, 261-5), and Mercury sternly rebuked him for this. The desire for such wealth was a weakness not proper for the ideal Roman hero; already at the end of the Second *Georgic*, such riches as the *Sarranum ostrum* (II, 506) are contrasted with the humble joys of the *agricola*. The same contrast recurs in *Aeneid*, V, 40 where the word *gaza*

²⁰ Which can be properly understood only in the light of the preceding lines 604-6, where Dido speaks of her desire to destroy the Trojans by fire (*faces*, 604; *flammis*, 607).

²¹ As it is by W. A. Camps, "A Note on the Structure of the *Aeneid*," *C. Q.*, IV (1954), p. 214.

is used for the third and last time in the epic. For Acestes receives Aeneas with *gaza agresti*, which is almost a contradiction in itself were it not to foreshadow Aeneas' future riches in *agreste* Latium; in the descriptions of Latium and the Latins *agrestis* occurs most frequently in the *Aeneid*. More specifically, it is Aeneas' host Evander, Acestes' counterpart in Book VIII,²² who bids the formerly wealthy Trojan to enter his humble abode (VIII, 364-5):

aude, hospes, *contemnere opes* et te quoque dignum
finge deo, rebusque veni non asper egenis.

In the house of Evander, Aeneas then rests (VIII, 368)

effultum foliis, et *pelle Libystidis ursae*.

Again this is anticipated by the welcome Aeneas is given by Acestes who appears (V, 37)

horridus in iaculis et *pelle Libystidis ursae*²³

and Acestes cheers the Trojans with his humble *opibus*. Latium, therefore, begins in Sicily.

One of the most significant imagistic echoes, which links Books IV and V and, at the same time, is used with subtly changing connotations, is that of the divine messenger Iris and her appearance. Glistening with the thousand colors of the rainbow she was sent by Juno to hasten the death of Dido (IV, 693-4; 700-2):

tum Iuno omnipotens longum miserata dolorem
difficilisque obitus Irim demisit Olympo . . .
ergo Iris croceis per caelum roscida pennis
mille trahens varios adverso sole colores
devolat et supra caput astitit.

One can hardly quarrel with the interpretation that Iris here radiates her one thousand colors out of *charis* for the magnani-

²² For the similarities between Acestes and Evander, see Wimmel, p. 51.

²³ One of the rare occurrences of *Λιβυρτίς* is Callimachus, frag. 676 (Pfeiffer). Callimachus doubtless inspired Vergil's aetiological poetry in *Aeneid* VIII, and the Evander episode therefore seems to have been composed before the corresponding description in *Aeneid* V. I owe this reference to Mr. E. V. George.

mously dying queen, and that some comfort and consolation is also implied by *roscida*.²⁴ At the same time, this final scene of Book IV is Juno's admission of the failure of her plot to unite Dido and Aeneas with the help of Venus. The cooperation between the goddesses in IV is replaced by a return to their earlier antagonism in Book V (779 ff.). And, ironically, Dido's wish to set the Trojan ships on fire (IV, 594, cf. 604-6) and to see Aeneas die *ante diem* (IV, 620) now is inverted into its opposite: *ante diem* (IV, 698) she perishes amid the burning citadel of Carthage.

In Book V, Iris is not sent because Juno takes pity on the long suffering of a mortal, but this time the goddess wants to ease her own, long-standing grief (V, 606-10):

Irim de caelo misit Saturnia Iuno
Iliacam ad classem ventosque aspirat eunti,
multa movens necdum antiquum saturata dolorem.
illa viam celerans per mille coloribus arcum
nulli visa cito decurrit tramite virgo.

It has rightly been noted that this passage is not merely a thoughtless repetition of that in IV.²⁵ Dido's wish to burn the Trojan fleet now has seemingly been fulfilled. Yet the material effect of the burning of the ships is negligible: only four ships are destroyed and the Trojans—all of them—could still continue their voyage to Italy without difficulty. More important is the effect this incident has on Aeneas. As before in Carthage, where he was scolded by Mercury as *regni rerumque oblite tuarum* (IV, 267) because he wanted to stay, and where he was torn between his conflicting feelings (IV, 447-8)

haud secus adsiduis *hinc* atque *hinc* vocibus heros
tunditur, et magno persentit *pectore* *curas*,

Aeneas now (V, 700-3)

casu *concussus* acerbo
nunc *huc* ingentis, nunc *illuc* *pectore* *curas*
mutabat versans, Siculisme resideret arvis
oblitus *fatorum*, Italasne capesseret oras.²⁶

²⁴ So E. Wolff, "Der Brand der Schiffe und Aeneas' Wiedergeburt," *M. H.*, XX (1963), p. 159. For the pleasant connotations of *roscida* see, for instance, Censorinus, frag. 3, 5 (not listed by Wolff).

²⁵ Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp. 158 f.

²⁶ Büchner, *op. cit.*, pp. 356 f. considers this incident as "Aeneas' most serious test," and compares his situation to that of the statesman

His decision is to build a city for the old and weak of his companions, and this signifies a further break with his past. At the same time, this city is consistently modelled on Rome, with whose site Aeneas will be familiarized in VIII, although its actual founding will not be described in the *Aeneid*. The terminology that is used in describing the foundation of Segesta is specifically Roman:²⁷

transcribunt urbi matres populumque volentem
deponunt (750-1)

interea Aeneas urbem designat aratro (755)

indicitque forum et patribus dat iura vocatis (758).

After being encouraged by the dream appearance of Anchises, and before he founds the city, Aeneas (V, 743-5)

haec memorans cinerem et *sopitos suscitāt ignis*,
Pergameumque *Larem* et canae penetralia Vestae
farre pio et plena supplex veneratur acerra.

Similarly, after the certain encouragement of the *prodigium* in Book Eight and after his introduction to Evander, who in many ways is the counterpart of Acestes, Aeneas worships the hero without whose action Rome could not have been founded (VIII, 541-4):

haec ubi dicta dedit, solio se tollit ab alto
et primum Herculeis *sopitas ignibus aras*
excitat, hesternumque *larem* parvosque penatis
laetus adit.

The foundation of Acesta, then, symbolically anticipates that of Rome and Lavinium. The immediate cause for the foundation of Acesta was, as we have seen, the burning of the ships, which was symbolic rather than being materially effective. Now there is little doubt that Vergil was familiar with Aristotle's version of the foundation of Rome, which is quoted by Dionysius

in Cic., *Rep.*, VI, 8, 8 who has lost the confidence of his people. Büchner thus goes on to argue for an especially close connection between Books V and VI. But in the *Aeneid* only a few deluded women rebel, and Aeneas' crisis, aside from that in Book IV, is more comparable to that in Book VIII; see below.

²⁷ See the commentary of Williams *ad loc.*

of Halicarnassus (I, 72, 3). Besides, the numismatic and literary evidence indicates that this version apparently was quite popular.²⁸ The immediate reason for the founding of Rome, according to Aristotle, who perhaps used an earlier source, was the burning of ships by Trojan women. So far from signalling the success of Dido's destructive designs, therefore, the burning of the ships, which results in the foundation of a city, prefigures the successful completion of Aeneas' fated mission. As his departure from Dido and the conflagration in Carthage free Aeneas for his task, so the burning of the ships foreshadows even more strongly that this task will indeed be completed: those unable or unwilling to continue will not encumber Aeneas any more, and the foundation of the city in Sicily presages the ultimate, successful founding of a city in Italy. Once more, Juno's action ironically turns into the opposite of what she had intended. For good reasons, therefore, her epithet in Book V is not *omnipotens*, as it was in IV, 693, but *Saturnia*, which prepares for Aeneas' arrival in Italy. These are the implications of the second intervention of Iris.

Because they have not been recognized, the appearance of the snake at Anchises' grave has been misinterpreted seriously. The serpent appears and (V, 87-9)

auro
squamam incendebat fulgor, ceu nubibus arcus
mille iacit varios adverso sole colores.

This is certainly an intentional echo of Iris' appearance a few lines earlier at the end of Book IV, and the description therefore is also related to her second appearance in Book V (cf. especially 658). In striking contrast to the poet's own words—the snake is *innoxius* (92) and makes the Trojans *laeti* (100)—it has been contended that the description suggests "hidden violence,"²⁹ or, at any rate, is "ambivalent."³⁰ The appearances

²⁸ The significance of this tradition and its ramifications are lucidly discussed by Alföldi, pp. 9 ff.; Hellanicus, *F. G. H.*, 4 F 84; Damastes, *F. G. H.*, 5 F 3.

²⁹ Putnam, p. 212. For the beneficent implications of a Vergilian serpent metaphor, see Galinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 45 and n. 61.

³⁰ Wimmel, p. 53. Putnam's argument is rather similar to Wimmel's. The most sensible discussion of the religious background of the tomb ceremony is J. Bayet, "Les cendres d'Anchise: dieu, héros, ombre ou serpent? (Virgile, *Énéide* V 42-103)," *Aparchai*, IV (1961), pp. 39-56.

of Iris do not support such an assumption. As we have seen, her function at the end of Book IV clearly is beneficent: she frees Dido from her agony and eases her painful death struggle. For this reason alone a reminiscence of it in the description of the snake, which most probably personifies Anchises, would not be entirely out of place, especially since there is no description of Anchises' death in the *Aeneid*. For the death of Dido and the burial of Anchises are analogous; although Anchises will continue to guide him, he has ceased to exist as the visible and, at times, oppressive symbol of Aeneas' past. Similarly, Iris' second intervention ultimately turns out to be beneficent for the Trojans. There is no reason, therefore, not to take the poet at his word: the snake is a good omen.

Why, then, this link between Iris, who is sent by Juno, and Anchises? The explanation is found, I believe, when we turn to Aeneas' dream vision of Anchises. There Anchises encourages his son after the burning of the ships by saying (V, 726-7):

imperio Iovis huc venio, qui classibus ignem
depulit, et caelo tandem miseratus ab alto est.

This is the last part of a sequence which began with Juno's sending Iris, because she *longum miserata dolorem* (IV, 693), which continued with the appearance of the Iris-like serpent, and with Iris' second intervention (V, 606)


Irim de caelo misit Saturnia Iuno

that led to the burning of the ships to which Anchises makes explicit reference. As Juno commiserated with Dido and later sent Iris from high heaven, so now Jupiter *caelo tandem miseratus ab alto est* (V, 727). A cycle has come to its end³¹ and Aeneas' sights now more than ever before belong to the future (V, 729-31):

lectos iuvenes, fortissima corda
defer in Italiam. gens dura atque aspera cultu
debellanda tibi Latio est.

³¹ For some good remarks on some more elaborate examples of this kind of reversal, see M. von Albrecht, "Die Kunst der Spiegelung in Vergils Aeneis," *Hermes*, XCIII (1965), pp. 54-64. The structural links between the four passages are not unlike those between the four books of the *Georgics*; cf. G. E. Duckworth, "Vergil's *Georgics* and the *Laudes Galli*," *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 229 f.

The four scenes are carefully balanced and form an interlocking framework pattern:



Because of its link position between the Iliadic and Odyssean halves and because it introduces the central part of the *Aeneid*, Book V is particularly rich in associations for the whole epic. This may be illustrated by a few more examples before a conclusion can be drawn.

As Heinze rightly observed,³² the miracle of Acestes' flaming arrow refers to the foundation of Segesta. The allusion to this event is linked by Vergil to the *prodigium* which leads Aeneas finally to accept his mission without any more questioning. We will see shortly that there is an intrinsic reason for this; meanwhile, it may suffice to note that just as Acestes receives an embossed bowl, Aeneas in Book VIII first sees and later takes possession of the embossed shield, which was made by Vulcan in Sicily and symbolizes the *fama et fata nepotum*. Both in Books Five and Eight, Aeneas' companions are stunned while he is the only one who knows how to interpret the portents. In Book V, this once more shows that Aeneas is coming into his own by being able to do what Anchises formerly had to do for him, although the process in Book V is not yet completed. For Aeneas understands the implications of the omen only partially; he knows that Acestes has been chosen to be a great ruler, but Anchises later still has to tell him that Acestes will be ruling over the new city, Acesta. In VIII, of course, Aeneas immediately arrives at a full and correct interpretation of the portent. The parallels between the two passages, which occur at the same place in both books, are certainly intentional:

attonitis haesere animis superosque precati
Trinacrii Teucrique viri, nec maximus omen

³² R. Heinze, *Virgils Epische Technik* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915), pp. 160-4.

abnuī Aeneas, sed laetum amplexus Acesten
muneribus cumulat magnis ac talia fatur:
"sume pater; nam *te voluit rex magnus Olympi*
talibus *auspiciis* exsortem ducere honores.
ipsius Anchisae longaeui hoc munus habebis,
cratera impressum *signis* . . ." (V, 529-36)

obstupere animis alii, sed Troius heros
agnovit *sonitum* et divae promissa parentis,
tum memorat: "ne vero, hospes, ne quaere profecto
quem casum *portenta* ferant: *ego poscor Olympo*.
hoc *signum* cecinit missuram diva creatrix,
si bellum ingrueret, Volcaniaque arma per auras
laturam auxilio. (VIII, 530-6)

The gift in Book Five (536-8), belonging to Aeneas' father Anchises, still recalls the past:

. . . quem Thracius olim
Anchisae genitori in magno munere Cisseus
ferre sui dederat monumentum et pignus amoris.

The gift in Eight (537-40), however, which is given by his mother Venus, presages the future:

Heu quantaē miseris caedes Laurentibus instant:
quas poenas mihi, Turne, dabis! quam multa sub undas
scuta virum galeasque et fortia corpora volves,
Thybrī pater! poscant acies et foedera rumpant.

The difference between the two passages, that between past and future, sums up the development that takes place in the central triad.

This development, as we have seen, is begun in the opening lines of Book Five, which reflect Aeneas' break with the past of Dido and Troy.⁸² Before the hero, however, can arrive at a full awareness of what the future holds for him, he has gradually to be freed from the bonds that tie him to the past. One device by which Vergil effects this is to allude to mythological events which convey a strong impression of the past, but are not specifically connected with the past of Aeneas. At the same time, just as Vergil projected contemporary events into the mytho-

⁸² This is further confirmed by Putnam's (p. 68) observation that Aeneas in V, 3 looks back (*respiciens*) to Carthage as he did when he was leaving Troy (II, 741).

logical past,³⁴ so mythological events of the dim past are transferred to the present of Aeneas and eventually even serve to anticipate the future.

Thus the boxing match between Dares and Entellus is to remind one of that between Eryx and Heracles.³⁵ By making Entellus the brother of Eryx, Vergil telescoped the mythological combat into Aeneas' present. Vergil is sympathetic to the Sicilian in that he has him win over the Trojan Dares.³⁶ The outcome of the fight looks like a vindication of Eryx' defeat at the hands of Heracles. The prize is an ox; Heracles had wagered oxen against the land of Eryx. But in another respect, Entellus acts like Heracles. Heracles returns the land; Entellus does not keep the steer. Divinely inspired (*cede deo*, 467) he fights fiercely (*iras*, 461; *saevire animis acerbis*, 462) against a proud man, who further is characterized by *dementia* (465) and, once more, an ox is at stake. The parallels with the fight of Heracles against Cacus can hardly be overlooked.³⁷ The latter foreshadows the final combat between Aeneas and Turnus, and so does the boxing match between Entellus and Dares.³⁸ It is modelled on the fight between Amycus and Polydeuces in the *Argonautica*. Vergil used this model in only two other passages in the *Aeneid*, and, not by coincidence, both are similes involving Turnus. At the beginning of Book XII, setting the tone for his behavior throughout the finale of the epic, Turnus is compared to a raging lion (XII, 4-9):

Poenorum qualis in arvis
 saucius ille gravi venantum vulnere pectus
 tum demum movet arma leo, gaudetque comantis
 excutiens cervice toros fixumque latronis
 impavidus frangit telum et fremit ore cruento:
 haud secus accenso gliscit violentia Turno.

³⁴ This was pointed out first by E. Norden, "Vergils Aeneis im Lichte ihrer Zeit," *N. J. A.*, VII (1901), p. 271.

³⁵ As told by Diodorus, IV, 23. See E. Sjöqvist, "Heracles in Sicily," *Opuscula Romana*, IV (1962), pp. 117-23.

³⁶ Cf. G. M. Columba, "Virgilio e la Sicilia," *Atti Acc. Palermo*, ser. III, XVII (1932), p. 243: "L'eroe del cuore di Virgilio non è il Troiano, ma il Siciliano."

³⁷ See Galinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 41 ff.

³⁸ This has been seen by Putnam, p. 215, although he relegates it to a footnote and does not elaborate on it further.

A related simile is used for Amycus, the Bebrycian antagonist of the hero Polydeuces (*Argonautica*, II, 25-9) :

ὃ δ' ἐσέδρακεν ὄμμαθ' ἐλίξας
ὥστε λέων ὑπ' ἄκοντι τετυμμένος, ὃν τ' ἐν ὄρεσσιν
ἄνθρωποι ἀμφιπέπονται. ὃ δ' ἰλλόμενός περ ὁμίλῳ
τῶν μὲν ἔτ' οὐκ ἀλέγει, ἐπὶ δ' ὄσσεται οἴοθεν οἶος
ἄνδρα τόν, ὃς μιν ἐτυψε παροίτατος, οὐ δ' ἐδάμασεν.

The changes that Vergil wrought in adapting the simile are crucial. The lion that Turnus is compared to is not simply any wild lion, but a Punic one. *Poenorum* deliberately is placed at the beginning of the sentence, and *leo* is separated from it by almost two lines.³⁹ Turnus is identified with Rome's arch-enemy, Carthage. Nor is this surprising. For the poet announces through Jupiter's speech in X, 11-14 that the Latin wars in the second half of the epic anticipate the Punic wars. Furthermore, the simile involving *implacabilis* (XII, 3) Turnus ends with the same phrase that marked the end of the first sequence of scenes in the epic, where Jupiter prophesied, at last, peace for the Roman race (I, 294-6) :

claudentur Belli portae; Furor impius intus
saeva sedens super arma et centum vinctus aenis
post tergum nodis fremet horridus ore cruento.

Turnus clearly is identified with *Furor impius*.⁴⁰

Likewise, the simile likening Aeneas and Turnus to fighting bulls (XII, 715) was inspired by a comparison Apollonius used for the description of Amycus and Polydeuces (II, 88-9). Moreover, the simile in *Aeneid* XII also is a deliberate echo of the fight of Hercules against Cacus in Book VIII.⁴¹ The link between the combats of Dares and Entellus, Hercules and Cacus, and finally, Aeneas and Turnus is an intentional one with im-

³⁹ It may be more than a coincidence that the only other instance of an equally long separation between the participle (*qualis*) and its noun is the simile which compares Aeneas to Apollo (IV, 143-4). This agrees well with the observation that Vergil apparently elaborated the similes at a late stage of the composition of the *Aeneid*; see Pöschl, p. 124, with bibliography.

⁴⁰ Already this beginning of Book XII, "Turnus' Book," suggests that there is much that Putnam's interpretation of it (Aeneas changes for the worse) does not take into account.

⁴¹ See Galinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 f.

plications that become progressively clearer. Furthermore, it should be noted that a Sicilian (Entellus), a Greek (Heracles), and a Trojan (Aeneas) fight in a similar way against similar opponents, the last of whom is explicitly compared to *Poenorum qualis in arvis leo*. This is more than a playful exercise by the poet. We will see shortly that it is merely the poetic reflection of the historical situation in Sicily in the third century B. C.

So far from being "deliberately unreal,"⁴² the games have a reality of their own in the context of the epic. The *lusus Troiae*, for example, is put by Vergil to a use similar to that of the boxing match. The participants are the ancestors of famous Roman *gentes*. The game itself was an institution fostered greatly by Augustus. It has roots that reach deep into the past; the earliest archaeological evidence for it is the famous oinochoe of Tragliatella in Etruria, which dates from the late seventh century B. C.⁴³ It may be more than a coincidence that Heracles also is represented on this vase. The setting Vergil chose for the *lusus* in Sicily, and the connection between the island and the game is further underscored by the reference to the Cretan labyrinth (V, 588-91). For the legend of Minos and Daedalus was current in Sicily and perhaps even was more than a legend.⁴⁴ By repeating this motif in Book VI, Vergil once more links Sicily with the destiny of Italy and Aeneas. At the beginning of that book (VI, 14 ff.) Aeneas admires the representations on the doors of a temple built by Daedalus. Like all of Book V, this episode in VI at first seems to be nothing but an interlude, but it actually is far from purposeless and is as well integrated

⁴² Putnam, pp. 66 f.

⁴³ Discussed by G. Q. Giglioli, "L'oinochoe di Tragliatella," *S. E.*, III (1929), pp. 111-60, with plates 23-7. On the *Troius lusus* see Mehl in Büchner, *op. cit.*, pp. 465-71, to whose bibliography should be added the important article by J. L. Heller, "Labyrinth or Troy Town?," *C. J.*, XLII (1946-47), pp. 123-39.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the archaeological and literary evidence, see T. J. Dunbabin, "Minos and Daedalus in Sicily," *P. B. S. R.*, XVI (1948), pp. 1-18; G. Pugliese Carratelli, "Minos e Cocalos," *Kokalos*, II (1956), pp. 89-104, and M. P. Nilsson, "The Historical Consequences of the Decipherment of Linear B," *Opuscula Selecta*, III (Lund, 1960), pp. 504 ff. All three scholars believe that the tradition of a Minoan colony in Sicily is genuine. Contra, G. Becatti, "La leggenda di Dedalo," *M. D. A. I. (R)*, LX-LXI (1953-54), pp. 30 ff.

into Book VI⁴⁵ as Book V is integrated into the epic as a whole. The labyrinth in VI is mentioned because of the role of Minos as a judge of the dead (cf. VI, 432). The traditional setting of the story of Minos' pursuit of Daedalus and of his death was Sicily, and Vergil's allusion to the labyrinth in Book V shows that he was aware of this. Vergil honored the Sicilian legend by transferring its setting, for the first and only time in literary tradition, to Cumae, and thus he brought it into a close connection with the central event of the epic: Aeneas' descent to Hades.

As Putnam has observed, the *Troius lusus* is imagistically related to that scene on the shield of Aeneas which for the Augustans was most emblematic of historical reality: Octavian's victory at Actium over the *ops barbarica* of Antony and Cleopatra.⁴⁶ Yet it should also be noted that the *prodigium* of the flames playing around Augustus' temples (VIII, 680 f.) is meant to recall the lambent flame that encircled Ascanius/Iulus in II, 683-4:

fundere lumen apex, tactuque *innoxia* mollis
lambere flamma comas et circum tempora *pasci*.

This passage, in turn, looks forward to the movement of the snake at the tomb ceremony in V, 84-5:⁴⁷

libavitque dapes rursusque *innoxius* imo
successit tumulo et *depasta* altaria liquit.

Likewise, the *augurium maximum* of II, 693-7, which sends Aeneas on his mission

de caelo lapsa per umbras
stella facem ducens multa cum luce *cucurrit*.

⁴⁵ See P. J. Enk, "De labyrinthi imagine in foribus templi Cumani insculpta," *Mnemosyne*, XI (1958), pp. 322-30. R. A. Brooks, "Discolor Aura: Reflections on the Golden Bough," *A.J.P.*, LXXIV (1953), p. 261, n. 22, rightly cautions against cabalistic overinterpretations.

⁴⁶ Putnam, p. 87, comparing V, 594 f. with VIII, 671-4, and V, 549 with VIII, 676.

⁴⁷ These two parallels were noticed, for instance, by Otis, pp. 272 and 275. Otis, however, does not see the reason for the parallelism between V, 525 ff. and II, 693 ff.—The parallel in Book II, of course, shows once more that Vergil's affirmation that Anchises' snake is *innoxius* has to be taken literally.

illam, summa super lambentem culmina tecti,
cernimus Ideae claram se condere silva
signantemque vias

anticipates the arrow *prodigium* of V, 525-8, which heralds the founding of Segesta, which in turn anticipates that of Rome:

namque volans liquidis in nubibus arsit harundo
signavitque viam flammis tenuisque recessit
consumpta in ventos: caelo ceu saepa refixa
transcurrunt crinemque volantia sidera ducunt.

I have chosen these examples not merely to show how well the Sicilian episode is integrated into the *Aeneid*—a list of further links between this seemingly “episodic” book and the other books of the epic has been compiled elsewhere⁴⁸—but how well it is related to some of the most essential passages of the work. Without being aware of the multiple connections between this book and the others, Nettleship already sensed the importance of the Sicilian episode and also tried to account for it:⁴⁹

Vergil rightly seized upon the fact that Sicily was the centre of the story of Aeneas. Legends of a Trojan settlement there had been alive since the fifth century B. C., and, what was more important for Vergil’s poetical purpose, Sicily was the meeting-point of Rome and Carthage. The great idea which inspires the first part of the *Aeneid*, the idea with which the poem opens, is that of bringing Carthage and Rome into a mythical connection.

In the proem, which is a symbolic anticipation of the whole epic,⁵⁰ Carthage and Rome are juxtaposed for the first time (I, 13):

Karthago Italianam contra.

In Dido’s curse, which is the *triste augurium* mentioned in the prologue to Book Five, this opposition is echoed (IV, 628):

litora litoribus contraria.

The artistic indispensability of Book V, therefore, reflects the indispensable historical role played by Sicily in the shaping and

⁴⁸ Especially by Wimmel, pp. 50 f. (links to *all* the other books); cf. Otis, pp. 270 ff. (mainly links to II and IX).

⁴⁹ Nettleship, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵⁰ As demonstrated by Pöschl, pp. 23-41.

transmission of the Roman Aeneas and Trojan legend. The origins of the Trojan legend of Rome have been the subject of a lively scholarly debate to which I hope to contribute soon. Some scholars have argued that the Romans adopted Aeneas as their ancestor as early as the fifth century B. C.,⁵¹ whereas others date the notion that the Romans were descendants of the Trojans to the time of Pyrrhus.⁵² Whatever one's opinion on this problem may be, it is essential, I believe, to take into account that the adoption and development of the legend was a gradual process. Even though Aeneas was known in Etruria and Latium before the third century B. C., it was only in that century, when Rome's expansive drive brought her in close contact with Greece and her culture, that the Roman claim to descent from Troy was found to serve as a close bond between Greeks and Romans. The evidence for an earlier activation, political or other, of the legend is ill-attested and contradictory. Aeneas seems to have been a popular figure among the Etruscans, Rome's enemies, but there is not a shred of evidence the Romans appropriated him for themselves until, perhaps, late in the fourth century B. C.

The event that brought the legend most sharply into focus and greatly spurred its formative development was the Punic Wars. One incident at the very beginning of the First Punic War stands out here: in 263 B. C. the inhabitants of Segesta voluntarily took sides with the Romans after killing the Carthaginian garrison. They gave as a reason for their action their and the Romans' common descent from Aeneas.⁵³ According to Thucydides (VI, 2, 3), Trojans had landed in the northwest of Sicily after the Trojan War. This tradition of a Trojan settlement in that region, which is frequently mentioned in ancient literature,⁵⁴ must have made the Segestans' claim appear more than

⁵¹ So especially Bömer, *op. cit.*

⁵² See J. Perret, *Les origines de la légende troyenne de Rome (281-31)* (Paris, 1942).

⁵³ Zonaras, VIII, 9, 12; cf. Cicero, *Verr.*, IV, 72; V, 83; D. S., XXIII, 5. For the relevant bibliography, see *A. J. A.*, LXX (1966), p. 234, n. 109.

⁵⁴ See, for instance, Pseudo-Scylax, XIII (*G. G. M.*, I, p. 21); Lycophron, *Alex.*, 951-77 with the scholia; Apollodorus, *F. G. H.*, 244 F 167; Strabo, VI, 2, 5, p. 272; XIII, 1, 53, p. 608; D. H., I, 52-3, 1.

credible, although Aeneas now is mentioned for the first time. This motivation of the Segestans was to find its way into literature soon. There is a strong possibility that Naevius may have used the Segestan incident to introduce into his epic the Aeneas legend, which perhaps even was told by a Segestan.⁵⁵ The assumption that the Greeks, in this instance and others, seized the initiative in making the Trojan legend a political theme is, in my opinion, not valid. For the action of the Segestans clearly presupposes the realization that the Romans attached some importance to the Trojan descent and were quite willing to see it exploited politically. The organization of the chrysophoric community centering around the cult of Aphrodite Erycina in Sicily as well as the Segestan coinage after 241 B. C. indicates that Rome, by manipulating the legend for political purposes, tried to appeal to the Greeks and tie them to Rome as allies so as to counter the Carthaginian influence on the island.⁵⁶ The initiative rested with the Romans at all times.

The Trojan legend in Sicily, therefore, was mobilized against Carthage. No example illustrates this better than the cult of the formerly Punic Aphrodite Erycina. After the end of the first Punic War, and especially after her *evocatio* to Rome in 217 B. C., the Erycina was transformed into a truly Roman goddess. As Schilling has so brilliantly stated: ⁵⁷

Enfin d'une déesse cosmopolite, les Romains ont fait une déesse nationale . . . A la venue des Romains, le caractère oriental l'emportait, souligné qu'il était par l'institution des courtisanes sacrées . . . C'est ici qu'il faut peut-être le plus admirer la hardiesse imaginative des Romains. Loin de se sentir gênés par l' "accaparement punique" de l'Erycine,

⁵⁵ This is the contention of S. Mariotti, *Il Bellum Poenicum e Parte di Nevio* (Rome, 1955), p. 27. A recent, concise discussion of the various reconstructions of Naevius' epic is H. T. Rowell's review of Strzelecki's Teubner edition of Naevius in *A. J. P.*, LXXXVII (1966), pp. 210-17.

⁵⁶ See the detailed discussion of D. Kienast, "Rom und die Venus vom Eryx," *Hermes*, XCIII (1965), pp. 478-89. On other instances (Acarnania, Ilion, etc.) of the use of the Trojan legend as a means of appealing to the Greeks, see Norden, *op. cit.*, pp. 327 ff., and Alföldi, pp. 30 ff. That the initiative rested with the Romans is stressed by H. Kirchner, *Die Bedeutung der Fremdkulte in der römischen Ostpolitik* (Diss. Bonn, 1956), pp. 13 ff.

⁵⁷ R. Schilling, *La religion romaine de Vénus* (Paris, 1954), p. 244.

ils ont merveilleusement exploité l'ambiance troyenne du pays des Elymes pour renverser la situation. En vertu de la fiction troyenne, ils pouvaient revendiquer Vénus Erycine pour leur déesse.

The Erycinian Venus became the ancestress of the Julians and eventually of the entire Roman people.

In the *Aeneid*, the emphasis on Sicily within Rome's Trojan legend is the poetic reflection of Rome's national experience. When the Trojans are driven to Sicily in Book III—just as the Romans were drawn unwillingly into the First Punic War—it is an island held by an enemy. For good reasons, the first landing in Sicily is to recall that on the Libyan coast, for the enemy is the same: an inhuman *monstrum* before whom *exterrita tellus Italiae*.⁵⁸ Sicily, as we have seen, is continually linked with Italy in the epic, and so was she in history. The foundation of that brave Sicilian city, which in 263 B.C. had made the Romans deeply aware of the implications of their claim to Trojan descent, is commemorated in the *Aeneid* and linked with Rome. Furthermore, throughout Book V Vergil is at pains to portray Acestes as a second Aeneas.⁵⁹ Sicily became Rome's first province and was inseparably connected with Italy; the second landing in Sicily anticipates the Trojans' arrival in rustic Italy, which, by no coincidence, is explicitly referred to in V, 82 f.⁶⁰

Vergil's endeavor continually to make the reader aware of the close bond between Sicily and Rome also accounts for the many parallels between Books V and VIII. Among several other examples, I have already mentioned the close relationship between the *prodigia* in both books. Furthermore, the state of depression that overcomes Aeneas in V after the burning of the ships is similar to his quiet desperation in VIII, after Evander has announced to him his future task (VIII, 520-2):⁶¹

⁵⁸ Compare Livy's description (XXI, 4, 9) of monstrous Hannibal (*inhumana crudelitas*), and of the feelings of the Romans after the battle of Cannae (*territi*, XXII, 57, 2).

⁵⁹ For the details, see E. Swallow, "The Strategic Fifth *Aeneid*," *C. W.*, XLVI (1953), pp. 177-9; cf. Monaco, p. 108.

⁶⁰ On the importance of the Tiber motif, see Buchheit *op. cit.*, pp. 179 f.

⁶¹ Cf. Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp. 161 f., who remarks: "Aber im achten Gesang handelt es sich schon um das *quale*: hier im fünften erst um das *num?* und *quid?*"

vix ea fatus erat, defixique ora tenebant
 Aeneas Anchisiades et fidus Achates,
 multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant . . .

In V, Aeneas is comforted by the appearance of his father, in VIII, by the *signum* sent by his mother. And in the fifth *Aeneid*, Aeneas is identified with Augustus (V, 72):

sic fatus velas *materna tempora myrto*

recalls the invocation to Octavian in the proem to the first *Georgic* (I, 28):

accipiat cingens *materna tempora myrto*.

In Book VIII, Augustus is identified with Aeneas (VIII, 678-80):

hinc Augustus agens Italos in proelia Caesar
cum patribus populoque, penatibus et magnis dis,
stans celsa in puppi

is an obvious reminiscence of

feror exsul in altum
cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis (III, 11-12)

and

iamque in conspectu Teucros habet et sua castra
stans celsa in puppi, clipeum dum deinde sinistra
extulit ardentem. (X, 260-2)

The prophecies of Anchises in Book V and Evander in Book VIII are both concerned with Aeneas' future task in Italy: he will have to wage war against a *gens dura atque aspera cultu* (V, 730), which is personified by Mezentius in Evander's account (VIII, 481-2, 501). The *convallis* of Caere (VIII, 597-9), where Aeneas receives the shield from Venus, corresponds to the *convallis* where the funeral games are celebrated in Book V (287-8).⁶² Finally, the Cyclopes, who were the enemies of the Trojans in Book III, now work *ad maiorem Romae gloriam* as they forge the armor of Aeneas.⁶³ Although the workshop of

⁶² This was pointed out by B. Rehm, *Das geographische Bild des alten Italiens*, *Philologus Suppl.*, XXIV, 2 (1932), p. 79.

⁶³ This is very much in keeping with the tone of the central, "Roman" triad of the epic; cf. G. E. Duckworth, "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 5 ff.

Vulcan was often associated with Mt. Aetna in the literary tradition, the fact that Aeneas' armor is made in Sicily may not be entirely without significance. For in the crucible of the Punic Wars, Sicily had contributed decisively to Rome's awareness of her Trojan origins and, as we have seen, Sicily does play a pivotal role in the *Aeneid*. Finally, when Aeneas receives his shield, he *ignarus imagine gaudet* (VIII, 730). *Ignari* the Trojans had first landed in Sicily (III, 469), *laeti* the second time (V, 34). With Book VIII, therefore, a cycle has come to its end. Considering the many parallels by which they are linked, it appears that the books which introduce and conclude the central triad must have been composed with a view to each other.

What is more, Book V appears to have been written with a view to the epic as a whole. The sequence of events in the fifth *Aeneid* is analogous to that in the entire epic.⁶⁴ Book V begins with a sea storm, the Trojans are driven to a foreign shore where they are received well and almost induced to stay. A part of them do stay on; this indicates that the Trojan past is left behind—*occidit occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia* (XII, 828)—and, at the same time, it anticipates the founding of a new city in Italy. Iris tries to do on a small scale what Allecto will attempt on a larger one later. The burning of the ships anticipates the equally unsuccessful one in Book IX, and the games beneath their gay surface foreshadow the war in the second half of the epic. The footrace and the boxing contest in particular look ahead to the ultimate conflict in the poem, i. e. the combat of Aeneas and Turnus in Book XII. What was sportive rivalry in Book V will become deadly seriousness in XII (764-5):

neque enim levia aut ludicra petuntur
praemia, sed Turni de vita et sanguine certant.

The significance, then, of the fact that Book Five is an *Aeneid in parvo* and is thoroughly integrated into the entire epic, emerges clearly. As the Sicilian episode epitomized and was inseparably connected with the development of Rome's Trojan legend, which it brought to full bloom, so the Sicilian book of the *Aeneid* epitomizes the epic as a whole and is linked to its

⁶⁴ Cf. Wimmel, p. 54.

every phase. It was in Sicily that the Romans became fully aware of the implications of their claim to Trojan descent; it is in Sicily that Aeneas begins to understand the implications of his mission. We do not know to what extent this was anticipated in the literary tradition before Vergil. At any rate, in the *Aeneid* the emphasis on Sicily within Rome's Trojan legend is the poetic reflection of the Roman national experience.

There can be little doubt that political calculation and cultural ambition were the prime factors in the development of Rome's claim to Trojan descent. The legend was adopted not by the people, but by the few who were responsible for Rome's policy. After being used for political purposes, the legend became the genealogical prerogative of Rome's *familiae Troianae*.⁶⁵ Long ago, A. Schweigler aptly observed that the legend did not have the characteristics of a living popular tradition,⁶⁶ and, more recently, an authority on the Etruscans remarked that "in Rome, the Aeneas legend was brought to the people from above, and never took firm roots."⁶⁷ In spite of the Italic roots of Aeneas, the adoption of the legend by Rome had had something artificial about it. Vergil, therefore, deliberately stressed that aspect of the Trojan legend which was most realistic for the Romans: its mobilization against the Carthaginians during the Punic Wars. And the poet was eminently successful in making Aeneas the truly popular property of the entire Roman people: soon after the publication of the *Aeneid*, the deluge of artifacts sets in which attests the widespread popularity of the hero in the next two centuries.⁶⁸

Since discussions concerning the chronology of this "superfluous" book provided a starting point for this essay, it is only fitting to conclude it with one final remark about this problem. Because Book V plays a central role in the epic and is thoroughly

⁶⁵ See, for instance, the discussions of Alföldi, pp. 33 f., with the relevant bibliography.

⁶⁶ *Römische Geschichte*, I (2nd ed., Tübingen, 1867), p. 309.

⁶⁷ R. Enking, "P. Vergilius Maro Vates Etruscus," *M. D. A. I. (R)*, LXVI (1959), p. 95.

⁶⁸ For a list of references, see G. Q. Giglioli, "Osservazioni e monumenti relativi alla leggenda delle origini di Roma," *B. M. I. R.*, XII in *B. C. A. R.*, LXIX (1941), pp. 3 ff., and K. Schauenburg, "Aeneas und Rom," *Gymnasium*, LXVII (1960), pp. 184 f., with notes 81 to 88.

integrated into it, and because it is as it were an *Aeneid in parvo*, the suggestion is attractive that it was composed concomitantly with the entire epic.⁶⁹ The description of the games is likely to belong to an early stage of composition when Vergil was still trying to establish his own poetic identity, using Homer as a model and also as a foil. Otis' analysis of the style of the games has shown how well Vergil succeeded in that respect; the games epitomize the difference between Vergilian "subjective" and Homeric "objective" narrative.⁷⁰ But, as we have seen, some scenes from Book XII must have been in Vergil's mind already when he composed the boxing match of Dares and Entellus, or perhaps the poet made the appropriate changes in Book V after writing Book XII. Book V in its entirety probably was finished late, near the end of the composition of the *Aeneid*, and this may explain some of the minor inconsistencies which scholars have so arduously been trying to find.

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⁶⁹ So Wimmel, p. 54. Cf. note 1, above, and the comments on Monaco's book by G. d'Anna, *Il problema della composizione dell'Eneide* (Rome, 1957), pp. 127-9.

⁷⁰ Otis, pp. 41 ff.

CITATIONS OF PORPHYRY'S *AGAINST ARISTIDES* PRESERVED IN OLYMPIODORUS.

It is clear that the polemic against Aristides, which is preserved in Olympiodorus' *Commentaria In Platonis Gorgiam* does not emanate from Olympiodorus himself.¹ For Olympiodorus or the student who preserved his lectures on Plato² in at least two cases represents a viewpoint in the polemic which differs markedly from that in the other parts of the commentary. So on p. 150, 18 (Norvin's edition), he espouses a threefold division of oratory, while elsewhere he uses only a twofold classification.³ Again on p. 195, 22, in keeping with tradition, he assigns Plato's mistreatment at the hands of the Spartan admiral Pollis to the time of Plato's first trip to Sicily, but in *Vita Platonis*, 5, to the time of the second trip.

That Porphyry was the source of the polemic is not absolutely provable, but highly probable. First he wrote "seven books against Aristides,"⁴ evidently as a Platonist in defense of Plato's *Gorgias* against the attacks of Aristides' three Platonic treatises. Such controversy had already begun in Aristides' own lifetime, for the *To Capito* was written by Aristides to answer his detractors shortly after the publication of the first treatise *To Plato: In Defense of Oratory*. Furthermore in Porphyry's time and for a century thereafter it was fashionable even for orators to compose against Aristides. Thus we have Libanius

¹ *Contra* F. W. Lenz, *A. J. P.*, LXVII (1946), p. 108. O. Immisch, *Philologus*, LXV (1906), pp. 8-11, accepts Porphyry as the source with little reservation.

² Cf. R. Beutler, *R.-E.*, s. v. Olympiodorus (13), col. 207, a "Kolleg-nachschrift."

³ Cf. Beutler, *op. cit.*, col. 210. For the identification of the source of the passage in question, see part I of this article.

⁴ *Suda*, s. v. Porphyrios; for the number seven, see the Conclusion of this article. The ascription in Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte d. griech. Literatur*, VII, 2, 2, p. 545, n. 7, of the citation of Porphyry in Proclus, *In Timaeum*, 37 A to this treatise is unlikely. Doubtless it came from *Concerning the Springs of the Nile according to Pindar*. The other attributions in Schmid-Stählin, *loc. cit.*, Schol. Aristid., p. 437, 13; p. 746, 2; and p. 751, 29 D are too general to be provable and refer only to the philosophic opposition which Aristides' work aroused.

To *Aristides: In Defense of the Dancers* (64 Foerster), and references to other such works.⁶ However, the most important evidence which favors the supposition of Porphyry as the source of the polemic is the total absence of his name in Olympiodorus' work. This omission is extraordinary when it is considered that Porphyry was one of the founders and leading exponents of the theory of the unification of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, to which Ammonius and his pupil Olympiodorus closely adhered,⁶ and that Olympiodorus does cite Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus. In two passages which contain identifiable parts of the polemic α τῶν ἐξηγητῶν (p. 149, 27) and α τῆς φιλόσοφος (p. 198, 5) are referred to. The single authorship of these passages, as well as of others naming Aristides and even of those omitting his name will be demonstrated by numerous stylistic parallels. Olympiodorus is not generally so secretive. It would seem that this vagueness is to be connected either to Justinian's renewed suppression of Porphyry's *Against the Christians* in 528 A.D.,⁷ or to the Christian student who wrote up the notes and harbored a deep resentment against Porphyry. Elsewhere and at other times, Olympiodorus freely admitted the presence of Porphyry's name.⁸

Olympiodorus had first hand knowledge neither of Aristides' relevant works⁹ nor of Porphyry's polemic. There is no way to explain a gross error of attribution such as occurs on p. 179, 9 ff. other than that Olympiodorus misunderstood what he had heard of Porphyry's criticism and mixed together Porphyry's commentary and the citation of Aristides' text.¹⁰ The inaccurate and occasionally misleading paraphrases of all the other passages

⁶ Palladius in Libanius, *Epist.*, 631 F; Sergius in *Suda*, s.v. For this phenomenon, cf. also Behr, *Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales*, Appendix C.

⁶ E.g., cf. Immisch, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.

⁷ Justinian, *Codex*, I, I, 3, reviving a law of Theodosius and Valentinian (448 A.D.), which ordered the burning of all copies of Porphyry's treatise.

⁸ Porphyry is cited in Olympiodorus' commentaries on Plato's *Alcibiades I*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, and the *Prolegomena* and *Commentaria* on Aristotle's *Categories* and *Meteora*.

⁹ *Contra* Lenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 110; but cf. Lenz on p. 121, where the argument is inconsistent with this view.

¹⁰ The passage is discussed in part III.

of Aristides may support this conclusion. Although most of the paraphrases are to be attributed to Porphyry, Olympiodorus makes no effort to correct them. Further on p. 171, 15, as a preamble to a citation of the relatively obscure *To Capito*, Olympiodorus curiously troubles to identify Aristides as the author of the very popular *Panathenaic Oration*. This may also mark a lack of familiarity with Aristides' works.¹¹ Finally it appears from p. 150, 1, when this passage is emended and correctly interpreted, that Olympiodorus' knowledge of Porphyry's polemic came only from his own notes of the lectures of Ammonius.¹² Thus in citations of passages of Aristides there was a triple opportunity for error, misunderstanding by Ammonius of what Porphyry wrote, or by Olympiodorus of what Ammonius said, and finally by the student who took down the lectures.

I. Olympiodorus, pp. 149, 20-151, 11; and pp. 12, 14-14, 18.

Text: The passage is corrupt in several places. On p. 149, 28 καλῶς εἶπεν περὶ αὐτῶν should be read (as earlier noted by P. Maas, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXXVII [1937], p. 182) for κακῶς κτλ. which is both ungrammatical with περὶ and without sense.¹³ Porphyry's comment was bitingly sardonic: "Through verbosity Aristides has made Plato's praise ambiguous." On p. 150, 1 ff. should be read: φησιν δὲ <ὡς εἶπεν> ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἀμμώνιος· ὅτι λαβὼν ἀφορμὰς ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου <εἰδους> τῶν πολιτειῶν κτλ. Clearly the citation of Porphyry is being continued from p. 149, 27. For Ammonius' lectures as a medium of the transmission of Porphyry, cf. p. 203, 3, although this reference is far less explicit. The second supplement is certain. Maas, *loc. cit.*, referred the following simile of the three kinds of doctors to Plato, *Republic*, 426 A, but the comparison is most inapposite and the plural πολιτειῶν inexplicable. For the five forms of government, cf. p. 12, 14 ff., a passage which also derives from the same portion of Porphyry's work.

Parallel passages: The major parallel is pp. 12, 14-14, 18, clearly from the same part of the polemic, although here Aristi-

¹¹ Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 121, thought that Olympiodorus was using a different source from that in his earlier citations.

¹² See part I of this article.

¹³ But Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 120, interpreted it: Aristides "considered great length the best way of making Plato's attacks ineffective."

des' name is only mentioned toward the end on p. 13, 25. The following similarities are to be noted: The Four saved their city, but were not *πολιτικοί* (p. 149, 30 = p. 13, 22 ff.); the simile of medical practice (p. 150, 1 ff. = p. 13, 8 ff., p. 14, 5 ff.); the relation of the apothecary to the doctor (p. 150, 26 = p. 13, 28); democracy the fourth form of government (p. 150, 2 = p. 12, 14 ff.); the citation of Demosthenes, 3, 22 (p. 150, 22 = p. 13, 16); the middle form of oratory to which Demosthenes and the Four are to be assigned (p. 150, 21 = p. 13, 25); the preservation of the soul (p. 151, 4 = p. 14, 1); acquiescence in a democracy (p. 151, 10 = p. 13, 23). From this passage of Porphyry apparently derive two citations of Aristides much used by Olympiodorus: the Four were good generals (p. 149, 30 = p. 13, 22 ff. = p. 198, 24 = p. 202, 19); and Plato never really accused the Four of being parasites (p. 13, 25 = p. 157, 12 ff. = p. 201, 15 = p. 215, 4).

Parallel phrases in passages attacking Aristides, which point to identity of authorship, but not necessarily to an origin in the same portion of the polemic: *φληναφοί* used of Aristides (p. 149, 25 = p. 179, 9 = p. 197, 26); triadic divisions of medicine (p. 150, 3 ff.), of oratory (p. 150, 17 ff.), of the soul, body, and external properties (p. 171, 31 ff.), of wealth, body, and soul (p. 179, 16 ff.); being and well being (p. 150, 25 = p. 180, 1 = p. 199, 26); the admitted need for safety (p. 151, 4 = p. 179, 11 ff.); acquiescence in a democracy (p. 151, 10 = p. 13, 23 = p. 185, 14).

Content: While the Four preserved their city, they were not *πολιτικοί*. Still they were not parasites. There exists a third class between the false oratory whose aim is parasitism and true oratory, helpmate of *πολιτική*. This class will not urge what is bad. It will, indeed, suggest what is good, but not insist upon it in the face of the disfavor of the masses. So the Four did not destroy the masses by catering to their whims, yet they did not give them more than preservation. They were like menials in that they knew how to provide safety, but not morality.

Sources: The major theme of the passage is the three classes of oratory which correspond to the three (or five if subdivided) forms of government. As noted, Olympiodorus himself, e.g. p. 12, 11 ff., p. 198, 25 ff., follows a twofold division. So does Aristides, e.g. 45, pp. 76 ff., 150 ff. D; 46, pp. 357-9 D, pp.

388 ff. D. It is this all or nothing concept which Porphyry attacks. However, interestingly enough Aristides himself noted that a threefold classification would be necessary to satisfy Plato's arguments, 46, pp. 351-5 D. Clearly Porphyry appropriated the suggestion, perhaps without acknowledgement.

Another argument in this context, which Porphyry seems to have taken over for his own ends, is Aristides' distinction between *ἐπιτάττειν* and *διακονεῖν*, which Aristides uses to prove that orators belong to the former category, 45, p. 40 D. On p. 13, 28 Olympiodorus reapplies the same words to the disparate functions of the ruling *πολιτικός* and his servant the orator.

The statement that the Four were good generals and saved their city is the major theme of oration 46 D and is found throughout the work, e. g. 46, pp. 363 ff. D; so too Aristides most frequently implies that Plato did call the Four parasites (e. g. 45, p. 106 D; 46, p. 161 D).

II. Olympiodorus, pp. 171, 14-172, 20.

Text: p. 172, 9 read *ἀγαθός* for *ἀγαθόν*, a misprint.

Parallels: *παρελογίσαστο* (p. 171, 6, cf. *παραλογισμοί* p. 171, 27, p. 172, 18 = p. 179, 9); triad of soul, body, and external properties (p. 171, 31 ff., cf. p. 150, 3 ff., p. 150, 17 ff., p. 179, 16 ff.).

Content: Aristides has wrongly interpreted Plato, *Laws*, 829 A, for acts of justice or injustice must be understood in a double sense as to whether they affect the soul, or the body and its external properties.

Sources: p. 171, 16 "*the letter to Capito*": While Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 122, rightly notes that there is no authority for this expression, still the work was a letter written shortly after and in defense of 45 D, and the title should be regarded as correct and learned, even if it is absent from our tradition.

P. 171, 16 ff. is a very loose paraphrase of 47, p. 419 D; p. 171, 19 ff. summarizes the argument of 47, pp. 422 ff. D.

Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 123, has found much of this passage of Olympiodorus reproduced with some slight changes in the scholium of a 15th century manuscript of Aristides (Laurentianus 60, 9) on this text of Aristides. Obviously it was copied from Olympiodorus and does not allow the assumption that Porphyry's criticism was independently used by the scholiast. For the interpretation of Olympiodorus' mention of Aristides'

authorship of the *Panathenaic Oration*, see page 188. It is clear why Porphyry chose to cite Aristides' arguments from 47 D, although they also occur in 45, pp. 98 ff. D. The brevity of 47 D lent much more emphasis to the discussion and made it more memorable.

III. Olympiodorus, pp. 179, 9-180, 24.

Text: Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 112, places a lacuna after *φησιν ὅτι*, p. 179, 11, on the grounds that there is no adequate parallel in Aristides' works to the citation here attributed to him and that *οὐκοῦν* κτλ., p. 179, 11, introduces an *aporia* which contains a paraphrase of the alleged lost citation (46, p. 229, 9 ff. D according to Lenz). But a lacuna need not be assumed. First of all, the *aporia* is raised in Aristides' name as the marginal comment to the text indicates (cf. p. 192, 3 ff.) and part of the same *aporia* again with the attribution to Aristides (*ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶπεν*) is answered below, p. 179, 29 ff. Secondly, as will be seen in the discussion of the sources, Lenz's own reference to Aristides is inappropriate. It is best to respect the text and regard the partially false attribution as either a misunderstanding on Olympiodorus' part or less likely malicious exaggeration of Porphyry.

Parallels: *ἀντιλογικός* (p. 179, 9, cf. commentary on *Alcibiades* I, p. 135 Creuzer and Dindorf, vol. III, pp. 435, 4; 437, 26; 756, 28; Lenz, *Mnemosyne*, Supplementum, V, pp. 7-10: Theon, the writer on rules of oratory, characterized 46 D as an *ἀντίρρησις*; then Dindorf, vol. III, p. 437, 13, does not refer to Porphyry, cf. note 4); *φλέγματος* (p. 179, 9 = p. 149, 25 = p. 197, 26); *παραλογίζεσθαι* (p. 179, 10 = p. 171, 6 and 27, p. 172, 18); triad of wealth, body, and soul (p. 179, 16 ff. = p. 150, 3 ff., p. 150, 17 ff., p. 171, 31 ff.); being and well being (p. 180, 1 ff. = p. 150, 25 = p. 199, 26); the unjust preserve justice in respect to one another (p. 180, 20 ff. = p. 185, 17, a passage not on any other grounds attributable to Porphyry and probably only Olympiodorus' reminiscence of this place, just as p. 185, 14 ff., acquiescence in a democracy, = p. 13, 23, p. 151, 10).

Content: Aristides argues that if survival is meaningless, then money and health which preserve us from death are evil, and we should be ungrateful to the gods for bestowing existence upon us and preserving us. In rebuttal it is noted that there is

good in all these properties but in different measure, the good of the soul taking precedence over that of the body and possessions. Furthermore ingratitude should not be shown to God, for together with mere existence he has given us the means of living a good life and to that end souls capable of reason. Oratory is to be blamed because while employing reason it endeavors to save men unjustly. The Four saved the body, but disregarded justice and the soul.

Sources: As it is stated in Olympiodorus, the full text of the *aporia* attributed to Aristides on p. 179, 11 ff. has no parallel in Aristides. Norvin solved the problem by inventing a reference "Aristid. orat. II 7," carelessly one hopes. Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 111, offered 46, p. 229, 9 ff. D. But this passage pleads for the very opposite of what we have here, and bears no similarity verbal or otherwise. It is clear that Olympiodorus has erred, either on his own or misled by Porphyry. The *aporia* in fact falls into two parts and is so treated in the *lysis* (p. 179, 15 ff. and p. 179, 29 ff.). The first is a distillation of the argument of Callicles in *Gorgias*, 511 D ff. Only the second, the ingratitude to the gods, which is consequent upon such indifference to self-preservation, comes from Aristides. The passage referred to is surely 46, pp. 263-4 D.

It is just possible that the unconnected diatribe on fate and free-will on p. 182, 8 ff., which is introduced without Aristides' name but raises points similar to those in the above cited passage of Aristides, also comes from Porphyry, who devoted a treatise, now mostly lost, to this question, *Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*.¹⁴

The final argument, which invokes the basically unjust motive in Pericles' restraint of Athenian ambitions for Sicily, is in answer to an oft stated point of Aristides, who, after Thucydides, II, 65, 11, praises Pericles' just decision and adds that it was Socrates' pupil, Alcibiades, who encouraged the people to this end, e. g. 46, p. 168 D.

¹⁴ For its argument, see Stobaeus, II, 8, 39-42; R. Beutler, *R.-E.*, s. v. Porphyrios (21), cols. 290-1. Cf. particularly Olympiodorus, p. 182, 13 ff. with Stobaeus, pp. 169, 21-172, 8 (Wachsmuth's edition) where Porphyry harmonizes traditional astrological necessity (e. g. Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*, 8, 6) with the conception of free-will by showing that the horoscope only confirms the soul's selection and does not cause it.

IV. Olympiodorus, pp. 192, 3-197, 19.

Text: Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 106, has correctly noted that on p. 192, 10 *oi* before *περί* is to be deleted.

Parallels: *ἀποροῦσι* (p. 192, 6, p. 192, 13 = p. 179, 10 mg.); the Four's weak opposition to democracy (p. 192, 22, cf. p. 150, 15 ff.); Plato's trip to Sicily (p. 194, 24 = *Vita*, 5).

Content: An answer to the charges which Aristides raised against Socrates and Plato to show that they suffered much the same as the Four: Socrates' failures with Alcibiades and Critias, and Socrates' execution; Plato's failure with the elder and younger Dionysius and the defection of Aristotle.

Sources: On p. 192, 11 ff., 46, p. 325 D is loosely paraphrased. The rest of the argument is a neatly ordered compilation of charges scattered throughout Aristides.

Alcibiades, 45, p. 111 D; 46, pp. 167, 199, 250, 264, 322-4, 359 D; Critias, 45, p. 111 D; 46, pp. 322-4, 328-9 D. The exculpation of the teacher for the student's faults, p. 192, 19, is an argument which Porphyry also seems to have borrowed from Aristides, cf. e.g. 46, pp. 197, 297 D. On p. 193, 6 ff. Critias is confused with Theramenes.¹⁵ It seems improbable that Porphyry could have made this mistake, and unlikely that he would employ so blatant a falsification. The same is true on p. 194, 16, an alleged first trip to Sicily, which is confused with Plato's study in Italy. Both are no doubt signs of Olympiodorus' meddling.

Socrates' death, 46, p. 326 D.

On p. 193, 25 ff., the remark about the insufficiency of merely being honest is in answer to statements such as 46, pp. 160, 197 D about Pericles.

Plato's failure with the Sicilian tyrants: 46, pp. 302-10, 312, 316, 324 D. A relic of Porphyry's polemic and distortion is found in *Vita*, 4 (curiously omitted here), where it is stated on the basis of 46, pp. 301-2 D, that according to Aristides, Plato's sole reason for travelling to Sicily was gluttony. The version given here of Plato's trip to Sicily answers Aristides' by changing biographical details. While Aristides followed the tradition (cf. Diogenes Laertius, III, 19 ff.; Lucian, *Demosthenis Encomium*, 23; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, II, 27), Porphyry broke

¹⁵ Cf. Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 105, n. 7.

with it, especially in his account of the misfortunes of the first trip (pp. 195, 22-196, 6). In Olympiodorus, there is no mention of Archytas who gained Plato's release from prison (46, pp. 304-5 D); Plato is not handed over to Pollis to be sold (46, p. 305 D) but only to be conveyed out of the country; Pollis' reason for bringing Plato to Aegina because of Aeginetan hostility to the Athenians (46, pp. 306-7 D) is ignored and palliated with a fictitious story of a projected trade for Spartan prisoners at Athens. In *Vita*, 5, Olympiodorus on his own attributes these events to the second trip and Dionysius the Younger.

Olympiodorus' rebuttal of Aristotle's alleged defection (p. 192, 10 ff. and p. 196, 30 ff.) refutes a charge which goes back to a misrepresentation of Aristoxenus' *Life of Plato*, as was shown by Aristocles (cited in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, XV, 2). In this regard, Aristides has also been misrepresented, for he too did not blame Aristotle for the defection. The distorted argument is repeated in three similar versions of a *Vita* of Aristotle (V. Rose, *Fragmenta*, 3rd ed. pp. 426-50). The so-called accusation of Aristoxenus and Aristides is cited twice in each version, and refuted first on chronological and then literary grounds: I, pp. 428, 8 ff., pp. 431, 20 ff.; II (which is very abridged), p. 438, 15 f., p. 439, 5 f.; III, pp. 443, 21 ff., pp. 447, 6 ff. The second argument of the *Vita* is so close to Olympiodorus—both cite *Phaedo*, 91 C, *Alcibiades*, 114 E, and Aristotle's epigram (frg. 673)—that they clearly derive from the same source. Immisch, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-11, postulated Aristocles as that source, but this need not be so, especially since Immisch failed to note that Aristides also rejected the story. Indeed, Immisch's generally accepted assumption that Aristocles discovered and preserved Aristotle's poem¹⁶ about Plato is highly questionable. It is true that Eusebius has omitted the portion of Aristocles' work which would have contained this material. But in the preserved portion (XV, 2, 12-14), where Aristocles refutes those who impugned Aristotle's motives in marrying Pythias, he does not quote any material in Aris-

¹⁶ For a revised opinion of the poem and its purpose, see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 105-10. But Jaeger too accepts Immisch's theory of transmission.

totle's defense, but only states the true cause and cites the references which may be consulted to support his statements. The identical use of ἀντικοδομεῖν in Aristocles and the *Vita* is an inadequate proof of their relationship because this was the verb used by Aristoxenus and was transmitted through Porphyry. However, the fact that Porphyry did not accept Aristocles' exoneration of Aristoxenus, cannot be used as certain evidence against Immisch's theory since Porphyry has also misrepresented Aristides.

Another source may be considered. On 46, p. 324 D, Aristides notes that his story of the abortive revolt is at second hand. Therefore he did not derive it from Aristoxenus. There is much likelihood that he got his account from the *Varia Historia* of his contemporary Favorinus, where he no doubt also found his version of Plato's discomfiture at Syracuse (cf. Diogenes Laertius, III, 19). He also appears to have taken the chronological arguments of 46, pp. 370-2 D and 47, pp. 435-6 D from Favorinus, for it seems probable from Diogenes Laertius, V, 5, 6 and 9-10, that Favorinus incorporated into his work extracts from Apollodorus' *Chronica*. Interestingly, Porphyry also seems to have turned to Favorinus for his material, for the quotation of *Odyssey*, VII, 120 f., attributed to Aristotle by the *Vita* (pp. 435, 14; 440, 17; 449, 20) is known to have been included in Favorinus' work (cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 9). Aristides would appear to reflect Favorinus' treatment of this controversy: that members of Plato's school attempted the defection during Plato's third trip to Sicily in 360 A. D., but that their efforts to found a new school were blocked by Chabrias and Iphicrates; and that Aristotle, who was at that time only twenty-four, was not involved. In the course of this version, Favorinus must have cited Aristoxenus, and perhaps criticized those who misunderstood his account, such as Eumelus (cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 6). Porphyry drew on this argument, and intentionally misinterpreting Aristoxenus and Aristides, connected their story with what had become an accepted canard against Aristotle (cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 2). A trace of Favorinus' argument may be found in the *Vita's* rebuke (p. 428, 17 ff.; p. 446, 6 ff.) of both Aristoxenus and Aristides for saying that Aristotle first joined Plato at the age of forty (cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 6, where Eumelus, who claimed that

Aristotle aged thirty first met Plato, is corrected), and the misapplication of the names may be traced to Porphyry. The errors in the *Vita's* chronology, particularly that Aristotle studied with Socrates and that as a result he survived Plato by twenty-three instead of twenty-six years, and the confusion of Eudoxus the mathematician with an alleged archon,¹⁷ are consistent with other similar blunders of Ammonius' school and need not be foisted on Porphyry.

V. Olympiodorus, pp. 197, 19-200, 13.

Parallels: *φλέγοντες* (p. 197, 26 = p. 149, 25 = p. 179, 9); the learned citation of Philiscus and of Aristophanes (p. 198, 2, p. 200, 10, cf. p. 244, 20); being and well being (p. 199, 26 = p. 150, 25 = p. 180, 1).

Content: Demosthenes himself, Aristides' idol, praised Plato. The Four were not *πολιτικοί* since they inflamed the people and suffered at their hands. So although they were good generals, as Aristides claimed, they employed popular oratory and not the true oratory. Of the latter Aristides had not the faintest conception. They were idle because they preferred sea-battles to land warfare, and sea-battles should be avoided at all costs. Apollo's famous oracle on Salamis answered only how physical safety was to be procured, not well being. Then the other opprobrious epithets which Plato assigned to the Four, "cowardly," "garrulous," and "greedy" are justified.

Sources: Aristides' description of Demosthenes as a form of Hermes, p. 198, 7, comes from 46, p. 398 D. Olympiodorus also used it in his commentary on *Alcibiades* I, p. 190 Creuzer (cf. also, *op. cit.*, p. 135, where he alludes generally to 46 D). As a phrase it has passed into literature, and so is found in Julian, VII, 237 C; Eunapius, Loeb, p. 496.

The learned citations of Philiscus, p. 198, 2 and of Aristophanes, *Aves*, 39-40, p. 200, 10, doubtless reveal signs of Porphyry's scholarship.¹⁸ However, the simple distinction of two oratories, the true and the popular, p. 198, 25 ff., is a mark of Olympiodorus' reworking of the material, since Porphyry had argued for a threefold division of oratory, p. 150, 18 ff.

¹⁷ On the correct interpretation of *ἐπὶ Ἐυδόξου* in *Vita*, p. 429, 1, a very subtle allusion, cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 16, n. 1.

¹⁸ On the citation of Philiscus, cf. Immisch, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

The long attack on naval warfare, pp. 198, 31-200, 7, answers Aristides' rejection of Plato's various censures of this mode of fighting (46, pp. 270-85, 290 D). Aristides also argued at length against Plato's other two epithets, specifically in his biography of Pericles. The brief rebuttal in Olympiodorus is probably due to his abridgement.

VI. Olympiodorus, p. 203, 9-22.

Text: p. 203, 14: τὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν <ἄριστον>. The supplement was made by Lenz, *op. cit.*, p. 115, after *Odyssey*, XI, 469-70. Lenz also wished to read ὡς εἶπε (sc. Homer), which is unnecessary. P. 203, 20 is sound; see below on Sources.

Parallels: citation of Ammonius (p. 203, 3 f. = p. 150, 1 f.).

Content: Aristides should not be offended by Plato's comparison of the Four with Thearion, etc., for Homer compares Ajax to a stubborn ass.

Sources: Aristides' objections to the comparison run through his treatises, 45, pp. 114, 145 D; 46, pp. 164, 200, 202, 257, 261, 265, 283, 301, 386 D. Here again Olympiodorus on p. 202, 15-18 has added to Porphyry's argument with the introduction of the two appropriate Homeric verses, *Iliad*, XI, 558-9, ignorantly separated as if they were unrelated. Lenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-18, has shown that these verses were drawn from two separate scholia to Aristides (Dindorf, vol. III, p. 557, 7 and an unpublished scholium on 46, p. 185, 15 f. D in Marcianus Graecus 423). But Lenz's emendation of Olympiodorus, p. 203, 20, παρασκευάζοντες to παρασκευάζων, referring to Homer is wrong, for it is both linguistically awkward and ἐκείνοι does not mean Achilles and Ajax, as Lenz thought, but Thearion and his fellows. That confusion, as well as the anomaly of the aorist tense of εἰσαγαγόντι, and the clumsy repetition of καὶ ἀργῶ ὄνῳ all bear witness to the intrusion of Olympiodorus. The verbal similarity of παρασκευάζοντες τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, "providing useful services" and scholium p. 557, 10 D πρὸς χρείαν, which impressed Lenz, reflects no more than an obvious choice of words necessitated by the idiom of the language. Since Olympiodorus himself shows no demonstrable familiarity with Aristides' text, the borrowings from the scholia are also at second hand.

Although they lack Aristides' name, two citations perhaps from Porphyry may also be considered.

VII. Olympiodorus, p. 157, 12-31.

Parallels: Plato did not call the Four parasites (p. 157, 12 ff. = p. 13, 25 = p. 201, 15 = p. 215, 4).

Content: The Four were not called parasites. Then follows a justification of Plato's banishment of comedy and tragedy from his Republic.

Sources: The question of the parasites has been discussed in part I. Aristides, 46, p. 381 D, attacked Plato's treatment of the arts. The propinquity of these two rebuttals, one of which is known to come from Porphyry, and the fact that Aristides treated both themes, as well as the irrelevance of Olympiodorus' discussion, may point to a common origin in Porphyry.

VIII. Olympiodorus, p. 244, 15-21.

Parallels: The quote from the unknown comedy¹⁹ (p. 244, 19, cf. p. 198, 2, p. 200, 10).

Content: Plato did praise Aristides the Just, but not as a *πολιτικός*, for he too suffered at the hands of the people and left no disciples.

Sources: Since Plato singled out Aristides the Just by name as an example of the good orator, Aristides is everywhere at pains to prove that he was in no better condition than the Four, 45, pp. 115-20 D; 46, pp. 192, 200, 232, 258-9, 353, 359, 362-3, 367, 388-90 D. This fact and the evident scholarship in introducing a hitherto unknown fragment from Old Comedy point to Porphyry.

Conclusion: The *Suda* ascribes seven books to Porphyry's work. If this number is correct, clearly a study of such length went far beyond simple refutations of Aristides' arguments. It must have imported a mass of historical references and carried over into Porphyry's own philosophical speculations. We have seen many examples of both these tendencies. The number seven may have been chosen to match the then current division of Aristides' three treatises, for 45 D was as yet undivided

¹⁹ For the comic verse, not found in Kock or Edmonds, cf. Maas, *op. cit.*, p. 182. It could well be from Eupolis' *Δῆμοι*, much used by Aristides in 46 D.

46 D was in five parts, and so with 47 D formed seven books. Indeed, Porphyry shows familiarity, as one would expect, with all three works, although his use of 45 D is less evident in the portions preserved by Olympiodorus. The argument here would be more technical, and hence less attractive to an excerptor. However, it should not be thought that Porphyry's seven books in any way approximated the contents of Aristides'. There is no evidence for this, and the predominantly biographical nature of the first four parts of 46 D, as well as repetitions in all three works, would make such an approach most awkward if not impossible. The intrusions, abridgements, and misunderstandings of Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and the student, if there was one, who wrote up Olympiodorus' lectures, make it difficult to determine the specific content of Porphyry's criticism in any given place. Still it is clear that Porphyry paraphrased, rearranged, and combined Aristides' scattered and reiterated arguments, the better to rebut them. It is also evident that in keeping with the style of the polemic, Porphyry was not chary in distorting Aristides' statements, and he has often implicitly or explicitly accused Aristides of errors and insults, of which Aristides was not guilty. Finally, Porphyry did not abstain from the employment of abusive language, a technique which was far less offensive to the ancients even in a scholarly discussion.

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THE SEXUAL AND FINANCIAL MEAN IN
HORACE'S *SERM.*, I, 2.

Sermones, I, 2 has never received the critical attention granted Horace's other Satires, partly because many critics are still offended by Horace's views on sex and partly because they find little unity in this poem.¹ These two problems, I believe, are closely related; since readers often misunderstand, or are unwilling to accept, the sexual liaison which Horace advocates, they overlook the structural coherence of the entire Satire and in particular the relevance of the first twenty-two lines to the rest of the poem. Before we discuss the problem of structural unity, therefore, we must examine Horace's remarks on sex more closely.

It is generally believed that Horace in this Satire favors a sexual relationship with a freedwoman (47-8) as a mean between adultery with a *matrona* and commerce with brothel prostitutes (30).² Although this is partly true, it is not Horace's main point. He is primarily interested not in the kind of *woman* to satisfy sexual needs, but rather in the kind of *relationship* existing between sexual partners. Nowhere in the Satire does he condemn adultery as immoral *per se*, which he might be expected to do if he were defining the class of women suitable for an

¹ Current critical opinion on this Satire is well represented by E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 76-86; D. Armstrong, "Horace, *Satires* I, 1-3: A Structural Study," *Arion*, III (1964), pp. 86-96, especially pp. 88-93; and N. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 9-12. In my view, Lejay in his commentary (Paris, 1911) offers a more perceptive analysis of this poem when he points out that "Les vers 28-30 semblent annoncer une opposition analogue aux précédentes: l'adultère bourgeois mis en regard de la débauche ignoble. Ce n'est qu'une apparence. . . . L'excès ne consiste pas à satisfaire la nature, mais à joindre au plaisir des raffinements étrangers; à le compliquer des recherches de la vanité, ou à se laisser entraîner par la passion aux prodigalités folles, et à s'enchaîner dans l'opprobre des liaisons" (p. 29).

² Fraenkel argues that Horace's main theme is the dangers of adultery rather than the benefits of pursuing the mean, but he does identify this mean as "a love-affair with a libertina" (p. 78). Cf. Armstrong, p. 91; Rudd, p. 11.

affair.³ Instead he emphasizes the practical dangers of sexual promiscuity, adulterous or otherwise, particularly the subsequent loss of *fama* and *res* (59, 61-2, 133; cf. *pericla*, 40-6, 65-6, 127-34). As I hope to make clear, it would be more accurate to consider the mean in sexual affairs as a casual relationship which satisfies natural desires without diminishing one's capital or reputation.

This revised definition of the mean clarifies certain passages in the poem. In lines 28-35, for example, after stating his theme, Horace recalls an anecdote about the elder Cato:

nil medium est. sunt qui nolint tetigisse nisi illas
 quarum subsuta talos tegat instita veste;
 contra alius nullam nisi olenti in fornice stantem.
 quidam notus homo cum exiret fornice, 'macte
 virtute esto' inquit sententia dia Catonis,
 'nam simul ac venas inflavit taetra libido,
 huc iuvenes aequum est descendere, non alienas
 permolere uxores.'

Rudd reads into these lines Horace's disapproval of brothels and his disagreement with Cato (Rudd, *op. cit.*, p. 11). This reading rests on the assumption that Horace is mainly interested in the social status of the woman in an affair, for which reason he rejects both the freeborn married woman and the brothel prostitute who was usually a slave of the owner. Yet Horace does not mention social class in these lines and, as Rudd himself notes (*ibid.*), he seems to approve of an occasional visit to a prostitute. Horace's real reason for citing this anecdote is hinted at in the adjective *nullam* (30), and confirmed by the conclusion of the story which his readers would remember:

Postea cum frequentius eum exeuntem de eodem
 lupanari vidisset, [Cato] dixisse fertur:
 'adulescens, ego te laudavi, tamquam huc
 intervenires, non tamquam hic habitares.'⁴

Horace thus uses this anecdote to illustrate a sexual extreme and, by contrast, the proper mean: the brothel serves a useful

³ For this same reason Horace never specifies the social status of his ideal woman (119 ff.), and his terminology for prostitutes is deliberately vague. Cf. note 6.

⁴ O. Keller, ed., *Pseudoacronis Scholia in Horatium Vetustiora* (Leipzig, 1904), II, p. 23.

purpose but the man who frequents these houses alone an excessive number of times will undoubtedly damage his good name and consume his financial resources.

Again lines 47-9 are often cited as proof that the mean in sexual affairs is a liaison with a freedwoman:

tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda,
libertinarum dico, Sallustius in quas
non minus insanit quam qui moechatur.⁵

If this interpretation were correct, we would expect Horace to define what he means by *tutior*, but instead he immediately contradicts himself in the reference to Sallust and then outlines the dangers in affairs with freedwomen (53-63). If, on the other hand, lines 47-9 are a question expecting a negative answer, the behavior of Sallust and, later, Marsaeus (55) further illustrates Horace's main theme. Sexual affairs, even with freedwomen, are dangerous when carried to extremes (*insanit*, 49, *matronam nullam*, 54, cf. 30), which compromise one's property or reputation (56, 59, 61-2). Horace here implicitly condemns the complicated and protracted affairs praised by the elegiac poets.

What kind of sexual liaison, then, does Horace advocate? In the final lines of the poem he describes the woman he admires, and while he does not specify her social class, from his choice of detail it is obvious that she represents the ideal sexual relationship, the mean between extremes. This relationship is casual and readily available without requiring pursuit on the part of the man (*parabilem facilemque*, 119, cf. 122). It is prompted by natural desire (*natura*, 124), and involves a modest financial transaction (*neque magno stet pretio*, 121-2). The participants remain anonymous (126), and, most important, the man suffers no physical dangers and does not forfeit his *fama* or *res* (133). These details suggest a liaison with the kind of independent prostitute, often a freedwoman, who solicited on the street and rented a room in a brothel for her business; this woman would provide the anonymous, financial, and yet satisfying relationship which Horace describes.⁶

⁵ Fraenkel, p. 77; Armstrong, p. 89.

⁶ For a full discussion of prostitution in Rome, see K. Schneider, "Meretrix," *R.-E.*, XV, cols. 1018-27, and J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Roman Women* (New York, 1963), pp. 224-34. Neither of these sources identi-

What connection exists, then, between the opening lines of the poem concerning finance and Horace's view of a suitable sexual relationship? The answer, I think, lies in his remarks on Sallust who was enslaved to his passions:

at hic si
qua res, qua ratio suaderet, quaque modeste
munifico esse licet, vellet bonus atque benignus
esse, daret quantum satis esset nec sibi damno
dedecorique foret (49-53).

Sallust would not have endangered his *res* and *fama*, here negatively alluded to in the phrase *damno dedecorique*, if he had paid a small sum to a prostitute for occasional pleasure instead of continually pursuing freedwomen. More important, by making a payment spontaneously to gratify a natural need, Sallust would earn the epithet *benignus*, or "generous." This epithet Horace also applies in the opening lines of the poem to Tigellius (4), whose generosity in money matters contrasts both with the inconsistency of the spender in lines 4-11 and with the avarice of the usurer Fufidius. This and several other verbal repetitions to be discussed shortly reveal important analogies between proper sexual and financial transactions: each answers a natural

fies the social class of the independent prostitute, but she seems to have occupied a position between the brothel prostitutes and the courtesans. The former were usually foreigners, slaves, or the daughters of free but impoverished fathers who sold them into slavery. Whatever their origin, these prostitutes were slaves of the brothel owner; they solicited outside the brothel to a low class of client and charged very little. The courtesan, on the other hand, was generally a freeborn Roman, or perhaps a freedwoman, and often well-educated; her lovers were more socially prominent and her affairs lasted longer. If her lover did not set her up in a household, she lived with female relatives or with a procuress. The women celebrated by the elegiac poets and described in the *Ars Amatoria* represent this class. Clearly Horace does not recommend an affair with this type of woman, even a freedwoman, because of the necessary expenses and, often, loss of reputation it involved. I myself believe that Horace does not exclude the brothel prostitute as a source of satisfaction, but if one prefers to read a note of distaste in line 30, then Horace seems to recommend the favors of the independent prostitute. As a sign of her profession she wore the toga (63, 82), and the commercial, public aspect of her solicitation is well described in lines 82-4.

need, involves a moderate expense, and does not entail the loss of *fama* or *res*.⁷

The first twenty-two lines of the Satire develop these comparisons in the sphere of finance. Tigellius' generosity represents the mean which is perverted in the attitudes of the anonymous protagonists (*hic*, 4, *hunc*, 7), and Fufidius.⁸ All three fear for their reputations (*metuens*, 5, *timet*, 12), the first two lest they be called prodigal or mean-spirited (*prodigus*, 4, *sordidus*, *animi parvi*, 10), and Fufidius lest he be known as a wastrel (*vappae famam ac nebulonis*, 12). All are obsessed with money; the first man is tight-fisted and the second man squanders all of his patrimony (*avi atque parentis / praeclaram rem*, 7-8), as well as money he has borrowed (*conductis nummis*, 9), while Fufidius works unscrupulously to enlarge his assets (*nummis*, 13).⁹ Most important, these men lack generosity. The first man ignores the needs of a friend (*inopi dare nolit amico*, 5), while

⁷ From his viewpoint as a pagan Horace emphasizes the analogies between sexual and financial transactions; later Christian writers, invoking a higher concept of human relationships, exploited the contrasts between monetary wealth and the spiritual wealth of true love. For an interesting discussion of this theme in Shakespeare's comedies, particularly *The Merchant of Venice*, see J. R. Brown, "Love's Wealth and the Judgment of *The Merchant of Venice*," *Shakespeare and His Comedies* (2nd ed., London, 1962), pp. 45-81.

⁸ I disagree here with both Armstrong (p. 88) and Rudd (p. 9), for whom Tigellius symbolizes extravagance. Admittedly Horace does not admire Tigellius' friends, but it would be unwise to allow the portrait of him in *Serm.*, I, 3, 1-19 to prejudice our reading of this Satire because the different themes in each poem require the emphasis of different character traits. The epithet *benignus* is not necessarily synonymous with *prodigus*; here, I believe, it connotes an admirable generosity. Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, II, cols. 1901-4, "*benignus*." The fact that Horace credits Tigellius with generosity, in spite of his general disapproval of his character, underlines the importance of this trait to the theme of the Satire.

⁹ Pace Fraenkel (p. 77, n. 2), I am not convinced by the arguments of G. Jachmann, "Verswiederholung in der augusteischen Dichtung," *Studi in onore di U. B. Paoli* (Florence, 1955), pp. 400-2, that line 13 is an interpolation from the *Ars Poetica*, 421. Jachmann does not consider the later significant repetitions of two words in this line, *dives* (74; cf. below), and *nummis* (43, 133; cf. below). Since verbal repetition obviously is an important part of Horace's poetic technique, it is entirely likely, in my opinion, that he repeated whole lines when it suited his purpose.

Fufidius is not generous to himself (*sibi non sit amicus*, 20), but, like the father in comedy, suffers for his actions (*miserum*, 21, *cruciaverit*, 22). There are further hints at the suffering which accompanies the improper handling of money in the words *frigus*, *duramque famem* (6), and *patribus duris* (17).¹⁰ These men's financial dealings are perverted because, ignoring their own natural needs and those of their friends, they have become involved in large expenditures which harm both their assets and their personal reputations.

After a brief transitional passage (23-7), Horace turns to sexual liaisons and completes the analogies between these and financial transactions in a series of verbal repetitions and related images. Adultery is frequently expensive (*dedit nummos*, 43), while sexual excesses with any woman usually lead to the loss of *fama* and *res* (*patrium fundumque laremque*, 56, *fama*, *res*, 59, *famam*, 61, *rem patris*, 62). The images describing adultery, *unde laboris* / *plus haurire mali est quam ex re decerpere fructus* (78-9), echo an earlier vivid image of the spendthrift (*malus*, 8) consuming his inheritance, like an animal stripping leaves from a tree (*stringat*, 8), with a voracious throat (*ingluvie*, 8).¹¹ The spendthrift is also pictured as a purchaser of trifles (*coemens obsonia*, 9), just as later the lover is compared to a buyer (83-92, *emptorem hiantem*, 88).

In addition, Horace draws several comparisons between Fufidius and the sexually promiscuous man. Fufidius hunts after the names, or accounts, of young men (*nomina sectatur*, 16), while the adulterer, despite Horace's warning, *desine matronas sectarier* (78), scorns the available woman and seeks the matron (*captat*, 108), comparing himself to the hunter pursuing a hare (*sectetur*, 106). A subtle repetition contrasts the awards; Villius, lusting after the matron Fausta, is *hoc miser uno / nomine deceptus* (64-5), whereas Horace, content with a prostitute, says *do nomen quodlibet illi* (126). The epithet *miser* was also applied earlier to Fufidius (21), and is later used of those caught in the act of adultery (130, 134). Similarly, the verb describing Fufidius' usurious practices (*execat*, 14), has an

¹⁰ Cf. the suffering connected with adultery, noted above.

¹¹ The verbs *stringat* and *decerpere* are also echoed later in *avellier* (104) and *abscindere* (113).

additional connotative meaning, "to castrate,"¹² which is later alluded to in the reference to the adulterer's punishment, *testis caudamque salacem / demeteret ferro* (45-6).

After developing these parallels between extreme forms of sexual and financial relationships,¹³ Horace uses further verbal repetitions to contrast these extremes with the mean. Unwise financial dealings produce poverty (*inopi*, 5) or ill-gotten wealth (*dives*, 13), whereas nature provides an abundance of beneficial sexual liaisons (*dives opis natura suae*, 74). Enjoying just such a liaison Horace does not share the fear of the unscrupulous financier or the adulterer (*metuens*, 5, *timet*, 12, *metuat*, 131, vs. *nec vereor*, 127). His woman compares favorably with the deceitful matron (*candida*, 123, vs. 94-5; *alba*, 124, vs. *albi*, 36), and she has a natural beauty (*natura*, 124). Horace also uses the adverb *recte*, once negatively in connection with adultery (*procedere recte / cui moechos non vultis*, 37-8), and twice positively (*tu si modo recte / dispensare velis*, 74-5, *illi recte*, 90), and then calls his ideal woman *recta* (123). Finally, he implies that his relationship with her does not injure his name or financial status (*nummi, fama*, 133).

It should be evident by now that although this Satire appears to lack unity, Horace has skillfully developed, through extensive verbal repetition, several parallels between the means and extremes of human sexual and financial activity. In conclusion I would like to point out how carefully he has chosen two similes to complement his theme. The first compares the prospective buyer of sexual satisfaction with the rich man purchasing a horse (86-92). The horse is particularly appropriate because this animal was commonly associated with sexual passion, as Horace himself attests in another Satire (*Serm.*, II, 7, 50).¹⁴

¹² Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, V, cols. 1833-4, "*emseco*."

¹³ The analogies between sex and finance are further reiterated through the repetition of *mercedes* (14), vs. *merx* (47, 83, 105), and *mercantur* (86), *inducit* (22), vs. *inducat* (88); *capiti* (14) vs. *caput* in the literal sense (83); *duramque famem* (6) and *patribus duris* (17), vs. *dura pericla* (40); *dare* (5), *daret* (52), vs. *dedit* (41, 43, 65), *donat* (56), and, in a positive context, *dat* (124), and *do* (126), Note also the contrast between Sallust who *daret quantum satis esset* (52), and Villius who *poenas dedit usque superque / quam satis est* (85-8).

¹⁴ This is pointed out by D. C. Allen (p. 107, n. 4), in a very interesting discussion of the classical sources of Shakespeare's imagery in

Furthermore several words in this simile, as I have already noted, appear elsewhere in the Satire in significant contexts (*mercantur, emptorem, inducat, caput, recte*).¹⁵ The second simile paraphrases an epigram of Callimachus comparing the lover to the hunter:

‘leporem venator ut alta
in nive sectetur, positum sic tangere nolit’
cantat, et apponit, ‘meus est amor huic similis; nam
transvolat in medio posita et fugientia captat’ (105-8).¹⁶

The aptness of this verse lies in the image it evokes of the soft hunt, the pursuit of gentle animals, associated with love. Although several classical authors exploit this idea, it does not become a critical concept until the late Middle Ages and Renaissance.¹⁷ Again, the rabbit is a conventional symbol of sexual lust,¹⁸ and Horace’s choice of language closely unites this image to the rest of the Satire. The traditional connection between hunting and venery echoes in the words *venator* and *venerem* (119), while the reference to snow (*nive*) recalls the matron’s snow-white pearls (*niveos lapillos*, 80). The phrase *in medio posita* and the word *fugientia* underscore the shallowness of the lover’s boast by reminding us of Horace’s judgment on sexual affairs, *nūl medium est* (28), and his warning to the adulterer not to confuse *fugienda petendis* (75). The hunter, moreover, will not touch ready game (*positum sic tangere nolit*), just as the adulter will not touch any but matrons (*sunt qui nolint tetigisse nisi illas*, 28).

Close study of Horace’s shorter poems has demonstrated his skill in using images, metaphors, and verbal repetition to unify

Venus and Adonis, “On *Venus and Adonis*,” *Elizabethan and Jacobean Studies* (Oxford, 1959), pp. 100-11.

¹⁵ Cf. above.

¹⁶ *Anth. Pal.*, XII, 102. Cf. Lejay, pp. 54-5 for additional echoes of this epigram in other Latin authors.

¹⁷ Allen, pp. 102-6 *passim*, analyzes this concept at length, citing several examples in classical authors, among them Plato, *Symposium*, 203 D; Tibullus, IV, 3; Propertius, II, 19, 17-24; and Ovid, *Met.*, I, 533-4. To these should be added the two hunts described in the *Aeneid*, IV, 151-9, in which Dido and Aeneas hunt goats and deer (*caprae, cervi*), while Ascanius pursues the hard hunt of the boar and lion (*aprum, leonem*).

¹⁸ Cf. Allen, pp. 109-10.

these works. It is extremely unlikely that he abandoned these techniques when he turned to the traditionally more informal genres of the Satires and Epistles. Therefore, when Horace protests that in the Satires he is not a poet, we ought to attribute these disclaimers to his satiric *persona* and no longer allow them to prejudice critical analysis of these poems.

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REVIEWS.

Ю. В. ОТПУШЧИКОВ. Из истории индоевропейского словообразования. Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1967. Pp. 324.

This book falls into three main divisions, of which all deal with word-formation, but the first treats it in connection with phonology, the second with morphology, and the third with lexicology, while the historical viewpoint is maintained in all three. In other respects the material is somewhat diverse in content. Two of the nine chapters are devoted to Slavic problems, and several deal with Indo-European comparisons, but a sufficiently large portion is concerned with Latin to make the book of considerable interest to classicists, the more so because one at least of the problems treated has been a particularly troublesome one and because the author has treated it with exceptional competence and success.

Carl Lachmann, *In T. Lucretii Cari De Rerum Natura Libros Commentarius* (Berlin, 1855), pp. 54-5, utilizing the testimony of Aulus Gellius, IX, 6; XII, 3; and Porphyrio *ad Hor.*, *Serm.*, I, 6, 122, with reference to a number of specific verbs, formulated a law that verbs whose roots ended in *b d g* lengthened the root vowel in the perfect passive participle: e.g., *ago* : *actus*, *lego* : *lectus*, etc., but gave no explanation. The difficulties connected with such a law can be easily imagined when one considers that, at least on first appearance, the assimilatory unvoicing of voiced stop before *t* must have occurred within the Indo-European period, so that there was no more reason for vowel-lengthening when the root ended in a voiced stop than in a voiceless stop; in other words Latin should be expected to show a simple and orderly development like that seen in Greek *ἄγω* : *ἐπακτός*, *λέγω* : *λεκτός*, *δείκνυμι* : *δεικτός*. Otkupščikov reviews and criticizes previous attempts to find a satisfactory formulation of the law and to explain it on phonetic grounds: the notion that when the root-final consonant became unvoiced the vibration of the vocal chords was transferred to the vowel, making it long (Juret, Grammont, Niedermann); analogy of long-vowel perfect and other forms with long vowel (Osthoff and others); notion that after the assimilation *-gt-* > *-kt-* the voiced stop was restored through analogy of present and other forms not subject to assimilation, after which the change **agtos* > *actus* took place (de Saussure, Sommer); admission of Lachmann's law for verbs with roots in *-g* but analogical explanation for those in *-d* (Meillet, Ernout, Maniet); notion that lengthening or non-lengthening was connected with the timbre of the vowel in question (Meillet, Niedermann, Maniet). Exceptional instances in which the expected lengthening does not occur were sometimes attributed to the stem-type found in the present tense; but in opposition to *findo* : *fissus*, *scindo* : *scissus*, *stringo* : *strictus*, which give support to such a theory, Otkupščikov cites *frango* : *fractus* and several other verbs which work against it. In seeking to explain exceptions (and exceptions to the exceptions)

analogy has been freely called in, but often in an *ad hoc* fashion and with a striking difference in its application by different scholars. Otkupščikov's own explanation begins at page 16. Earlier (page 10) he had criticized H. Pedersen's theory that participles like *fissus*, *scissus*, *sessus* had kept their originally short vowel because they represented replacement of earlier participles in *-no-* by the familiar type in *-to-* after Lachmann's law had ceased to be effective. He himself makes the earlier use of participles in *-no-* an essential feature of his explanation, though his line of argument is quite different from Pedersen's. It may be briefly summarized here: the Latin verbal system, in which the perfect passive participle is uniformly in *-to-* [or *-(s)so-*] was only gradually developed. Not only do Sanskrit and the Germanic and Slavic languages show an important rival type in *-no-*, but Latin itself beside verbs with lengthened vowel in the participle has many relics of *n*-formations: e. g. *lignum* < **leg-nom* '(that which is collected), wood,' *regnum* (itself with vowel-lengthening of uncertain explanation) beside *rego*, *rēctus*, *tignum* < **teg-nom* beside *tēgo*, *tēctus*, etc., and in some cases if a formation in *-no-* does not appear in Latin, it can be supplied from a cognate language or may be indirectly attested through the existence of a form with *-ro-*, the well-known alternant to *-no-*. At the same time those verbs which in apparent violation of Lachmann's law have a short vowel in the participle show no related forms with *-no*-suffixes in Latin and few in other languages. These latter therefore had ancient inherited participles with *-to-*, while the former had new formations in *-to-* replacing older ones in *-no-*. In a few cases also participles with long root vowel, such as *flūctus*, *visus*, had, through syncope, replaced trisyllabic forms of the type of **fluitus* (indirectly attested by the frequentative *fluitare*), Umb. *uirseto*, etc., and in a few verbs either of the two processes could have led ultimately to the same lengthening. The application of experimental phonetics to certain languages, including English, has shown that a vowel before a voiced stop in a closed syllable tends to be longer than a vowel before a voiceless stop in a closed syllable, and the vowels in *actus*, etc., having gained their length in forms where the *g* was still voiced, kept it in the new forms *āctus*, etc. Latin initial intensity and the possible development of rising-falling intonation are also taken into account. Otkupščikov's treatment of his material is open to a few minor criticisms. The argument regarding the trisyllabic participles, though not implausible in principle, is slightly less convincing than the foregoing portion because of the paucity of available material. Moreover the phonetic changes which occurred, partly before the breakup of the Indo-European speech-community, when a dental suffix was added to a root ending in a dental present a special problem which deserves somewhat more attention than it has received here. Yet in general the treatment is comprehensive, careful, and easy to follow, the more so because summaries of the argument are presented at a number of points. Roots ending in *b* and roots originally ending in aspirates both receive their due share of attention. The former, though included in Lachmann's formulation, are next to non-existent insofar as they involve original *b*, because of the extreme rarity of this consonant, which the author recognizes. Where the root-final aspirates are concerned, the chrono-

logy of their phonetic changes is complicated and uncertain, but Otkupščikov admits vowel-lengthening under the conditions of Lachmann's law in the case of those which adopted participles of the standard *-to*-type at a time when the root-final was in a voiced stage. In concluding this review of the first chapter it should be emphasized that the author's explanation of a sound law applicable only to Latin has the special merit of being based on accentual conditions which themselves are peculiar to Latin.

The next chapter is so closely related to the first as to be in some respects inseparable from it. Beginning with a review of the verbs treated in the foregoing, and a list of several whose vowel-quantity in closed syllable in the participle is uncertain, it goes on to a discussion of nouns in *-men* and *-mentum*, making use of the material assembled by J. Perrot, *Les dérivés latins en -men et -mentum* (Paris, 1961). He shows that these, like the *-no*- and other *n*-formations treated in the first chapter, have a close distributional relationship to verbs with lengthened vowel in the participle.

The third chapter is on the vocalism of the root in the Indo-European *s*-aorist, and especially on the lengthened vowel which, because of its appearance in three separate languages, Latin, Old Church Slavic, and Sanskrit, has been widely regarded as a feature inherited from the parent speech. The Latin forms with lengthened vowel—*vēxi*, *rēxi*, *trāxi*, etc.—belong to verbs with roots ending in voiced stops, including original voiced aspirates, and the relation between vowel-length and original voiced root-final is in fact more consistent than in the case of the participles, where some, with ancient inherited *-to*-, escaped the vowel-lengthening. This relation is therefore taken both as ground for explaining forms like *vēxi*, etc., as further examples of Lachmann's law and as evidence that the lengthening was not inherited but developed within Latin itself. The long vowels in the Slavic and Sanskrit aorists are explained quite differently from those in the Latin forms. Both resulted from compensation after consonantal loss, but under somewhat different conditions. In Slavic it was a question of loss of the root-final consonant: thus *věšъ* < **ved-som*, while in Sanskrit the process started in the second and third singular only, where the addition of *-s*, *-t* to the tense-sign *-s* was followed by loss of one or more consonants, and the lengthening of the root vowel in, for example, *ayās*, *ayāt* < **a-yaj-s-s*, **a-yaj-s-t* resembled the lengthening of the stem-vowel in *i*-*s*-aorist forms like *amandīt* < **a-mand-is-t*. Thus in the three languages the lengthening was different in its distribution within the paradigm, different in its cause, and developed within the separate history of each language. Unfortunately the author appears to have missed one important bibliographical item, or at least there is no evidence, either in the text or in the notes, that he has seen it. Calvert Watkins, *Indo-European Origins of the Celtic Verb*, I. *The Sigmatic Aorist* (Dublin, 1962), like Otkupščikov, affirms the development of the long vowel in the *s*-aorist to have been a late one achieved separately in the separate dialects (for Latin pp. 26-37, for Slavic pp. 41-6, for Indo-Iranian pp. 46-52). Comparison of his views with those of the author under review is impossible here, but in general it may be said that Watkins depends less on explanations of a phonetic character and more on the extension and remodeling of inherited paradigmatic vowel-alternations.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the Latin frequentatives and especially to those in *-itare*, a type often regarded as derived from the present stem. Otkupščikov is strongly opposed to this view and argues not only for derivation of practically all Latin frequentatives from past participles but also for participles in *-itus* as, at least in the prehistory of Latin, a large and important class. For the suffix *-itā-* he admits three sources: *-itā-*, *etā-*, and *-etā-*. The *i* of the first is the same *i* which is to be seen in the passive verbal adjectives to Sanskrit causative-intensive verbs, and the correspondence Skt. *vartáyati* : *vartitáh*, Goth. *(fra)-wardjan* : *(fra)-wardíps*, L. *moneo* : *monitus* is pointed out on page 82. Since, however, all three types yield *-itā-* in Latin, there is no lengthy discussion of the type in *-etā-*, generally associated with disyllabic bases—the so-called *set*-roots of Sanskrit grammar—nor of that in *-etā-*, a category whose Indo-European status seems rather dubious, but which might gain a certain degree of support from Greek adjectives like *αἰπερός*, *ἐπιπερός*, and from Umbrian participles like *maletu*, *tasetur*, *pesetom*. Occasionally the author is carried away by his zeal for setting up participles of the trisyllabic type. For example, on page 85 he reconstructs a form **agitos* as starting point for *agitare*, but the Sanskrit *ajitáh* cited as support for it may be simply another instance of the spread of *set*-forms which is so extensive in Sanskrit verbal derivatives, and a form **agitos* seems all the more unnecessary in view of the amount of argument presented earlier in support of a prehistoric verbal adjective **ag-nos*. Nonetheless the chapter is a well-reasoned and valuable account of the Latin frequentatives. It ends with a few pages somewhat more general in content, illustrating the degree to which a language like Latin, starting with roots neither nominal nor verbal in themselves, can proceed through a succession of stages in the formation of nouns from verbs and vice versa.

The fifth chapter is of considerably more interest to Slavacists than to classicists. Through careful examination of numerous etymological equations the author shows that *d* as a noun-forming suffix (*-dъ*, *-do*, *-da*, *-dъ*) was much more frequent and productive than previous investigators had supposed, and that some examples which had previously been explained away as Gothic loans are in fact native Slavic forms. Throughout this chapter he isolates *d*-suffixes by identifying instances of alternation with *g*-, *k*-, *n*-, and *t*-suffixes, and he makes extensive use of Russian dialect forms. Only two items, which bear on questions of Latin etymology, are singled out for discussion here. OCS *gnězdō* 'nest' is troublesome because its initial *g* and the vocalism of its root fail to match the other words for nest—Skt. *nīdāh*, Arm. *nist*, L. *nīdus*, OHG *nest*—all of which are commonly taken as derived from **ni-sd-os* (root **sed-*) '(place where the bird) sits down.' Otkupščikov proposes deriving the Slavic forms from an Indo-European root **gnoi-*, evidently with a semantic evolution 'burn > hearth > home > nest,' which is not very clearly or convincingly elaborated, and he also favors bringing L. *nīdus* into the same etymological family. Whatever solution is adopted for the Slavic forms, however, it seems imprudent to disrupt the rather transparent and well-matched forms outside of the Balto-Slavic group. The other etymological problem selected for treatment

at this point appears at pages 159-60 and concerns words for 'dead.' Skt. *mṛtāḥ* and Gk. *βροτός* and *μορτός* (Hesychius) give evidence of **mriós*, OIr. *marb* and Welsh *marw* of **mrwós*, while L. *mortuus* and OCS *mrъtvъ* show a sort of combination of the two suffixes, which the author takes as an instance of suffix-contamination. However, the explanation based on the analogical influence of the word for 'living,' familiar in the treatment of L. *mortuus*, will work also for the Slavic group (*vivus* : *mortuus*, *živъ* : *mrъtvъ*) and is in fact to be found in Vasmer's *Russisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Between the two explanations it is difficult to make a decision.

The sixth chapter is among the most interesting, partly because its thesis is a particularly bold one: that many Indo-European roots ending in any of the six sonants *i u l r m n* possess variants ending in some or all of the other of these sonants, all six root-forms being essentially similar in meaning. Thus, a group of roots *(s)*kei-*, *(s)*keu-*, *(s)*kel-*, *(s)*ker-*, *(s)*ken-*, *(s)*kem-* is shown to produce a variety of forms with or without movable *s-* and with full-grade *e* or *o* or else with zero grade, all having meanings derived from a basic meaning of striking or cutting. The argument commences with material taken from the Baltic languages, which are well known for their archaic character, but is carried on through Slavic and other Indo-European languages and through several roots, including the roots **ei-* 'go' (where the alternating sonants are to be seen in *έρχομαι*, *ἐλθεῖν*, dialectal *ἐνθεῖν*, etc.) and **stā-* 'stand.' The whole theory leads to much interesting speculation. Forms like *ἐνθεῖν* and *ἀδερφός* are usually taken as deviations from *ἐλθεῖν* and *ἀδελφός* resulting from secondary sound-changes in dialects, and I for one find it hard to dissent from this view, but the author regards these forms as probably very ancient, arguing that as one follows the history of a language back in time one finds not less but more dialectal variation (pages 176-7). Generally speaking also, the distribution of forms containing one or another of the different sonants does not conform at all to linguistic boundaries. So far as **stā-* 'stand' is concerned, problems arise in connection with its relation to **stei-*, **steu-*, **stel-*, etc., all of which produce forms having to do with standing, firmness, rigidity, etc. Otkupščikov recognizes the difficulty of making a root ending in a long vowel fit into the system, and he discusses the question on pages 187-9, but without reaching a firm conclusion. This appears to be partly the result of a certain reluctance to take a position on the laryngeal hypothesis, which de Saussure had anticipated with his *coefficients sonantiques* and which is now widely applied in the study of roots ending in long vowels. One is tempted to wonder whether Otkupščikov's theory has any parallel in the case of roots ending in stops, for example in such roots as *(s)*pek-* 'look, see,' but the question is answered to a certain degree in the last two pages of the chapter, where it is suggested that the six sonants arose through differentiation from a smaller number existing at an earlier stage. At the stage of Indo-European linguistic pre-history usually reached through our reconstructions the system of root-variants elaborated by Otkupščikov in his sixth chapter was probably no longer in a flourishing condition, assuming that the system had existed at all, and there were no doubt many roots which would not show variants

of the type postulated; **bher-* 'carry,' for example, appears not to have had beside it any roots **bhel-*, **bhet-*, etc., with closely related meanings. Yet the whole subject deserves more study, and it is to be hoped that Otkupščikov himself will pursue it further.

The third division of the book, like the first two, includes three chapters, and its subject is word-formation and historical lexicography, or, more precisely, analysis based on word-formation in etymological investigation. Chapter VII is devoted to general principles and much of the doctrine contained in it is so familiar as to require no discussion here. An etymology is generally thought to be sound if it is satisfactory on phonological grounds and on semantic grounds. The suitability of the etymology on grounds of word-formation is generally taken into account as one aspect of the formal (as opposed to the semantic) side of the etymology, but Otkupščikov gives it special prominence and regards criteria based on word-formation as more objective than those based either on phonology or on semantics. The Latin etymologies which take up the latter part of the chapter are presented as examples of the application of this method rather than for their own sake, but because of the very careful and detailed analysis involved in their presentation they deserve some discussion here. For *frēmentum* 'scab' several already proposed etymologies are rejected as faulty, and derivation like that of *com-plēmentum* beside *compleo* is also rejected, since no **freeo* exists. The length of the *e* must be the result of compensation, and *frēmentum* is taken from **fred-s-mptom*, related to *frendo* 'grind (the teeth)' as *caementum* < **kaid-s-mptom* to *caedo*, etc. The semantic evolution from 'bite' to 'scar, scab' is supported by parallels from Lithuanian and Old English. On the formal side, however, one slight objection occurs to me: *frendo*, unlike *fundo*, *tango*, *vinco*, etc., is not a verb of the nasal-infix type, and a stem **fred-* is no more to be expected beside it than *(*in*)-*ced-* *(*de*)-*fed-*, **ped-*, **ted-* beside (*in*)-*cendo*, (*de*)-*fendo*, *pēdo*, *tendo*. Yet if we merely change **fred-s-mptom* to **frend-s-mptom*, we have a reasonably plausible reconstruction whose complex consonant-cluster would have been simplified with resulting lengthening of the *e*.—*armentum* 'plough-animal' has been a troublesome word because its traditional connection with *arāre*, going back to Varro, led Skutsch to postulate a change **arāmentum* > **aramentum* (iambic shortening) > *armentum* (syncope). Otkupščikov rejects this and also the alleged connection with *ἀρμα* '(war)-chariot' and takes *armentum*, which is attested in the fragments of the Twelve Tables, from the unextended root **ar-* 'plough,' just as *segmentum* is from **sec-* in contrast to the late Latin *secūmentum* from **secā-*. The accompanying discussion of semantic parallels, vowel-gradation, and suffix-alternation cannot even be summarized here, but is valuable nonetheless.

The eighth chapter contains a series of etymologies, mostly of Slavic words the treatment of which in the standard dictionaries the author regards as faulty. Like much other material in the book, they have the special function of illustrating the importance of careful attention to word-formation in etymological analysis, and a prominent place is given in them to suffix-alternation and to vowel-lengthening resulting from compensation after loss of *s* in a con-

sonant-cluster. The section on *L. frēna, frēnuscūli* (pages 239-43) partly covers the same ground as the section on *frēmuntum*, which is assigned to the same word-family, and the whole group might perhaps better have been treated in one place, but nevertheless it is not a case of mere repetition, and the section in Chapter VIII contains some valuable discussion of the semantic evolution of words for 'bit' and 'bridle,' with good arguments for development of the latter from the former and not the reverse.

The ninth and last chapter is devoted to a problem of toponymy. The author argues that the name of Lake Ilmen, near Novgorod, is not of Finnic origin but is a Slavic word related to Russ. *il* 'silt, slime' and illustrating a principle of word-formation which is widespread in Slavic place-names and known in other Indo-European languages as well (use of *-men*-suffixes in river-names, etc.). The chapter is interesting for a variety of reasons, including its presentation of an apparent survival of the very ancient Indo-European *r/n*-alternation—*Ilmen* has a by-form *Ilmer* for which Otkupščikov cites many parallel cases of alternation—and the suspicion that West Slavs participated in the colonization of Novgorod, place-names of the type in question being much more frequent in West Slavic than in East Slavic territory.

The two-page conclusion, while recognizing the great advances in Indo-European linguistics in the past, dissents from the pessimistic view that all that can be accomplished in etymological investigation has been accomplished, and pleads for further study, partly on the basis of principles which the foregoing chapters have sought to outline. There are a bibliography listing over four hundred titles, an index of words discussed, an index of ancient and modern authors cited, and a short list of misprints. The special merits of the book, which are many, include exceptional clarity of style and arrangement and careful attention to attestation of forms cited and to chronology of sound-changes. It must be considered an essential item of bibliography for further study on the grammatical problems and individual words with which it deals, and it is further evidence of the fact that the work of contemporary Russian scholars in Indo-European linguistics will more and more have to be taken into account.

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- B. A. VAN GRONINGEN. *Theognis*. Le premier livre, édité avec un commentaire. Amsterdam, N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1966. Pp. 462. \$16.80. (*Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde*, N. R. LXXII, No. 1.)

In his review of Douglas Young's Teubner Text of *Theognis*, in *Gnomon*, XXXVI (1964), p. 562, H. Rahn defined as the most urgent need of the present a "vorurteilslos die Formprobleme der

Versgruppen in einem den erhaltenen Text fortlaufend interpretierenden Kommentar." He thus voiced a demand issued time after time by Wilamowitz, Pohlenz, Jacoby, and Kroll, though the latter warned in his day (1936: *Theognisinterpretationen*, p. 283, n. 25) that much preliminary work had yet to be done before a full scale commentary would become feasible. Since then Carrière, Peretti, and Adrados have enriched our knowledge of the history of the text with their findings as well as their disagreements; and Young's admirable edition has furnished as solid a basis for textual study as the many unresolved issues permit. van Groningen's commentary is, therefore, the answer to a long-felt need; and his past publications have shown that he was ideally equipped to take on the job. His *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (1958) and *La poésie verbale grecque* (1953) have demonstrated his fine knowledge of styles and of syntax, and his ability to look at texts without preconceptions but not without sympathy.

The plan of the commentary is as follows: after each poem, printed in the Greek but without apparatus, van Groningen provides a discussion organized by lemmata; followed by a general conclusion which focuses on the nature and purpose of the poem under consideration. In addition, very occasionally, he prints Latin translations by his compatriot Hugo Grotius. The versions, pretty as they are, help to remind us how much we have learned since Grotius' day about the special qualities of archaic poetry. The commentary covers only book one; van Groningen does not intend to turn to book two, "pour deux raisons, l'inspiration poétique est foncièrement différente, et—motif plus personnel—je ne parviens pas à m'intéresser à ces fades épigrammes pédérotiques." It would be interesting to know whether he believes, with Pohlenz, *G. G. A.*, CXCV (1932), p. 411 and most others, that book two is late, or whether he would subscribe to Young's recent speculation that book two represents Theognis' less respectable verse which, like that of Robert Burns, accumulated on notepapers around the house, and which came to be circulated only after his death: *Miscellanea Critica* (Teubner, 1964), I, p. 366.

At the end of the volume there are five brief appendices: 1. van Groningen argues (not entirely convincingly, it seems to me, in the light especially of Peretti's findings about the indirect tradition) that Stobaeus' Theognis lacked certain portions of our corpus, and that Stobaeus' source was inferior to the exemplar, roughly contemporary, of our A; 2. that the seal is the name of the author, written near the beginning of the collection *after* the work was completed (van Groningen, by a rare omission, fails to refer to the work of Leonard Woodbury); 3. that the elegy 261-6 is not a γοῖφος; 4. that throughout the collection the spirit is secular rather than religious; that the main divinity, if we must look for one, is Zeus rather than Apollo or Artemis; and that this is an argument against regarding lines 1-18 as an invocational proem. App. 5 deals with Melanchthon as a student of Theognis. There is no index, which, given the scope of the commentary, is a pity.

The Dutch go in for useful compilations of textual and grammatical discussion; cf. e.g., recent articles on Plato by Verdenius. One is grateful for the publication of such listings; they usually

represent the fruits of long years of close study. The present work amounts to an elition with discursive apparatus, including a full discussion of textual, grammatical, and other difficulties. Under each heading van Groningen collects the readings and interpretations of other scholars. The effect is that of a variorum commentary. It might have been helpful if there were an introductory assessment of the more important recent positions, along the lines of Hudson-Williams' tidy and informative introduction. Apparently van Groningen decided that this might have obstructed the principle of *Vorurteilslosigkeit*. As it is the reader is forced to distinguish between the views of the various scholars cited without the benefit of a larger understanding. Still, it is good to have easy access to the more important points of view under the appropriate headings. For the fullest recent bibliography, see the edition of Adrados (1959), pp. 159 ff.

Often, as in the matter of the three poems addressed to Simonides (467 ff., 667 ff., 1345 ff.) van Groningen settles the controversy with a sane and disenchanting "non liquet." It is a congenital drawback of variorum commentaries that in the end judgment is likely to be suspended, or reduced to compromise. van Groningen does not entirely escape this danger; cf. the discussion of 472, and of the poem of which it is a part; also 661. At the opposite extreme, there are a few occasions when van Groningen's conclusion is more confident than the evidence permits; cf. his statement that 891-4 is by an unknown Chalcidian contemporary of Solon. But generally the discussion is not only fair and judicious, but constructive. My reservations on this or that point are not to be construed as questioning the importance and the value of the book. For years to come it will serve as a major source of information. Our debt to the author is great, both for the undertaking itself, and for the large degree of success with which it has been carried out.

The achievement is particularly praiseworthy since it rests on an act of abnegation. The more interesting questions about Theognis are obviously those regarding his person and origin, the history of the transmission, and the general question about the genre and the nature of the poetry. Theognis is not one of the towering figures in the history of Greek poetry or thought. He is the sort of poet who appeals not with the minutiae of his art but rather with the tone and burden of his utterance. The Kynos collection evidences a mood, a social temper, which cannot be appreciated properly except by reading the collection as a whole. Consequently van Groningen's step-by-step treatment can never have been conceived by him as promising to furnish striking rewards. His plan leaves him no opportunity to commit himself to one or the other theory of authorship, though the implied axiom of his treatment is that we are dealing with a book by one author, which has suffered certain accretions (this midway course between Kroll's intransigent analysis, on the one hand, and Young's biographical unitarianism, on the other, is probably the best we can do). Nor does his method allow a student to get an insight into the larger questions of the transmission. From his treatment of 173-8, e.g., it is impossible to tell that this is one of the key passages for determining the channels of the transmission. Under each lemma the variants are discussed on

their merits; the piecemeal method fails to alert the student to the fact that the value of the indirect tradition which Plutarch and Stobaeus feature is in principle slight.

van Groningen eschews literary judgments; the commentary is deliberately geared to proceed as if all the poetry were of the same rank. But within the limits of this careful positivism the discussion shows some surprising lacks. There is, for instance, no analysis of the technique of invocation in the beginning lines, and of its difference from the use of the invocation in Homer or Hesiod. Again, van Groningen's reluctance to recognize the presence of *γρίφοι* (at 257-60, 261-6, 579-80, and elsewhere) induces him to try to explain some designedly obscure poems as if their obscurity were a hindrance to their appreciation, and needed to be resolved along philological lines.

Like Kroll, but unlike Jacoby and Peretti, van Groningen looks at each poem without preconception as to the original ordering of the poems, though he tries throughout to determine the connexions between a poem and its predecessor(s). Often he resigns himself to the conclusion that this cannot be done. The history of Theognis scholarship is full of the broken remains of theories (Wilamowitz's Trinkllederbuch theory, Nietzsche's Stichwort theory, etc.) about the relations of the poems among each other. It is only recently that a prior question, viz. where a poem ends and where it begins, has emerged as the really crucial issue. Garzya and Young print 887-90 as one poem; van Groningen regards the passage as two distichs combined by a *γνωμολόγος*; Young proposes to read 499-510 as one poem; van Groningen breaks the passage up into three. Any such decision is necessarily arbitrary; one assumes that in *ca.* 500 B. C. there would have been no attempt, and indeed no way, to set off one section from the next; cf. now *Pap. Oxy.*, 2380, of the 2nd or 3rd century A. D., which disregards the break between 254 and 255, *pace* Young's remark, edition xiii, "hic habes seriem sex carminum . . .". A purist procedure would be to print Theognis without paragraphing; cf. Hermann Fraenkel's suggestion, years ago, to print epic poems without punctuation. Nobody will complain that van Groningen did not resort to such desperate means. But it may legitimately be objected that the problem of paragraphing as such is not taken up.

The textual differences between van Groningen and Young are slight; generally van Groningen subscribes to Young's thorough vindication of A. Some of the differences are to be found in lines 47, 52, 203, 311, 352 (van Groningen wisely refuses to amend), 463, 491, 519, 545, 632, 659, 961, 981, 993 (van Groningen properly prefers Athenaeus' *ἐφίμερον*), 1128 (once again van Groningen leaves the crux), 1166, and 1172 (one may wonder about the feasibility of *γνώμη* being both gift and ruler within so brief a compass). There are times when van Groningen tries too hard to make sense of the MS reading, as in 516, where Young wisely attaches daggers; cf. also 288, 800, 1194 (van Groningen's explanation that the line is a proverb makes sense). But more typically he extends the range of the daggers: 352, 897-900, 903, 1202. Young and van Groningen have the same text at 127 and 477; in both cases van Groningen's attempt to account for the reading strikes me as

strained. At 270 he argues against accepting the new reading παρ[ῆ] of *Pap. Oxy.*, 2380; at 278 he similarly rejects the ἐπερχόμενον of the lesser MSS and the papyrus; in both cases I would argue for the pap. reading (278: the father is in the house already, the sons dread meeting him face to face, *not* seeing him come into the house; further, a beggar does not enter, he approaches). At 1085 he does not seem to appreciate the difficulties which led Young (1964, p. 370) to suggest that "no fully satisfactory interpretation has yet emerged"; nor does he note that A reads $\text{δημῶν ἀξιοὶ δε πολλὰς}$ and what he prints in his text is an emendation by Welcker. At 463 he adopts εὐμαρὲς οἷς ; his lengthy commentary does not succeed in glossing over the harshness of the grammar.

His notion, at 632, that an open syllable vocative ending may be counted as long is most unlikely. There is no other example in Theognis; the other cases of metrical lengthening which he cites are either cases of closed syllables, or vowels before liquids. The frequency of Κύρνε or Κύρν' makes for another counter-argument; Theognis avoids the vocative before a word starting with a double consonant (at 372 mute + liquid does not make position); at 120, 174, 183, 412, 1104 Κύρνε καὶ form a trisyllabic dactyl; and at 76 and 180 λ does not make position.—On occasion von Groningen is a little too exacting in his grammatical expectations. At 879 he claims that πῖν' cannot express the command "drink" which should have to be aorist, but rather something more general, like "my cellar is at your disposal." But cf. 763 πίνωμεν where the sense is surely "bottoms up." Since he makes important inferences from this for the interpretation of the whole passage (a host speaking rather than a guest describing his reception, hence not Theognis), the point is not negligible.

The book is well printed, on good paper, and a pleasure to use; Few of the misprints I have noted are likely to mislead (but on p. 7 the Parisinus should be 388 rather than 380; on p. 260, line 13, fr. b. read 'K 329' for 'K 32 g'). One final request: a publication such as this will be subject to a great deal of handling over the many years that it is likely to prove useful. Academies traditionally put out their material in paper covers. Would it be appropriate to ask that in cases like van Groningen's *Theognis* the publication be in two formats, and that the buyers be able to choose between a hardbound copy and a paperback?

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HÉLÈNE CADELL, ed. Papyrus de la Sorbonne (*P. Sorb. I*). Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. xx + 183; 29 pls. 55 Fr. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Paris*, Série "Textes et Documents," tome X.)

Since extant Greek papyri of Roman and Byzantine date far outnumber those of the Ptolemaic era, this first volume of the new

Sorbonne series is doubly welcome: 52 or 53 of its 68 texts are dated in or assignable to the Ptolemaic period. Most of these have been recovered from mummy cartonnage, wrappings made of layers of discarded papyrus stuck together and plastered over. Detaching the individual layers with minimal damage to the writing on them obviously requires patience and skill. Some were successfully detached when the cartonnage was first brought to Paris, shortly after the turn of the century; but the systematic processing of the whole collection awaited the initiative of the late director of the Institut de Papyrologie de Paris, André Bataille (to whose memory the present volume is dedicated). Once taken apart, cartonnage has this special virtue for the classicist and the historian: the dated documents in any cluster provide approximate dates for the undated texts. For example, the principal prize so far yielded by the Paris cartonnage comprises some 400 lines (a third of them complete or nearly so) from Menander's *Sicyonian*, which Bataille, together with his student Alain Blanchard, published in *Recherches de Papyrologie*, III (1964), pp. 103-76; not only is there thus restored to us a major portion of a lost play, but the style of the script and the internal evidence of the cartonnage point to the conclusion that this copy of the play was written less than a hundred years after the poet's own lifetime.

The volume opens with eight literary texts: five fragments of Homer, one of Demosthenes (*Phil.*, I, 4-7), one of a Greek glossary, and one from a Latin-Greek vocabulary. This last (No. 8) is by far the most interesting of the group. E. A. Lowe has catalogued it (*Codices Latini Antiquiores*, V, No. 699) as an example of a fifth-century Latin hand; Mlle. Cadell, citing earlier traits in the Greek and Latin alike, assigns this careful round hand to the latter half of the third century. And she observes acutely that, despite the eastern provenience of the manuscript, the text proclaims that the native tongue of the writer was Latin rather than Greek. Something is wrong (as the editor senses) with the reading offered in I, 14 λα[sus? πον]ήσας/τλάων. *Laesus* and τλάων seem glaringly out of place in this otherwise pedestrian vocabulary. As far as can be judged from the photograph of the text in Plate III,¹ on the Latin side the third letter can be reconstructed as c, d, e, g, o, or p; and in the Greek it seems possible to read πλέων at the end of the line.

Documentary papyri (Nos. 9-63) and five ostraca constitute the remainder of the volume. Many of the documents deal with the life of the military settlers of the Ptolemies, and they contribute new details on the personnel, units and echelons of the cleruchic administration. Nos. 9-12 are official letters from one Lykomedes, previously encountered in other papyri but unidentified. Mlle. Cadell is able to demonstrate (pp. 38-9) from these new documents that Lykomedes was a nome strategos, in office from 268 to 257 B. C. No. 9 also contributes to Ptolemaic chronology a new datum, the importance of which is clear even if its implications are not yet

¹ The writing does not show up well in crucial places. This is true even on the original: "Le [papyrus], d'un ocre sombre, aux bords effilochés, parsemé de taches brunâtres et de granules encore plus foncés n'est pas de belle qualité et l'ecre d'un brun-roux ressort assez mal" (p. 26).

so (pp. 43-4). At the end of line 1 δεδ[does not look right; a future tense seems to be required by the sense, but I am unable to offer any suitable reading. In No. 10 I should translate κ[ριθῆ (line 3) by "judged" rather than "condemned"—the guilt or innocence of the charge is yet to be established. No. 16, a brief account for the four days corresponding to 24-27 January 257 B. C., takes on special interest if some of the expenditures were made, as the editor suggests, for a Dionysiac festival. In No. 19 wine is characterized as ἀστυώτατος (some parallel uses of the epithet are assembled in the editor's note).

In No. 20, a letter, the writer says (lines 2-7): γίνωσκε τοὺς λατόμους μὴ ἔχοντες (l. -ας) χαλκοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐγ τ[ο]ῦ Μεσορή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ [τ]ὴν καταγωγὴν τῆς [χάλι]κος (restoration assured by line 11). The editor thinks that a participle, e. g. πεπανμένην, should be understood with the second clause, and she translates: "Sache que les carriers ne sont plus payés depuis le 13 de Mésorê; apprends également que le transport de la chaux <a cessé(?)>." But surely the Greek is sufficient as it stands, saying: "Know that the quarriers have not been paid since Mesore 13th, and likewise the transport of the rubble (has not been paid for)." That this is in fact the sense is further indicated by the writer's following statement, ἐγὼ γὰρ οὖς ἐξε[κομι(aut sim.)]σα χαλκοὺς ἐξαν[ήλωσα] αἰς τε τοὺς λατο[μήσαν]τας καὶ καταγωγὴν χάλικος. Incidentally, "rubble" is a safer translation for χάλιξ than "lime(stone)," which is an identification that may in this instance be supposed but is not assured.

Nos. 23-31 are a group of chits authorizing loans of seed grain. In No. 25, line 4, the editor reads and restores περι[] τὸν Ἰβιώ[να δανείον εἰ]ς κάτεργον, and she comments in her note on the two difficulties presented by this text: (1) we are not told which of four villages named Ibiou is meant, and (2) the restoration [να κτλ.] is ca. 4 letters too long for the lacuna. Both difficulties can be dispelled by a different restoration, viz. Ἰβιώ[να κεῖ εἰ]ς, which gives us the well-known village of Ἰβίων (Εἰκοσιπεντ[αρούρων]) in a restoration of precisely the right length.

In No. 35 four men are recorded as guarantors of a fifth man for mined salt (which was a royal monopoly) worth 455 drachmas. The names of the guarantors are followed by numerical symbols which the editor thinks must refer to quantities of salt, probably artabs. I find it a priori improbable that the unit of measure, if one were involved, would have been omitted by the writer in each of three instances; once might be an oversight, but three times seems purposeful. Consulting the photograph of the papyrus in Plate XIV, I read the figures as follows: line 2, $\angle = 1/2$ (so also the editor); line 4, $\varsigma/ = 1/6$; line 6, $\gamma/ = 1/3$. $1/2 + 1/6 + 1/3 = 1$. In other words, the fractions indicate the portions of the total guaranteed by the respective guarantors.

In the note to No. 63, line 6, the bibliography on the Christian symbol χυγ is out of date. Add *P. Merton*, 94, 1n. and A. D. Nock, *Speculum*, XXVI (1951), p. 505, n. 11.

The volume is handsomely produced by—to judge from its appearance—varityper and photo offset. It also offers an unwonted luxury: all of the papyri and ostraca published in the volume are repro-

duced in the twenty-nine plates, which are cleverly arranged to fold out so that they can be consulted side by side with the printed texts. Mlle. Cadell's editorial work displays all the requisite virtues of eye and mind: her reading is skilful and sober, her commentaries the product of assiduity and thoughtful inquiry. The new generation has made its mark, and the future of papyrology in France seems secure.

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G. ZUNTZ. *An Inquiry into the Transmission of the Plays of Euripides*. Cambridge, University Press, 1965. Pp. xx + 295; 16 pls. \$12.50.

This book, whose manuscript the author reports was submitted to the press in 1962, is "gratefully dedicated" to Alexander Turyn; "gratefully," because it was Turyn's work, *The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of Euripides* (1957), which inspired Zuntz to a systematic restudy of the whole question of Euripidean transmission. "To utilize and pursue . . . the discoveries of Turyn is the object of this book" (p. xix). That Zuntz finds himself, at the end of his researches, in disagreement with a basic, if controversial, conclusion of Turyn's does not seem to bother him; presumably Turyn's equanimity, too, remains undisturbed.

The issue is simply this. Are L (Laurentianus 32.2) and P (Vaticanus, Palatinus graec. 287 and Laurentianus, Conventi Soppressi 172) *gemelli*, twin descendants of a single ancestor, or is P a copy of L? Turyn had strongly maintained the former view (*Byz. Man. Trad.*, pp. 254 ff.), following Paley, the early Wilamowitz (*Einführung* [1889], p. 208; he had changed his mind in the *Ion* of 1926), and Murray. The contrary theory of P's derivation from L was put forward for the Florentine part of P by Prinz in 1872, elaborated by Vitelli, who maintained that P was a copy of a copy of L with some interpolation from other MSS in the annotated plays (*Andr.*, *Med.*, *Rhes.*, *Hipp.*, *Alc.*, *Tro.*, *Hec.*, *Or.*, *Phoen.*); in 1899 Weeklein modified Vitelli's theories somewhat and held that P was a direct copy of L for the unannotated or alphabetic plays with the exception of *Bacchae*. It is this, the "Vitelli-Weeklein theory" (Turyn, p. 268, n. 265 for other adherents), which Zuntz now champions vigorously and at length.

Turyn had made the amazing discovery that the corrector of L, invariably given the anonymous label l, was none other than Demetrius Triclinius, "on the basis of his handwriting, his metrical knowledge, and the character of his metrical notes" (*Byz. Man. Trad.*, p. 243). This discovery Zuntz accepts, but denies Turyn's further contention that corrections introduced into L by Triclinius (readings labelled L^t) were unknown to P. Here Zuntz distinguishes between several stages of Triclinian corrections, or, as he calls them, 'Tricliniana.' Some of Triclinius' more general metrical notes in L

are incorporated in P; the detailed notes are absent. These different stages of Triclinius' work Zuntz thinks he can distinguish on the basis of variations in the color of ink Triclinius used to make his corrections. Tr.¹ corrections, readings which find their way into P, appear in dark brown or black, later stages as greyish- or even reddish-brown. This is a tricky argument, and there are places, such as *I. T.*, 1148-50, where Zuntz must himself admit that the gradation of color is "hard to interpret or even to establish." Obviously aware of the weight his theory of ink-variations must bear, Zuntz introduces a "Note on Inks" (pp. 57 ff.) and an account of certain chemical experiments to which he was a party in an effort to discover what the chemical constituents of Triclinius' various inks might have been ("well-mixed black ink" for the first set of corrections; for the second an ink "prepared with an admixture of iron sulphate [green vitriol]"; the last corrections in an ink "imperfectly balanced but which contained an admixture of gum" p. 62).

Zuntz turns his attention to a minute examination of the *Supplices*-pages in L, and discerns, on the basis of color of ink, "three sets of Tricliniana." These may be summarized as follows: Tr.¹, in black ink, are "standard" corrections; Tr.², in grey or light brown, indicate the beginnings of lyrics by enlarging the initial letters and note the over-all rhythm, while Tr.³, in an ink which may be brown, dark brown, or red-brown, are detailed metrical comments and divisions into cola. Actually, Zuntz thinks he can discern numerous additional stages of editorial work on the MS: (a) a stage between Tr.¹ and Tr.² at which the fragment of a *hypothesis* to *Supp.* was written; perhaps "the master handed his pen to a pupil, or amanuensis, and dictated the fragment to him" (p. 62 n. †), (b) a stage we may call "post-Tr.³," e.g. at *Supp.*, 1189 by "some later reader, after Triclinius but before p," who deleted *oἷος*. Before Triclinius began his editorial work on the MS Zuntz attempts to distinguish L*, the original uncorrected transcription by the 'the main scribe L,' L¹ (as we may label him), the original scribe who made certain corrections *inter scribendum* as at *Supp.*, 138 (p. 68, cf. p. 129), and L², "the scribe L himself; not *inter scribendum* but going over the finished play and adding a few marginal variants and corrections" (p. 63 at *Supp.*, 8; cf. also Zuntz' comm. at vv. 138, 946, and 1033). When distinctions are so finely drawn, and on grounds so attenuated as minute gradations in the shade of ink in which corrections were made (a criterion which does not always work, as in *Ion*, cf. p. 90, and *I. T.*, p. 93), the uninitiated are obviously at the mercy of the palaeographer who has examined the MS himself, and in some of these cases it may be that Zuntz' distinctions between dark brown and greyish-brown (Tr.¹ and Tr.² respectively) are conditioned by the fact that the former are in P and the latter are not. In other words, the desired conclusions, that P was copied from L between L^{tr1} and L^{tr2}, may sometimes be thought to be wagging the ink-color-test. And there are some cases in which, as Zuntz admits, the test simply goes against the hypothesis, as at *I. A.*, 4, 109, and 217 (pp. 96 ff.).

Turyn had maintained that L and P were *gemelli* in both the alphabetic and select plays. Zuntz believes that P copied the former

from L directly. He takes as his starting point the argument that only the "particular manner of writing in L can account for the surprisingly different, and abstruse, reading in P" (p. 3): L's $\epsilon\upsilon$ looks like α , his omicrons like thetas; hence L's $\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ at *El.*, 730 becomes $\epsilon\upsilon\theta\upsilon\varsigma$ in P. (Turyn interprets this evidence in another way. "The word $\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is written in L so clearly that P must have been influenced by a different exemplar," viz. the common source of LP, *Byz. Man. Trad.*, p. 267.) To this Zuntz adds the fascinating account of his search for the "absurd colon" at *Hel.*, 95 P, which turned out to be nothing more than a copy of the flaw in the paper of L! (The flaw, a tiny piece of straw, stuck to the finger of the Assistant Librarian of the Laurentian Library when she was examining L with Zuntz in 1960; it is now stored in a strong-box in the library.) For the annotated or select plays Zuntz, modifying Vitelli's theory, believes that P's model "was a copy of L as corrected by Tr.¹ into which some corrector (?Triclinius again) had introduced some good readings from other sources" (p. 38). For the Byzantine triad, *Hec.*, *Or.*, *Phoen.*, all scholars admit that L and P represent peculiar divergences from the tradition which cannot easily be accounted for, or, for that matter, related to each other. Turyn erected an elaborate hypothesis that the common source of LP was based on an originally old textual stock but had been interpolated with many Moschopulean and Thoman readings. Many of these Byzantine interpolations are reflected in the copy L. After L had been copied, the common ancestor was drastically revised with the result that some of the Byzantine interpolations were removed and old readings restored, but at the same time *other interpolations were introduced*, which appear in P but not in L (*Byz. Man. Trad.*, pp. 298-301). Zuntz disputes Turyn's view that these 'Moschopulean' and 'Thoman' readings originated (i.e. were invented by) those scholars and believes that three-quarters or more of them go back to older and more trustworthy MS authority. (Zuntz' argument that Thomas would not have inserted $\delta\upsilon\sigma\chi\epsilon\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ at *Or.*, 606 unless he had found it in some MS is not cogent; surely Thomas could have known, almost as well as Zuntz, from the parallels which the latter adduces on p. 153, that $\delta\upsilon\sigma\tau\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ was a standard gloss on $\delta\upsilon\sigma\chi\epsilon\rho\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ and have substituted the less obvious word himself.) Zuntz' hypothesis to account for the peculiarities in the Triad in L and P is no less complicated than Turyn's "... those Byzantine readings in which L and P agree were in the text of the ancestor manuscript; the rest, in the margin—whence the scribes of L and of the intermediary π made their different selections ... Triclinius (if it was he) can be assumed to have noted the Moschopulean and Thoman readings which he selected, with competent judgement, as superior, in the margin of the manuscript from which the ancestor was copied. When the ancestor was written, in his scriptorium, these marginal readings were put into its text" (pp. 172-3). For *Bacch.* as for the Triad, Zuntz admits that L and P are "*gemelli*, deriving from one and the same model" (p. 112). In several places (vv. 524, 525, 552) Tr., by whom Zuntz discerns in *Bacch.* "the traces of two working processes only" (p. 114), added, *from another MS*, what L found illegible. On the basis of glosses in L but not in P at vv. 151, 306, and 603 and differences in the division of

lyrical cola, Zuntz concludes that L and P were copied from the same model but that the copy P was made "only after that parent manuscript [A] had been corrected" (p. 122). Alternately, an intermediary copy of A may be postulated, π , "carrying those significant corrections and alterations and also the faults caused by mistaking the writing in A" (p. 122).

A corollary of Zuntz' theory of the relation between P and L is that "L must have been written very shortly before Triclinius first set to work on it, and in a scriptorium with which he was closely associated" (p. 50). Secondly, P must have been "in Triclinius' scriptorium at the time when he had begun, but not yet finished, his work on L" (p. 13). In this Zuntz is at odds with Turyn who dates Tr.'s revision of L *ca.* 1320 A. D., and P, on palaeographical grounds, not before 1340 A. D. Zuntz counters with a picture of L and P both copied, at approximately the same time, in "a lively centre of scholarly endeavor, where the study, correction and reproduction of manuscripts was carried on eagerly and on a comparatively large scale" (p. 50); the place may have been the 'university' of Thessalonica, with Triclinius at its head.

When he returns later to assess Tr.'s editorial methods Zuntz maintains that "there are authoritative readings as well as sheer inventions among every type and stage of Triclinius' alterations" (p. 194). At stage 1, Tr. must have had ready recourse to the MS from which L had been copied ("the *Vorlage* of L") and would have had access to other MSS. Some of his readings at this stage, therefore, can be considered to rest upon good MS authority (in this category Zuntz would place Tr.'s $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ $\nu\chi\epsilon\upsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\upsilon$ for $\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\chi\epsilon\upsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\upsilon$ at *Supp.*, 1136, pp. 79-81). On the other hand, even here Zuntz detects signs of Tr.'s "ruthlessness" at enforcing metrical correspondence that is symptomatic of stage 3. The situation becomes more complicated still in dialogue passages where, besides obvious corrections, made by Tr. by reference to the model MS, he also seems to have invented readings to improve the metre, some of which *actually turn out to have been correct* (exx. at p. 197). In the last analysis Zuntz' readiness to accord to some of Tr.'s corrections "an authority the same as, or even greater than, the original writing in L" (p. 199) often seems based on the insecure criterion of what Zuntz thinks Tr. was and was not capable of himself: the correction at *Hel.*, 74 f. was "entirely beyond the range of Triclinius" (p. 198; cf. p. 89, n.† on *H. F.*, 924 and p. 79, n.†, "to posit a non-attested word was beyond Triclinius").

Enough perhaps has been said to show that the book is not easy reading. For the "general reader," if any such still exist, the most valuable sections will be Ch. III, "The Character and Origin of MSS. L and P" (pp. 126 ff.) and Ch. VI, "Main Stages of the Tradition" (pp. 249 ff.). The 'main scribe L,' as Zuntz calls him, borrowing from Turyn, wrote on "crude, thick paper" (p. 126) in "a practiced and unmistakable hand but one whose inelegance and irregularity indicate the scholar rather than a professional." The MS is "a combined effort aiming at substance rather than appearance . . . a book by scholars for scholars" (pp. 127-8). P, on the other hand, is written on parchment, a rare and precious material, "with the greatest regularity," by one scribe whose writing

is "even, good and almost calligraphic" (p. 136). The scribe's technical competence, however, is matched by what Zuntz calls "a supreme mental incompetence, as a result of which his capacity for errors is literally unlimited" (p. 136); "... for all that he understood of the text he was writing, it might have been Chinese" (p. 137). P, unlike L, is not a scholar's copy, but was written "by a professional scribe and intended for the book trade" (p. 138). A market was found for the MS among the Italian book collectors, for its Florentine part was in the possession of Antonio Corbinelli, who died in 1425 A.D. P was corrected with reference to L and became the printer's copy for the Aldine edition of Euripides of 1503/4. The divagations of L are detailed by Zuntz in his last chapter at greater length. He sums up the story on his last page. "The devoted humanism of eminent Byzantine ecclesiastics, about the beginning of the tenth century, rescued the traditional core of Euripides' work; a dignitary of similar persuasion [whom Zuntz tentatively but altogether persuasively identifies as Eustathius], late in the twelfth, secured the 'nine plays'; a century later, the outstanding scholar of the age [Triclinius] saved and combined both these relics; finally two eminent converts [Petrarch's teacher of Greek, Barlaam, and Simon Atumanus] carried the whole treasure to the shores of Italy" (p. 288). Zuntz traces the MS L back to its hypothetical origins, "(a) an ancient manuscript of the alphabetic plays in majuscule letters—we may call it ϵ —discovered by Eustathius; and (b) its transcript into minuscules (' ϵ '), made for Eustathius, corrected and annotated by him . . . rediscovered by Triclinius, who (c) had made from it that copy (Λ) which became the model of our MS. L" (p. 185). The combination of the known plays of the Selection with his own "miraculous" discovery of the Alphabetic plays may, as Zuntz suggests, actually have been effected by Triclinius himself.

To what extent does L faithfully preserve the Alexandrian tradition? In order to answer the question Zuntz reconstructs, in his most virtuous chapter (V, pp. 217 ff.) the *Helen*-papyrus, *Ox. Pap.*, XXII (1954), 2336, a fragment of the later 1st century B. C. containing parts of lines 630-674 of the *Helen*. The similarity between the reconstructed text II and L over a gap of 1500 years is amazingly close, "and this fact is in itself little short of a miracle" (p. 236). "This general identity is evidence of a common archetype . . . [which] could only be the 'Alexandrian edition' reasonably fathered on Aristophanes of Byzantium" (p. 221).

When so much is given it may seem churlish to ask for more. Actually, what is wanted is not more but less or, perhaps, the same amount organized in a more lucid order. The subject, difficult by nature, seems to be made more so by the rather random way in which the various segments of Zuntz' "inquiry" succeed one another. This is really logical λέξις εἰσούμενη. And the fog which surrounds the argument in certain sections does not lift on repeated reading. In the hypothetical reconstruction of "How MS. P was copied" (pp. 174-80) it is impenetrable, and the diagram on p. 176 only makes it more so. The intricateness of Zuntz' argumentation on the "Alternation of Speakers" in the Papyrus (pp. 230 ff.) merely increases the inherent obscurity. His analysis of the emotional

values in the scene between Helen and Menelaus (p. 247) shows to what good uses he can apply his close criticism of the text, and on p. 282 he captures effectively "the boundless insecurity in the life of everyone" during the so-called Palaeologean Renaissance of the 13th century. But even when he is at his most general, as in the last chapter, he interrupts his narrative to engage in controversies which only delay his main progress: Pertusi's theory of an early selection is combatted (pp. 257-61), or Turyn's of two medieval archetypes (pp. 261-72), or K. Weitzman's misguided notion of a late and otherwise unattested illuminated text of Euripides' lost plays as the basis of some poor illustrations in pseudo-Oppian, *Cynegetica*, III, 244-8 in cod. Marc. gr. 479 (pp. 278-81).

There is one typographical peculiarity which is here noted only to be discouraged. Footnotes are labelled not numerically but by the symbols † ‡ § ¶ ||, etc. The author's intention may have been to distinguish them clearly from line references and other numbers which dot the text, but the system makes later citation of Zuntz' notes more difficult than it need be and leads to unwieldy substrata of notes on, e.g., pp. 32, 67, 93, 158 (which goes as high as ††† [= note 12]), and 283. Several misprints caught my eye: the note on p. 90 refers to p. 189, n. †, which does not exist; "elemenrary" (p. 196) and "und" (p. 137) are easily corrected. More important are two incorrect references to plates on p. 14; Zuntz is illustrating the "absurd colon" in *Helen*, 95. At p. 14 n. † Plate V (e) should refer to V(d) and at n. ‡ Plate V(d) should be V(e). There are 4 indices, the first a very full "Index Locorum Euripideorum" (the numeral II. has dropped out before the second on p. 293) and 16 excellent plates.

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NICOLAOS C. HOURMOUZIADES. *Production and Imagination in Euripides: Form and Function of the Scenic Space*. Athens, 1965. Pp. xii + 180. (*Greek Society for Humanistic Studies*, Second Series: *Essays and Researches*, No. 5.)

One of the gaps in our knowledge of the Greek drama is caused by the inability of scholars to agree in saying what the original production of a fifth-century play actually looked like. Vase paintings, the ruins of ancient theatres, literary testimony, and hints in the plays themselves have given us an approximate picture. But large sections of it remain blurred. Hourmouziades, in attacking this problem, has narrowed the scope of his inquiry to the plays of Euripides. He defends the relevance of the "internal evidence" thus gathered by the fair assumption that Euripides, in writing his plays, would not have created insoluble technical problems for their production.

Hourmouziades begins with the scene-building, which in his view underwent no essential changes between the earliest and the latest of Euripides' extant plays. Although it was wooden and might

have been altered with ease, radical change was made impractical by the permanent sockets in the breccia foundation, by the shape of scenery panels and mechanical devices, and by the requirement that the building serve as the neutral background for many different plays (pp. 6-7). Internal evidence shows that nearly all Euripides' plays are designed to take place before a building or dwelling, whether palace, temple, private house, hut, barrack, or cave. Yet, as a rule, references to this background are vaguely worded, suggesting the poet's hesitation to describe in detail what was visibly a standard set (p. 13). There was a practicable central door, opening in and often attended by a porter. He thinks there may have been side doors as well, but in none of the five scenes that he adduces do I find his objections to a single door decisive (pp. 21-5). He rejects as unproved the hypothesis of a *prothyron*, while acknowledging that it would make some scenes more effective (p. 28). The roof, he points out, was accessible from the interior, with room for at least three people (as required by the end of the *Orestes*). It also held, he thinks, a wooden superstructure to screen the *mechane* and to provide a platform for unusually striking appearances (pp. 29-34).

The section on *skenographia* leads him into a more controversial matter, viz. the degree of realism in scenic decoration. Solid evidence on this point is scarce, and so he appeals to what the logic of Greek theatre production supposedly demanded. Unlike the plays of Shakespeare, in which the dramatic locale changes at the poet's will and is richly described with imagined details that the audience does not expect to see, Greek tragedies are laid before a definite background which, generally speaking, remains unchanged. Consequently, "the areas of production and imagination are kept distinct from each other" (p. 37). In practical terms this means that spare descriptions of the background are evidence of spare decoration, and references in a play to visible details of the setting are good clues to what the audience actually saw. When these clues multiply in the later plays, Hourmouziades concludes that realism, nearly everywhere triumphant in the arts, had influenced scenic decoration too (p. 38). The painter Agatharchus and his school enabled "the producers of the fifth century to subject the background to certain alterations so as to look different from what it actually was, and, consequently, to suit plays with various scenic requirements" (p. 41). But Agatharchan illusionism need not imply adaptation of the scene to different plays (see P. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions* [Oxford, 1962], p. 94). Hourmouziades' arguments to the contrary (pp. 38-41), which include dating Agatharchus to the late fifth century (in agreement with Rumpf and Webster), are worthy of attention but to my mind not convincing.

Hourmouziades believes that, in spite of a fundamental realism, decoration remained simple. A few basic sets sufficed, among them a palace or temple background, a multiple-dwelling scene, and a country scene. Movable panels established the basic distinctions. Portable stage properties, e.g. altars and tombs, might also be required from time to time. The parodos of the *Ion*, however, with its elaborate description by the chorus of what they see as they stand before the temple at Delphi, seems to present "a unique case" (p. 53). What did the audience see? Hourmouziades'

answer is that the chorus, standing before the east pediment, is mainly describing the west pediment sculptures. This he takes to be "a very clever trick of the poet: his chorus described the side of the temple which was not visible simply because nothing of what was referred to in the description was seen by the audience" (p. 56). Yet somehow it is all visible to the chorus (σκέψαι, δερκόμεσθα, λεύσσεις, λεύσσω, ὄρω, 206-14). There is no easy solution to the problems of scenic decoration in this play, and Hourmouziades is to be commended for attacking them squarely. But the results hardly vindicate his theory of a sharp distinction between the areas of production and imagination, and they make less credible his argument that in general the mention of something as visible implies its visual representation.

Whether there was a raised stage (*logeion*) in the fifth-century theatre is a question to which archaeology and the study of literary texts have as yet given no definitive answer. Hourmouziades has re-argued Haigh's case for a low stage (*The Attic Theatre*, 3rd ed. [Oxford, 1907], p. 143), which others have defended from time to time, and which Pickard-Cambridge, who once accepted it, repudiated in his book *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens* (Oxford, 1946), pp. v and 30-74. I do not think that Hourmouziades' arguments have settled this difficult issue. What is clear is that a high stage is out of the question, since some scenes require free movement between orchestra and scene building, and that archaeological evidence is consistent with the existence of no stage at all (Margarete Bieber, *The History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, 2nd ed. [Princeton, 1961], p. 60). Hourmouziades argues, however, that the requirement of an elevation of some sort in several Aeschylean plays "suggests the presence of a *logeion*" (p. 61). But the orchestra terrace and temporary structures would have sufficed (Pickard-Cambridge, pp. 33 ff.; Bieber, p. 57). Nor can one be confident that *paraskenia* were meant to frame a stage, or even that they existed at all in the fifth century (see T. B. L. Webster, "Staging and Scenery in the Ancient Greek Theatre," *Bull. John Rylands Library*, XLII [1960], pp. 503 ff.). That the chorus does not normally mingle with the actors need not reflect a difference in elevation but only a difference in function. The failure of the chorus to intervene when Hecuba is about to faint (*Troades*, 462-5), if it is not simply an expression of conventional detachment, may only prove that a slight distance separates her from them. On the other hand, Hourmouziades is clearly right in rejecting Pickard-Cambridge's argument (*Theatre*, p. 71) that the chorus, embodying "the spirit and soul of the poet's teaching" and commanding "the main interest of the audience," could not have performed on a lower level than the actors (p. 67). So inflated a view of the importance of the late fifth-century chorus can prove nothing about scenic design. Hourmouziades also argues persuasively for the improved visibility which a low stage would have permitted in the performance of scenes in which characters sit, kneel, or lie down (p. 72). Yet good management of stage movements could have reduced problems of visibility to a minimum even here. In spite of the continuing vigor of polemic, mutual concessions have left little ground between advocates of a stage and its opponents. Pickard-Cambridge, e. g., rejected a stage three or four

feet in height but allowed, in some plays, an elevation of one or two steps as an architectural feature of the scene-building (*Theatre*, pp. 47, 74). Hourmouziades would give us a stage reached by two or three steps, one which might at times represent the *crepidoma* of a temple (p. 58 and n. 5).

Hourmouziades believes that the *ecyclema* was used in the fifth century, and he has the weight of evidence in his favor. One of his strongest arguments is that without it certain scenes, of which *Heracles*, 1928 ff. is the best example, would have been clumsy and ineffective. A tableau composed of several persons, some behind others, located far enough within the doorway to be clear of the inward-swirling doors, would have been visible to only a segment of the audience. Moreover, the humor of *Acharnians*, 408 ff. and of *Thesmophoriazusaë*, 95 ff. is much diminished unless we suppose a parody of the tragic *ecyclema*. The matter is not so clear in other plays. Hourmouziades, following a scholiast, assumes that the device was used at *Clouds*, 184 ff., when the students of the *phrontisterion* come into view. The presence of "various scientific instruments etc. clearly indicates that he [Strepsiades] has actually entered the Phrontisterion," i. e. mounted the *ecyclema* (p. 103, n. 1). But the students could have walked out, bringing the equipment with them. This may be why they talk of going back "inside" (195 ff.). On the other hand, in a scene which used the *ecyclema*, such talk might be part of the joke (a possibility overlooked by Pickard-Cambridge, p. 104). In short, a capable group of actors could have performed the scene either way. In discussing another play, Euripides' *Cresphontes*, Hourmouziades has revived the theory that the spectacular scene in which Merope recognizes her own son just as she is on the point of killing him was performed on the *ecyclema*. This reconstruction has in its favor the fact that it closely follows the story as told by Hyginus (*Fab.*, 137), and it makes the detail of *Cresphontes*' sleep relevant and dramatically effective. With the intended victim awake and out of doors, as in C. Robert's reconstruction ("Zur Theaterfrage," *Hermes*, XXXII [1897], p. 428; he follows O. Jahn), the danger to *Cresphontes* of failing to be recognized in time would have been much less. However, Hourmouziades has ignored an ambiguity in the evidence. It is not certain that Hyginus follows Euripides in implying that the attack took place indoors and that the victim was asleep. In at least one major detail, the name "*Telephontes*" instead of "*Cresphontes*," his version is not Euripidean (W. Schmid, O. Stählin, *Gesch. d. Griech. Lit.*, I, 3, 1, pp. 395-6, makes "*Telephontes*" an assumed name, but that is not the implication of Hyginus' phrasing). While there is much to be said in support of Hourmouziades' theory, Euripides may have chosen to avoid so unusual a use of the *ecyclema* by having his hero fall asleep out of doors, like Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, or by having him awaken and emerge from the palace to find the aroused Merope.

In his discussion of imagined interiors and invisible off-stage areas, the author shows that Euripides normally used common sense rather than a foolish consistency, but it is not always clear that any issue of importance depends on this fact. There are occasional examples of excessive literal-mindedness. *Orestes*, 98 and 108, e. g., which simply express Helen's reluctance to appear in public or to

allow her daughter to do so, should not be given topographical implications and used to prove that "the way from Clytemnestra's tomb to the palace goes through the city" (p. 133, n. 1). Supernatural appearances are discussed ably in an appendix. The author thinks the *mechane* was certainly used in five plays of Euripides (*Medea*, *Andromache*, *Heracles*, *Electra*, *Orestes*) and probably in four others (*Hippolytus*, *Ion*, *Helen*, *Bacchae*).

In a book about the staging of ancient plays it is natural that far more questions should be raised than solved. Hourmouziades can be criticized for claiming at times to have solved problems for which there is only scant or ambiguous evidence. On the whole, however, he has done a service by handling a number of issues intelligently and by discussing dozens of Euripidean passages from a fresh point of view.

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VINCENZO DI BENEDETTO. Euripidis Orestes. Introduzione, testo critico, commento e appendice metrica. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia" Editrice, 1965. Pp. xxxi + 318. L. 4,500. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori*, LI.)

Here, in answer to my plea that more attention be paid to the late Euripides, is another, much longer commentary (303 pages of close single-spaced discussion, plus an introduction concerning the MS tradition and a metrical appendix). Only the brazen-hearted will read it through. It provides, for those who are interested, a good deal of useful information about Euripidean phrasing and dramaturgy, and for anyone studying the *Orestes* it is indispensable and (if such be possible) too short.

Di Benedetto's commentary shows considerable erudition and a fine feeling for Greek nuances. Whether he is distinguishing between $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \acute{o}\upsilon\chi\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\alpha\varsigma$ (line 30) and $\acute{o}\iota\ \pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\alpha\varsigma$, or describing the effect of a shift from optative to future indicative (508-9), or commenting on dramatic effects, the relevance of style to speaker, or the significance of shifting levels of diction (especially in the later scenes involving the Phrygian and Menelaus), he has sought after and frequently pinned down, as few scholars can, "la sfumatura precisa" of a word, phrase, or line in its immediate dramatic context. The scope of his erudition is fairly wide; he knows the fragmentary remains of the sophists very well and the attempts made to reconstruct their ideas. On occasion, the allusions he sees to ideas of Anaxagoras or Protagoras (6-7, 314-15) are probably misleading, but most parallel passages cited from Euripides or other writers are persuasive.

The edition itself is fairly conservative. Di Benedetto's judgments, like Biehl's,¹ will excite little controversy, for most pas-

¹ *Euripides, Orestes*, erklärt von Werner Biehl (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1965). Cf. my review in this Journal, LXXXVIII (1967), pp. 360-3.

sages are undisputed. In line 384 he reads αὐτὸν. I would prefer the MSS reading, αὐτὸς (translating, "You yourself have arrived at the critical moment of troubles," which ironically foreshadows Menelaus' deeper, as yet unrealized involvement in Orestes' fate). A similar irony corroborates his retention of Paley's emendation, τόδε δοκεῖν, in 782 (Orestes may *think* the plan will work, but he is deceived). We are reminded, too (as at 1385-86), that there are moments of despair when the wise editor—like the mad hero—will use his dagger.

Few lines are reassigned to different speakers. Di Benedetto argues convincingly that Electra joins the chorus in singing lines 1302-10—a fine operative effect. The punctuation is conservative. Couldn't 1581 be an indignant question?

Like Biehl, Di Benedetto gives much attention to questions of interpolation. Here the two frequently differ. Biehl rejected 626, but Di Benedetto has convinced me that 537 must go instead. In three instances he may reject verses prematurely. Line 127 is very useful: it not only conveys a favorite Euripidean theme, the instability of human nature, however noble (compare especially *Hecuba*), but looks forward to the later importance of the *soteria* motif. Lines 602-4, if removed, leave a vacuum: without them, 605-6 seem uncalled for and silly. In rejecting 716, Di Benedetto disagrees, I think wrongly, with Pohlenz, who perceived a connection between 488 and 716. It is an ironic reversal, one of many in the play—and surely Di Benedetto is mistaken when he claims that such "richiami a distanza" are foreign to Euripides' practice and would not be perceived by his audience. (Aristophanes and Thucydides show clearly enough that, whatever their follies, late fifth century Athenians were great listeners.)

This brings me to what I consider a chief weakness of the commentary. Di Benedetto supplies close and painstaking discussions of a number of troubled passages (e.g., to take some of the most helpful, on lines 205-7, 318 ff., 396, 485-8, 502, 606, 705, 755, 1086-7, 1324-5, and 1550; only one difficult line, 308, goes altogether without comment). However, he too often misses those cross-references that illuminate the meaning of individual words, phrases, and lines in the context of the play taken as a whole. (Here we miss Biehl's leitmotifs like "Entlastung" and his thoughtful introductions to the different scenes.) Comparison of lines 213-14 and 240 with 236 would suggest that the question raised in 236 is ethical, not epistemological: does deception bring greater happiness than the awareness of reality? The meaning of ὄχλος in 282 is best seen if we compare 108, where too ὄχλος is contrasted with παρθένος. As always in Euripides, there is much foreshadowing, and motifs latent in the first part of the play become explicit in the second. Already line 125 helps us anticipate Hermione's return, while 659, where Orestes says Ἑρμιόνην μὴ κτεῖνε σύ, is a triumph of prophetic irony and ambiguity (we must constantly remember that Euripides, like the gods, knows what must happen). In 387 ἡγρίωσαι conveys more than physical description: it looks forward to Orestes' ferocity of spirit late in the play, where the animal metaphors of 1272 and other lines take on an almost literal reality.

Let me finally mention four large questions of interpretation raised but inadequately answered by this commentary.

First, how far are we justified in explaining Orestes' suffering in merely psychological and subjective terms? Surely this and every play of Euripides has a metaphysical dimension that matters seriously. We cannot write off the Erinyes as "un fenomeno puramente interiore": they have a certain demonic reality, and Orestes' νόσος belongs to history itself. Apollo's bow, whether seen on stage or not (and probably not), is more than an indication of Orestes' madness; it is significant that Orestes must struggle, unaided by an Apollo of Aeschylean benignity and foresight, in his own defense.

Second, Orestes may not be absolved of his guilt too easily, whether by himself, his sister, or the modern commentator. Justification is not to the point. Euripides shows instead how guilt, whether real or imagined, leads to further guilt (whether real or imagined), the murder of Clytemnestra to the "murder" of Helen. Di Benedetto misses the complexity of the relationship between these two events—although, by a curious slip (one of very few), he writes Helen for Clytemnestra on page 26. Biehl, with his leitmotifs, more successfully traces the escalation of guilt in this play.

Third, we do injustice to Euripides' intellect and sensitivity if we see any one play as a reaction only to recent historical events. Gilbert Murray went much further; still, certain biographical assumptions of Di Benedetto are unwarranted. Has Euripides' feeling for the "instability of life" (Di Benedetto on 979-81) altered so radically, even under pressure of the war, since he wrote *Medea* and *Hippolytus*? And if he had a "crisis of democratic convictions" (Di Benedetto on 1168), can we ascribe it to any one time or circumstance?

Fourth (and this bears most particularly on the play), Di Benedetto regards the last part of *Orestes* as an artificial, spectacular effort of Euripides to compensate for the absence of genuine dramatic tension towards the end of the play. I strongly disagree. Admittedly, Orestes' desperation goes beyond all rational calculation; but he starts to burn down the palace not because a mechanical scheme requires such an action, or because Euripides needed violent melodrama, but rather because, as Thucydides and Aristophanes also testify in their different ways, the best-planned human actions frequently get out of control. Sicily is not the only example. Coups are sudden and senseless, Greek tragedy and history universal.

We may well ask (to leave this fine commentary) whether Euripides is saying, with Apollo, towards the very end,

ἴτε νυν καθ' ὁδόν, τὴν καλλίστην
θεῶν Εἰρήνην τιμώντες.

And if so, why the apotheosis of Helen?

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J. E. RAVEN. *Plato's Thought in the Making. A Study of the Development of his Metaphysics.* Cambridge, University Press, 1965. Pp. xi + 256. \$5.50.

Professor Raven's book is an interpretation of the development of Plato's metaphysics (p. viii). Like most contemporary scholars, he accepts the view that the chronological order in which the dialogues were written reflects the actual development of Plato's thought (pp. 19-41). Although his preface might lead one to believe that the book is intended for non-specialists (p. vii), it raises perennial problems confronting Platonic scholarship.

Raven begins with a short history of Greek philosophy from Thales to Socrates (pp. 1-8). Platonism is characterized as "essentially a metaphysical or ontological theory of nature which grew gradually out of the prior Socratic problem of how we ought to live our lives" (p. 11). Regarded as a preparation for the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras* is included among the early or Socratic dialogues (p. 49). The hedonism of Socrates in the *Protagoras* (351 B 3 f.), a position akin to that of Callicles in the *Gorgias* (p. 46), is dismissed as merely apparent (pp. 45-9).

Raven considers the *Gorgias* the culmination of Plato's Socratic period, while the *Meno* is viewed as the beginning of a new, creative phase (p. 54). The *Meno's* myth of Recollection and its hypothetical method (pp. 59-70) are said to be further amplified in the *Phaedo* (pp. 89-100) which is dated before the *Symposium*. The *Republic* is taken to be a synthesis of the *Phaedo's* austerity and the warmth characteristic of the *Symposium* (pp. 75, 118). The analogies of the Sun and the Divided Line in the *Republic* are both interpreted as exclusively concerned with illuminating the realm of Ideas or Forms; they are not meant to provide an exhaustive picture of every state of mind from sense-images to intelligible reality (pp. 146-51). Only the Cave analogy is said to fulfill this latter function (pp. 164-71). Raven understands the Idea of the Good, enigmatically described in the *Republic*, as the ultimate goal of the hypothetical method first mentioned in the *Meno* (pp. 157-62). He finds the dialectic leading to its apprehension further adumbrated in the *Phaedrus* and the later dialogues, especially the *Sophist* (p. 161). However, he admits that even the *Sophist* leaves our knowledge of dialectic fragmentary, since no mention is made of the universal Good without which all the other Ideas remain uncoordinated into a unified whole (pp. 233-4).

According to Raven, the third part of the Divided Line represents the uncoordinated plurality of Ideas whose truth is simply assumed, since the Good constituting their *raison d'être* is unapprehended on this level of cognition (pp. 155-9). Raven is certain that Plato was less informative to posterity than he was to his students concerning the coordination of the *Sophist's summa genera* into an all embracing unity under the Good (p. 234). For he is convinced that Plato's thought after the *Republic* subscribed to the notion of the Good championed by the *Republic's* Socrates. Indeed Raven's concept of Plato's mental development rests on the assumption that Plato at different times in his career embraced views ascribed by him to his Socrates and to various other characters created by him.

It is one thing to note that Plato's Socrates or his Eleatic Stranger maintains a certain position; it is something else to contend that either are spokesmen for Plato's own views.¹ What Raven asserts about the Divided Line applies to all Platonic interpretation: "... a correct interpretation must depend on a correct reading of Plato's psychology. Our only reliable clues to Plato's psychology are to be found in Plato's own words" (p. 144; cf. 106). Since Plato never speaks in his own name in the dialogues,² his opinions, as expressed in the words put by him into the mouths of his characters, are subject to more than one interpretation, unless the interpreter has attained the infallible cognition native to the fourth part of the Divided Line. Scholars whose work springs from the unproven assumptions populating the third part of the Divided Line are in no position to brand opposing hypotheses, which succeed in coherently accounting for Plato's thought, as obviously wrong. Thus I do not perceive why Raven maintains that "it is perverse to reject" the evolutionary hypothesis of Plato's thought (p. 41). Although he has produced an interesting interpretation based on that assumption, neither he nor anyone else—to my knowledge—has proved the hypothesis itself. How can one know with certainty what ideas Plato supported and when he supported them? Is the account of Plato's life in the *Seventh Letter*, on which Raven relies heavily, trustworthy? Is it "no longer a mere conjecture but an almost irresistible conclusion from the *Meno* that the theory of Ideas first dawned on Plato's mind as a result of his reflection on what he had learnt . . . from the Pythagoreans" (p. 69)?

Given the uncertain authenticity of the Letters and Plato's silence in the dialogues, it would be difficult to disqualify any interpretation capable of coordinating the plurality of dialogues into a unified whole. Yet, one should not lose sight of various possible interpretations. For example, one need not trace the origin of Plato's concern with separate ideas to an interest in Pythagorean thought. Thus according to K. Popper,³ the Platonic *χωρισμός* was intended to provide his philosopher-kings with the absolute political power demanded by what he considered prudent statesmanship. For Popper, tyrannical aspirations led Plato to reject any superhuman, transcendent authority capable of operating in the temporal realm. If Plato's Ideas and, in particular, his absolute Good, possessed the independent reality condemned by Aristotle, the decisive factor in Platonic morality might well be one's intention in using one's knowledge of the Ideas, for they themselves would be impotent in worldly affairs.⁴ In practice, therefore, Platonic dualism may be

¹ Cf. P. Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy," *J. H. I.*, VIII (1947), pp. 406-30; L. Edelstein, "Platonic Anonymity," *A. J. P.*, LXXXIII (1962), pp. 1-22; J. Klein, *A Commentary on Plato's Meno* (Chapel Hill, 1965), pp. 3-31.

² However, he is mentioned three times in the dialogues and not once (*Phaedo*, 59B10) as Raven claims (p. 85); cf. *Apology*, 34A1, 38B6.

³ K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, I⁴ (Harper, 1963), pp. 78 f., cf. pp. 74 f., 142 f., 155, 284 (n. 60). Against Popper, see R. Levinson, *In Defence of Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 398 ff., 499-579.

⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096b32-1097a15 and C. Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*² (Berlin, 1963), p. 66: "Die Berufung auf

interpreted as depriving politics of divine or superhuman supports. Attempts to interpret Plato as a tyrannical nature are, of course, open to question, although I do not believe that they have been decisively refuted. In any case, such efforts permit one to notice aspects of the dialogues to which Raven's interpretation pays scant attention. Thus he makes no mention of the "Machiavellian" origins of the *Republic's* ideal polity. Yet, in the *Republic* (372D4-373E7) the need for philosophy and philosophic rulers arises out of Glaucon's rejection of ἡ ἀληθινὴ πόλις . . . ὥσπερ ὑγίης τις as a ὑὼν πόλις. Instead he prefers the city described by Socrates as φλεγμαίνουσα and as moved by a craving for luxuries which goads it on to unprovoked aggression against its neighbors (cf. *Republic*, 572D8-573D5). To curb the tyrannical bent of its citizens, philosopher-kings and soldiers to execute their directives become necessary. In this way, philosophical and military education finds an essential place in Socrates' Utopia.

Raven's certainty that Plato is concerned mainly with a metaphysics intended to reinforce Socratic idealism encourages one to overlook such aspects of the dialogues. According to Raven, Plato shared his Glaucon's condescension toward what Glaucon calls "a city of pigs," the community of "the artisans, the shopkeepers, and the merchants": "He is not in fact concerned with them at all" (p. 121). In the same spirit, Raven notes the antagonism between Socrates and the sophists or rhetoricians (pp. 7-9, 49-50), without paying sufficient attention to what they have in common. For example, he fails to consider that Plato's Socrates shares the notion that virtue is knowledge or that wisdom should rule with Plato's Thrasymachus, Callicles, and Protagoras.⁵ Plato's sophists and rhetoricians disagree with his Socrates about the nature of knowledge and virtue, not about the equation of the two. Both regard man as capable of infallible insight into life's ultimate Good, however differently they view that absolute (e.g., as philosophical contemplation or as tyrannical power). In this sense, both Plato's Socrates and his sophists were teleologically oriented.

Raven contends that the science of Plato and, to a lesser extent, that of Aristotle, was vitiated by teleology (pp. 239, 229-32, 178-80). In regard to the discussion of Necessity in the *Timaeus* (47E3 f.), Raven claims that Timaeus here "momentarily deserts science and reverts to first principles" (p. 240). Yet, would not the *Republic's* Socrates have insisted that if science means genuine knowledge, it necessarily involves certain cognition of the first principle? For

das Recht [könnte] bedeuten, dass ein höheres oder richtigeres Recht, ein sogenannter Natur- oder Vernunft-Recht dem Recht des *status quo* entgegengesetzt wird; dann ist es für einen Politiker selbstverständlich, dass die 'Herrschaft' oder 'Souveränität' dieser Art Recht die Herrschaft und Souveränität der Menschen bedeutet, die sich . . . darüber entscheiden . . . wie und von wem es angewandt werden soll."

⁵ *Republic*, 340D1-341A4; *Gorgias*, 489E1-490A8; *Protagoras*, 352A8-353A8; cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), pp. 184 ff., 197 (n. 29); G. B. Kerferd, "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*," *Durham University Journal* (1947-8), pp. 19-27. My views on this matter are contained in "Plato's *Republic*: Utopia or Dystopia?" *Modern Schoolman*, XLIV (1967), pp. 319-30.

without comprehension of the Good all other knowledge is said to be worthless (*Republic*, 505A2-B4).

Raven is apparently convinced that modern science is more scientific than the teleological science of Aristotle or of Plato's *Timaeus*. An adequate discussion of this immense problem would be out of place here. In any case, Raven notes that the formulas or laws of modern science would be located by Socrates on the third part of the Divided Line (p. 158), the realm of unproven hypotheses. Raven (p. 145) considers it an "irrelevant accident" that mathematically the third part of the Line, hypothetical reason (*διάνοια*), equals the second, belief or faith (*πίστις*). Yet, in the absence of true knowledge will not the scientific or unscientific hypotheses of the third part necessarily arise from mere opinion or faith (*πίστις*)?

Raven contends that Plato's basically religious approach to philosophy is revealed in the *Republic's* Myth of Er (p. 187). But, as in the case of *Timaeus's* myth, its fanciful imagery should not blind one to its essential rationalism. At the Myth's close (619B7-D10), Socrates makes it clear that moral excellence based on the conviction (*πίστις*) produced by conventional indoctrination devoid of philosophic insight is, in fact, a thin veneer concealing, but not altering, tyrannical cravings (cf. *Phaedo*, 82A10-C1).

Mere trust or belief (*πίστις*) would not have sufficed for either Socrates or his opponent, Thrasymachus. Neither would therefore have had much use for a concept of scientific knowledge incapable of revealing the ultimate good of all their efforts, including their science.

Concentrating almost exclusively on what he judges to be Plato's metaphysical development, Raven naturally places less emphasis on other aspects of the dialogues. Certainly he has produced a cogent and provocative exposition of what that development may have been. Perhaps no one can do more. At any rate, his book, like any fruitful hypothesis about Plato, compels one to seek that non-hypothetical or "correct reading of Plato's psychology" (p. 144) which alone could give rise to a definitive interpretation.

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LILY ROSS TAYLOR. *Roman Voting Assemblies*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. xix + 175. \$7.50.

Ever since it was known that Miss Taylor was to deliver the eighth series of Jerome Lectures those who did not have the good fortune to be in either Rome or Ann Arbor to hear them have been eagerly awaiting their appearance in published form. Their expectations have now been fulfilled, and the book will not disappoint them: it constitutes another distinguished contribution to her series of studies on the political life of the Roman Republic. Not that we have here a narrative account, or list, of the decisions and doings of the assemblies in the last two centuries B. C., since this is not a

book of history. But it is a most useful handbook for the historian, a manual in which he will find recorded everything of moment about the meetings of the Roman People and their organization.

The importance of political machinery in the Roman state has always been manifest, even if its details have not been fully understood. Now the exact manner in which it could be manipulated to ensure the passage of certain bills or the election of certain individuals is meticulously set forth as never before. By describing precisely both the make-up of the various assemblies and the mechanics of their workings, Miss Taylor flashes many an illuminating light on aspects of Roman life that have hitherto received scant and unsatisfactory treatment. Everything that she says will reward careful perusal. Searching exploitation of new archaeological and old numismatic evidence and an easy familiarity with the literary sources have enabled her to show how incorrect is the widespread notion that *comitia tributa* and *concilium plebis* were virtually indistinguishable, how distinctly separate from the *forum* the *comitium* really was, and how possible it was for voters to be, quite literally, excluded from the *saepta*. Fundamental is her demonstration that *comitia*, whether elective, legislative, or judicial, were invariably preceded by *contiones*, and it is a major merit of her work to have placed this securely beyond doubt. It must now be accepted as a fact of cardinal importance, and once this is firmly realized much of what took place in the different assemblies becomes clear. Probably no one harbors the illusion that they represented democracy in action (see especially p. 83). But now it becomes evident (p. 37) that the usual assertion about the urban mob dominating them is also erroneous. There were ways and means by which the assemblies could be made to serve personal ends, and Miss Taylor gives as complete a picture as the existing evidence permits of the methods by which the ambitious, the wily, and the unscrupulous could rig them. There are still some things she does not tell us. Precisely how, for instance, did a voter establish his identity? *Curatores*, with some help no doubt from the *divisores*, were supposed to see to it that only those entitled to vote actually did so (see p. 69). But how did they detect malingerers? How did a visitor from, say, distant Vibo Valentia establish his right to vote in the tribe selected for Latins? Miss Taylor does not go into this matter, presumably because there is no known answer. In other respects her work is a wonderful mine of information.

The book is well printed and slips are few. Dr. Carney's initials are T. F., not T. E. (p. 128, n. 23); and it should be "choose" not "chose" on p. 98. Moreover, should not "candidate" replace "voter" on p. 79 (line 5 from the bottom)? Has the verb "were" dropped out of the second last line on p. 99? The Samnite war mentioned in p. 153 (n. 21) would better be described as "the Third" than as "the great"; and it seems inexact to say (p. 65) that "no new tribe was ever created" after 241: were not at least two, and possibly more, brought into a short-lived existence in 90 B. C. (see Appian, *B. C.*, I, 49, 214 f.)? But these are trivia that hardly diminish our immense debt to the author.

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ALAIN HUS. *Docere et les mots de la famille de docere. Étude de sémantique latine.* Presses Universitaires de France, 1965. Pp. xxii + 409. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Rennes.*)

M. Hus has distinguished the meanings and shades of meaning of *docere* and the words related to it and has given a detailed historical and statistical account of them from Livius Andronicus to Hadrian. A six-page brochure outlining the meanings and shades of meaning facilitates cross reference.

This is a very good book, the product of acumen and careful and extensive research. The copious and involved material is well organized. Of the many results that Hus' study has yielded, only a few can be reported in this brief review.

Docere usually signifies "to teach" or "to inform," in one or another aspect of these senses. Some meanings in which "teaching" or "informing" has more or less receded are "prove" (*Ad Heren.*, IV, 8), "reveal" (*Cic., Cat.*, II, 13), "persuade" (*Cic., Ad Att.*, II, 19, 2), "compel" (*Lucr.*, IV, 317 [341]).

Among the meanings of *doctus* are "ingenious," "astute," "intelligent," "skillful," "instructed," "educated," "learned," "cultivated," "informed." Hus' detailed discussion of *poeta doctus* may be summarized, in part, as follows. To Cicero, a *poeta doctus* is one who, endowed with superior ability, has become a master of all the resources of his language (pp. 215-216). On the other hand, in *Tusc.*, I, 3 Cicero, like Lucretius (II, 600), characterizes some of the poets of ancient Greece as *docti* by reason of their mastery of the wisdom of the ancients; but, unlike Lucretius, not once does he call them *docti poetae* (pp. 219-20). When a poet of the empire characterizes another poet as *doctus*, he is referring primarily to technique. Learning is always in the writer's mind, but it has a subordinate place (p. 241).

In the republic *doctor* denoted a specialist in the teaching and theory of an intellectual discipline. Cicero involved it, as well as *docere* and *doctus*, in the highest ranges of intellectual activity (p. 276). In the empire *doctor* designated a teacher of other kinds of subjects too, including agriculture, dance, gymnastics, the gladiatorial art. Cicero's honorific use is continued by the Church (p. 275).

The author, apparently influenced by Schaerer,¹ states (p. 307) that the ancients had no clear conception of science as objective and did not distinguish it from a thinker's perception of it. *Doctrina*, he says, "was one of the rare Latin words in which the idea of scientific objectivity was discernible. But the mentality of the ancients was still too close to primitive categories for even a Cicero to be able to change it completely (*bouleverser*)."² This disparagement of the ancients seems to me unwarranted. And does the author mean to imply, in the reference to Cicero just quoted and in the statements that Cicero yields forty-two examples of *doctrina* desig-

¹ Just before making this statement, the author cites p. 43 of R. Schaerer, *Ἐπιστήμη et τέχνη, Étude sur les notions de connaissance et d'art d'Homère à Platon* (Diss. Lausanne, 1926).

nating a "science considered in itself" (p. 301) and that Lucretius understood the meaning of "scientific system" (p. 307, n. 37), that these two Romans were farther removed from "primitive categories" than were any of the Greeks?

It is sometimes difficult, as Hus points out (p. 306), to distinguish between an objective and a subjective meaning of *doctrina*. This is true, e. g., of Nep., *Epam.*, II 2: *At philosophiae praeceptorem habuit Lysim Pythagoreum . . . neque prius eum a se dimisit quam in doctrinis tanto antecessit cœdiscipulos ut facile intellegi posset pari modo superaturum omnes in ceteris artibus*. Hus regards *doctrinis* as objective, meaning "philosophical systems" (p. 314). It seems to me subjective, signifying "knowledge of philosophical systems." (For *doctrina* [singular] meaning "knowledge of philosophy" see p. 298.)

Doctrina has other meanings too, which the author presents in detail. His discussions of *doctrina*, "culture," in relation to *ars*, *sapientia*, and *humanitas* are especially instructive.

Hus' semantic analysis of *docilis* throws light on two passages in Propertius, though he himself does not follow the gleam. In I, 2, 12, *Et sciat indocilis currere lympa vias*, he takes *indocilis* with *lympa* (p. 349). However, *vias* is flat without a modifier. *Indocilis* qualifies *vias*, in my judgment, and means "untaught." This sense of the adjective would be an extension of that in Cic., *Ac.*, II, 2, *indocilem usus disciplinam*, cited p. 342 and interpreted, "(lessons) . . . that cannot be taught." From "unteachable" to "untaught" is a short step, especially for Propertius. In Prop., IV, 2, 63, *Me tam docilis potuisti fundere in usus*, a bronze statue of Vertumnus is addressing the artist who molded him. He has told how, with changed accessories, he can represent a great variety of characters. Hus (p. 349) is uncertain about the interpretation of *docilis*. Is it not an accusative, denoting "pliant," "possessing an aptitude for complete adaptation," a meaning which Hus presents on p. 345? Strictly it is the statue that is adaptable or pliant. If this interpretation is correct, we have here an effective use of the transferred epithet.

The most frequent meanings of *documentum* are "example" (to be avoided or, less often, to be followed), "precedent," "illustration" (pp. 354, 359). Contrary to the practice of Cicero, Sallust sometimes employs *documentum* in the sense of *argumentum*, "proof." In this he is followed by Livy and Tacitus. Quintilian uses the word in this sense only (p. 361). *Documentum* is an historian's word and is used thirty-four times by Livy (p. 359). It never signifies "document" (p. 360).

This review has stressed Hus' interpretations of words, for, since they will help in the exact understanding of passages in literature, they are his most valuable contribution. The general conclusions are of secondary importance, but they too are full of interest. In his final chapter, which is in large part a summary, Hus traces the development of the meanings of the words he has studied, their interrelations, the effect of cultural changes upon their connotations. All this is preceded by a discussion of their etymology. The author reaffirms his preference for the etymology proposed by G.

Redard,² which, as he stated in the Introduction (p. 3, n. 8) seems to him to agree, though not entirely, with his own observations.

P. 2, near foot, for *unannehmbär* read *annehmbär*. P. 220, line 3, for 5.600 read 2.600. P. 295 for *maiores* read *maiorum*. P. 305, Liddell is misspelt. P. 326, near center, for III C2 read IIIA.c2. P. 342, the reference to Cie., *Ac.*, I, 4 should be deleted. P. 353, second paragraph, for (p. 9) read (p. 10).

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JEAN TAILLARDAT. *Les images d'Aristophane. Études de langue et de style. Deuxième tirage, revue et corrigé.* Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1965. Pp. 553.

This is an attractive, hard-bound reprinting of a work which appeared in 1962 in the *Annales de l'Université de Lyon* (Troisième Série; Lettres; Fasc. 36). The original edition had a tip-in sheet of *corrigenda*, which have now been transferred to the text. Otherwise there are no changes which this reviewer could find by a random check. The work was originally a doctoral thesis, finished in 1956 but not published until 1962; therefore the author added in late 1961 three bibliographical items and two pages of *addenda* to his discussion of individual images, most of which refer to the *Dyscolus* of Menander, first published in 1958. Optimum use of the book is facilitated by three indices, of which the fullest is an index of Greek words studied. The Table of Contents is also detailed enough to serve as a topical index, which classifies images according to the subject-matter treated (e.g., Nature, Man, Society, etc., with various subheadings). Finally, Taillardat provides an excellent and very full bibliography (pp. 507-15).

So much for mechanics. Turning to the substance of the book, we may first note that Taillardat uses the term "image" as including both simile and metaphor; since they are inextricably mingled in Aristophanes' text, they must be treated together. There are currently two principal methods of studying imagery in ancient texts. The fashionable approach today is to study the function of one or more key or "controlling" images throughout a single text, as has been done for the *Antigone* by Robert Goheen and for Aeschylus by Robert Murray. The older, more traditional method is to identify and interpret seriatim each image in a given author. Taillardat's work falls emphatically into the latter class, and while adherents of the now not-so-New Criticism may find it somewhat disappointing, it may in the long run prove more useful to editors and serious students of Aristophanes. A brief Introduction and Conclusion frame what is essentially a lexicon of all significant images in Aristophanes, with some attention devoted to the fragmentary remains of other authors of Greek Comedy.

² "Du grec *δέκωαι*, je reçois, au sanskrit *atka*, *manteau*. Sens de la racine **dek-*," *Sprachgeschichte und Wortbedeutung* (Festschrift A. Debrunner [Berne, 1954]), pp. 351 ff.

In his Introduction, Taillardat notes that although all critics agree on Aristophanes' striking use of images, there are no studies which attempt to distinguish what images are common to the language of his age and what is owed to the comic poet's original use of language. A clear outline of the method of study of the work follows: the first step is to identify the image, usually with the aid of the scholia (the brief remarks on the scholia on pp. 9-11 are very helpful); the second is to determine the "tone" of the image (is it from ordinary language, from the elevated or "literary" style, or is it vulgar?). The third and most difficult task is to judge whether the image is original with Aristophanes, shared with other contemporary writers, or so common that it has become a cliché, or faded metaphor no longer felt as a real image. Criteria for each of these classes are established and discussed; Taillardat sagely recommends extreme caution in passing these judgments, in view of the limited amount of fifth century Greek that has survived; the fact that an image is not attested elsewhere in the Greek literary texts available to us does not prove that Aristophanes invented it. In any case, it is suggested that totally original images, created by Aristophanes *ex nihilo*, are quite rare. Taillardat also adds some interesting remarks on what he calls *permutant métaphorique*, or a "metaphoric series" based on synonyms or related words: "as soon as a word has received a metaphoric sense, all synonyms of the word are susceptible of receiving the same sense." Thus, if βλέπειν *vāpu*, "to give a mustardy look" receives the sense of "to give a bitter or harsh look," then any other sharp or bitter herb, seasoning, or liquid can replace *vāpu* in the phrase (e.g., oregano, acid, or vinegar). This is a fertile source of apparently but not really original images.

Images may be classified either according to the thing to which the object or action in the text is compared (the *tertium comparationis*), or according to the idea described (e.g., object, emotion, activity, etc.). Thus, in the common phrase, "a storm of protest," "storm" is the *tertium comparationis*, while "protest" is the idea or activity described. Taillardat decides rather hesitantly for the second method, for good reasons; but a number of miscellaneous images classified according to the *tertium comparationis* are gathered together in an appendix (pp. 475-93).

The bulk of the work (over 450 pages) is a long, detailed discussion of particular images, arranged in such categories as I Nature: (1) The heavens and the elements; (2) animals; (3) vegetables. Naturally, no summary of this section can be attempted; it will suffice to say that Taillardat shows great erudition in tracking down the sources of many images, as well as good sense and judgment in interpreting the material. Even if one cannot always agree with the author's interpretations, the relevant evidence is set forth clearly and the reader is free to form his own conclusions. Although many of his explanations agree with the standard commentators (who, after all, were not all fools), Taillardat also offers a goodly number of interpretations which are new, at least to this reviewer: e.g., his observations on the famous ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσε in *Frogs*, 1200-47, or the "Weighing of Verses" scene in the same comedy. I also found the sections on Aristophanes' use of terms relating to the arts, music, and literary criticism most instructive.

Conclusions are succinct and cautious. Taillardat concludes (justly, I think) from the evidence amassed to have justified his suggestion that few images were created by the poet *ex nihilo*, although an occasional original image may have been suggested by the stage-action (e.g., *Lys.*, 1003: the Spartans walk around bent over "like men carrying torches in a wind"). But most images seem to be drawn from the common store of the Greek language, or from the epic, lyric, and tragic styles. Aristophanes shows his ingenuity and originality in "rejuvenating" and "realizing" (i.e., making concrete) such common images. Incidentally, Aristophanes does not use mixed metaphors for comic effect, but incongruity, or disparity between the noble style of the image and the humble or familiar object or activity it represents is a frequent source of humor (especially in parodies). Images may dominate the structure of a single scene, but Taillardat denies the existence of key images throughout a whole play. *Per contra*, one may quote Whitman: ". . . it need hardly be said that the controlling image of the *Birds* is flying" (*Aristophanes and the Comic Hero*, p. 182). Finally, Taillardat suggests a comparison with a great French master of comic language, Rabelais: "In both authors, the suggestive power of words is enormous."

The book has been meticulously proofread and printed; I found no misprints and only a few minor errors: e.g., in *Knights*, 628-9, it is not the Sausage-Seller but Paphlagon who hurls "huge, rugged words" down on the knights (p. 281, ¶ 500). In the Parabasis of the *Clouds* (530 ff.), the comedy exposed because Aristophanes was too young to rear it was the *Daitaleis*, not the *Clouds* itself (p. 451, ¶ 778). In the same paragraph, it is hardly correct to say that the first *Clouds* "was appreciated only by the élite among the spectators"; Aristophanes clearly suggests that he is blaming these élite spectators for the poor reception of the play (ταῦτ' οὖν ὑμῖν μέμφομαι/ τοῖς σοφοῖς . . . 525-6).

But in general, I have nothing but praise for this book, which seems to embody the best traditions of French classical scholarship: it is clear, sound, judicious, and a pleasure to read. If few will want to read it through, all future editors and serious students of Old Comedy will want to keep it on their desk and consult it frequently.

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W. H. C. FREND. *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1965. Pp. xx + 625. £4 12s 6d.

This lengthy treatise on martyrdom and persecution in the Early Church was begun in 1951 at the suggestion of Hugh Last as a revision of E. G. Hardy's *Christianity and the Roman Government*. After attempting such a revision, however, W. H. C. Frend, Cambridge University Lecturer in Divinity, came to the conclusion that

it was impracticable on two different counts: "Apart from the mass of recent material which would have to be incorporated in foot-notes, Hardy wrote as a Classical scholar in an age dominated by Classical studies, whereas my approach was that of an historian, tending to attribute as much importance to the attitude of the Christians themselves and the influence of Christian doctrine as sources of conflict, as to the outlook of the Roman authorities and the legal system of the Roman Empire" (p. vii).

Frend is not unaware of the difficulties connected with his task and he mentions two in particular: the lack of a firm chronological framework into which to place many of the source materials and the further lack of definite criteria for determining the authenticity of the various *Acta Martyrum* (p. xi). To these he might have added a third: different theological convictions with respect to the value and meaning of martyrdom, which can lead to different interpretations of the frequently vague and conflicting evidence. Nevertheless, despite these obstacles, Frend believes that "the *Antike und Christentum* school on the Continent has made possible a new assessment of the first four centuries of Christian history," and that, as a consequence, "the persecutions and the whole field of Church-State relations in this period have become ripe for re-examination" (p. xiii).

Frend begins his re-examination of these Church-State relations with a description of the persecution at Lyons in the summer of 177. This account, which is preserved in Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, V, 1-3, tells us something about Christian "ideas regarding martyrdom," "the motives of the pagan population bent on the destruction of the Christian community," and "the official policy of the Empire towards the Church" (p. 1). After thus concretely setting up the problem, he discusses the meaning of martyrdom in the Old and New Testaments, the attitude of Rome towards foreign cults, the introduction of ruler worship from the Hellenistic East, the spread of Christianity, and the early conflicts between Jews and Christians. He then takes up successive phases in the struggle between Church and State and the final compromise effected in the fourth century.

As should be apparent from this brief outline, Frend has covered an immense amount of territory in a single volume. The copious notes which accompany each of the chapters and the thirty-two pages of bibliography are an indication of the diligence with which he has pursued his goal. Nevertheless, despite the mass of material he has accumulated and the erudition with which he has expounded it, a careful reader may get the impression that he has attempted too much. If, instead of treating both martyrdom and persecution in a single work, he had limited himself to one or other of these two themes, he might have reached more satisfactory conclusions. So much has been written in recent years on the concept of martyrdom in Late Judaic and Early Christian times that it is rather doubtful if anything significant could be discovered at this time, but the history of the Roman persecutions is quite another matter and certainly deserves to be reconsidered. Frend obviously believes that a historical study of the Jewish and Christian attitudes towards martyrdom is essential for an understanding of the persecutions.

But if this is so, he should have written an even longer book. My own opinion is that an investigation of the Roman persecutions of the Christians can easily prescind from Jewish antecedents. What Arnaldo Momigliano has noted with respect to the fourth century is quite applicable to the second and third as well: "Modern scholars have found it easy to prove that in form and substance the Jewish martyr is the prototype of the Christian martyr. Such scholarly discoveries have little relevance to the realities of the fourth century. The pupils hated their masters, and were hated in their turn" (*The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century* [Oxford, 1963], pp. 79-80).

The search for dependence of Christian upon Jewish attitudes towards martyrdom can lead to a loss of historical perspective. Frend, for example, states that "the account of the martyrdom at Lyons provides a starting-point for the study of the clash of cultures that divided the Ancient World, between the theocracy of the Jews and Christians and the equally universal claims of the Greco-Roman state. In this clash, martyrdom and persecution are the abiding features" (p. 1). But Christianity was never a theocracy in the same sense as Israel, and the early Christians shared in the common culture of the Greco-Roman world to a much greater extent than did the Jews. There is no evidence that they lived in separate quarters, much less in ghettos, but readily mingled with their pagan neighbors: *neque enim Brachmanae aut Indorum gymnosophistae sumus, silvicolae et exsules vitae . . . navigamus et nos vobiscum et militamus et rusticamur et mercamur: proinde miscemus, artes, operas nostras publicamus usui vestro* (Tertullian, *Apologeticum*, xlii). Moreover, the problem which confronted the Christians was quite different from that which confronted the Jews. Judaism was a *religio licita*. Though proselytism was generally prohibited, Jews could appeal to numerous edicts and decrees granting them special favors, privileges, and exemptions in the matter of public worship. The occasional persecutions which they suffered under the Romans resembled more the pogroms they had experienced in Antioch and Alexandria under Hellenistic rulers than they did the persecutions of the Christians. Though Christianity had its origins *quasi sub umbraculo* of this *insignissimae religionis, certe licitae* (Tertullian, *Apologeticum*, xxi), the Christians themselves could not expect any favored treatment once this shadow had been dispelled.

Similarly, it seems somewhat exaggerated to maintain that "without Maccabees and without Daniel a Christian theology of martyrdom would scarcely have been thinkable. Without the apocalyptic of the Palestinian Essenes, it could hardly have sustained the necessary fanaticism to overcome the universal hostility of the Roman Empire. Without the Dispersion, and in particular, the Alexandrian interpretation and allegorization of this apocalyptic, the ultimate reconciliation of Church and Empire would have been impossible" (p. 65). Without denying the influence of earlier writings upon the development of the Christian ideal of martyrdom, it must be admitted that a complete theology of martyrdom could easily be developed from the New Testament alone (see H. Delehaye, *Les origines du culte des martyrs* [2nd ed., Brussels, 1933], pp. 1-4).

As for the ultimate reconciliation of Church and State, no Alexandrian solution was quite so simple or effective as that given in answer to the question of paying tribute: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matt. 22:21).

Frend does not adequately distinguish between the recklessness in the pursuit of martyrdom on the part of certain heretics and the legitimate desires and aspirations of orthodox Christians. He believes that Ignatius' "letters display a state of exaltation bordering on mania," and that "his example of voluntary martyrdom had its forerunners among the Jews" (pp. 197-8). But Ignatius' refusal of "unseasonable kindness" on the part of the Christians no more betrays a "voluntary martyrdom" than the refusal of Socrates to secure his own release from prison through bribes offered by his friends. Frend deprecates "the fanatical desire for martyrdom found among many Christians" (p. 194) but admires the position taken by Clement of Alexandria, "the first Christian writer who placed the ascetic ideal on the same level as that of the martyr" (p. 356). There is something to his contention that Clement's Platonism began "a revolution in the history of the Christian's relation to the world" (p. 356). But in contrast with the praise given to Clement's prudent reserve, Frend finds some fault with Cyprian's retirement during the persecution of Decius: "He had led his army gallantly from the rear" (p. 415). A more objective judgment of the bishop's action can be found in E. W. Benson, *Cyprian: His Life, His Times, His Work* (London, 1897), pp. 84-6.

In his conclusion, Frend states that a radical, apocalyptic concept of martyrdom prevailed among the Christians of the West throughout the fourth century, whereas in the East "apocalyptic hopes were fading by the turn of the third century, their place taken by a more optimistic view of the destiny of man and his relations with his Maker." As a consequence, "the ultimate legacy of the persecutions was the lasting division of Christendom into its eastern and western parts" (p. 569). This seems to me to be a poorly founded and even false generalization. Very little difference can be found in the cult of the martyrs in the East and in the West. The *memoriae* of the martyrs were visited by pilgrims in the West as were the *martiria* in the East. The anniversaries of their deaths were preserved in the martyrologies, but also in the menologies and synaxaries. The sermons of St. Augustine on Saints Perpetua and Felicitas are of the same type as those of St. John Chrysostom on St. Ignatius and St. Babylas. And the continued interest in the martyrs during the Middle Ages found similar expression in the writings of Symeon Metaphrastes and Jacobus de Voragine. The division of Christendom might as well be explained by the later controversies over the worship of images; but, actually, it is to be sought elsewhere and most likely in the different modes of thought and action that characterized the East and the West in pre-Christian times.

Many of the classical problems of Early Church history are practically insoluble with the evidence at our disposal. About all that a historian can do is to present objectively the available data and let the reader draw his own conclusions. Because of a lack of space,

Frend cannot always treat these problems as extensively as he should. He notes, for example, with respect to Pomponia Graecina, that "the charge was adhesion to 'foreign religion,' and the description of the suspicious symptoms suggests Judaism" (p. 113). Further, "there seems little reason to doubt that the formal grounds for the execution of Acilius Glabrio and Flavius Clemens by Domitian in 95 was suspected conversion to some form of Judaism" (p. 113), though in another context he argues that the charge against Glabrio was probably political rather than religious (p. 215). He agrees with Merrill in holding that Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians does not contain any reference to a persecution under Domitian and that "the sudden and repeated misfortunes and calamities" which Clement mentions as having "befallen us" were simply some now unknown difficulties which prevented him from writing earlier (pp. 215-16). He believes that Polycarp was martyred between 165 and 168 (p. 240) and that "it is doubtful whether one can speak of the Emperor's [Constantine's] 'conversion' as a result of the phenomena which he saw on the eve of the battle of the Milvian Bridge" (p. 542). These are all defensible opinions, but by no means universally accepted.

Along with Henry Dodwell and Henri Grégoire, Frend is inclined to minimize the extent of the persecutions and the number of the Christian martyrs. It may well be that "the total recorded 'incidents' in the whole Empire for two generations [between 70 and 135] may be counted on the fingers of one hand" (p. 181), but a close analysis of the evidence for persecution to be found in the New Testament, the Apostolic Fathers, Eusebius, and Pliny would reveal that the "recorded 'incidents'" give anything but a complete picture of the trials endured. He believes that the context of Porphyry's reference to "thousands" who died during the persecutions of Decius and Valerian "suggests gross exaggeration" (p. 435, n. 163), but in opposition to this it might be noted that one of the accusations which Porphyry brought against Christ was that he did not save his followers from their tormentors (frag. 64; see Pierre de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne: Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du I^{er} au VI^e siècle* [2nd ed., Paris, 1948], pp. 285-6). Frend estimates that throughout the empire during the two years of the Great Persecution, 303-305, there may have been "a grand total of 3000-3500 victims" (p. 537). In this he is somewhat more generous than Grégoire who maintains that a total of ten thousand martyrs for all the persecutions taken together *serait sans doute très supérieur à la réalité* (*Les persécutions dans l'empire romain* [2nd ed., Brussels, 1964], p. 166). The difficulty of arriving at precise figures may be illustrated by the fact that the number of people killed at Auschwitz during the Nazi regime is variously estimated at between two and four millions. The names of the vast majority of these latter-day victims are of course unknown, yet we have the names of something like one thousand early Christians who died for their faith (L. Hertling, "Die Zahl der Martyrer bis 313," *Gregorianum*, XXV [1944], p. 105). One would think that the sum total of Christian martyrs at least equalled the number of Jews killed on single days at a number of different concentration camps during World War II.

A few points in detail could be corrected in *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church*. With Livy and Wissowa, Frend makes a possible distinction between the *di novensides*, the "newly settled deities," and the older *di indigetes*, the "Roman indigenous deities" (p. 107), but the etymologizing is more than doubtful (K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* [Munich, 1960], p. 45, n. 1). From Cicero, *Pro Balbo*, XI, 28, he argues that "a man would not be a citizen of two states" (p. 106). This may have been true during the Republic, but it was not so during the Empire. An Egyptian had first to obtain Alexandrian citizenship before he could obtain that of Rome in the early second century (Pliny, *Epist.*, X, 6). Frend describes the statue of Hippolytus as that of "the bearded philosopher seated in dignity on the marble throne found on the Aventine in 1551" (p. 377). The statue was not found on the Aventine but on the site of the Catacomb of St. Hippolytus on the Via Tiburtina, and the beard is at least doubtful. The statue was discovered without a head and was fitted with one made in the Vatican workshops.

The volume is attractively printed, but it could have been more carefully proofread. There are a considerable number of misprints in the English text and the Latin quotations. Errors in Greek words and phrases are almost the rule rather than the exception. Despite these shortcomings in plan and execution, this is undoubtedly the best treatise in English on the Roman persecutions and, because of the difficulties connected with such a study, it is likely to remain so for a long time to come.

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† LUDWIG EDELSTEIN. *The Meaning of Stoicism*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xii + 108. \$3.00. (*Martin Classical Lectures*, XXI.)

In the twenty-first of the Martin Classical Lectures Professor Edelstein has attempted to set forth the common message of the Stoics: "Stoicism was not a uniform doctrine . . . (but) despite . . . individual differences, the Stoic dissenters remained Stoics. That which they had in common, that which made them Stoics, is what I understand as the meaning of Stoicism" (p. xi). This volume is not a popularization nor is it a laborious consideration of the myriads of philological and philosophical difficulties involved in interpreting the Stoa. Edelstein tries to state the deepest meaning of Stoicism in straightforward terms without dwelling on detail. Yet on virtually every page he deals with complex issues with ease and penetration that can hardly be appreciated by a casual reader. Perhaps the greatest contrast in English to Edelstein's views are those of Edwyn Bevan in *Stoics and Sceptics* (1913).

The ideal of the Stoic sage did not arise simply from the political

crisis of the 4th century but, if from this source at all, from a particular element in the situation, "the new consciousness of man's power . . . , the belief in the deification of the human being" (p. 13). Edelstein, however, is not sympathetic to any attempt to explain philosophies by human temperaments. "Philosophy, I still venture to believe, is the search for truth; there is within man a disinterested desire for understanding" (pp. 15-16). The moral answer of Stoicism is rooted in physics and logic: "Stoic moralism is not a moralism determined by merely practical ends" (p. 18). Stoic physics and logic are not afterthoughts attached to moral convictions.

Stoicism develops within the *philosophical* currents of the 4th century, in which metaphysical idealism and epistemological realism had been found wanting. Naturalism and materialism were the common ground of philosophers. Nature develops within herself and receives nothing from the outside. Individuals have their essence within themselves and "are not merely special instances of a general law" (p. 25). The individual possesses a core of unchanging uniqueness that is the heart of his being, and it persists throughout the constant change of temporal events. From a further examination of human nature the cardinal principles of Stoic ethics are derived. Preserving one's own proper being in the pursuit of a rational mode of life becomes the aim of Stoic ethics. That we ought to follow this path becomes clear when we "are introduced" to our own nature, "when we understand who we are in reality and decide to be what we are" (p. 38).

What is ordinarily called the Middle Stoa is characterized as a period of Stoic self-criticism. The philosophy of Posidonius, in particular, is neither a simple eclecticism nor a mere revival of Platonism or Aristotelianism. Nor does it seem to be correct to regard the Late Stoa as a return to Zeno and Chrysippus. The self-criticism which had taken place had a telling effect, and in general "the latest phase of Stoicism seems to have been nearer to the Middle Stoa than to the beginnings made by Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus" (p. 70). In the Middle Stoa a new philosophical temper emerges, an attitude which rests on factual knowledge, rational investigation, and a new spirit of science. There is a richer concept of the individual in Panaetius and a decisive dualism in Posidonius' conceptions of the unity of man, where the power of reason is limited, and of Nature, where Stoic pantheism is limited. The scientific spirit encourages the development of the idea of progress and Stoicism "is freed from any narrow moralism. Progress becomes progress with regard to everything that is within the domain of man" (p. 68).

Perhaps the most impressive chapter in this volume is the last, "The Stoic Way of Life." Stoic ethics, he argues, is a critique of traditional morals and casts new light on human relations. Human conduct takes on new dignity when the rights and humanity of persons are fully acknowledged. Changed attitudes regarding family life and work of all kinds are chosen to illustrate this thesis. Morality, and so the good, is not limited to the exercise of citizenship. Man, in the exercise of his diverse talents in individual labor, fulfills the promise of human potential and comes to know the good

in diverse forms. The concept of profession and of calling evolves. Rules of conduct are formulated for the different roles men play in their lives. Arching the edifice of human endeavor is that of "the human profession." Man's basic task is that of becoming human through education to individual responsibility and through cultivation of *humanitas* and *φιλανθρωπία*. Though Edelstein is critical of Stoicism for failing to satisfy man's hunger for transcendence, for naively identifying reasoning and moral insight, for underestimating the importance of suffering, and so on, he nonetheless sketches a moving account of a significant and viable Stoicism that, after all, commanded the allegiance of some of the world's finest moralists.

The English literature of Stoicism is spare, indeed, and its quality is, perhaps, not what it should be. There have been a few noteworthy contributions in recent years, such as those of Jason Saunders, Benson Mates, and Josiah Gould. I think it a modest claim that this slender volume of Edelstein's will become a little classic of interpretation and bring many who are not specialists within the range of a more sophisticated approach to the Stoics.

Very few errors were detected in the text. Since, however, this volume was published posthumously without the expansion of notes intended by Professor Edelstein, there are certain unavoidable defects: (1) the notes are almost exclusively citations without comment; (2) translator, edition, and so on are not indicated; (3) at times the cited text does not appear, without explanation, to support the statement adequately (p. 35, n. 18; is an inquiry *περί ὁρμῆς* equivalent on the face of it, to the study of "human nature"?); (4) a statement in the text may be a virtual quote and not so noted (compare the Loeb and p. 18, n. 48). Such omissions, necessitated by the state of the manuscript at Edelstein's death, ought not to detract seriously from any of his major theses. There can be no question, however, that had Professor Edelstein finished a fuller documentation his arguments would have had a better chance of acceptance.

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CLAUDE NICOLET. L'ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.). Tome I: Définitions juridiques et structures sociales. Paris E. de Boccard, 1966. Pp. 763. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, fasc. 207.)

This immense work is beautifully organized. There is everywhere a clear, logical exposition of fact and theory. Very full, sometimes too full. The first part (pp. 15-143) is given over to matters of public law, what is known about the "Servian" system, the equestrian census, the recruitment of the 18 centuries, the *plebiscitum reddendorum equorum*, the number of *equites equo publico*, role of the *equites* in the elections, and the gold ring. The second part (pp. 147-164) concerns titlature, prosopography, and structure of the order. The third (pp. 167-630) illustrates the struggles of the

equites to win control of the *quaestio* courts. The objective of the fourth (pp. 663-722) is to assess the society and ideology of the order as a whole.

The most important question asked by Nicolet in the first part is this, "How does one define the *ordo equester* in the age of the Republic?" Despite a wealth of material in our sources, no ancient author saw the necessity for giving a full answer. There was no need. But today we must define it. Ever since the researches of Marquardt, Belot, and Mommsen it has been usual to apply the term *ordo equester*, from the Gracchi onwards, to two groups of Romans: those who belonged to the 18 centuries and therefore had the public horse, and those whose wealth qualified them to receive the horse but who, in fact, did not receive it. The number of the latter soon came to be much larger than the former. Thus, the customary view of the order has been rather broad and loose, the main requirement being the possession of a census rating of 400,000 sesterces. Nicolet objects to this, strenuously. He develops what becomes the principal theme running through all his book: the title *equus Romanus* under the Republic is reserved for those who were in the 18 centuries and therefore had the public horse. That is all. Far from being a very large, loosely organized group of men, the order was actually a real, honorary "order," in the sense that the honor of being a Knight was formally granted by a Roman magistrate (the censor) and not merely acquired by the possession of a certain census rating. One had to have the wealth, but that alone did not automatically make one a Knight. Other criteria were considered.

This brings up the question of the horse itself. A real horse was certainly given in the early Republic, but what about the first century? Nicolet does not ask this question. But if one accepts the historicity of the *plebiscitum reddendorum equorum*, whereby not long after 123 B. C. (so Nicolet dates it) the Senators were forced to "turn in" their horses after a certain age and forever be excluded from the *ordo equester*, it would appear that up to then a real horse was still presented to the new Knight. It would be proof of membership. In the time of Cicero the 18 centuries were no longer real military units. Was a real horse still presented, or was the phrase *equo publico* just a relic-symbol of the past? The theory of Nicolet, which makes the order much more restricted in numbers and much easier to control, has this advantage, that it makes the presentation of a real horse more meaningful. The present reviewer is inclined, nevertheless, to reject Nicolet's basic premise.

The second part is the very heart of the whole book, a prosopographical account of the Knights. Nicolet rightly restricts himself to *equites certi*, omitting those for whom the evidence is slight. Nevertheless, the total amounts to over 370 names. A full investigation of the careers and lives of each one is reserved for the second volume. Here we are treated to a review of the Knights in the various patterns of their activities.

In order to organize his material Nicolet discusses the Knights from the following points of view: their relations with the Senators; their careers in brief; their activities as landowners; the *publicani*, *negotiatores*, and *foeneratores*; municipal origins; the *tribuni mili-*

tum and the *praefecti*; their intellectual activities as orators, writers, poets, etc. the control of the courts. Each of these sections is provided with a full description and a prosopographical table. It is impossible in a review to do more than touch upon a few of the important and challenging conclusions reached by Nicolet. The whole book must be read and digested. Controversies will arise.

Relations with the Senators. The passage of a Knight into the Senatorial order was prepared by the preceding generation, in which his parents had connections of some sort with a Senator or a magistrate in office. The violent opposition between the orders was not by nature a sociological or economic conflict, but a political struggle.

Landowners. A Roman middle class certainly did develop in Rome by the end of the second century. It was essentially commercial or mercantile, did not constitute an aristocracy, and was not assimilated as such into the equestrian order. It existed alongside of it. The wealth of the Knights, like that of the Senators, consisted largely of landed property. Connections between Knights and the business world existed, of course, for some of the Knights used their money in commercial ventures to amass even greater fortunes. But the *publicani* and the *negotiatores* accounted for only a small part of their numbers. All Knights did not live and act in the same way. Out of a total of over 370 only 37 were *publicani* and only 46 were *negotiatores* or *foeneratores*. And many of the last group also belonged to the first, being engaged in multiple activities. Lowly *mercatores* were not Knights at all, despite their money. The title of *eques Romanus* "définit seulement une aristocratie de fait." Some few of them turned to the world of business, others to the intellectual or political world. Many avoided these paths completely and lived the good life as landlords and cultured gentlemen. "Success" meant different things to different Romans. Some could find it in business, others in politics or writing. As Nicolet says so well (p. 464), "le but recherché est le même: pouvoir donner un rom à des jardins."

The courts. In this complicated and highly controversial arena Nicolet first orients the reader in the problems and then directs his attention to the *lex Acilia repetundarum*. His use of the sources and the results of modern research is quite thorough, but he would have found food for further thought in Badian's critique of recent literature or the subject in *Historia*, XI (1962), pp. 203-9. Nicolet follows Tibiletti in the belief that the epigraphic copy of the law is not a *lex Acilia* but an actual *lex Sempronia* of Gracchus himself. He states (p. 487, n. 2) that Tibiletti had proved this "définitivement." Untrue. Tibiletti has a case, but no real proof. At any rate, Nicolet must investigate the law because of his conviction that membership in the equestrian order depended upon the granting of the public horse by the censor. In the crucial lines 13-16 the law presents the procedure to be followed in the selection of the annual batch of 450 judges: *Pr(aetor), qui inter peregrinos ious deicet, is in diebus X proxum(eis), quibus h(anc) l(egem) populus plebesve iouserit, facito ut ei CDL viros legat, qui in hac civit[ate]—*. The lacuna here and in 16 must have contained the exact qualification for serving as judge. Was it a property qualification (as Tibiletti

thinks) or membership in the equestrian order? To answer this question Nicolet seizes upon the next clause in the law, which states that the *praetor* may select the 450 judges but may not select anyone who has been plebeian tribune, *quaestor*, *triumvir capitalis*, military tribune in any of the first four legions, *triumvir* for granting and assigning land, a member of the Senate, etc. These men are ineligible. Nicolet feels that the *plebiscitum reddendorum equorum* could not at that time have been in effect, for, if it had been, the legislator would not have felt himself obligated to spell out these disqualifying posts so minutely. He could simply have said that the judges should be chosen from among "those who have the public horse." Therefore the *plebiscitum* could have been passed only after the passage of the law on *repetundae*, i. e. after 123 B. C. The obligation felt by the legislator to name the posts so carefully implies, to Nicolet, that at the passage of the law there were still Senators in the 18 centuries. He therefore feels that the passage in 13 and 16 might be filled out in this way: *qui in hac civitate equum publicum habebit habuerit quoque sestertium—millium n(um)um census siet*]. Possibly.

That this law allowed only Knights to serve as judges is known from other sources, but Nicolet thinks he has found proof of it in the law itself. Lines 27-28 concern the rights of the judges after they have been selected and it is said of them that "whoever receives money by virtue of this law . . . let the [censor] not remove him from his tribe nor take away his horse." He argues that it could not, therefore, have been a mixed court. But the present reviewer does not think it need be taken that way at all.

Nicolet also offers a new restoration for another part of line 16. Where former editors have *queive merc[ede conductus depugnavit depugnaverit]* he suggests *queive merc[ede aliqua vel pretio—corruptus siet]*. Here also it is difficult to accept his restoration.

This is a book that will cause a great many discussions and no little controversy. It must be read, but its conclusions must not be accepted without careful consideration. *Caveat lector*.

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M. F. Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber III. Mit einem Kommentar herausgegeben von JOACHIM ADAMIETZ. München, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1966. Pp. 236. DM 32. (*Studia et Testimonia Antiqua*, II.)

Except for the passages included by David Gaunt in his *Selections from Quintilian* (London, 1952), modern commentaries have been available only for books one (F. H. Colson, Cambridge, 1924), ten (W. Peterson, Oxford, 1891), and twelve (R. G. Austin, Oxford, 1948) of the *Institutio*. These are certainly the parts of widest significance, but anyone interested in the history of rhetoric or in Roman education or in Latin style has frequent occasion to turn to other books and has longed for commentaries with basic supplementary material. Quintilian does not need exegesis to the same

degree as an author of profound difficult thought, like Aristotle, or a writer abounding in linguistic peculiarities, like Homer, nor does he need the apparatus of epigraphy, archaeology, and historical research required by Livy or Tacitus, but his work is filled with sometimes specific, more often vague, allusions to earlier rhetoricians, where the reader would like to know if the source can be identified, and the thought is sometimes imprecisely expressed, in which case an editor familiar with Quintilian's ways can be helpful. This new commentary by Joachim Adamietz, a former student of Buchheit at Giessen, aims specifically at indicating the relationship of the *Institutio* to the rhetorical tradition and at understanding Quintilian's own views. It well fulfills the former aim at least and is a work of careful compilation and synthesis. It is also a well printed and bound volume which can stand with dignity in the Quintilian section of any library.

Adamietz includes a brief forward, introduction, Latin text, German commentary, extensive bibliography, and serviceable index. The introduction concerns itself with three subjects, viewed in terms of the *Institutio* as a whole and book three in particular: sources (pp. 9-14), organization (pp. 14-21), textual tradition (pp. 21-3).

The account of sources is sound in that it stresses Quintilian's use of Cicero and minimizes the influence of Celsus and Pliny. Adamietz does not believe that Quintilian made direct use of Aristotle. In the past I have agreed with this view, but recent study, and consideration of passages like V, x, 17, has led me to think that Quintilian had probably read the *Rhetoric* at some time in the past, though he may not have remembered the details of its contents perfectly.

The discussion of the organization of the *Institutio* puts slightly too much stress on the *ars, artifex, opus* distinction of II, xiv, 5. If Quintilian had regarded that as fundamental to his work he would have mentioned it in the latter part of the preface to book one where he explains the structure he will follow, and perhaps he would have handled the three headings more evenly. The reference in book two was apparently suggested to Quintilian by the fact that the term *rhetorice* involves both theory and practice, speaker and speech, as becomes clear when a Latin equivalent is sought. In his typically deliberate way, once the distinction *ars, artifex, opus* is made Quintilian feels the need to carry it out in book twelve, even though it produces some strain on the structure of that book, where the position of chapter ten is really illogical. In book three the chief structural problem is the point at which the discussion of invention actually begins. Adamietz puts it at III, vi, i, but chapters four and five deal with matters of invention too.

In considering the MSS Adamietz rejects, as have most scholars, any independent value in Radermacher's beloved *Parisinus Latinus* 7723. He prefers Halm's *apparatus*, and as is shown in the table of comparative readings he gives, his text abandons Radermacher in some forty-eight places for that of Halm or Meister. There is no *apparatus criticus*, but textual matters are discussed in the commentary when the need arises. Since both major MS traditions can be called upon for book three, textual problems are fewer than in

some parts of the *Institutio*. Generally Adamietz' text is satisfactory, but I feel doubtful about the exclusion of *calere* and *irasci* in III, vi, 24: that they are not entirely logical does not mean Quintilian did not write them, especially since the MS evidence clearly supports both words.

The commentary takes up about two-thirds of the volume. There is an outline of each chapter, identification of sources or references, paraphrase of many passages, citation and often quotation of relevant parallels, references to modern discussions, notes on the text. Adamietz resists the commentator's common impulse to say everything or to solve all problems. He knows, for example, that "the greatest authority of our time" in III, vi, 2 cannot be Pliny the Elder, but he has no other suggestions. Julius Gabinianus is worth considering, as are some of the Greek rhetoricians of the time.

Radermacher is supposed to have said that a running commentary is one which runs away from the problems; in most places Adamietz avoids this fault. The chief exception is his discussion of Quintilian's own *status* system. Quintilian first describes a system which he had formerly taught (III, vi, 63-6), but goes on to say that he had become convinced that this had certain logical flaws, and he outlines a revised system (III, vi, 67-82). He is however an educator, more interested in teaching how to speak than in logical analysis, and this leads him to advance a third account which he calls a *latius primo fusa ratio* and a *facilior tamen et apertior via* (III, vi, 67). Adamietz does not bring out the significance of this third account, nor comment on the meaning of *latius fusa* nor on the changed terminology of *formae actionis* for *status*, nor on the interesting concept of *simulacra* (88). He is perhaps not running away from problems so much as failing to do justice to what is characteristic of Quintilian, and perhaps he does not quite understand the passage. He seems puzzled by some points (e.g., *mixta* in 88) which seem to me rather self-evident. A diagram of Hermagoras' system of *status* is furnished; what would have been more helpful would be a diagram of Quintilian's *three* systems, old, new, and pedagogic.

The writing of commentaries has fallen into disrepute in some circles, chiefly because the task is so often one lacking in vision or imagination. There are of course exceptions, and Austin's edition of Quintilian twelve is an example. From the point of view of creative scholarship Adamietz' commentary, useful as it is, has no claim to fame. To take a single point, book three contains much of what Quintilian has to say about deliberative oratory. Now perhaps the single greatest topic in the study of rhetoric under the empire is the fate of deliberative oratory, and one of the chief problems in the study of Quintilian is how little he has to say about changes. There is some evidence to indicate that he was more conscious of the situation than his express words indicate. But if a student comes to the study of Quintilian through Adamietz' commentary he will not, I think, recognize the existence of the problem. A really good commentary reveals an author not only in terms of internal consistency and in his specific relationship to the narrowly defined tradition in which he worked, but in terms of the broader issues of his age, the developing influences which surround him, his own achievement, and his right to our sympathetic attention and

imitation. And it may go beyond that to deal with the non-historical validity of the author's thought.

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KURT LATTE, ed. *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, Vol. II, E-O. Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1966. Pp. 823. 200 Dan. Kr.

Kurt Latte died in June, 1964 (R. Stark, *Gnomon*, XXXVII [1965], pp. 215-19): his contributions to our knowledge of antiquity were many and various. Pride of place, perhaps, may be given his lexicographical studies which, spanning some fifty years, culminated in his edition of Hesychius' *Lexicon*. The first volume (1953) was received with high praise; the second will receive and deserve the same reaction.

The volume contains 22,965 entries. These are accompanied by marginal references to the source of the gloss (where discoverable), testimonia (largely from lexica and scholia) and a spare apparatus, in which Latte records the best conjectures (many his own) for frequently desperate cruces. The volume ends with a *Mantissa adnotationis*, which consists of discussions of the textual problems in 59 entries.

The volume was seen through the press by K. Barr, assisted by M. Leumann and W. Buchwald, both of whom contributed readings and emendations. In a work of this scope, it would be unrealistic to expect total accuracy. There are some errors in the printing of the Greek, but these are easily corrected. A sample check of references to authors produced no errors.¹ A minor irritant is the failure to reproduce the *index compendiorum* and *nominum et librorum conspectus*, which prefaced the text in vol. I.

For all its excellence, this edition is not the final word on Hesychius. Many problems remain, but one suspects that their solution will not be due so much to human ingenuity² as to new knowledge, whether through papyri or through the Greek lexica as yet unpublished.³

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¹ Some *errata* in the *Mantissa*: p. 809, line 9, read *ignotum*; p. 810, the numeral of note 1 is missing; p. 812, line 25, read *admissum*.

² Cf., however, the recent series of *Hesychiana* in *Helikon*, V (1965).

³ The interpolation in E 6887, which Latte records as *incol. in marg. m. rec. ex Harp. addita*, is drawn from the epitome, rather than from the full recension, of Harpocration. This means that the interpolated material is probably taken from a MS of the Suda (II 521).

In the gloss *μέταυλον*; *μέσαυλον* (M 1127), the alphabetic order requires a form in *μεττ-*. It is not beyond probability that this is what Hesychius wrote: the form *μέτταυλον* (a *vox nihili*: cf. Homeric *μέσσαυλον*) seems to have made an entrance early into the lexicographic tradition, for precisely the same situation is found in Harpocration's lexicon, where the alphabetic order requires *μεττ-* and the MSS vary between *μετ-* and *μεττ-* (and where, further to complicate matters, the explanation in the gloss has nothing to do with the lemma).

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summary of topics and a list of lines where comment is made upon each is given at the end of this paper.

Book XVIII has been chosen, as it provides some good illustrations of certain important features of Homeric style, a few very striking effects, and occasionally a peculiar usage. The content of the book is varied, comprising the beginning of Achilles' grief, a scene between him and Thetis, a battle, a Trojan council, the conversation between Thetis and Hephaestus, and the description of the scenes depicted on the Shield. I am not, however, attempting to differentiate the book from others in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and any other book would have served my purpose almost as well.

My concern here is mainly with the arrangement within the verse of sentences, phrases, and words, and with the component parts of the formulaic diction. I am not much concerned with grammar, nor with the familiar figures of speech;⁴ still less with appreciation of the artistic merit of the book as a whole or of the particular episodes which it contains, which has already been excellently done.⁵ Only when there is something of particular interest involved, or an unusually good example of some technique, do I identify formulae or refer to similar verses or phrases (which are often adequately given beside van Leeuwen's text). Most important of all, I am not suggesting that an anomalous usage of any kind is post-Homeric. I merely try, in the first place, to indicate cases where there is a possibility of identifying individual treatment of a standard phrase and suggest why this is done, and secondly, to examine the employment of certain techniques to see what effects the poet may be producing by his manipulation of the traditional constructions. I hope that notes of this type may help appreciation of this book and also bring out something of the general flexibility and resources of expression in the early epic style.

I use the term "A caesura" for a break between words in or before the second foot of the verse; "B caesura" for one in the third foot; and "C caesura" for a break between the fourth and fifth feet, i.e. the bucolic diaeresis.⁶ All these may be

⁴ On which see especially Stanford, *op. cit.* (above, note 2).

⁵ By E. T. Owen in *The Story of the Iliad* (Toronto, 1946).

⁶ With the exception of the last, which I use in a more restricted sense, these terms correspond to those of H. N. Porter in his article

observed in *Il.*, I, 158 ἀλλὰ σοί, ὦ μέγ' ἀναιδές, ἄμ' ἐσπόμεθ', ὄφρα σὺ χαίρῃς. When it seems desirable, I use "etc." after a Greek word to include other forms of the same word (generally metrically equivalent), but often (e.g. in the case of adjectives) this may be assumed without any indication.

2. Ἀντίλοχος δ' Ἀχιλῆι πόδας ταχύς ἄγγελος ἦλθε

A striking example of irregular combination of different formulae. The usual arrangement of a line like this is represented in *Il.*, III, 121 Ἴρις δ' αὖθ' Ἑλένη λευκωλένῳ ἄγγελος ἦλθεν and *Od.*, XII, 374 ἐκέα δ' Ἡελίῳ Ὑπερίονι ἄγγελος ἦλθε / Δαμπετίη . . . , which both show the normal noun-epithet combination fitting between the A and C caesurae. For Achilles, the regular formula of this length in this position is shown in Ἀχιλῆα πόδας ταχύν (line 358 below), which occurs three times in the accusative. Ταχύς, however, is never found in Homer in the dative case, and normally where a dative of this formula is required, the adjective δαίφροσι is substituted (three times). In this particular instance Achilles' usual epithet is allowed to remain after his name, but is grammatically separated from it and attached to the subject (or complement) of the sentence. The alteration is made a little easier by the frequent occurrence of the combination ἄγγελος ἦλθε (etc.) in this position in the verse, sometimes preceded by an adjective or descriptive phrase (e.g. *Il.*, XXIV, 194 Ὀλύμπιος ἄγγελος ἦλθε; *Il.*, II, 26 [etc.] Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι).

Antilochus was admittedly in an enormous hurry to reach Achilles before Patroclus' body could be carried off by the Trojans, but the decision whether the peculiar alteration in the usual formulaic structure is done intentionally to stress his speed, or is simply the result of a momentary embarrassment in composition and an unorthodox solution, must be left to individual taste. Line 362 below should be compared, and *Il.*, VIII, 312 θρασὺν Ἑκτορος ἡνιοχῆα for the usual θρασὺν Ἑκτορα. A slightly different switch in the agreement of an adjective may be observed by comparing *Il.*, V, 534 with (e.g.) XVI, 286.

"The Early Greek Hexameter," *Y. C. S.*, XII (1951), pp. 3-63. I quote from T. W. Allen's Oxford Classical Text (*Iliad*, 3rd ed. [1920], *Odyssey*, 2nd ed. [1917]).

3. προπάροιθε νεῶν ὀρθοκραιράων

The phrase is peculiar in that the epithet is generally used of cattle, after βοῶν (e.g. in line 573 below). This phrase recurs only in *Il.*, XIX, 344, and its meaning is obscure. No other epithet occurs here after νεῶν or νηῶν. Can this be an example of an ornamental epithet regularly used of two entirely different objects?

In view of the immense variety of the epithets found in this position such an economy would appear remarkable. Occasionally a descriptive adjective is used of similar objects (τεύχεος ὑφήλοιο or δόμον ὑ.) or one of quality is transferred from one noun to another (usually μάχην . . . κυδιάνειραν, once ἀγορὴν . . . κ. ; εὐήγορα χάλκον and εὐ. οἶνον: some, of course, like μελιήδεα, are used of many things). And the kind of metaphorical meaning which would be required of ὀρθοκραιράων when applied to ships would not be unparalleled in fixed epithets. The only parallel case I have found, however, of a fixed epithet used literally of one noun and metaphorically of another is that of οἶνοπα, used generally of the sea but twice (*Il.*, XIII, 703; *Od.*, XIII, 32) of oxen; and here the dubious meaning of the word makes the metaphorical sense uncertain.

The phrase as it stands probably does not long antedate the composition of the *Iliad*, because of the antevocalic shortening that appears in νεῶν. Hoekstra has shown that there is little creation of new formulae after the introduction of the linguistic changes associated with the Ionic dialect.⁷ But προπάροιθε often occurs in this position, sometimes followed by a noun-epithet combination, as in προπάροιθε πυλάων ὑψηλάων, and when the forms of ναῦς with short first vowel became available, the singular form of the phrase under discussion, προπάροιθε νεὸς κυανοπρόριοι, was developed (from νηὸς κ. according to Hoekstra).⁸

The parallel development after the plural νεῶν was less simple. The adjective is once used in the accusative plural in *Od.*, III, 299, νέας κυανοπρωρείους but this is a unique and linguistically irregular form which could not have been traditionally attached to νῆας. Nor could the alternative epithet φοινικοπάρηος have served any better, for there is no example of a compound of

⁷ *Homeric Modifications of Formulaic Prototypes*, especially pp. 124 f.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-6.

παρειά with genitive plural ending in -ειῶν, though the simple form sometimes so occurs. If there was once an epithet which regularly followed the genitive plural νηῶν it is lost to us—and quite possibly was lost to Homer, since the rate of replacement of formulae may have been high.⁹

It seems that the explanation must be that the poet, faced with the difficulty of providing a plural phrase whose proper form (if it had existed) had been lost, improvised by borrowing an epithet from a phrase of similar sound, βοῶν ὀρθοκραϊράων, and perhaps might himself have been perplexed to account precisely for its application to ships; it would not be the only expression which his hearers could not fully understand. I do not see that the repetition of the phrase at *Il.*, XIX, 344 makes this explanation any less likely, as repetition of apparently unformulaic lines and phrases is so common (cf. lines 58, 132 below).

4. ἃ δὴ τετελεσμένα ἦεν

A slightly unusual expression. The main uses of τετελεσμένος (etc.) are (a) with ἔσται, to refer to "what will be accomplished" (very often with ἐξέρω); (b) with εἴη, in a wish for the future; or (c) with ἔστι, with the future sense of "if I can accomplish it, and if it is fated to come about."¹⁰ The meaning in the present instance could possibly be the past tense of this last usage, "he thought over what was to come about," "he was pondering over what would happen," but τετελεσμένος has usually a specific reference to definite events or predictions and it is best to take the meaning here as entirely past, "he thought over what had been fated to come about." This is the only occasion on which the common phrase is used to refer to a past occurrence.¹¹ Perhaps the very conception is new—the thought of presenting Achilles meditating on the past, and how past events had been fated to turn out, together with the artistic

⁹ This is suggested by J. B. Hainsworth, "The Homeric Formula and the Problem of its Transmission," *B.I.C.S.*, IX (1962), p. 66.

¹⁰ The only other uses are: to refer to what has happened and is now the case (*Il.*, I, 388); and with regard to the decision of Zeus, valid in past, present, and future (*Hymn to Aphr.*, V, 26).

¹¹ If Allen's Oxford Text is right, it is also the only case of the neuter plural form of τετελεσμένος in this expression.

technique which shows us the thoughts of Achilles as he watches (and we watch) Antilochus racing over the plain towards him. The whole idea is related to that expressed in the formula which is used to introduce Achilles' thoughts, εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν; this formula occurs eleven times but only in this verse, and cannot have been created before neglect of the digamma became possible. Both the idea and the formulaic verse seem to belong to the most sophisticated epic style.

13. σχέτλιος· ἦ τ' ἐκέλευον . . .

This is a good example of the use of a "runover" adjective. (A runover word is one which stands as first word in the verse, is grammatically connected with the preceding verse, and is followed by a pause in the sense.¹²) It is given emphasis by its isolated position as well as by its meaning, and is followed by a sentence which further elaborates its significance. There are many examples in any book of Homer.

The use of a runover word like this, followed by a linked thought, is one of the many techniques of paratactic composition in Homer; it is sometimes called the appositional mode of expression, in which a statement is first made and then elaborated in detail.¹³ Other grammatical units besides adjectives are used in this runover position, and with the same type of following linked thought; there are good examples below of a proper name so used (lines 80-81), a verb (62), an adverbial expression (106), and a participle (201).

Cases occur in which an adjective (for example) in this position is not followed by any kind of link in thought or by any exegesis; in this book the use of ἀμβροσίη (line 268) is an example, or the noun Τρώων (272). In such cases there is no parataxis, as the thought is broken off at the unconnected runover word; this is perhaps why such effects seem unpleasing, as

¹² A detailed study of runover words was made by S. E. Bassett ("The So-Called Emphatic Position of the Runover Word in the Homeric Hexameter," *T. A. P. A.*, LVII [1926], pp. 116-48). I do not think he proved his point, but his article contains much useful information and a sound appreciation. Hoekstra adduces evidence (*op. cit.*, above, note 7, pp. 108-9) to show that a certain type of runover word becomes much more frequent in the later stages of epic diction.

¹³ See especially H. and A. Thornton, *Time and Style* (London, 1962), ch. I.

the pattern of the runover word is maintained but its purpose and effect have disappeared.

Σχέλιος has a wide range of meanings, all derogatory, and the common denominator seems to be something like "impossible to deter from an undesirable course of action." Here, in plain language, Achilles says "The pig-headed fool, after I told him to . . ."

16. τόφρα εἰ ἐγγύθεν ἦλθεν ἀγανού Νέστορος νίος

An example of an end-formula, running from the C caesura to the end of the verse, which can be lengthened where necessary (as here) by prefixing an adjective which fits between the B and C caesurae. Μεγαθύμων and ἀνύμωνος are often similarly used. Pallis wondered¹⁴ why Homer did not use Νέστορος ἀγλαός νίος; the answer may be given by the words of Porter¹⁵ "In no poet of authority is there a single certain instance of a word longer than - or ~- ending in position 6" (i.e. ἦλθεν would be impossible here).

18-19. ἦ μάλα λυγρῆς / πείσσαι ἀγγελίης . . .

An interesting case of the rare enjambement between an adjective and its following noun. Here the poet seems to be thinking of the verses (*Il.*, XVII, 685-6) in which Antilochus himself is summoned by Menelaus to hear the terrible news—*ὄφρα πύθηναι / λυγρῆς ἀγγελίης*—and the same words are re-arranged at the end of the present verse in the place of the epithet *ἱπποδάμιοις*, which in three other instances concludes a verse of similar construction to this (*Il.*, II, 23 = 60; IV, 370; XI, 450). In the course of this the unusual adjective-noun enjambement appeared. Compare line 291 below.

20-1. νέκυος δὲ δὴ ἀμφιμάχονται / γυμνοῦ· ἀτὰρ τά γε τεύχεα . . .

The emotional effect seems to be built up by repetition of this runover adjective and epexegetical phrase; the second verse is used first by Menelaus to Ajax in summoning him to help in the defence of Patroclus' body (*Il.*, XVII, 122), later (following a different line) by Menelaus to Antilochus as he sends him to Achilles with the news (*XVII*, 693), and finally (again after

¹⁴ A. Pallis, *The Σ Rhapsody of the Iliad* (Oxford, 1930), *ad loc.*

¹⁵ *Op. cit.* (above, note 6), p. 9.

a different line) by Antilochus himself in his brief and tragic announcement to Achilles (the present passage). The flexibility of the technique which enables this verse to be attached grammatically to three different preceding lines is noteworthy.

26. μέγας μεγαλωστί

The latter word is used only in this phrase in surviving early epic, and the powerful combination of the two words is presumably due to the brilliant initiative of one composer. A similar type of neatness in expression may be noticed in (for example) lines 54, 98-9, 301, and 308-9 below.

28. δμῶαί δ', ἄς Ἀχιλεὺς λήισσατο Πάτροκλός τε, / . . .

A fine stroke brings in the name of Patroclus, with its memories of past companionship in battle and perhaps a hint of the regard in which these women, like Briseis, held him. The language is slightly strained to accommodate the thought; the insertion of a relative (or any other) clause in the middle of a sentence is not common; Achilles' name is unornamented; and λήισσατο occupies its usual position in the line but has to remain singular in number. The construction is more normal in the roughly parallel line (*ending its sentence*) *Od.*, I, 398 καὶ δμῶων, οὓς μοι λήισσατο Δίος Ὀδυσσεύς.

30-1 and 50-1. The epithet δαίφρονα in line 30 possibly has some pathetic effect, but it is used chiefly to fill out the verse to the C caesura, where the simple phrase χερσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι (unique, but cf. χερσὶ τε δοῦρα [*Od.*, XXII, 148] and the frequent use of χερσὶ in this position] leads into the phrase στήθεα πεπλήγοντο, just as the form with the relative pronoun αἱ δ' ἅμα πᾶσαι does in lines 50-1. In both cases the remainder of the second verse is also formulaic.

Owen¹⁶ well stresses the pathetic effect of the repetition of the same phrase for the mourning of the womenfolk and the nymphs, even though presumably the formulaic diction is primarily responsible for it.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* (above, note 5), pp. 157-8: "The pictorial and verbal echo seems to strengthen and yet soften the mournfulness of the former scene."

54. *Δυσαριστοτόκεια* is a superb compound, perhaps invented for this one occasion. It never recurs. Perhaps the nearest parallel would be *Od.*, XXIII, 97, *μη̐τερ ἐμὴ δύσμητερ*.

58 (= 439). *νηυσὶν ἐπιπρόεγκα κορωνίσιν Ἴλιον εἴσω*

The usual formula *νηυσὶ* (or *νήεσσιν*) *κορωνίσιν* is divided in order to insert the verb; or alternatively, *κορωνίσιν* is inserted between the B and C caesurae as a filler, in order to lead up to the final phrase of the line; cf. *Od.*, XIX, 182 and 193, which both end with *νήεσσιν* [*νηυσὶ*] *κ. Ἴλιον εἴσω*. This is the only time in its many occurrences that *κορωνίσιν* stands separated from its noun: the verbatim repetition (56-62 = 437-43) of a passage containing this perhaps unusual usage is interesting but of course not unparalleled. Compare line 30 above.

62. An emphatic runover verb, followed by a sentence closely linked in thought; compare line 13 above.

63. The phrase *φίλον τέκος* is here used as object of the clause, whereas in the many other instances of its occurrence it is always vocative, i. e. an insertion and not essential to the sense.¹⁷ In the same way *Διὸς τέκος* and *ἐμὸν τέκος* are also always used in the vocative. The use here appears to be a flexible adaptation of the normal pattern of usage, based on the sound of the formula rather than its usual sense.

64. *ἀπὸ πτολέμοιο μένοντα*

The phrase (found only here) has strong significance, heightened perhaps by the doubt whether the tone is temporal, concessive, or some other. Similar heavily-weighted phrases in this position occur below in lines 152, 195, 335, and 337.

68. *Ἐπισχερώ* occurs three times in this position, always before a pause and a new phrase beginning at the C caesura. It makes little contribution to the sense, and would seem to be as much a standard filler as the adjectives found here. The first part of the verse recurs at *Il.*, XXIV, 97. *Διαμπερές* is very commonly used in the same way, but has a rather stronger sense (as in line 563 below).

As usual *θαμναί* is virtually an adverb in sense, and accord-

¹⁷ In *Hymn to Demeter*, II, 71 it is also essential.

ingly the enjambement between it and its noun is not harsh. Cf. the note on lines 18-19 above.

69. One of the not very frequent instances of a noun-epithet formula incorporating a preposition. The same expression, lengthened by prefixing *πόδας*, occurs in line 354 below. Cf. also lines 234, 257.

74. *ἐξάυδα, μὴ κεῦθε· τὰ μὲν δὴ τοι τετέλεσται / ἐκ Διός, . . .*

Compare *Il.*, I, 363 (with the same verse preceding), where the sentence continues to the end of the verse without much altering the sense. Here the expression is shortened to allow the further thought to be added in the same line, and perhaps to place *τετέλεσται* and *ἐκ Διός* in the particular positions they here occupy. Cf. line 90 below.

79-93. This short speech is remarkable for its unusual and highly effective sense-cola. There are several rare constructions in the first few lines (see below); then, after a normal couplet (86-7), a long series of successive subordinate clauses following a heavy ellipse in line 88.

80-1. *ἐπεὶ φίλος ὦλεθ' ἑταῖρος, / Πάτροκλος, τὸν . . .*

A proper name in the runover position, in apposition to a noun in the previous verse, is followed by a clause linked in sense; here the circumstances make the effect strongly pathetic. Similar constructions occur in lines 114-15 and 432-3 in this book, and Patroclus' name is used again in this way in *Il.*, XXII, 386-7. The effect is rather different from that of runover adjectives, and the construction is not strictly paratactic (cf. note on line 13 above). Here, for instance, the name adds nothing that we do not know, but makes its impact by its emotional effect only.

82-4. The movement of the verse is quite unusual. First comes the long, unexpected runover adverbial phrase; then the very short, isolated sentence between the B and C caesurae; then the new sentence, enjambling over to the middle of the next line and followed first by an ornamental (but highly pathetic) adjective and adjectival phrase in the same line, then by a runover adjective and linked relative clause in the next. The slow,

regretful epithets are both effective in themselves and contrast strongly with the abrupt shock of the preceding sentence τὸν ἀπώλεσα. The runover adjective καλὰ, here given weight by the pathos of its context, also serves as a convenient filler and link to the phrase which occupies the rest of that verse, which is found after a different—but equally effective—runover in *Il.*, XVI, 381 = 867 (and after the introductory syllables ὥς μὲν καὶ . . . in *Il.*, XXIV, 534). The whole passage shows superb exploitation of the traditional constructions and formulaic diction to produce an emotional effect.

90. The sentence could have continued to the end of the line with the phrase δόμον Πηλῆιον εἶσω, as in line 60 above, or φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, as in *Od.*, XIX, 258. Instead, a new clause is begun at the B caesura (as in line 74 above), perhaps in order to place ζῶειν in an emphatic position. In line 91 the combination of Aeolic forms in ἄνδρεςσι μετέμμεναι is termed exceptional by Hoekstra¹⁸ and emphasises the individual style of the passage.

92. The line begins with πρῶτος here, with ἦ κεν in *Il.*, XI, 433, with αὐτίκ' in XII, 250, and with φθῆη in XVI, 861. All are effective, the present case perhaps especially so, and show the skill with which a standard phrase can be introduced.

94. Θέτις κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα

This phrase is substituted here and in *Il.*, I, 413, XVIII, 428, and perhaps XVIII, 127 (the MSS differ) for the usual formula θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα (found below, lines 146, 381, and four other times). The variant phrase used here is easily constructed from the standard expression

[θαλερόν] [κατὰ] $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{δάκρυ χέουσα (etc.)} \\ \text{δάκρυον εἵβων (etc.)} \end{array} \right.$

thanks to the suitable iambic shape of the name itself. A similar substitution technique, and similar addition of colour, occurs with the names of Dolon in *Il.*, X (Δόλων, Εὐμήδεος υἱός 314, 412, 426; Δόλων, ὑπὸ δ' ἔτρεμε γυῖα 390; Δόλων, ὃν ἐπέφνομεν ἡμεῖς 478); Ares in *Il.*, V (*Ἄρης ἄτος πολέμοιο *Il.*, V, 388, 863; VI, 203; *Ἄρης βροτῷ ἀνδρὶ εἰκώς V, 604; *Ἄρης καὶ πότνι' Ἐνώ V, 592;

¹⁸ See Hoekstra, *op. cit.* (above, note 7), p. 146.

**Ἀρης καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη* XVIII, 516); and Medon, in the *Odyssey* (*Μέδων πεπνυμένα ἰδώς* IV, 696, 711; XXII, 361; XXIV, 442; *Μέδων, ὃς ἐπέυθε-ο βουλὰς* IV, 677 = XVI, 412; *Μέδων, ὃς γὰρ ῥα μάλιστα* XVII, 172; *Μέδων καὶ θεῖος ἀοιδός* XXIV, 439).

An even closer parallel to the meaning of the present passage is found in *Od.*, XXIV, 280, *τὸν δ' ἡμείβετ' ἔπειτα πατὴρ κατὰ δάκρυον εἶβων*, where, for the sake of emphasizing the personal relationship and the old man's grief, the alternative formulas which would include Laertes' name are passed over.¹⁹ In all these cases, the purely ornamental title is dropped in favour of a phrase more precisely befitting the immediate circumstances, a practice which seems to indicate the composer's complete mastery of his style, and perhaps the impending decay of the formulaic system.

98-9. . . . ἐταίρω / κτεινομένῳ ἐπαμῦναι· ὁ μὲν . . .

An effective juxtaposition of the contrasting words, making full use of the weight which falls on *κτεινομένῳ* as first word of the verse. In 100 the runover verb bears a similarly heavy weight, and introduces a linked thought in the remainder of the verse. Three very imposing lines with which to begin the speech.

102. A case of the common use of anaphora at the beginning of the line and at C caesura; other examples in this book are found in lines 159, 185, 419, 472, 483, 535, 536-7, 595, 597. Bassett gives a list of some of the many other cases in Homer.²⁰ It is one of the many techniques which demonstrate the strength of the pause at the C caesura.

106. A short runover adverbial phrase is linked by contrast in sense to the following sentence. Compare line 238 below, where there is no contrast but still a fairly strong connexion.

108. καὶ χάλος, ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπήναι

Cf. *Od.*, XIV, 464 (*οἶνος*) / ἡλεός, ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ μάλ' ἀεῖσαι. This is the kind of parallelism that results from habitual

¹⁹ Cf. *Od.*, XXIV, 327, 375. There are not enough occurrences to speak of a regular formula for the name, but names of that metrical shape are very common in the *Odyssey*.

²⁰ "Notes on the Bucolic Diaeresis," *T.A.P.A.*, XXXVI (1905), pp. 112-14.

positioning of words in a particular place in the line and the schematization of sentence construction that arises from it: it is not necessary to postulate a formulaic expression.

112. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἑάσομεν ἀχνύμενοί περ.

A simple expression, but composed of various building-blocks, as van Leeuwen's parallels show. The first part, as far as the C caesura, is used at *Il.*, XVI, 60 with the ending οὐδ' ἄρα πως ἦν (which is itself used again in XXIII, 670); the last part, from the B caesura on, is used (after different beginnings) at *Il.*, XIX, 8; XXIV, 523; *Od.*, XVI, 147: the ending, ἀχνύμενοί περ, is common; and the whole verse recurs at *Il.*, XIX, 65.

113. Φίλον is of course very common with θυμόν and the like, but here may owe its presence mainly to the need to fill up the verse; cf. the same adjective with μήτηρ in line 189 below, and μέγαν in lines 344 and 588. Compare also the use of γέρον in line 331.

114-15. Compare lines 80-1. Here the runover name Ἑκτορα is not followed by any link in sense or grammar, which perhaps stresses the hatred with which Achilles bites off the name (in light fiction, "He spat out the name of his enemy"). The remainder of lines 115-16 is repeated in *Il.*, XXII, 365-6 at Hector's death (after the equally powerful beginning τέθναθι), and perhaps reminds us of the decision Achilles makes here. The use of the two different words, each brilliantly effective, to introduce the same sentence shows the fusion of form and content that marks great poetry.

122-5. This passage has been mentioned by Kirk²¹ as an example of unaccustomed confusion, as three verses go by before the structure of the sentence becomes clear. A similarly long-drawn-out construction occurs in lines 274-6 below, but the sense is there easier to follow and the many nominative nouns add greatly to the effectiveness of the passage. In the present case, the phrasing is formulaic enough (though there is a metrical anomaly in 123²²) and one may choose whether to

²¹ *Op. cit.* (above, note 2).

²² Line 122 is like *Il.*, XVIII, 339, XXIV, 215: ἀμφοτέρησι δὲ χερσὶ occurs twice, but without δέ is found only in 123 here and *Od.*, IV, 116

consider the construction the venturesome composition of a master or the bungling of an incompetent. It may be noted that line 120 above has the somewhat unusual insertion of a subordinate clause before the main clause is properly under way.

129. *τειρομένοις ἐτάροισιν ἀμυνέμεν αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον.*

The whole verse has a formulaic appearance and the closing noun and epithet might appear essential for the meaning, but in *Il.*, XVII, 703 they are omitted and a new clause begun with *ἔνθεν ἀπῆλθεν*, to which construction there are close parallels at *Il.*, IX, 602 and XV, 688.

131-2. *χάλκεα μαρμαίροντα· τὰ μὲν κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ
αὐτὸς ἔχων ὤμοισιν ἀγάλλεται· οὐδέ ἔφημι . . .*

The use of two runover adjectives, especially in this kind of physical description, to fill the first half of the verse is very common; instances occur below in lines 370, 390, 480, 542, 612. Rather similar in effect are the cases where a runover phrase of two words occupies the first half of the verse (e.g. *πάντοσε δαιδάλλων* [479]; other examples in lines 59 [= 440], 461, 500, 510, 517, 519). See the note on lines 369 f. below.

In *Il.*, XVII, 472-3 the same participial phrase and verb as in 132 here are preceded by *τεύχεα δ' Ἕκτωρ* and followed by *Αἰακίδαο* (ending the verse and sentence). In both constructions, however, the phrasing is so common and natural that it is impossible to say whether the one is a modified version of the other; in the present passage, the introductory words, made up of an end-of-verse noun-epithet formula preceded by one or two syllables of introduction, is a fairly common means of beginning a sentence after the B caesura (cf. lines 223, 280 below), and the starting of a new sentence at the C caesura, as in 132, is of course very common; in XVII, 472, the position and construction of Hector's name is found elsewhere (the same words occur in XVIII, 82, with a different enjambling line), and the

(the single word spanning 1st and 2nd feet and ending in a spondee is almost unique in Homer; see Gieseke, *Homerische Forschungen* [Leipzig, 1864], p. 130 and Porter [above, note 6], Table XII, p. 58); the first part of 124 is paralleled in *Od.*, VIII, 88, XI, 530; the second in *Od.*, VII, 274. *Παρειάων ἀπαλάων* does not recur, but it is only its grammatical construction here that seems awkward.

conclusion of the sentence, *Αιακίδαο*, is easy to parallel (cf. 221, 222 [if the text is right] below).

137. *τεύχεα καλὰ φέρουσα παρ' Ἡφαίστοιο ἄνακτος*.

Cf. line 617 below, *τεύχεα μαρμαίροντα παρ' Ἡφαίστοιο φέρουσα*. *Φέρουσα* is frequently found in both these positions, and the use of the "padder" words *καλά*, *μαρμαίροντα*, and *ἄνακτος* is normal. It is impossible to tell if the variant lines to convey the same significance are both Homeric.

144. Only here and in *Il.*, VI, 504 is *κλυτὰ τεύχεα* followed by another epithet to fill up the line; in the latter instance the phrase *ποικίλα χαλκῷ* is used, as it often is after the noun *τεύχεα* alone. Here that phrase is unsuitable, as the armour will be of gold, and the more general epithet *παμφανόωντα* (which is commoner in casual constructions like this than with any particular noun: cf. 206 below) is substituted. The poet is thinking ahead about the golden armour, and paying careful attention to detail.

148. *Il.*, XV, 405 is similar, but substitutes *ὧς εἰπόντα* for *Οὐλυμπόνδε*. Both are fitting in their context.

152. *νέκυν, θεράποντ' Ἀχιλῆος*.

A new phrase, most effective in its context, modelled (by sound) on the standard expression *θεράποντες Ἄρῃος*. Parry collected some other "puns" of this type, for example *ἄναξ ἐνέρων Ἀιδωνεύς* (cf. *ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων*).²³

154. Hector is honoured with a nominative formula extending over the whole verse. Such lengthy expressions in the nominative are not at all common; actually Hector has them more often than the other great heroes (in *Il.*, XI, 295, 300, and XIX, 204, besides this instance). As usual the long title is used not merely for convenience but because emphasis is needed, in this case to revert to the triumphant Hector after the emotional crisis we have shared with Achilles. As a kind of balance, three lines later the two Ajaxes receive a complimentary phrase which has much the same effect.

185-6. Two successive instances of mid-verse noun-epithet formulae, fitting between the A and C caesurae, with specialised

²³ *L'épithète traditionnelle dans Homère* (Paris, 1928), p. 92.

epithet used only for that particular noun: a similar case occurs in 143 above. There are a few other such regular pairs, demonstrating the immense imagination used in constructing formulae, but often common "filler" adjectives (*μεγαθύμων, δαίφρονα*, etc.) are attached to preceding nouns when required (cf. 30 above).

203. Perhaps *Δὲ φίλος* is inserted mainly to lead the verse up to the C caesura, as I have suggested in other instances (cf. note on line 30 above). As often happens, however, it is possible that the "filler" may have special force here; Achilles arises, with the power of Zeus' daughter behind him, and the great goddess (*δῖα θεάων*, 205) casts a halo around him. A similar effect occurs in *Il.*, XXIV, 472, as Priam approaches the majestic hero in his tent.

The whole passage here (203-14) is heavily ornamented with descriptive adjectives and phrases, culminating in a simile; Owen speaks of "a burst of stately music."²⁴

226. *μεγαθύμων Πηλείωνος*

The usual genitive formula of this length for Achilles is *Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος* (eight times); this variant is found only here, in *Il.*, XIX, 75, and XVII, 214 (where some MSS give the dative case, and Zenodotus preferred to read the regular formula). The expression is easily formed from the regular ending *Πηλείωνος* (etc.) plus the common "filler" adjective *μεγαθύμων* (found seventeen times here in the genitive before a name or equivalent expression). It is possible that in all three cases where this variant phrase occurs it has more effect than the traditional formula, as has been suggested in similar circumstances above (line 94), but I would not insist upon this; it could too easily be simply a momentary slip into the usual technique of lengthening a noun by prefixing an adjective fitting between the B and C caesurae.

234. *μυρόμενοι· μετὰ δέ σφι ποδώκης εἶπετ' Ἀχιλλεύς*

In *Il.*, XXIII, 14 the verse begins similarly but ends with . . . *Θέτις γόον ἔμερον ὥρσε*: here a "filler" adjective fitting between the B and C caesurae is inserted before verb and subject, producing the effect of a divided formula (though actually this

²⁴ *Op. cit.* (above, note 5), pp. 160-1.

epithet and noun do not occur together); in *Il.*, XVI, 166 a parallel phrase with initial vowel occurs, ἀρήιος ἴστατ' Ἀχιλλεύς. Other instances in this book are Ἀγαμέμνονι μῆνιε δίῳ (line 257), an expression which does occur without the inserted verb, and ἐλαφιβόλος ἀρπάσῃ ἀνὴρ (line 319), which has a similar construction to the above formulae: perhaps also 218 ἀσπετον ὄρσε κυδοιμόν (cf. *Il.*, X, 523 ἀσπετος ὄρτο κυδοιμός).

236. κείμενον ἐν φέρτρῳ, δεδαιγμένον ὀξεί χαλκῷ

The line balances two common expressions, of identical construction, around the B caesura; so also (in this book) the adjacent lines 251 and 252, and 576.

239. Ἥελιον δ' ἀκάμαντα . . .

One of the rare occasions where a noun-epithet formula at the beginning of the verse is used to begin a sentence; cf. line 484 below, where τ' replaces δ' to link the expression to what precedes and the construction is normal. In the context it seems possible that the usually ornamental adjective has a significant meaning, as in the next verse we are told that the sun is "reluctant to depart."

268. Here the runover adjective is (I think) meaningless, and without connection in thought to the following sentence; cf. note on line 13 above. The adjective is presumably inserted either because any mention of "night" was felt to be incomplete without the usual decorative term,²⁵ or (less probably, perhaps) to pad out the verse so that the verb *κινήσεται* can fall in the usual position for words of that shape. If the first explanation is correct, it is an interesting example of the influence of a habitual expression even when the grammatical form has been altered.

272. The runover noun *Τρώων* is odd; Leaf remarked that there was no justification for its prominent position, and it does not connect with the sentence which follows it. In *Il.*, XXII, 43, where the same phrase ends the preceding line, the runover word used is the much more effective *κείμενον*. The runover word

²⁵ Five times *νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίην* begins a verse; *ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα* does so once; and three times a verse is ended with *ἀμβροσίη νύξ*.

seems to be inserted here merely to fill the space before the next phrase, which is similar to one which begins the verse in *Il.*, XXII, 454 and may be a standard expression. It is, however, poorly chosen; note the similarly poor runover adjective four lines above.

274-6. See note on lines 122-5 above.

289. The two epithets which stand at the end of the line are both usually ornamental, but are here used as the predicate of the sentence, with a strongly significant sense: "Men spoke of the city as rich in gold and bronze." This is a good example of the way in which usually formulaic adjectives can still be used with their full value. The construction, however, seems highly individual, and it may not be just coincidence that the sentence also contains, in the previous line, the only example of the unmetrical nominative μέρορες ἄνθρωποι. The poet is boldly (or carelessly, if you wish) using a different construction, and a different case, of traditional words,²⁰ and disregarding the metre.

291-2. Enjambement occurs between the adjective and following noun, but is not harsh because πολλά here, as often, has an almost adverbial sense; cf. note to line 68 above. Here the verse is perhaps so constructed because the following names and epithet form a standard phrase (*Il.*, III, 401, cf. *Hymn to Apollo*, 3, 179).

296. This is one of the heavily-weighted complete sentences which sometimes occur between the C caesura and the end of the verse; cf. 435 and 515 below. This expression also occurs in *Il.*, XVII, 449, where Πριαμίδης is used as padding to lead up to it.

301. Καταδημοβορῆσαι is a *hapax legomenon*, perhaps invented for the occasion. Cf. notes to lines 26 and 54 above.

308, 309. . . . ἧ κε φέρησι μέγα κράτος, ἧ κε φεροίμην.
ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος, καὶ τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα.

²⁰ The only other occurrence of πολύχρυσος πολύχαλκος together is in their peculiar attribution to Dolon (*Il.*, X, 315), and the latter is not otherwise found in this position in the verse, but I see no reason to think the words other than traditional.

These are two very neat expressions, which were obviously thoughtfully constructed by some individual poet. Rather similar cases are *Il.*, XXII, 253 *ἔλοιμί κεν, ἢ κεν ἀλοίην* and *Od.*, XV, 300 *ἢ κεν θάνατον φύγοι ἢ κεν ἀλώη*. The expression in line 308 appears again (slightly modified) in *Il.*, XIII, 486, after *αἰψά κεν . . .* There is a not dissimilar interest in neat wording shown in the wordplay *ἐς δ' ἀγορὴν ἀγέροντο* in line 245 above (so too in *Il.*, II, 788²⁷) and perhaps a line or two before the present passage in line 306, where Hector's phraseology seems to repeat, and refute, the wise words of Polydamas (278). It is, however, impossible to be sure, as the expressions are so common (303 = 277 and *Il.*, VIII, 530; *τῷ δ' ἄλγιον* and *αἶ κ' ἐθέλλοι* both occur in these positions elsewhere).

314-15. *ἄρπον ἔπειθ' εἵλοντο κατὰ στρατόν· αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
πεννύχοι Πάτροκλον ἀνεσπενάχοντο γοῶντες.*

In *Il.*, V, 380 and XI, 730 a verse which begins like the first line here quoted concludes with the phrase *ἐν τελέεσσι*, carrying the sentence to the end of the line; and again, in line 298 above a similar but slightly modified verse concludes with this same expression. Why is the last phrase omitted here, and a new sentence—in fact, a new paragraph—begun at the C caesura? I can suggest two reasons.

(a) Homeric poetry very much liked to begin a sentence at this point:²⁸ examples are unnecessary as they occur on every

²⁷ See Stanford, *op. cit.* (above, note 2), Index, *s.v. schema etymologicum*.

²⁸ Pauses in sense at the C caesura occur more often in some passages than others, but I am not sure that the statistics are very significant. For what it may be worth, in the present book the average proportion of lines containing a fairly strong pause in sense at this point (determination is occasionally somewhat subjective) is 15.5% (94 cases in 607 verses, omitting the peculiar circumstance of the nymph-names in lines 39-48); in the Shield (478-608) the proportion is 17.7% (23 cases in 130 lines); the lowest proportions fall in the sad scenes of Achilles' grief (in lines 1-38, 4 cases [10.5%]; in lines 310-42, 2 cases in 32 lines [6.3%]); the highest incidence in a passage of some length is in the Trojan assembly (lines 243-309, 14 cases in 66 lines [21.2%]) and in the description of the two cities on the Shield (509-40, 7 cases in 31 lines [21.3%]). In one short passage, Hephaestus' reaction to Thetis' arrival, the level rises to 44.4% (lines 403-21, 3 in 18 lines). There are runs of 3 consecutive cases at 306-8, 377-9, 466-8.

page, and one may compare the cases mentioned above (comments on lines 74 and 90) where the poet has preferred to start a new sentence at the B caesura rather than to continue to the end of the verse. Often alternative forms of verses with either a new start at the C caesura or a simple filler ending occur, and the alternative ending to a familiar verse may in itself have been considered refreshing. Again, there may be an additional effect of simultaneous and contrasting actions given by the placing of a new subject within the same verse: "The Trojans feasted, while the Achaeans mourned Patroclus." This is skilful technique.

(b) The sentence may be constructed as it is in order to fit *παννύχιοι*, and also the remainder of line 315, next to each other and in their present positions in the line. The whole scene of mourning is framed, in characteristic ring-form manner, by the almost parallel lines 314-15 and 354-5. The basic elements of the thought, *παννύχιοι* and *Πάτροκλον ἀνεστειλάχοντο γοῶντες*, occur in both couplets; in 314-15, they are placed in the same line, with the remaining essential part of the sentence, the subject, placed ahead in the preceding verse; in the second couplet (lines 354-5), the subject is understood already and really need not be expressed at all, and so an additional phrase *πόδας ταχὺν ἀμφ' Ἀχλῆα* is placed after *παννύχιοι* to add to the pathetic sense and fill out the line. Then the subject, *Μυρμιδόνες*, is placed at the beginning of the second line, and the rest of the sentence falls into place after it. Both couplets have their own special features, and the slight variation between them is itself pleasing. Hoekstra²⁹ draws attention to a similar remodelling of an expression, again with pathetic effect, in *Il.*, XXIII, 152-3.

331. *Γέρων* almost always precedes *ἱππηλάτα* and the following name, but one instance occurs where its omission (*Il.*, IV, 387) indicates (if indication is required) that it can be regarded as a dissyllabic filler to be inserted or not as occasion demands. Here it also lends a certain amount of pathos, showing the thoughtfulness with which these standard expressions were created.

333. A very heavy stress, because of the meaning, falls on *σεῦ ὕστερος*, though it stands in a position often occupied by a

²⁹ *Op. cit.* (above, note 7), pp. 105-6.

purely ornamental adjective. This line, like many others, falls into four separate phrases divided at the A, B, and C caesurae.

334-5. . . . πρίν γ' Ἑκτορος ἐνθάδ' ἐνείκαι
τεύχεα καὶ κεφαλὴν, μεγαθύμου σοῖο φονῆος.

This is one of the infrequent cases of a genitive standing in the verse preceding that in which its noun is placed. Here the construction is obviously intended to emphasise the name of Hector by its isolated position at the beginning of its clause. The emphasis is continued in the concluding phrase of line 335, which is not a standard complimentary expression³⁰ but an effective intensification of the thought. The use of *μεγαθύμου* is slightly unusual; it is otherwise always a "good" word, and one wonders if it could possibly be construed with *σοῖο* here instead of with *φονῆος*.

336-7. δώδεκα δὲ προπάροιθε πυρῆς ἀποδειροτόμησω
Τρώων ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, σέθεν κταμένιο χολωθείς.

In close proximity to the couplet last commented upon occurs another which includes a fairly harsh adjective-noun enjambement and a similar emphatic appositional phrase in the second half of the verse. The position of the adjective is normal, cf. *Il.*, XV, 746 *δώδεκα δὲ προπάροιθε νεῶν αὐτοσχεδὸν οὔτα* (where the adjective is used substantivally and there is no harsh enjambement). Here the arrangement of the words may be affected by the need to fit in the unwieldy verb-form. The couplet is repeated in *Il.*, XXIII, 22-3.

343. ὥς εἰπὼν ἐτάροισιν ἐκέκλετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς

The schematized construction set up around *ἐκέκλετο* is perhaps as good an example as can be found of the variations and permutations possible with the units of sense that fall between the caesurae of the verse. As inspection of the Concordances will show, this verb is found only in this position (*Iliad*, sixteen times, *Odyssey*, four times); between the beginning of the verse

³⁰ Actually there may not have been one to hand; *βροτολόγῳ ἴσος Ἄρην* is not found in the genitive, and *μεγαθύμου Πριαμίδαο* does not occur (this patronymic is only found twice in the genitive, in identical verses).

and the A caesura are found seven different names (in the nominative), the connecting phrase *ὡς εἰπὼν* (five times), a dative noun (three times), an article plus a conjunction (twice) and an adverb (once); between the A and B caesurae are found eight different nouns in the dative, and (twice) the adverb *ἐτέρωθεν*; between the B and C caesurae stands the verb; and after the C caesura there are various formulaic qualifying phrases (e.g. *μακρὸν ἀύσας*), the dative *ἐτάροισιν* (twice, when the usual place of the dative, between the A and B caesurae, is filled by *ἐτέρωθεν*), a noun-epithet formula in the nominative (when there has not been one earlier in the verse: three times, including the present line), the speech-introduction *φώνησέν τε* (twice), and once a new and complete sentence (*τοὶ δὲ πύθοντο*). Two of the twenty verses are repeated three times each, and one twice; the remaining twelve differ in some way from each other.

344. The formulaic adjective *ὠτώεντα*, which might have been used to conclude the verse (cf. *Works and Days*, 657; *Il.*, XXIII, 264), is passed over and a new sentence begun at the C caesura. There is a similarly obvious case where an ornamental epithet might have been used, and is not, at line 503 below; *ἡρόφωνοι* could probably have been inserted if required (though actually there is no example of the nominative) and in fact the genitive form is so used two lines further on. Cf. note to lines 314-15 above.

356. *Ζεὺς δ' Ἥρην προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε.*

The sudden introduction of the two unexpected names seems abrupt and unlike the usual richness of Homeric expression. Perhaps the best defence is to stress that the scene changes and both the names are fresh to us: both need equal stress, whereas a little experiment will show that other possible ways of introducing both within a single verse stress one or the other, as would normally be required within a scene (e.g. *Ζεὺς δ' αὖτε Κρονίδης προσέφη λευκόλεον Ἥρην*; *Ἥρην δὲ προσέειπε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*). An easier version, perhaps more normal, of this verse occurs at *Il.*, XVI, 432, beginning *Ἥρην δὲ . . .*

358-9. *σεῖο / ἐξ αὐτῆς . . .*

The unusual order, with the genitive of the pronoun preceding its preposition and separated from it by enjambement, only adds

to the desired emphasis on *σείο*. Owen gives a good explanation and defence of this much-criticised passage.³¹

362. *καὶ μὲν δὴ ποῦ τις μέλλει βροτὸς ἀνδρὶ τελέσσαι*

Compare the usual phrases *βροτὸν ἄνδρα τελέσσαι* (*Il.*, XIX, 22), *βροτῶ ἀνδρὶ* (*Il.*, V, 604, etc.), *βροτοῦ ἀνέρος* (*Il.*, XVIII, 85), and the note on line 2 above. The grammatical division here introduced between the two words composing the regular formula was probably made easier by the frequency with which *βροτός* occurs in this position in the verse without *ἀνὴρ*. Like verse 2, this use illustrates the independence of thought of the poet and his flexibility in handling the formulaic expressions.

369f. This is a good example of the Homeric manner of attaching descriptive adjectives to a sentence already complete in sense—the paratactic style which H. and A. Thornton describe.³² We see Thetis approaching the house, then notice its structure, and realise that its construction from bronze is only natural since it is the work of the smith-god. Compare lines 373 and 390 below (and many others), and Tennyson's ". . . an arm / Rose up from out the bosom of the lake, / Clothed in white samite, mystic, wonderful, / Holding the sword. . . ." (*Passing of Arthur*).

396. The strongly significant adjective *κυνώπιδος* is put in after the manner of the ornamental filler adjectives; cf. note to line 30 above. Line 262 has a similarly significant usage of *ὑπέρβιος*, where the adjective is predicative (the same phrase occurs at *Od.*, XV, 212, and the longer expression *ὑπερφίαλος καὶ ἀπηγής* ends the line at *Il.*, XV, 94). In the present instance, the adjective apparently seemed too strong for some tastes, and in some MSS the unique form *βοώπιδος* is substituted.

435. *κεῖται ἐνὶ μεγάροις ἀρημένος, ἄλλα δέ μοι νῦν.*

The final sentence bears considerable weight, but its meaning must surely always have been difficult to grasp. Cf. line 296 above. Possibly the poet was in a difficulty. *Ἐν(ι) μεγάροισ(ι) (ν)* often occurs in this position, but is usually followed by a pause

³¹ *Op. cit.* (above, note 5), pp. 159-60.

³² *Op. cit.* (above, note 13), *passim*.

at the B caesura; in those cases where an essential word does follow the phrase, as here, the verse is concluded with the adjective *ἡμετέροισι* or with a new sentence. Since that adjective would be inept here he had to begin a new sentence, and unless he chose to enjamb his space was very limited.

444-5. Compare *Il.*, XV, 56-9, where a fuller version of the tale inserts an extra verse between the two of this couplet and adds another at the end. Thetis here neatly abbreviates Achilles' woeful story, and demonstrates the possibilities of expansion and contraction which the traditional style allows.

508. The verse might almost be printed in quotation marks, as if inscribed on a prize; cf. the inscription *ὅς νῦν ὀρχηστῶν πάντων ἀταλώτατα παίζει* on a Geometric vase.³³

528-9. *τάμνοντ' ἀμφὶ βοῶν ἀγέλας καὶ πώεα καλὰ
ἀργεννέων οἰῶν*

The usual phrases are *βοῦς περιταμνόμενος ἡδ' οἰῶν πώεα καλὰ* (*Od.*, XI, 402, XXIV, 112); *πεντήκοντα βοῶν ἀγέλας, τόσα πώεα οἰῶν* (*Il.*, XI, 678, cf. *Od.*, XIV, 100); *ἡ βοῶν ἀγέλην ἢ πῶν μέγ' οἰῶν* (*Il.*, XV, 323, *Od.*, XII, 299, cf. *Il.*, XI, 696). Here there seems to be a conflation of the first two expressions, and although the whole thought could easily be included in the one line by omitting *καλὰ* and substituting *οἰῶν* (or even *μήλων*, though this word-combination is not found in Homer: see crit. app.) or (with Zenodotus) ending the verse with *πῶν μέγ' οἰῶν*, the poet preferred to enjamb into the next verse: this allowed him to use the much more effective *ἀργεννέων οἰῶν*, taken from the verse-end formula *οἰῶν ἀργεννάων* (line 588 below, etc.) and adapted by means of the Ionic shortening and contraction. The stress on the colour is effective and probably the reason for the construction adopted: cf. the mention of the black ploughland in lines 548-9 below, and the dark grapes and silver poles in 562-3.

531-2. In line 532 the ornamental adjective between the A and B caesurae agrees with a noun in the preceding verse, in a sentence which begins at the C caesura. This is a fairly common

³³ Mentioned, with bibliography, by T. B. L. Webster in *B.S.A.*, L (1955), p. 39.

pattern of sentence-construction, and is found in successive couplets in lines 595-6 and 597-8 below.

576. A verse much admired for its sound.³⁴ The balance of the phrases around the B caesura should also be noted; cf. lines 236, 251, and 252 above.

595-6 and 597-8. The sentence-structure of the two couplets matches word for word, which must surely be exceptional. Cf. note to lines 531-2 above. (The ancient critics athetised the second couplet.)

In a recent article,³⁵ which appeared after this study had been prepared, Professor F. M. Combellack quotes the following words of D. S. Carne-Ross:

Parry did not sufficiently ask himself what happened to the Greek oral tradition when Homer took over—what dislocations occurred when a poet of the highest genius irrupted into this closed world of fine verse craftsmen. We may study formulaic poetry in the *gustars*, but with Homer what we should surely be doing is studying the way in which a great poet *uses* a formulaic tradition: we should be asking ourselves how he adapts himself to its limitations (for by the highest standards, the standards of Homer, they *are* limitations), how he forces the traditional elements to mean more than they ever meant before, how he enriches it with new formal and verbal possibilities.

Combellack comments, "This program seems to me at once absolutely splendid and absolutely impossible. . . . The only way we can ever discover what use a poet has made of tradition is to compare him with his predecessors and contemporaries. And this is precisely what we cannot do with Homer." This is logical and cautious; but it seems to me that perhaps a little more can be attempted in the area delineated by Carne-Ross than Combellack allows. We cannot compare Homer with his predecessors and contemporaries, and comparison with his successors and imitators will obviously be of limited value. To a fairly considerable extent, however, we can compare him with

³⁴ See most recently W. B. Stanford, *op. cit.* (above, note 2), pp. xxii f.

³⁵ "Some Formulary Illogicalities in Homer," *T. A. P. A.*, XCVI (1965), pp. 41-56; this passage, p. 54, quoting from Carne-Ross' "postscript" to Christopher Logue's *Patrocleia of Homer* (Ann Arbor, 1963; p. 53, note 2).

himself; we can compare standard usages and constructions with those which are unusual and apparently individual, and we can identify usages which may be considered to be of especial literary merit and which, even if not demonstrably originating with Homer, are development and exploitation of the epic diction showing particular creative genius. In this way I have tried to throw a little more light on the examples in Book XVIII of some traditional constructions (runover words and the associated opportunity of emphasis or pathos; variations possible after the C caesura; manipulation of formulae, and invention of new phrases on old models; and use of "filler" adjectives) and the possible occurrence of standard expressions used with more than purely ornamental significance.

This kind of attempt may well be thought hazardous and subjective, but even if it fails to define examples where Homer's genius is bursting through the old tradition, it may at least do something to reassert the flexibility and power of the traditional resources at the poet's disposal.

The following are the main topics discussed in this paper, at the lines listed under each heading:—

Enjambement, 18-19, 68, 132-5, 291-2, 336-7, 358-9.

Use of runover words, 13, 20-1, 62, 80-1, 106, 114-15, 131-2, 268, 272, 369 f.

Break in sense at C caesura, 102, 112, 129, 131-2, 144, 296, 314-15, 344, 435.

Use of adjectives (etc.) between the B and C caesurae, 30-1, 58, 63, 68, 148, 185-6, 203, 333, 396.

Construction of verses and sentences, 16, 18-19, 20-1, 58, 82-4, 108, 112, 113, 129, 131-2, 137, 236, 309, 314-15, 334-5, 336-7, 343, 369 f., 444-5, 531-2, 595-6.

Manipulation of formulaic expressions, 2, 28, 63, 69, 74, 90, 92, 94, 152, 226, 234, 239, 289, 309, 331, 356, 362, 528-9.

Unusual effectiveness of "filler" word, 84, 115, 203, 331.

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CATULLUS 5 AND 7:
A STUDY IN COMPLEMENTARIES.

Vivamus, mea Lesbia, atque amemus,
rumoresque senum seueriorum
omnes unius aestimemus assis!
soles occidere et redire possunt:
5 nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux,
nox est perpetua una dormienda.
da mi basia mille, deinde centum,
dein mille altera, dein secunda centum,
deinde usque altera mille, deinde centum.
10 dein, cum milia multa fecerimus,
conturbabimus illa, ne sciamus,
aut ne quis malus invidere possit,
cum tantum sciat esse basiorum.

(Catullus 5)

Quaeris, quot mihi basiationes
tuae, Lesbia, sint satis superque.
quam magnus numerus Libyssae harenae
lasarpiciferis iacet Cyrenis
5 oraculum Iouis inter aestuosi
et Batti ueteris sacrum sepulcrum;
aut quam sidera multa, cum tacet nox,
furtiuos hominum uident amores:
tam te basia multa basiare
10 uesano satis et super Catullo est,
quae nec pernumerare curiosi
possint nec mala fascinare lingua.

(Catullus 7)

I

Even the most intense love poems of Catullus, as Elder, Quinn, Commager, and others have recently helped us to see, are not simple outpourings of emotion; all impose order and structure on the emotions they treat.¹ Yet the search for artistry

¹ J. P. Elder, "Notes on Some Conscious and Subconscious Elements in Catullus' Poetry," *H. S. C. P.*, LX (1951), pp. 101-36; K. F. Quinn, *The Catullan Revolution* (Melbourne, 1959) and "Docte Catulle" in *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Elegy and Lyric*, ed. J. P. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 31-63; Steele Commager, "Notes on Some Poems of Catullus," *H. S. C. P.*, LXX (1965), pp. 83-110. On

and intellectual structure should not blind us to the real intensity which pervades these poems. Conversely, we must not forget (as contemporary critics seem in no danger of forgetting) that it is only through their formal perfection and artistic control that these poems are able to transcend the privacy of passion: through their form they convince us of the deep validity and truth of the emotions which they contain and show us something arresting or significant enough in those emotions to warrant our attention and our involvement.

Each generation reacts against the excesses of its predecessor. In our present eagerness to break away from biographical romanticism, to place form before feeling, to value the imagined event above the lived encounter with the world, we sometimes fall into an opposite excess and read into Catullus something of the modern poet's alienation from concrete experience and his loss of a directness of relation between life and art. A sensitive interpreter of Catullus has, for example, written,

Catullus soon discovered that this new kind of love, despite the hope it gave of lasting *amicitia*, could end, like the usual type of affair, in "betrayal." By the time this stage is reached, *he is almost certainly less concerned with the real Lesbia than with solving the linguistic and poetic problems* he faced in expressing the conflict in himself between the residue of physical attachment and intellectual awareness of its folly. [*Italics mine.*]²

To be sure, the question of the relation between poetry and experience is immensely complex. Yet, while intensity of emotion needs art to realize itself as expression and thus affect us meaningfully, the presence of art does not in all poets exclude the possibility of real emotion over real experiences. All poetry is, to some extent, concerned with "solving . . . linguistic and poetic problems," but a poet like Catullus is driven to "solve" such problems because he has lived and felt something which he needs to define, explore, and hold through form. It is precisely Catullus' extraordinary intensity of feeling which moves him to a corresponding intensity of form. It is, of course, only

the structure of Poem 5 see R. E. Grimm, "Catullus 5 Again," *C. J.*, LIX (1963-64), pp. 15-22.

² Quinn, *Catullan Revolution*, p. 81. Also his *Latin Explorations* (New York, 1965), p. 142.

as that feeling has been refined and transmuted into form that we, as students of literature, are interested in it, for only then does it become poetry. But, in our concern for the poetry rather than the poet, we should not set up a false and simplistic antithesis between feeling and form nor reduce the poet's task to an elaboration of the latter when in fact what occurs is a process of fusion far more complex than either feeling intense emotion on the one hand or solving formal problems on the other.

Poems Five and Seven provide a useful focus for these questions, especially as critics have agreed on the formal artistry of both. They are the more interesting because they provide us with two related poems which take different approaches to the same theme,³ Seven exhibiting its formal qualities and artistic

³ That the two poems are closely connected is clear from the verbal echoes between them. Each poem addresses Lesbia (*mea Lesbia*, 5.1; *Lesbia*, 7.2). The monosyllabic ending of 7.7, *cum tacet nox*, recalls the similar effect in 5.5, *brevis lux*, with its *nox* in the next line (5.6). Line 9 of Seven, *tam te basia multa basiare*, obviously points back to the subject of 5.7-10, *da mi basia mille . . .*; and the last two lines of Seven echo the last two of Five:

aut ne quis malus invidere possit
cum tantum sciat esse basiorum (5, 12-13).

quae nec pernumerare curiosi
possint nec mala fascinare lingua (7, 11-12).

And it is perhaps worth noting that Ben Jonson, who knew his Catullus extremely well, allows the two poems to fuse into one in his adaptation, *The Forest*:

Kiss, and score up wealthy sums
On my lips, thus hardly sundred,
While you breathe. First give a hundred
Then a thousand, then another
Hundred, then unto the tother
Add a thousand, and so more:
Till you equal with the store
All the grass that Rumney yields,
Or the sands in Chelsea fields,
Or the drops in silver Thames
Or the stars that gild his streams,
In the silent summer-nights,
When youths ply their stoln delights.
That the curious may not know
How to tell them as they flow,
And the envious, when they find
What this number is, be pin'd.

W. Kroll, *C. Valerius Catullus* (ed. 2, Leipzig, 1929; reprint, Stuttgart, 1959) on 7.1 speaks of Seven as "ein Pendant zum 5. Gedicht"; and

consciousness openly, Five concealing its art for an effect of greater immediacy.

Five is especially instructive because its careful structure, recently analyzed by Grimm, frames one of Catullus' most outspokenly passionate utterances (5, 7-9):

da mi basia mille, deinde centum,
dein mille altera, dein secunda centum,
deinde usque altera mille, deinde centum.

It is with the intensity of these lines, rather than with their place in the structure of the poem, that I wish to begin my study.

Set aside for a moment our analytical tools and the lines flood us with that intensity. At first hearing, the numbers seem a wild, passionate jumble; and only at second or third glance do we notice their orderly succession, the careful alternations in the interspersing of *dein* and *deinde*, the varied position of the caesura, the placing of *centum* at the end of each line, the balance of *mille*, *dein-de centum* at the ends of the first and third lines.

It is, clearly, in large part through their ordered pattern of sound and meaning that these lines reveal the speaker's passion and convince us of it. But what the lines reach toward and effect goes beyond this ordered pattern. Here the poet seeks to find as close an equivalent as language will allow for the passionate gestures of the lover. Regarded in terms of sound and rhythm⁴ (other criteria will be considered later), the lines embody almost pure gesture and pure exclamation. The monosyllabic, primal simplicity of *da*, "give," introduces a series of repeated hundreds and thousands which flash by in rapid alternation like figures on a revolving sphere. Language here seems at first reduced (or, from a different point of view, lifted) almost to the status of a passionate babble.

E. T. Merrill, *Catullus* (1893; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1951) calls Seven "a companion-piece to 5, and . . . undoubtedly written at about the same time with it." But aside from the brief comparison by Quinn (*Catullan Revolution*, p. 52), the two poems have not generally been considered together. A valuable exception is L. Ferrero, *Interpretazione di Catullo* (Torino, 1955), pp. 170 ff. and especially 173-4, who discusses the poems somewhat along the lines set forth here.

⁴ With regard to the rhythm of 5, 7-9 Grimm, p. 18, observes the "striking" effect of "the three strong initial beats of *da mi basia mille* after the languid *lormienda*. . ."

The alliteration, the repetition of the same simple words, the absence of verbs (after the initial *da*), the boldness, conveying passion, of continuing the enumeration for three lines in a thirteen-line poem—all this to a detached observer or in the hands of a less gifted poet might verge on the ridiculous. By revealing himself in this intimate moment of uninhibited entreaty—a posture not necessarily flattering—the poet himself enacts that reckless scorn of society and sober opinion which he advocated in his opening lines (2-3).

This impassioned plea for kisses, however, has its more serious implications. The multiplicity of kisses is set against the stark singleness of the "one night" of death's eternal sleep. The theme of the poem is not only love, but life. *Vivamus* is its first word. Line 1 joins life and love; and lines 4-6 and 7-9 respectively juxtapose death and love.⁵ Love, Catullus seems to suggest, is the essence of life.⁶ Or, in other terms, life, when fully realized, is a matter of passion which by its sheer energy is able to defeat for a while the staticity and torpor of death. In lines 7-9, then, Catullus seeks to grasp something of this essential quality of "life," the quick pulsation of energy wherein act flows into act with no clear division, no order. Life of this sort cannot be held fast or measured at a single point, but overflows the limits set to it, as the elisions of lines 8-9 overflow the boundaries between words. Though the lover must begin with finite numbers which he piles one on top of another, ostensibly keeping track of the hundreds and thousands (*mille altera, secunda centum, altera mille*), he will finally confound that number: *conturbabimus illa ne sciamus* (11).⁷ Passion, seeking

⁵ On "life" as the theme of Five see Elder, p. 122: "The theme is *Vivamus*. What image will effectively body that idea? Suns, the sun of life, the source of warmth." And he notes in this connection "Catullus' tendency to state his theme at the start of a poem" (p. 123).

⁶ See Kroll, on 5, 1: "Das *vivere* besteht hier eben im *amare*."

⁷ Recent critics have stressed the orderliness of Catullus' counting. He seems to be performing an actual reckoning, whether on an abacus, as H. L. Levy, *A. J. P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 222-4, has argued, or on his fingers, as Roger Pack, *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 47-51, has suggested (see also Grimm, pp. 15-16). But this appearance of counting contrasts with the rhythmic accumulation suggested by the repetitions; and Merrill's note on *conturbabimus* (5, 11) is still to the point: "The confusion of the count is already effected in the poem by the hurrying

to be its own end, wants to blot out the rest of existence, to acknowledge no limits, to feel in its repeated, yet finite multiples, an infinity of power with which it may challenge the "one night" of death and the limitless power (note *possunt*, 4) of nature's endless cycles: *soles occidere et redire possunt* (4).

The last two lines of Five, then, will reflect not merely superstitious fear, but carry forward and conclude the basic theme of the poem. Against the lover's thoughtless and reckless expenditure of energy stands this shadowy "some one" (*ne quis malus*) who watches (*invidere* in 12 contains some implications of "seeing"),⁸ counts, and calculates (cf. *tantum sciat*, 13), whose power lies in knowing the *precise* number.

The poem presents censorious old men in its second line and some envious evil person in its second line from the end. These two opponents of the lovers are related. Both are left rather vague; and both are simultaneously felt as real persons and as symbols of something more. The *senes* of line 2 are at one level the conservative and "sensible" members of society (like the old men presented in Roman comedy) who disapprove of such goings on. But at the same time they are symbols of the waning of life and energy which emerges generically in lines 4-6. So the envious *malus* of 12 is both a potentially real person who can actually curse the lovers' happiness and a symbol of everything hostile to the passionate life exhibited in lines 7-11. He embodies a niggardly counting up, an envious taking stock, a hoarding of life which, by its very attitude, destroys the exultant freedom of feeling, utterance, and action which the poet seeks to capture in lines 7-11.

Catullus replies to both the old men and the evil envier. The first he answers in their own terms: he makes an ironical gesture of calculation and exact evaluation: *aestimemus* (3), a deliberately prosaic word. His "valuation" is, of course,

succession of *mille* and *centum*." The enthusiastic, but imprecise response of E. V. Marmorale, *L'Ultimo Catullo* (ed. 2, Naples, 1957), p. 30, also bears witness to the impression of infinite abundance created by Catullus' language: "... il c. 5, pieno della tracotanza impertinente del giovine che grida ai quattro venti il suo diritto all'amore e la sua illimitata possibilità di godere, espressa col numero infinito dei baci" (italics mine).

⁸ On the implications of seeing in *invidere* see Kroll, *ad loc.*; also Grimm, p. 19.

negative: they are *all* to be valued at *one* cent (editors have often noted the juxtaposition of *omnes* and *unius*). He dismisses them in terms of money (*assis*), with its implications not only of counting, but also of the realm of practical affairs which the lover traditionally disdains.⁹

Yet this act of bravado meets a deeper obstacle in another set of juxtapositions: *lux-nox* in 5-6 and *perpetua-una* in 6. The old men are reminders of time, change, and death. But, since they are only men, they can be dismissed; the universal fact of death, written in the settings and risings of the sun, cannot. Catullus could count the mumbling talk (*rumores*) of the old as worth *one* cent; but he comes up against the *one* night of death. It is the very immediacy of death, however, which spurs the poet on to answer it and to break through into an intensity of life which can negate death.¹⁰

The answer is not in words or talk like the old men's *rumores*, but in gestures; not in "valuation" or orderly calculation, but in a passionate mustering of numbers which seem to defy the spirit of arithmetic even as they are reckoned one upon another. Few sympathetic readers of Catullus, I would hazard, are tempted actually to perform the addition in these lines.

In his recent study of Five, Grimm has pointed to this "blend of insatiate passion (the lover demanding ever more kisses) and rational calculation" and has stressed the tension deriving from the union of "the ardent passion of the lover with the hard-headedness of the businessman."¹¹ The language of calculation occurs throughout, from *aestimemus* and *assis* to *fecerimus* and *conturbabimus* (the two latter, as interpreters have suggested,

⁹ On the *senes* see Quinn, "Docte Catulle," p. 51: "For them, the implication is, the appraisal of all forms of happiness is reduced to a matter of accountancy." *Aestimatio* occurs in one other poem of Catullus, 12, 12; and here too there is an opposition of prosaic, monetary value and a personal, sentimental attachment beyond any material price: *quod me non moerit aestimatione, verum est mnemosynum mei sodalis*. Interpreters have pointed out that not only *aestimemus* and *assis*, but also *conturbabimus* and *fecerimus* may be drawn from the language of accounting and finance: see Grimm, pp. 20-1, with his note 13, p. 22; also C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus. A Commentary* (Oxford, 1961) on 5, 10 and 5, 11.

¹⁰ See Grimm, p. 18: "The energy of *da mi basia mille* represents Catullus' violent reaction to the limitation set forth in line 6."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

very probably reflect the terminology of finance and arithmetic). Yet all this technical terminology is ironical; and its use in lines 7-11, rather than marking "a return to the control imposed by number," as Grimm suggests,¹² shows the lovers adopting number only to defeat it, employing the language of the business world and practical affairs only to negate that world in the passionate insouciance of their own enclosed realm. Hence Catullus seems to be keeping track of the hundreds and the thousands just when his passion is overleaping such numerical restraints.

Arithmetical calculation informs the structure of lines 7-9, but their emotional intensity and their style (especially the alliterative beat of the rhythm) destroy the rational, calculatory frame. The content seeks, as it were, to annihilate the form which contains it. The finite, serving as the vehicle for the infinite, is shattered as it performs its office.¹³ Catullus has here given a concrete, dramatic embodiment of the paradoxical essence not only of love but of poetry also: the transcendence of measure and limit in and through measure and limit.

This middle section (lines 7-11) answers not only the sober and practical old men of the beginning, but also the envier of the end. The echo of *ne sciamus* (line 11) in *sciat* of line 13 facilitates this connection between the middle and end of the poem. The *senes* are answered by the irony of *aestimemus* and *assis* (which also foreshadow the precise counting of the envious *malus*) and by the challenge to death in the passion of lines 7-11. The *malus* is answered by the reckless, uncounted expense of energy for its own sake. In both cases the heart of the meaning lies in the lines which contain the least paraphrasable "meaning," the lines in which the words are vehicles less for discursive meaning than for cry and gesture, the lines which in sound and rhythm are perhaps the closest of any in Catullus to inarticulate, unmeditated, thought-less exclamation and action.

These lines present the life of passion as possessing not only infinite potency and energy, but also infinite generosity. Catullus

¹² *Loc. cit.* Also H. A. Khan, *Latomus*, XXVII (1968), p. 12.

¹³ One might compare Rilke, *Sonnets to Orpheus*, II, 13:

Hier, unter Schwindenden, sei, im Reiche der
Neige,
Sei ein klingendes Glas, das sich im Klang
schon zerschlug.

calls upon his Lesbia to "give," *da*; and the syllable resounds again and again in the repeated "*d*"-sounds of *deinde*, . . . *dein* . . . *dein* . . . *secunda* . . . *deinde* . . . *deinde* . . . *dein*. Here, then, is latent another antithesis: the mutual generosity, the free giving and taking between the lovers *versus* the hostility, spite, malice on the part of the old men and the vague evil envier.

These antitheses articulate the poem's structure and serve to direct its emotional forces to a sharper focus. Something too of the powerful effect of Five lies in a consistent progression and juxtaposition of the large, basic terms of our existence: life and love *versus* age and death; sun and light *versus* night and darkness; infinite multiplicity *versus* number and limit; the direct involvement of passion and action *versus* distanced observation and calculation.

II

Poem Seven presents a difference of mood which reveals itself at once in the style. Here passion is not celebrated as an answer to death or to the timid hoarding of waning energies. Passion here is madness; the lover is *vesanus Catullus* (10). Nor does Catullus attempt to find a verbal equivalent for the eager, inarticulate ardor of love. Instead, he describes that love in highly elaborate language, language which renders in Alexandrian style well-worn literary conventions and commonplaces (7, 3-8).¹⁴ The closest the poet can come to the "life" of his passion is to compare it to the sands of far-off Africa and the stars in the

¹⁴ On the effects of literary convention and learning in Seven see Quinn, *Catullan Revolution*, pp. 53-4 and "Docte Catulle," pp. 41-2; Ferrero, pp. 173-4. Elder, p. 109, sees the ponderous language of 7, 3-6 as "purely a matter of humor" and regards Seven in general as "a delicate trifle." There may well be a touch of humor here, and that would not be inconsistent with the implications of the star-simile in lines 7-8 (see below). Such humor is really a part of the seriousness: by standing back in amused contemplation of his situation, Catullus can recognize its "seriousness" and seek to control it. For an interpretation somewhat along these lines see Commager, pp. 85-8. Marmorale, p. 30 notes the ambiguity of Catullus' presentation of his passion in Seven, but oversimplifies the situation: he speaks of "la levità del sentimento, la quale non è mascherata neppure nell'accenno in cui Catullo chiama se stesso *vesanus*, pazzo d'amore: chi è *vesanus* non scherza garbatamente sul numero dei baci."

distant night sky. Instead of the immediate simplicity of Five's *da*, he gives us learned details of places that have nothing to do with the lovers (7, 3-6):

quam magnus numerus Libyssae harenae
lasarpiciferis iacet Cyrenis
oraclum Iovis inter aestuosi
et Batti veteris sacrum sepulcrum.

Description of direct physical passion is here confined to a single line, *tam te basia multa basiare* (9); but even that has come now after the controlled effects of a line like 6, *et Batti veteris sacrum sepulcrum*, with its chiasmic arrangement of the two noun-adjective pairs, and its solemn homoeoteleuton (-*crum -crum*) which only deepens the sense of distance and the heavy presence of the tomb (*sepulcrum*).¹⁵

Everything in Seven is contemplated at a distance. The very first word of the poem, *quaeris*, suggests a calm moment when the lovers talk (talk in Five has a negative value: *rumoresque senum*) and indulge in verbal, not physical expressions of love.¹⁶ True, in Seven Catullus mentions kisses in the first line. Yet his word is the longer and more rare *basiationes* and not the simpler and more colloquial *basia* (5, 7 and 7, 9).¹⁷

In the *satis superque* of his second line Catullus envisages satiety and even excess, notions far from the turbulent enumeration of 5, 7-11. Even if we are to think of *satis superque* as

¹⁵ On this effect of distance see Commager, p. 85: "The view of the vast silent night, like that of Battus' tomb, chills and distances us."

¹⁶ Elder, p. 108 remarks, "The very question itself 'How many kisses?'—has a slightly intellectual twist, and the poet can play with it. . . ." Editors have suggested that the question is purely rhetorical: "Ebensowenig ernst zu nehmen wie *requiris*, 85.1," says Kroll, *ad loc.*; similarly G. Friedrich, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1908), *ad loc.*: "Dies *quaeris* ist natürlich nur formal." Elder, p. 125, is probably closer to the truth in noting Catullus' frequent use of question and answer, and he suggests that this is due to unconscious habit rather than a conscious use of a traditional motif (pp. 125-6). See also Ferrero, pp. 173-4 who sees in the *quaeris* a reflection of Lesbia's character and the tone of elegant artificiality of her milieu, which here evoke a corresponding artificiality from her lover.

¹⁷ Friedrich, *ad loc.* suggests that *basiationes* are long kisses. In any case it is a rarer word than *basia*, as Kroll, on 5, 7, points out: "*Basia* ist ein volkstümliches, zum ganzen Ton des Liedes [c. 5] passendes Wort." See also Fordyce, on 5, 7.

quoted from Lesbia's question (*quaeris*), this implication still holds. In either case a sense of the limits and cloying possibilities of love has from the very beginning defined the terms of the poet's answer.

The answer is, of course, an attempt to negate the suggestion of limit implied in the question. It takes the form (again conventional) of an *adynaton*: to number the amount of kisses that would sate him is as impossible as it would be to count the grains of sand in the desert or the stars in the night sky.¹⁸ When, therefore, he repeats *satis et super* in line 10 (*vesano satis et super Catullo est*), it is to announce jubilantly the triumph of passion over limit. Yet to the triumphant answer is joined a recognition of something more complex in the enframing words *vesano . . . Catullo*. Precisely this absence of limit has an awesome and frightening side when the poet, having passed through the distant realms of lines 3-8, sees himself at greater remove: he speaks of himself in the third rather than the first person (compare *mihi* in line 1)¹⁹ and recognizes his "madness" (*vesano*). Much of the power of this poem lies in just this tension between triumphant affirmation and momentary self-recognition, between the certainty of passionate commitment and a lightning-flash illumination of the abyss over which he stands. Catullus does what "Longinus" says a great writer should do: he remains sober in the midst of his revels (*De Sublimitate*, 16, 4, *κὰν βακχεύμασι νήφειν ἀναγκαῖον*).

One must beware of supposing that Seven presents the poet in a less "sincere" mood or suggests a lessening of passion.²⁰ On the contrary, Seven, in its explicit reference to *vesanus*

¹⁸ The comment of Friedrich on *quam sidera multa* (7, 7) is amusingly beside the point: "Es sind auch in den klarsten Nächten nicht mehr als 3000. C. würde sich über diese Tatsache nicht wenig gewundert haben, genau wie ich erstaunt war, als ich sie zuerst hörte."

¹⁹ For an excellent discussion of this shift from the first to the third person see Commager, pp. 85-6 and *passim*, especially p. 90 on the similar effect in poem 51. M. Schuster, "Valerius (Catullus)," *R.-E.*, VII A 2 (1948), col. 2387, speaks of the similar "Selbstapostrophen" functioning "wie eine Warnung seines besseren Ichs" and remarks on their "fast naiv anmutende" effect. See also Fordyce on 68, 135.

²⁰ On this question of sincerity in relation to Catullus see Quinn, *Catullan Revolution*, pp. 54-5.

Catullus, may indicate an even more desperate, more helpless involvement.²¹ It may perhaps be that seeking to grasp and present to himself and to Lesbia the entirety of his love, he suddenly discovers in the process that his love has become something which he cannot himself reach and comprehend, something almost foreign to him, greater and vaster than he, and so accessible objectively only through what is distant, strange, exotic.

The difference between the two poems, then, lies not so much in the intensity of the passion each presents as in the perspective against which the poet views that passion. Death, which in Five was a direct spur to "life" (*vivamus*) and love, is also muted here in Seven. It is hinted at only obliquely in Battus' *sacrum sepulcrum* (6) and in the phrase, *cum tacet nox* (7). In Five light was a metaphor for life, night for death (5, 4-6). So in Seven the nocturnal silence (*cum tacet nox*) may also recall death, suggesting too the cessation of the talk between the lovers, the words for which Lesbia's *quaeris* asks. But even so, its suggestion of death is mild and remote, totally without Five's earnestness and immediacy.

In Five the outside world vanishes before the lover's passion. The urgency of passion there leaves no time for talk (cf. the rejection of the *rumores*, 5, 2); it blurs sight (cf. the negative implication of *invidere*, 5, 12) and the clear apprehension of particulars (*conturbabimus illa ne sciamus*, 10). In Seven, on the contrary, talk is the setting for the poem, particulars abound, and sight is clear (7, 7-8). Five's blurring of the real world in the violent abandon of love does not occur here.

The theme of sight in Seven is obviously connected with its more distanced attitude (7, 7-8):

aut quam sidera multa, cum tacet nox,
furtivos hominum vident amores.

²¹ Commager, p. 85 notes that *vesanus* is almost a technical term for the lover's madness cf. 100, 7. A. C. Moorhouse, "Two Adjectives in Catullus, 7," *A. J. P.* LXXXIV (1963), pp. 417-18, points out that *lasarpicium* was used to treat "hysteria, hypochondria, and nervous instability," and hence, along with *vesanus*, it may indicate his recognition of his own illness and weakness: Catullus "implies that he too might stand in need of the medicine" (p. 418).

The stars not only see men's loves, but provide a commentary—in the context, an almost pathetic commentary—on their futile efforts at concealment. *Furtivi amores* are, of course, love-affairs exactly like Catullus' with Lesbia: they are *furtivi* because adulterous. So lucidly can the poet contemplate his own condition that for a moment he puts himself in the stars' place and looks on the agitations of human loves, his own among them, with the telescopic detachment of a heavenly body.²²

The stars in lines 7-8 of Seven only complete what is implied in the previous lines: the lovers' world here is wider, more open, less involuted than it is in Five. Hence geographical localities are present in all their particularity: *Libyssae harenae, lasarpiciferis Cyrenis, oraculum Iovis, Batti . . . sepulcrum*. The physical world is solid enough to appear even in its economic contours in the ponderous *lasarpiciferis*. The particularity of local histories is adumbrated in *Batti . . . sepulcrum*. As Five presented the lover in the perspective of temporal change, Seven shows him trying to give expression to his intensity through metaphors of space. For both poems it is as if Catullus tried to absorb the physical world into his love, to dissolve its objectivity into the subjectivity of his passion.²³ In Five this attempt suc-

²² On the *furtivi amores* see Commager, p. 85: "The stars, the measure of the infinitude of Catullus' love, are at the same time the remote—one might also say the amused—spectators of his love among an infinity of others." See also Quinn, *Catullan Revolution*, p. 53.

²³ For the theme of love's blissful disregard of external reality compare the idyllically happy lovers in poem 45, 21-2:

unam Septimius misellus Acmen
mavult quam Syrias Britanniasque.

This disregard of the outside world is perhaps also one component of the *otium* of poem 51: see A. J. Woodman, "Some Implications of *otium* in Catullus 51.13-16," *Latomus*, XXV (1966), pp. 217-26, especially pp. 224 ff. Woodman, in a somewhat different connection, calls attention to a relevant situation from the *Aeneid* (IV, 193-4), the *luxus* of Eido and Aeneas:

nunc hiemem inter se luxu, quam longa, fovere
regnorum immemores turpique cupidine captos.

One might compare the explicit and highly elaborate working out of this dissolving of the physical world in love which occurs repeatedly in the metaphysical poets. The closing of Donne's "The Sunne Rising" will serve as a representative example:

Thou sunne art halfe as happy'as wee,
In that the world's contracted thus;
Thine age asks ease, and since thy duties bee

ceeds; and external reality seems to give way before the alliterative pulsation and the almost incantatory magic of his passion: *da mi basia mille, deinde centum* . . . (5, 7-11). In Seven the specificity of the outside world is too strong. It cannot be absorbed. Its distance from the lovers is a real distance (note the emphatic anastrophe of *inter* in 7, 5), reaching even to the stars. And this geographical distance brings with it a mood of psychological distance which materializes in the objectivity of the *furtivi amores*.

From this concrete realization of the physical world and the stellar distances in 3-8 the poet seeks to return for a single moment to the simpler, all-absorbing passion of Five: *tam te basia multa basiare* (7, 9), perhaps recalled to it by the last word of the preceding line, *amores*. But the momentary return to a passion of this directness is qualified by the emotional and psychological complexities of the next line's *vesano* . . . *Catullo*.

Analogously the last two lines of Seven make more tangible the dangers which the world outside can hold (7, 11-12):

quae nec pernumerare curiosi
possint nec mala fascinare lingua.

The end of Five, confounding the sum of kisses, arrives at a final banishment of number from the lovers' world. The end of Seven, while stating—or hoping—that the kisses cannot be numbered, gives in its diction (the heavy *pernumerare*, line 11) a not altogether encouraging prominence to number (cf. also *magnus numerus*, line 3). Five enacts the gestures of love whereas Seven speaks generally about love; correspondingly, Five performs the act of counting whereas Seven can actually speak of number itself (7, 3 and 11).

Here too the adversaries who threaten the lovers are plural (*curiosi*), not singular. The plural substantive also makes them rather more definite than the indefinite form, *ne quis malus*, of Five. The danger of evil spells is also more explicit than in Five (*mala fascinare lingua*, 7, 12) and, in the *mala lingua*, more strongly visualized. Catullus gives a striking emphasis to this closing phrase of the poem, as Quinn has pointed out, by

to warme the world, that's done in warming us.
Shine here to us, and thou art every where;
This bed thy center is, these walls, thy spheare.

putting *mala lingua* into the nominative case rather than the ablative which one might more easily expect.²⁴ By so doing, he has deepened his effect of ominous vividness, for the *mala lingua*, made coordinate in this way with the personal subject, *curiosi*, becomes itself almost personified.

III

To say that Seven is more artful or more artificial than Five is, as we have seen, an oversimplification, and a false oversimplification at that. Both poems are artful and artificial; and both, in seeking an objective equivalent for emotion, play order and emotion off against one another, but in such a way that order and structure are not at odds with emotion, but are rather its tools and the means for its full realization. In both poems the constraints of the form not only enable the poet to represent the intensity of his emotion, but also free him from that emotion enough to allow him to see it in larger terms: nature's cycles and human death in Five; geographical distance and stellar perspective in Seven.

Given this basic similarity, it is still valid to say that love in Five, seen against the fundamental facts of change and death, has fewer complications. Passion in Five leads at once to the physical acts (the kisses) which give it expression. Hence all the finite verbs of Five (excluding *esse* and *posse*) are commands, exhortations, or implied prohibitions: *vivamus*, *amemus*, *aestimemus*, *da*, *conturbabimus ne sciamus*. In Seven the atmosphere is quieter, the syntax more complex (lines 3-12 form one long sentence), the emotional state of the speaker more ambiguous. Hence the verbs ask questions (*quaeris*) or make calm general statements (cf. *iacet*, 4; *tacet*, 7; *vident*, 8). Since Seven has also lost Five's immediate sense of death as an incentive to love, love itself becomes different. Love in Seven is actually named (*amores*, 8); in Five the speaker is too close to it, too unambiguously involved in its momentary radiance, to name it generically. He refers to love here only in a verb,

²⁴ Quinn, "Docte Catulle," p. 46. Kroll, *ad loc.* stresses the very real fear that such magical practices evoked among the Romans and aptly cites Pliny, *N.H.*, XXVIII, 19: *defigi diris precationibus nemo non metuit*. He cites also Virgil, *Ecl.*, 7, 27-8: *baccare frontem / cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro*.

amemus, an exhortation to action. Seven not only generalizes about love (*hominum . . . amores*), but gives it an epithet, *furtivos*, which places the poet's own case in large and perhaps pathetic perspective. Yet, as the poet is able to see all love with a calm, perhaps even an amused removal, the particularity of his own case comes upon him with a force that brings him to name his own name in the third person: he is himself an instance of the *furtivi amores* described in the objective language of his own simile. He can still address Lesbia in the second person (7, 2; also *te*, 7, 9);²⁵ yet his own name, in an oblique case, not the vocative, now takes its place among the other proper nouns of the poem, the distanced specificities of Libya, Cyrene, Battus' tomb.

The two poems thus embody two different stances toward love, perhaps present to Catullus simultaneously, but in any event bracketed by him through the cross-references which link the poems. In Five love and death are both felt with an intensity which leads the poet to seek to absorb into the moment of intense feeling all the concreteness of the outside world, to dissolve thought, speech, and number into the non-orderable gestures of lines 7-11, to find an equivalent in sound and rhythm for passion's moment of blind, inexhaustible energies. In Seven the particularities of this world, both geographical and historical, obtrude. Catullus' attempt there to reach Five's sense of the noncalculable profusion of life's energies stumbles upon the very language he uses to suggest that profusion.

In Five he is still aware of the gulf between man and nature: *soles occidere et redire possunt*. But he seeks to match in momentary intensity what he must lose of nature's limitless abundance; and he does so precisely through a blunt realization of the ultimate human limit, death (5, 5-6):

nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux
nox est perpetua una dormienda.

The unadorned factuality and simplicity of this awareness are what enable him to release the energies of lines 7-11. Catullus

²⁵ It is interesting in this connection that in Seven the poet addresses Lesbia by her name alone (7, 2), whereas in Five she is *mea Lesbia* (5, 1). The change reflects the difference in moods between the two poems. Perhaps too the intensely felt reality of death in Five enforces a more possessive clinging to life and love, and hence *mea*.

in Seven, seeking to find an objectively comprehensible summation and an intellectual equivalent for his love, dissipates the energy of those kisses of Five, the inward forces concentrated in the lovers' enclosed world. In giving us equivalents in terms of the physical realities of space and time rather than the actions which in a sense have no equivalents, he comes for a moment to see coolly and rationally what this sort of love is: the madness of *vesanus Catullus*. And, as suggested above, he draws back with a certain hesitation, perhaps terror, from this mad lover, this *vesanus Catullus* that he has become, even as he glories in his madness. So in Poem 51, while describing the passion which his "leisure" feeds, he realizes the danger of that "leisure" exactly when he "gambols and is transported" in it (51, 13-14):

otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est:
otio exsultas nimiumque gestis.

Hence, to come back to our poems, Seven ends not with Five's fading recollection of all those kisses ("kisses" is the last word of Five: *cum tantum sciat esse basiorum*), but with the reality of the envious *curiosi* and the tangible details of their sinister power: *mala fascinare lingua*. Catullus sees the danger here as coming from the outside, from the *curiosi*. But his *vesano* . . . *Catullo* perhaps implies a momentary insight into the truth: the danger lies also *within* and he is already subject to a magical *fascinum* even more powerful, a magic that has transformed him from *Catullus* to *vesanus Catullus*.

It may not be accidental, then, that Five is followed by a poem which deals jocosely with a trivial and purely physical amour of a rather vulgar type (*nescio quid febriculosi / scorti diligis*, 6, 4-5), whereas Seven is followed by the painful, halting efforts of the *miser Catullus* to harden his will and endure the separation which in the thematically related Poem 76 he can envisage as realizable only through the aid of the gods (76, 25-6):

ipse valere opto et taetrum hunc deponere morbum.
o di, reddite mi hoc pro pietate mea.²⁶

²⁶ The vexed question of the extent to which the order of the poems is due to Catullus is most fully discussed by A. L. Wheeler, *Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry* (Berkeley, 1934), pp. 1-32. Though skeptical about any large portion of the collection reflecting Catullus' arrangement, Wheeler admits (pp. 27-8) that Catullus' inten-

The inward movement of Eight, in other words, appears as an enlargement and development of the momentary awareness of Seven's *vesamus Catullus*; and, in summoning the powers of his inner self in Eight, Catullus shows that he has learned what he has most to fear.²⁷

The first word of Five is an appeal to life, *vivamus*; the first word of Seven is *quaeris*, "you ask." In Seven it is the question which involves the poet in his attempt to count, to find objective equivalents, to speak and think rather than act. The questioner has not understood the deeper implications of Five's *conturbabimus . . . ne sciamus*. To ask such a question is to risk the spirit of love and of poetry, which seek not to define the measurable, but in their different ways to hold and make present in tangible form elusive capacities for energies which would otherwise be lost in the infinities toward which they reach. To ask *quot* of such powers is to impose on them a foreign task. The question of Seven comes from Lesbia; the poem, while answering that question, is in a sense a reproach to her for having asked it.

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tion may be reflected in a few small groups of poems here and there, among which, Poems 5 and 7. There has been a growing feeling (resting, to be sure, on no solid proof) that Poems 1-60 form a *libellus* arranged (at least in part) by Catullus himself: see Schuster, cols. 2365-7 and Quinn, *Catullan Revolution*, p. 106, n. 11; also Elder, p. 131, n. 1. Fordyce, Appendix II, pp. 409-10, shares Wheeler's skepticism and caution. See now my forthcoming essay, "The Order of Catullus, Poems 2-11," *Latomus*, XXVII, no. 2 (1968).

²⁷ Note that in 8, 12, as in 7, 10, Catullus goes from the second to the third person in speaking of himself: *iam Catullus obdurat*. The *basia*-theme of Five and Seven also appears in 8, 18, *quem basiabis?*

WAS THE LEIDEN MS OF TACITUS COPIED FROM THE EDITIO PRINCEPS?

The vexed question of the status and value of Leidensis 16B, in respect of which some have claimed, and others have denied, independence from the Medicean tradition, has recently suffered an alarming development. In some carefully argued pages of 'Addenda' to Mendell's introduction to the 1966 reproduction of the Leiden manuscript,¹ Dr. E. Hulshoff Pol has claimed that Leidensis descends from the editio princeps printed in Venice by Vindelinius de Spira about 1470, as corrected by Agricola and other scholars. She bases her thesis, which, if true, would blow Mendell's claims sky-high, upon her examination of Agricola's copy of the editio princeps now found to be in the Württembergische Landesbibliothek at Stuttgart. This carries interlinear and marginal corrections in various hands, one of which must be assumed to be that of Agricola himself. The appearance in Leidensis of readings which coincide with these corrections (or with the printed text left without correction) is held to prove that the manuscript merely reproduces the edition, incorporating some, though not all, of the conjectures of Agricola and other scholars. An alleged resemblance between the hand of Leidensis and that of some of the annotations is claimed as proof that the scribe of the codex was none other than Agricola himself.

Before this new doctrine is seized upon by those who dismiss Leidensis as worthless—except as the repository of a number of humanistic conjectures of varying merit—, it seems desirable to examine it in the light of a collation of the recentiores upon which the present writer is engaged and which it was not possible for Dr. Hulshoff Pol to make. I dismiss the matter of handwriting, since I am unable to detect the resemblances she has found, and, as she herself admits, autograph specimens of Agricola's writing are no longer to be found, even at Groningen where he was town-clerk in 1481-3. It is in any case of little moment to know the exact identity of the scribe of Leidensis.

¹ *Tacitus. Annales (XI-XVI) et Historiae: Codex Leidensis Bibliothecae Publicae Latinus 16B (Codex Agricolae): praefatus est C. W. Mendell, addenda ad praefationem adiecit E. Hulshoff Pol* (Lugduni Batavorum, Sijthoff, 1966).

The major issue is whether the manuscript is, or is not, dependent on the corrected editio princeps at Stuttgart.

For the purpose of judging the validity of Dr. Hulshoff Pol's arguments as presented in the 'Addenda,' I have consulted microfilms of the following recentiores, a large majority of those now known:²

Group I ending *H.*, V, 26, 2 *Flavianus in Pannonia*

(a) 'Genevese'

- B72 = Bodleianus 34472
- V58 = Vaticanus Lat. 1958
- H = Harleianus 2764
- Mal = Malatestinus
- Prm = Parmensis 861
- J = Jesus Coll. 109
- G = Gudianus 118
- BO5 = Bodleianus 27605

(b) 'Non-Genevese'

- B = Laurentianus 68.5
- Hol = Holkhamicus 359
- U = Urbinas Lat. 412

Group II ending *H.*, V, 23, 2 *magnitudine potiozem*

- N22 = Neapolitanus iv c 22
- P = Parisiensis Reg. 6118
- Vin = Vindobonensis 49
- N23 = Neapolitanus iv c 23
- Ven = Venetus 381
- V63 = Vaticanus Lat. 1863
- L = Leidensis 16B

Group III ending *H.*, V, 13, 1 *euenerant*

- K = Copenhagen 496
- N21 = Neapolitanus iv c 21
- O22 = Ottobonianus 1422
- O48 = Ottobonianus 1748

² The following have not been reported, or not fully reported: Prm (Parmensis 861), J (Jesus Coll. 109), G (Gudianus 118), Hol (Holkhamicus 359), L24 (Laurentianus 63.24), A (Laurentianus 68.4), Y1, Y2, and Y3 (Yalenses). This was because microfilms of these MSS were not available to me at the time of writing: but the omissions are unlikely to alter the general picture here presented.

Cra	= Brit. Mus. Add. 8904 ³
V64	= Vaticanus Lat. 1864
V65	= Vaticanus Lat. 2965
C	= Budensis 9 ⁴

The classification adopted above is based on criteria provided by *prima facie* characteristics (titles, subscriptions, lacunae, etc.) and on a so-far partial collation. Within II and III, the order of citation is determined by the apparent closeness of affinity, in Ia by dating, and in Ib alphabetically. Some nine manuscripts can be exactly or closely dated:

Group I

B72	1440 (self-confessedly 1410)
V58	1449
H	1452
Prm	1452
J	1458
G	1461
B05	1463

Group II

Van	1453
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Group III

C	1467
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As it happens, all the datable manuscripts are older than the *editio princeps* (1470). As for L, it is commonly assigned to a

³ In his 1812 edition Brotier remarks (I, p. lx, n., cf. V, 355): "*sero nobis innotuit MS. codex membraneus, qui Parisiis adseruatur, in Bibliotheca Institutionis Oratorii Jesu . . .*," but his suggestion that this was the codex Corbinelli is unfounded (*H.*, I, 12,3 *militis stulta spe N21 O48 V65 Corb. militis multa spe Ora*). Equally unfounded is the statement of Mendell (*Tacitus*, p. 323) that the Oratory MS "was undoubtedly destroyed by the French revolutionists." An early folio of a Tacitus manuscript in the British Museum (Add. 8904 = Plut. ccclxx.D) bears the inscription *Institutionis Parisiensis oratorii d. jesu*, and in 1818 was in the possession of H. J. T. Drury (1778-1841) for long Lower Master at Harrow, from 1820 also Rector of Fingest, Bucks., and a notable collector of manuscripts. It belongs to Group III, and is closely related to O22.

⁴ I. Borzsák, "Die Tacitus-Handschriften der Bibliotheca Corviniana," *Az Egyetemi Könyvtár Évkönyvei*, I (1962), pp. 141-56 deals fully with the Budapest manuscript, and also with YI.

date in the neighbourhood of 1475-81 on the evidence of its watermark (Briquet 6599). In many ways it is a typical representative of its group, but has suffered demonstrable interpolation to a greater degree than other recentiores. Its citation by editors for many readings which it in fact shares with other codices has tended to falsify our impression of it. A task that still remains to be done is to isolate the unique contribution of this manuscript, and to sift the wheat from the chaff of this contribution.

The coherence of Group II, to which Leidensis belongs, is demonstrated by the following *prima facie* criteria:

1. All its members end at *H.*, V, 23, 2 *magnitudine potiozem*;
2. None has the long lacuna (*H.*, IV, 15-62) characteristic of III;
3. None has the long excerpts (*H.*, IV, 20 *illi ueteres*—25 *Vocula mira* and 42 *toleremus istorum*—53 *temeraretur opus*) characteristic of at least 10 manuscripts in Groups Ib and III.
4. All its members apart from N22, which appears to betray the influence of the Ia tradition, show the same nine gaps (usually corresponding to one word) in the text of the *Histories*. L, however, which seems to be heavily interpolated, fills these gaps also by interpolation which departs from the general tradition.

In addition, the affinity of these manuscripts is convincingly shown by the frequency of readings which are common and peculiar to them: cf. the following (those of the other classes in parentheses):

H., I, 16, 3 *sed audita* (et audita); 26, 2 *erumpentibus* (erumpentis, erumpentia); 29, 2 *hodie perire* (perire hodie); 30, 1 *donare nescius* (donare nesciet); 31, 3 *ingestis* (incestis, infestis); 32, 1 *adclamantium* (adclaminationum); 37, 3 *Gingonii* (Tingonii, Ciconii, Cingonii).

Leidensis, however, not infrequently deserts this consensus to show readings which occur in other groups:

H., I, 19, 1 *qui non uoluerant* II *qui noluerant* L *Iab* III
 26, 1 *sui principis* II *principis sui* L *Iab* III
 29, 2 *erat hoc nomen* II *hoc nomen . . . erat* L *Iab* III

- 37, 1 uocari *II* uocare *L Ia B III*
 39, 1 usque in urbem *II* in urbem usque *L Ia B*
 39, 1 ut quod euenit *II* utque euenire *L Hol III*
 39, 1 morum tempus *II* more tempus *L more tempus*
Hol III
 43, 2 Marcus *II* Murcus *L Iab*
 46, 1 detinuerat *II* obtinuerat *L Iab III*
 47, 1 promiscue acta *II* promiscue iacta *L Iab III*.

Since the editio princeps ends at *H.*, V, 23, 2, it must descend from a MS related to *II*, and we must now seek to determine which (if any) of the known members of this group it was. Our knowledge here has not advanced much beyond the point of view expressed by Walther in 1831:

ex quo codice MSto Spira sua hauserit, incertum, interque eos codices MSSStos, quorum scriptura hucusque innotuit, nullus Spirensi libro plane similis est. Plurimum tamen consentit cum cod. MS. Regio Parisiensi et cum illo quem Broterius dicit Corbinelli, neque uero omnibus in locis. Multa habet etiam communia cum MSS. Vatican. 1863 et 1364. Saepe propria scriptura utitur haud raro insigni. Quare instar codicis MSti recte habetur. Accedit quod Spira sine ullo emendandi studio in ista editione versatus est. Nam Annalium et Historiarum libri in omnibus plagulis documenta ferunt, quibus patet incuriose illum exscripsisse codicis MSti vestigia . . .

It is true that Vindelinius worked in great haste. Between 1470, when he took over from Johannes de Spira, and 1472, when a crisis in the Venetian book trade occurred, he published more than fifty classical, legal, and theological books. The probability therefore is great that he used one manuscript only, possibly (though not probably) checking this haphazardly against a second if such were available. But there is little to be said for Walther's choice of *P*: *A.*, XI, 32, 1 fucilianos *N22 Vin N23 Ven V63 ed. pr.* lucilianos *P L*; 32, 3 reperiuntur *N22 Vin N23 Ven V63 ed. pr.* expuuntur *P*; *H.*, I, 39, 1 foro propinquantem *N22 Vin N23 Ven V63 ed. pr.* foro appropinquantem *P L*; 45, 2 consulem signatum *N22 Vin N23 Ven V63 ed. pr.* consulem designatum *P L*; 46, 4 sed Othonem uulgi *N22 Vin N23 Ven V63 ed. pr.* sed Otho ne uulgi *P L*.

Vindelinius' book opens, without title, with the initial words of *A.*, XI, *Nam Valerium Asiaticum*. This, quite apart from

other *prima facie* indications, points in one direction only, for the openings of the manuscripts of Group II are as follows:

- N22 Cornelii Taciti Diurnalium Augustae Historiae liber xi
incipit feliciter FRAGMENTUM
P C. Corneli Taciti historici illustris xxx librorum quos
aedit fragmenta incipiunt. & primo liber tertius deci-
mus. uixitque sub Domitiano
N23 and V63 Cornelii Taciti liber xi
Ven Ex Cornelii Taciti Historici Libro Undecimo
L Liv xi Ex Cor. Taciti libro undecimo
Vin (no title).

That Vindelinus used a manuscript closely related to Vin as his main exemplar is abundantly clear from even a short collation. A few examples will suffice (*cett.* = N22 P N23 Ven V63 L):

- A., XI, 32, 2 subsidium *Vin ed. pr.* saepe subsidium *cett.*
H., I, 1, 1 conferri ad unum *Vin ed. pr.* ad unum conferri
cett.
2, 2 urbs uastata *Vin ed. pr.* urbs incendiis uastata
cett.
2, 3 quam quasi scelera *Vin ed. pr.* quam scelera *cett.*
7, 1 Harebonius Gunitianus *Vin ed. pr.* arebonius
gunicianus
N23 alii alia
7, 2 cognitione *Vin ed. pr.* cogitatione *cett.*
7, 2 nequirent *Vin ed. pr.* nequiverint *cett.*
8, 1 bellus inexpertus *Vin ed. pr.* bellis inexpertus
cett.
IV, 50, 4 multitudine inferiori *Vin ed. pr.* multitudine in-
feriorum *cett.*
51, 2 accepit *Vin ed. pr.* accipit *cett.*
53, 3 Plauto eliano *Vin ed. pr.* Plauto eliano *cett.*

Nevertheless, it is improbable that Vindelinus used Vin itself. The discrepancies between this MS and the *ed. pr.*, though not numerous, are significant. When the two disagree, *ed. pr.* has usually strong support from other MSS of Group II:

- A., XI, 31, 1 in posterum percontatur *ed. pr.*
in posterum percunctatur (l' *impositum superscr.*)
N23 Ven V63
in posterum praecontatur *Vin*
impositum percontatur *N22 P L*

- 32, 2 crine fluxo *P N23 Ven V63 L; ed. pr.*
 crine fuso *N22 Vin*
- 32, 2 Vibidiam *N22 N23 Ven V63 L; ed. pr.*
 uiduam Vidibiam *Vin*
 in bidiam *P*
- H.*, III, 53, 3 patrinis *N22 N23 Ven V63; ed. pr.*
 paternis *P Vin.*

Furthermore, there is a reasonable certainty that *Vin* is some 15 years younger than *ed. pr.* Its dating depends on scribal and artistic similarities with another Vienna MS, *Vin 3*, the work of Gian Rainaldo Mennio of Sorrento and securely dated 1487 (for a full description of *Vin 3* and 49 see J. Schlosser and H. J. Hermann, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der illuminierten Handschriften in Österreich*, VI, Abt. 4 (1933), pp. 38 ff. with plates).⁵ It is at any rate clear from the above passages that *Vin* is not a direct copy of *ed. pr.*, nor *ed. pr.* a direct copy of *Vin*; and an instructive passage dealt with below (p. 316; *H.*, I, 31, 1) is confirmation of this. It seems safest therefore to conclude that an ancestor of *Vin* now lost was the exemplar used by Spira.

Since *Vin* and *L* are related, mere coincidence of readings between *L* and *ed. pr.* is irrelevant to an attempt to prove that *L* is descended from *ed. pr.* If numerous readings unique to *L* were found also in *ed. pr.*, the situation would be very different; but this is not so in my experience, though I have made no careful check on this point in view of the overwhelming evidence of the descent of *ed. pr.* from *Vin* or a relative of *Vin* other than *L*, and in view also of the much more important issue that Dr. Hulshoff Pol has raised by her claim that the similarities between the corrected Stuttgart *ed. pr.* and *L* establish the descent of the latter from the former. She has performed a valuable service by reproducing four pages of the Stuttgart volume, so that within this limited field it is possible fully to compare the behaviour of the corrector(s) vis-à-vis *Leidensis*. She also cites some instances of similarities in other parts of *A.*, XI-*H.*, V, and the remarks that follow, dealing principally with passages which appear in the reproduction or in her Addenda, attempt to determine the degree to which her claim may be regarded as substantiated.

⁵ I am grateful to Fräulein Ingeborg Geiger of Vienna for drawing my attention to this work.

Of the readings common to L and the corrector(s) of the Stuttgart ed. pr. we may eliminate from consideration all such as appear also in any other of the recentiores demonstrably older than 1470 (that is, M and the MSS listed above, p. 304) for the corrections might have derived from a knowledge of one or more of these, and therefore provide no conclusive evidence of a link with L. It will be remembered that Ven, C, and nearly all members of Group Ia are exactly datable. Among similarities of this sort I place the following:

- A., XI, 30, 2 *necnon ed. pr. nec nunc corr. Ia L*
 32, 1 *efferrēt ed. pr. afferrent corr. Ven L*
 32, 2 *subsidiū ed. pr. saepe subsidium corr. Ia Ven*
 L C
 32, 3 *reperiuntur ed. pr. eripiuntur corr. Ia L C*
 H., IV, 45, 1 *praesentis ibi ed. pr. praesenti sibi corr. Ia L*
 46, 3 *praecipuas germaniae ed. pr. praecipua corr. Ia L*
 52, 1 *libertorum ed. pr. liberorum corr. Ia L*
 53, 2 *virginibus ed. pr. virgines corr. Ia L C*
 53, 3 *coeptas ed. pr. coepta corr. Ia L C*
 54, 1 *volgatorum more ed. pr. vulgato rumore corr. Ia L*
 54, 2 *passionem ed. pr. possessionem corr. Ia L*
 44, 1 *voluntatem ed. pr. libertatem corr. Ven L*
 44, 2 *ablata ed. pr. admissis data corr. Ven L*
 52, 1 *imparens ed. pr. ni parens corr. Ven L*
 51, 2 *neque ambiri ed. pr. ambiri corr. Ven L*
 54, 3 *continua bellorum ed. pr. continua ciuiliū bel-*
 lorum corr. Ven L.

In every one of the above instances, M agrees with L and corr. against the ed. pr.

Nor can much reliance be placed upon readings common to the corrector, L, and any other manuscript, especially if the latter belongs to Group II; or upon readings of L *in rasura*. Of the small number of instances of this sort in the limited field open to us I quote only A., XI, 31, 1 *pavore ed. pr. pavoris corr. L in ras.*; and 32, 1 *fucilianos ed. pr. lucilianos corr. P L*. There remain, however, some instances where readings of the corrector are found in L, and—so far as I know—in L alone:

- A., XI, 30, 2 *cicios vectios plaucios corr.*
 cicios uectios plantios L
 30, 2 *cogeretur una cum his et reddere corr. L*
 31, 1 *dein Lusium corr. L*
 31, 3 *Vectium corr. L*
 H., IV, 44, 2 *egressis in exilium corr. L*

The harvest is small, but in the circumstances might be regarded by some as significant. Let us admit, therefore, that some kinship exists between the corr. and L. Theoretically, there are three possible types of relationship:

1. L is copied from the corrected ed. pr.
2. The corrections derive from L (or a similar MS)
3. The corrections and L draw upon a common source.

The third solution is not susceptible of proof or refutation. Dr. Hulshoff Pol has decided in favour of the first. I propose to show that her interpretation leads us into insuperable difficulties, so that in the present state of knowledge the remaining solution, namely that the correctors were using L or a kinsman of L, is alone plausible.

In the first place, a theory which requires us to believe that L, though in many ways a normal member of Group II, descends from the corrected printed version of another manuscript of the same group must cause some misgiving. Moreover, though manuscripts continued to be written long after the introduction of printing, and though there is nothing intrinsically improbable in the copying of a printed text in the form of a fine manuscript destined for a princely library, L is scarcely one of these grand productions. It is written in a clear, unpretentious humanistic hand, with a simple title and no subscription. If we are to suppose, with Dr. Hulshoff Pol, that the manuscript was written by Agricola in person—or even that it was written at his direction and under his correction—the problem of the juxtaposition of some excellent readings with much arrant nonsense is rendered grave. But what possible motive could have impelled Agricola to copy, or have copied, an emended ed. pr.? In 1473 (possibly already in 1469) he was at Pavia, and he spent the years 1475-8 at Ferrara. But it was in this very town that G had been bought on Monday 28 September 1461, and Agricola cannot have been ignorant of the existence of manuscripts of Tacitus in N. Italy during these years. If he knew of them, a decision to go to the considerable trouble and expense of copying an emended ed. pr. of doubtful value is quite inexplicable.

But what of the discrepancies between the corrected editio princeps and L? If the latter were a copy of the former, it

might indeed depart from it if the scribe had hit upon a conjecture which attracted him or found a superior MS reading elsewhere; but we should *ex hypothesi* expect such discrepancies to be relatively few.

The fact is that L differs at many points from the corrected editio princeps of Stuttgart. In so doing, it presents readings which are

(a) in agreement with other members of II:

A., XI, 31, 1	praetorienas	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) Vin N23 Ven</i>
	praetorius	<i>N22 V63 L</i>
	praetoria	<i>P</i>
	pauore	<i>ed. pr. N22 P Vin N23 Ven V63</i>
	pauoris	<i>corr. L (sed is in ras.)</i>
31, 2	celebrat	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) Vin</i>
	celebrabat	<i>N22 P N23 Ven V63 L</i>
H., I, 70, 1	accipit	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 Vin N23</i>
		<i>Ven V63</i>
	accepit	<i>P L</i>
IV, 44, 3	etiam	<i>ed. pr. N22 P Vin N23 Ven</i>
		<i>V63 L</i>
	et iam	<i>corr.</i>
45, 1	Malius	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) P Vin</i>
	Mallius	<i>N23 Ven V63 L</i>
	Manlius	<i>N22</i>
45, 2	Semensium	<i>ed. pr. P Vin V63 L</i>
	Seniensium	<i>corr. N22 N23 Ven</i>
46, 2	construi-	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 Vin</i>
	constituit	<i>P N23 Ven V63 L</i>
	conquisita	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) P Vin N23 Ven</i>
		<i>V63</i>
	conquisiti	<i>N22 L</i>
52, 2	tum a Vespasiano	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 P Vin</i>
	cum a Vespasiano	<i>N23 Ven V63 L</i>
53, 3	lustratas	<i>ed. pr. N22 P Vin N23 Ven</i>
		<i>V63 L</i>
	lustratis	<i>corr.</i>
	lustrata	<i>L'</i>
54, 2	portenti	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 Vin N23</i>
		<i>Ven V63</i>
	^t portendī	<i>P (corr. ead. m.?)</i>
	portendī	<i>L</i>

(b) in conflict with all other members of II, but correct:

H., IV, 46, 2	separati	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 P Vin N23</i>
		<i>Ven V63</i>

	separatim	<i>L</i>
46, 3	primum statim	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 P Vin N23</i> <i>Ven V63</i>
	primus statim	<i>L</i>
53, 2	uictis cornisque	<i>ed. pr. N22 Vin Ven V63</i>
	uictis tornisque	<i>P</i>
	uictis cornisque	<i>N23</i>
	uictis coronisque	<i>corr.</i>
	uittis coronisque	<i>L</i>
54, 1	Salmatis	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 P Vin N23</i> <i>Ven V63</i>
	Sarmatis	<i>L</i>
54, 2	fatale nunc igne	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) N22 Vin</i>
	fata non igne	<i>P</i>
	fatali non igne	<i>N23 Ven V63</i>
	fatali nunc igne	<i>L</i>

(c) in conflict with all other MSS, probably interpolated and incorrect

A., XI, 31, 1	quibus tacentibus certatim	<i>ed. pr. (corr.) P Vin</i>
	quibus fatentibus titum	(<i>l' tacen superscr.</i>) <i>N22</i>
	quid tacentibus certatim	(<i>bus super d add</i>) <i>N23</i>
	quid tacentibus certatim	<i>Ven</i>
	quis tacentibus certatim	<i>V63 (d super quis add)</i> <i>V63</i>
	quibus dubitantibus et	
	incertis	<i>L</i>
H., IV, 50, 4	offensum	<i>ed. pr. N22 Vin N23</i> <i>Ven</i>
	offensā	<i>P</i>
	offensium	<i>V63</i>
	ruspensium	<i>corr.</i>
	aspensium	<i>L in ras.</i>
52, 1	ad inuictissimos	<i>ed. pr. P Vin Ven V63</i>
	adininctissimos	<i>N23</i>
	ad iunctissimos	<i>corr. N22</i>
	ad coniunctissimos	<i>L</i>

In the above instances, where the reproduction of four pages of the Stuttgart editio princeps affords us ocular testimony of the activity of the correctors, there is little to support Dr. Hulshoff Pol. But she has also referred to a number of passages not so reproduced, by which she seeks to sustain her thesis. To these we must now turn in order to consider whether they in fact perform this function satisfactorily:

A., XI, 4, 1 domum suam nesteris et Poppaeae congressibus *M*

nesteris *U*; *N23*; *N21 Ora C*

nesteris *O23 O48 V64*

^o
nesteris *Ven*

nesteris (*sed alterum e in o corr.*) *V63*

nesteris (*Valerii in marg. ead. m.*) *N22*

uesteris *B*; *P*

Valerii *Ia*; *Vin L*; *K ed. pr. (corr.)*

The reading *Valerii* is at least as old as 1440 (*B72*) and its appearance in *L* (and *Vin*!) as well as in *ed. pr.* is non-significant. All three groups show the split in the tradition, and the scribe of *N22* was aware of the alternatives; but the corruption of *suā Mnesteris* to *suam Valerii* is more credible than the converse. For the relative merits of the two names, see the discussion by F. R. D. Goodyear, *C. Q.*, N.S. XV (1965), pp. 314 f.

7, 1 postquam adnuit tacere incipiunt *M*

tacere *U*; *N23 Ven V63*; *Ora V64 C*; *ed. pr.*

tacens *B72 H Mal*; *K*

tacens (*tacere in marg. ead. m.*) *V58 BO5*

tacere (*agere superscr. ead. m.*) *O48*

tacere (*agere superscr. in. post.*) *N21*

tacē (*cere superscr.*) *N22*

agere *B*; *P Vin*; *O22*

dicere *L*; *corr.*

L is clearly interpolated, but the priority of the correction in *ed. pr.* is not proven. It is noteworthy that we have here another early split in the tradition, *agere* appearing in representatives of all three groups, and the confusion *c/g* reflecting a majuscule exemplar. *Tacere* is nonsense, *tacens* an unlikely appendage to *adnuit*. Tacitus probably wrote *ita agere* (*ita fere* Heinsius), and if so, the survival of *agere* in all three groups despite *M* is interesting. For the departure of *ed. pr.* from *Vin*, see above pp. 307-8.

8, 1 farasmagnis opibus *M*

pharasmanis opibus *Ia*; *O22*

^r
phasmanis opibus *K*

pharas magnis opibus *Ib*; *L*; *N21 V64 C*

pharasmanis opibus (*ex pharas magnis corr.*) *O48*

pharas opibus magnis *Ora*

faras magnis opibus *P Vin N23 Ven V63; ed. pr.*
 faras magnis opibus (*pharasmanis in m. ead. m.*) *N22*

L agrees with MSS of I and III, including C (1461), and therefore scarcely deserves Dr. Hulshoff Pol's censure. The widespread survival of the correct *ph-* against M is interesting.

10,1 *recuperare Armeniam habeat M*

habeat (*b superscr. m. post.*) *V63*
 habebat *Ib; N22 P Vin N23 Ven; III; ed. pr.*
 parebat *Ia; in marg. N22; K*
 auebat *in marg. m. post. B; O22*
 in animo habebat *L; corr.*

The priority of corr. is not proven. L's reading is not to be rejected out of hand, since the sequence of letters *meniamina-nimo* would invite corruption; but *auebat* is certainly an easy remedy.

16,3 *Caesar augustus (radendo ex augustum effectum)*
pecunia M

augustus *B72 V58 BO5; Ib; P Vin N23 Ven; III excepto K; ed. pr. (corr. ?)*
 augustus (*in marg. auctus*) *N22*
 auctum *H Mal G; K*
 aggesta *L*

"... videmus ... *aggesta* denique pro *augustus* ... in hoc libro [*sc. in ed. pr.*] non apparere" (Hulshoff Pol, p. xxiii). Since there seems to be a conflict here between corr. and L, this example does not help her case. L's *aggesta* seems to be an unskilful interpolation based on a resolution of *aġ* (= *August-*). Cappelli cites *AU* = *Augustus* (8th century). Four MSS preserve the correct reading against M.

31,3 *potissimum amicorum omnes praeter L codd.*
potissimum quemque amicorum L; corr.

The priority of corr. is not proven. It is hard to defend the vulgate reading, and where the recentiores are so faithful in reproducing dubious Latin, we must assume that *quemque* is interpolated so long as L's credentials are sub iudice.

XIV, 4, 4 *gestamine sellae M; Ia; B; N22 P Vin; ed. pr.*
moestam misellam U; N21

mestam misellam	III exc. K
moestam misellam	(al' gestamine sellae in marg. ead. m.) K
gestamine sellae	(1' mestam miselle superscr.) N23
gestamine sellae	(1' mestam & miselle superscr.) Ven
gestam in esellae	(1' mestam miselle superscr. m. post. gestamine sellae in marg. m. post.) V63
moestam misellam gestamine sellae	L
meste super gestamine	corr.

It is clear that L cannot derive from the corrected ed. pr., but fully reflects the split between Ia and III, as do three other members of II, with K.

XV, 14, 2 Lucullos pompeios et siquaces cum spatio trium uel quattuor litterarum M

et siquaces	B; Vin; ed. pr. (corr.)
et siquaces	(1' Scipiones superscr. ead. m.) Ven
et sequaces	P
et sequaces	(al' Scipiones in marg. ead. m.) N23
et sequaces	(1' Scipiones superscr. m. post.) V63
et si qui ducem	B72
et si qui duces	V58 H Mal J G BO5
et si qui duce ^s	K
et si qui ducem	(es superscr. ead. m.) N22
et Scipiones	U; L; III

"L praebet absurdissime *Scipiones*," Hulshoff Pol; but she admits the relationship with III, while pointing out the totally different reading of the (uncorrected) ed. pr. of Stuttgart. It is quite incredible that L here offers a "coniectura Agricolae in describendo facta," for since *Scipiones* appears in C, the reading is at least as old as 1467, and it is curious that she attributes to Agricola an activity rightly deserving her injurious adverb.

XVI, 17, 3 Mela quibus Gallio et Seneca parentibus natus M; Ia (at Seneca et gallio B72); B; V63

quibus Gallia	N22
quidem Gallio	U; P N23 Ven; III
quidem Gallia	Vin L; ed. pr.

The agreement of L and ed. pr. is non-significant when shared by Vin.

H., I, 3, 1 laudatis antiquorum mortibus pare exitus (s *super* pare *m. post.*) *M*

par exitus *II exc. N22; III; ed. pr.*

pares exitus *Iab; N22*

This is not an argument for the descent of *L* from *ed. pr.*, since the singular appears in *Ven* (1453) and *C* (1467). (*Par* is not impossible: cf. Sörbom 70 and the immediately preceding *necessitates, necessitas*).

13, 3 petulanter egerat (*ex petulante regerat, ut uid., corr.*) *M*

petulante^a regerat *V63*

petulanter egerat *Ia; B*

petulanter rexerat *U; II exc. V63; III; ed. pr.*

The same objection may be made as in the preceding example.

29, 2 aduersas res (*ex rem corr.*) *M*

aduersas res *Ib*

aduersam rem *II; K V65 C*

auersam rem *N21 O48 Ora V64*

auersam rem (-as.. -es *ead. m.*, adu- *m. post.*) *O22*

aduersas *B72 V58 Mal BO5*

aduersas (*sed -as in ras., res add. m. post.*) *H*

aduersa (*rem. p. in marg. m. post.*) *G*

aduersam rem *p. L*

aduersam rempu. *ed. pr.*

L and *ed. pr.* agree against the rest with the exception of the corrector of *G*. This is an early corruption, *aduersas rem* generating variants. The likelihood of *L*'s following *ed. pr.* is extremely remote. The preference of a majority of the recentiores for the singular against the corrected *M*, and the omission of the noun in *Ia* are indications that *M* represents a branch of the main tradition.

31, 1 rebus euentior te magis et non nullo *M; P*

rebus euentior te magis et non nullo (*ectior super entior, re super te additis*) *N23 Ven V63*

rebus euentior re magis et non nullo *B*

rebus euectior re magis et non nullo *L*

rebus euectior re magis et non nullo *III*

rebus euectior re et non nullo *N22*

rebus euectiore et magis non nullo *Vin*

rebus euectiore magis et nullo *II*

rebus euenit timore magis quam non nullo B72
 rebus euenit timore magis et non nullo V58 H Mal
 G J BO5
 rebus euectior re (*spatium*) et non nullo *ed. pr.*

L reflects the tradition of III as often, not the *ed. pr.*

31,3 incestis pilis M; Ib; III

incestis^g V63
 ingestis N22 P Vin N23 Ven L; *ed. pr.*
 infestis V58 H G BO5
 infestum J
 infoesti B72
 infesti Mal

This is not an argument for the descent of L from *ed. pr.*

40,1 lugubri trospectu M

aspectu II; III; *ed. pr.*
 prospectu V58 H Mal G BO5; B U
 conspectu B72

Not an argument for the descent of L from *ed. pr.* The least objectionable reading is *aspectu* (cf. *adspectus* at § 2, and GG *sub vv. aspectus, facies*).

41,1 uexillarius comitatae Galbae cohortis M

comitatus G; Ib; II; III; *ed. pr.*
 comitantes Ia exc. V58
 comitatus (comitantis *superscr.*) V58

Not an argument for the descent of L from *ed. pr.*

52,1 sorde M

sortem O22
 sordem *cett. codd.; ed. pr.*

There is no sufficient ground for Acidalius' generally accepted emendation *sordes* (cf. Ernesti, *ad loc.* and Neue-Wagener, I, 586, 711 f.) which does not (*pace* Hulshoff Pol) appear either in L or *ed. pr.*

55,3 promptus M
 promptius M²

promptius Iab
 promptus P N23 V63

prope N22 Vin; N21 V64 V65 C; ed. pr.
 propere L; K O22 O48
 promptus (P propere superscr. ead. m.) Ven

The emendation *propere* is at least as old as 1453, and there seems no likelihood that Hulshoff Pol's suggestion ("L *propere* . . . ex *prope* in Spir.") is true.

69, 1 (ciuitatis excidium) *deest M*
 nouitatis Ib; P Vin Ven V63; III; ed. pr.
 nouitatis (ci superscr.) N22 N23
 ciuitatis Ia; L; K; corr.

Ed. pr. agrees with Vin, and the correct reading was current long before 1470.

ibid. (ut est mos uulgi) *deest M*
 ut est mos uulgi Ib; III
 ut est mos uulgo Ia; Vin Ven; ed. pr.
 ut est mos uulgo (us superscr.) N22 P N23 V63
 ut est mox uulgi L; corr.

Despite the careless *mox*, L's *uulgi* is right against ed. pr. and the reading is at least as old as 1467 since it appears in C. As to *mox* (also in Y1), the priority of the corr. is not proven.

70, 1 (accipit/acceptit) *deest M*
 accipit Ia; N22 Vin N23 Ven V63; III; ed. pr.
 (corr.)
 acceptit Ib; P L

L conflicts with ed. pr. If Giarratano is right in attributing *acceptit* to Laurentianus 63.24 also, this reading antedates ed. pr. since the MS belonged to Piero di Medici who died in 1469.

ibid. decurionum (*deest M*) omnes praeter L codd.; ed. pr.
 decimanorum L; corr.

The reading *decurionum* is so obviously right in this context that the marginal "correction" in ed. pr. can only reflect an erroneous reading found in a MS (e.g. L). Legio X Fretensis receives a single brief allusion in H. (V, 1, 2): it was in Judaea. If anything, this example explodes, rather than supports, Hulshoff Pol's thesis.

70, 2 (cum ala Petriana?) *deest M*
 cum alpe triaria Ib; III exc. K

cum alpe triarina	G; N22 P Vin Ven; ed. pr.
cum alpe taurina	V63
cum alpe triarina	(al'ala tauri superscr.) N23
cum ala taurina	L; corr.
in alpe graia	Ia exc. G; K

Notably, L presents the correct *cum ala* (against ed. pr.) but was not alone in so doing if *al'* in N23 implies *alii*. The priority of corr. is not proven.

77,2 quorum honoris M
honor omnes recc.; ed. pr.

One of many examples of a complete consensus of the recentiores against M, whose error probably derives from confusion with the nearby *honoratis*. This agreement is significant in view of the fidelity with which the recentiores of Tacitus reproduce error. The example does not help Hulshoff Pol.

83,1 cupidite M
cupidine II; III; Gött; ed. pr.
cupiditate Ia b

Nor does this one.

III, 6, 1 bello quam gloriam	M; V58 H Mal J G BO5 (cui superscr.) B72 (at quam gloriam in ras. m. post.) K
bello quam gloriam	
bello quam gloriam	
bello magis quam gloria	Ib; II; III exc. K; ed. pr.
bello magis quam bonus gloriam	corr.
bello magis quam honestus gloriam	(hon. m. post.) L

The inserted word *honestus* is said by Walther to be written "recenti manu"; according to Hulshoff Pol, it is "non recentiore manu scripta . . . quam textus ipse." She is in a better position to judge than I am, but on the evidence of the photographic reproduction, I am inclined to agree with Walther. Certainly the hand is different from that of the scribe of L (cf. the ligatured *-est-* of *honestus*, not characteristic of the latter). The original reading of L was *bello magis quam gloria*, the erased *t* of *et* (*dux* . . .) being clearly visible, and *m* being

added in darker ink in the erasure. The interpolation therefore tells us nothing to Hulshoff Pol's purpose; and the corrector of the Stuttgart ed. pr. had in any case another idea.

I conclude therefore that Dr. Hulshoff Pol's thesis is unsound. It should certainly not distract us from the task of establishing and evaluating the readings of L and of the recentiores in general. The doctrine that has prevailed for the last century, namely that the recentiores descend in a direct line from M and possess no independent value, begins to appear more and more suspect as one examines the facts. But this problem, like the problem of the status of L, extends far beyond the horizon of the present paper, and its solution demands much more information than is at present available.

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ΜΗ WITH THE PARTICIPLE IN LONGUS AND ACHILLES TATIUS.

The romances of Longus and Achilles Tatius have provided me with examples for the study of one point in Greek grammar: the use of $\mu\eta$ with the participle. The participle accepts negation in late authors which would be ungrammatical in the classical period. The negative of the participle was commonly $\sigma\upsilon$ in classical Greek, but $\mu\eta$ gradually encroached on $\sigma\upsilon$ and finally (in Modern Greek) displaced $\sigma\upsilon$ entirely from the participle.¹

Unusual negation of the participle is so easily seen because the rules of the negated participle are fairly well defined. In Homer $\mu\eta$ and $\sigma\upsilon$ have distinct uses and $\mu\eta$ occurs only once with the participle (*Od.*, IV, 684), which is in an optative sentence of wish. $\mu\eta$ is the negative of the will, fancy, or opinion. With $\mu\eta$ the idea is negated, the thought denied. $\sigma\upsilon$ denies the fact, the reality. In time $\mu\eta$ overcame $\sigma\upsilon$ for reasons not too well established. Certainly the analogy of similar constructions influenced the choice of $\mu\eta$. For example, the articular infinitive, whose negative is $\mu\eta$, is often quite close to the attributive participle, whose negative is $\sigma\upsilon$.² The nature of the constructions with $\mu\eta$ was probably responsible for the ultimate conquest of $\mu\eta$. $\mu\eta$ was used to negative verbs in constructions involving strong emotions: commands, prohibitions, oaths, petitions, promises, and wishes. Consequently, $\mu\eta$ was felt to be the stronger negative, since it was used in contexts of stronger feeling.

I

A student learns early in his study of Greek that one negative is used with some constructions and the other negative is used with others, and that $\sigma\upsilon$ is the negative to expect with the participle. But there are exceptions. $\mu\eta$ occurs with the participle

¹ All occurrences of $\mu\eta$ with the participle in classical Greek have been gathered in a dissertation written under the direction of B. L. Gildersleeve: W. F. Gallaway, *On the Use of Μη with the Participle in Classical Greek* (Baltimore, 1897).

² W. K. Pritchett ("Μη with the Participle," *A. J. P.*, LXXIX [1958], pp. 392-404) gives this explanation for the intrusion of $\mu\eta$: "As $\mu\eta$ is the regular negative with the articular infinitive, when the participle is predicative and the article omitted, $\mu\eta$ comes to be retained" (p. 402).

when the participle is conditional. In a vague sense, this definition is sufficient to account for the most common occurrences of $\mu\eta$ with the participle, but it is better to be more specific. The grammars discuss the use of $\mu\eta$ under each of the major divisions of the participle. As a background for the examples in Longus and Achilles Tatius, I shall list those uses of $\mu\eta$ with the participle, discuss them, and give one example for each within a minimum of space, for these constructions are common knowledge and can be found in any descriptive grammar.

1. *The Attributive Participle.* The articular participle is used in much the same way an adjective is used, often becoming a substantive, thus: οἱ φεύγοντες, "the exiles." Negated, οὐ refers to definite individuals: οἱ οὐ φεύγοντες, the definite "persons who are not exiles," while $\mu\eta$ refers to indefinite individuals (generic): οἱ $\mu\eta$ φεύγοντες, "any who are not exiles."

Soph., *Tr.*, 725: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς $\mu\eta$ καλοῖς βουλευέμασιν οὐδ' ἐλπίς.

This "generic" use is nothing but an abridgement equivalent to the conditional relative sentence.³

When there are definite individuals involved, $\mu\eta$ is "characterizing,"⁴ the "sort of person who" and is equivalent to the Latin characteristic clause of *qui* with the subjunctive.

Soph., *O.T.*, 397; ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μολών,/ ὁ $\mu\eta$ δὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπανσά νυν.

2. *The Circumstantial Participle.* As the attributive participle is somewhat equivalent to an adjectival clause (Smyth,

³ B. L. Gildersleeve, "Problems in Greek Syntax," *A.J.P.*, XXII (1902), p. 13.

⁴ A. B. Laird ("When Is Generic $\mu\eta$ Particular?" *A.J.P.*, XLIII [1922], pp. 124-45) questions the correctness of this explanation. Approaching the question from the relative clause, Laird says that $\delta\varsigma \mu\eta$ is used to emphasize character but not to definite persons, that $\delta\varsigma \mu\eta$ is characterizing but only when the fact contained in the relative clause is already well known and does not need to be asserted. In examples like Soph., *O.T.*, 397 the force of $\mu\eta$ is really generic. Laird formulates the following rule for the participle: "ὁ $\mu\eta$ with a participle (or adjective) may apply to a definite individual (proper name or personal pronoun) when that individual is the only one of a group belonging to a certain class, the others being of the opposite class, and when it is well known that he is of that class" (p. 127). For the traditional view, see Kühner-Gerth, II, p. 185.

§2046, 2055, 2189), so the circumstantial participle is equivalent to an adverbial clause, expressing all the notions of an adverbial subordinate clause. The circumstantial participle is not limited to the adverbial notion only, for when it is used co-ordinately or as an attendant circumstance it is equal to an independent clause. The circumstantial participle is negated by οὐ: τοῦ βασιλέως οὐκ ἐλθόντος, except when it is conditional: τοῦ βασιλέως μὴ ἐλθόντος, "if the king does not come."

Eur., fr. 461: οὐκ ἂν δύναιο μὴ καμὼν εὐδαιμονεῖν.

3. *The Supplementary Participle.* Whether the participle is in indirect discourse or not, we expect οὐ except when the supplementary participle occurs in an indirect command construction, where the negative is μὴ. Yet even in indirect discourse μὴ may occur, for when ἐπίσταμαι and οἶδα denote confident belief (analogous to the use with the infinitive, cf. Smyth, §2727) the negative is often μὴ (Kühner-Gerth, II, p. 203). But this is not good prose style.

Soph., *O.C.*, 656: οἶδ' ἐγὼ σε μήτινα / ἐνθένδ' ἀπάξοντ' ἄνδρα πρὸς βίαν ἐμοῦ.

II

The foregoing uses of μὴ with the participle are elementary and need no further explanation. Turning from these, we find other uses of μὴ with the participle, which, though not so common as the above constructions, are still correct grammar. The participle is a unit of a sentence, and its constructions must be considered in the light of the sentence as a whole. μὴ with the participle may not be a solecism, though it does not fall into any of the above groups. Circumstantial participles occur with μὴ which are not conditional and which would seem, at first glance, to demand οὐ. This use of μὴ with the participle, called attraction by some, is expressed by Thompson:⁵ "When a Participle is attached to a leading clause which requires to be followed by μὴ (e.g. Imperative or Optative of Wish), the Participle comes within the influence of that clause, and takes μὴ though otherwise it would take οὐ." I have found the grammars

⁵ F. E. Thompson, *A Syntax of Attic Greek* (London, 1907), p. 412. See Kühner-Gerth, II, pp. 199, 200.

generally misleading in their explanation of this usage. The impression is made that the participle has μή because of its dependence on the main verb, and not because of its own force.⁶ But in such cases the participle is merely a substitute for a finite verb which would have μή. The point of this will be clearer if we have an example: Aes., *Ag.*, 906-7: ἔκβαν' ἀπῆνγης τῆσδε, μὴ χαμαὶ τιθεῖς / τὸν σὸν πόδ' . . . The participle is circumstantial and not conditional. How is the negative to be explained? Is it "through an influence of the verb on which it depends" (i. e., ἔκβαν') or is it not rather because μὴ . . . τιθεῖς stands for μὴ τίθει? The distinction may sound hair-splitting, but the uses of μή and οὐ in early and classical Greek were quite separate, and, as Moorhouse⁷ points out, the Greek language was not likely to negative the participle mechanically, according to the force of another word, but according to its own sense in the sentence. The participle is transferred from a hypothetical finite verb of the same construction as the existing finite verb.

G. E. Howes perused all the Greek authors before 400 B. C. and made a study of this usage where the force of the participle would appear to demand οὐ.⁸ The examples are grouped according to their dependence on indicatives, subjunctives, optatives, imperatives, or infinitives. Howes leaves the impression that he is explaining exceptions to the rule of participial negation,⁹ even though he admits the Greek authors are nearly consistent in their use of this "exceptional" negation. He seems to feel that only a conditional participle should have μή, unless the participle is induced by its environment. But, on the contrary,

⁶ Cf. also Smyth, §§2728, 2737.

⁷ A. C. Moorhouse, "On Negating Greek Participles, where the leading verbs are of a type to require μή," *C. Q.*, XLII (1948), p. 35. See also A. N. Jannaris, *An Historical Greek Grammar* (London, 1897), p. 430. Pritchett, *op. cit.*, accepting the theory of attraction, takes issue with Moorhouse.

⁸ G. E. Howes, "The Use of μή with the Participle, where the negative is influenced by the construction upon which the participle depends," *H. S. C. P.*, XII (1901), pp. 277-85.

⁹ At least so it appears from his title and from his last paragraph: "This list of passages, even though incomplete, in which the negative with the participle is induced by its environment, may lead us to think twice before stating that in a given sentence a participle, merely because it has the negative μή, has necessarily a conditional force—a principle laid down in many of our grammars" (p. 285).

this use is perfectly proper, for it is the force of the participle itself which demands the use of $\mu\eta$; the indicatives, subjunctives, optatives, imperatives, and infinitives with which $\mu\eta$ with the participle is found simply provide the suitable surroundings for that type of participle to occur. So says Laird: " $\mu\eta$ is used with the conditional participle not because it is conditional but because the requirements for $\mu\eta$ are present when the participle is what we call conditional, and, if the same requirements are present at times with a participle that is not conditional, $\mu\eta$ is none the less the proper particle."¹⁰ These "requirements" for $\mu\eta$ with the participle are present when the participle is equivalent to a finite verb which would have $\mu\eta$. When these requirements are not present we see the beginnings of that process which resulted in the widespread use of $\mu\eta$ with the participle in later Greek.

Using the examples provided by Howes, Moorhouse classifies differently these instances of $\mu\eta$ with the participle, regarding the usage according to the sense of the participle instead of the influence of another construction. Moorhouse bases this usage on the "predication" of the participle, which he describes in the following way: "Where there is predication of the participle, the negative is $\mu\eta$: this is what we should expect, because the participle could be expanded into a correlative leading verb, and the leading verb is *ex hypothesi* of a type to take $\mu\eta$. Where there is not predication of the participle, the negative is $\omicron\upsilon$: the participle stands in an adjectival relation, and takes the same negative as an adjective would."¹¹ Taking this as his rule, Moorhouse groups the examples into four categories to see whether $\mu\eta$ or $\omicron\upsilon$ is used with predicative or non-predicative participle.¹² In fifteen cases $\mu\eta$ occurs with a participle which

¹⁰ Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹¹ Moorhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹² The categories are:

1 (a), $\mu\eta$ with predicative participle

1 (b), $\mu\eta$ with non-predicative participle

2 (a), $\omicron\upsilon$ with predicative participle

2 (b), $\omicron\upsilon$ with non-predicative participle

The total number of examples in each group is: 1 (a) 81; 1 (b) 15; 2 (a) 0; 2 (b) 35. Thirteen of the fifteen cases under 1 (b) are found in Sophocles, Euripides, and Thucydides, all writing at the end of the period under study. Certainly this use of $\mu\eta$ with the participle

is not predicative, whereas *οὐ* never occurs with a predicative participle. These fifteen exceptions of *μή* point to the spread of *μή* from its original sphere, as it begins to encroach on *οὐ* in all uses with the participle.

The causal participle is the first to demonstrate this encroachment in the authors before 400 B. C. We normally expect *οὐ* with the causal participle, but *μή* occurs,¹³ probably with an underlying conditional sense and similar to the *θανυμάζω εἰ* construction where the *εἰ* is about the same as *ὅτι* (Soph., *O.T.*, 289: *πάλα δὲ μή παρὼν θανυμάζεται*). See Thompson, p. 412; Kühner-Gerth, II, p. 201. The causal participle with *μή* is rare in classical Greek, but examples are abundant enough to establish its existence.¹⁴ Since the cause in the participle may be based on character, a notion of characteristic was sometimes felt in the causal participle, and was accordingly negated by *μή*.¹⁵

Having reviewed both the usual and the somewhat rare uses of *μή* with the participle in classical Greek, it will now be in order to consider briefly the history of the participle and of *μή* as they extend to later Greek.

III

The participle was originally an adjective.¹⁶ In early writers its weakness as a participle is seen in its inability to accept negation. Bolling, doing research in the early epic poets, says: "*μή* with the conditional participle is absent for exactly the same reason that *οὐ* with the causal participle, and *οὐ* with the temporal participle are extremely rare—because there is no opportunity to use them since the participle is not yet felt as a was more likely to occur in sentences where *μή* negated the leading verb.

¹³ E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik auf der Grundlage von Karl Brugmanns Griechischer Grammatik*, 2 Vols. (Munich, 1950), I, p. 594.

¹⁴ Examples are noted and discussed briefly by A. F. Braunlich, "Euripides, *Medea*, 239 and 815: *μή* With the Causal Participle," *A.J.P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 415-18. (Thuc., I, 77, 3; 118, 2; III, 54, 2; Isaeus, I, 11; V, 16; Xen., *Cy.*, III, 1, 37; VI, 3, 15; Demosth., III, 8; Soph., *O.T.*, 289; *O.C.*, 1155; *Ph.*, 170-1; Eur., *Heracl.*, 533; *Ion*, 313).

¹⁵ Pritchett, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-3.

¹⁶ Schwyzer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 173.

possible substitute for a subordinate finite verb.”¹⁷ The participle used as an equivalent to a hypotactic clause is a later Greek development traceable within historical times.¹⁸ It is a literary device, avoided by the vernacular in all periods as being awkward and indefinite.¹⁹ Note the examples given in Jannaris to illustrate the clumsiness of the participle in long sentences in Plato, Thucydides, and Demosthenes.²⁰ The circumstantial participle particularly was felt to be scholastic, and finally dropped from the vernacular. As a result, Modern Greek has a very limited use for the participle.²¹ Thus if we take the long view, we see a pyramidal history of the participle: its beginning was weak, it reached its zenith in classical Greek, and gradually slipped from use in later Greek.²² In classical Greek, when the participle is equivalent to a hypotactic clause, the negatives occur with it and $\mu\eta$ begins its encroachment.

The oldest Sanskrit does not use *ma* with the participle nor with any dependent clause, but only with the independent sentence.²³ We have already noted that $\mu\eta$ with the participle occurs only once in Homer (*Od.*, IV, 684).²⁴ In Homeric times there was still a sharp distinction between $\mu\eta$ and $\omicron\upsilon$ —a sharper distinction in fact than is found between the moods. Future indicative, subjunctive, and optative are not so far apart as are $\mu\eta$ and $\omicron\upsilon$.²⁵ The individual character of $\mu\eta$ goes back to Indo-European and continues through the history of the language.²⁶

¹⁷ G. M. Bolling, “The Participle in Hesiod,” *Catholic University Bulletin*, III (1897), p. 447.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Jannaris, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 504.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 505.

²² For the percentage of participles per page of 30 lines throughout Greek literature, see A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (Nashville, 1934), pp. 1098-9.

²³ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 448; Schwyzler, *op. cit.*, II, p. 591; Smyth, § 2689a.

²⁴ D. B. Monro, *Homeric Grammar*² (Oxford, 1891), p. 263.

²⁵ B. L. Gildersleeve, “Encroachments of $\mu\eta$ on $\omicron\upsilon$ in Later Greek,” *A. J. P.*, I (1880), p. 48.

²⁶ Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 1166-7. It is almost certain that $\omicron\upsilon$ was not a negative in Indo-European. An etymology of $\omicron\upsilon$ is proposed by W. Cowgill, “Greek $\omicron\upsilon$ and Armenian *oc*,” *Language*, XXXVI (1960), pp. 343-50.

When the participle comes to accept negation, $\mu\eta$ is restricted to certain constructions. Yet even in early times $\mu\eta$ begins to invade the territory of $\sigma\upsilon$ and there is a steady process from Homer with only one example of $\mu\eta$ with the participle to Modern Greek with nothing but $\mu\eta$. Different stages of the process can be seen in classical Greek, post-classical, and the koine: $\sigma\upsilon$ is common in classical Greek and $\mu\eta$ needs to be explained; $\mu\eta$ is common in the koine and $\sigma\upsilon$ needs to be explained.²⁷ The novelists, standing between the two ends, combine elements of both. Atticists like Longus and Achilles Tatius try to compose according to the Attic pattern, but occasionally slip and use $\mu\eta$ with the participle where it would not be used by an Attic author.

To see how the romances of Longus and Achilles Tatius compare with Attic writers in the use of $\mu\eta$ with the participle, I shall now turn to examples in their works.

IV

There is a heavier concentration of the negated participle in Longus than in Achilles Tatius, considering how much shorter Longus' romance is than Achilles Tatius'. $\sigma\upsilon$ occurs with the participle the same number of times in both authors: 38 times. $\mu\eta$ occurs with the participle 24 times in Longus, 31 times in Achilles Tatius. These numbers are not large enough to justify a comparison between the two authors. Both writers negative the participle in about the same way, so I have found it convenient to list their examples together and consider them against the classical idiom.

$\mu\eta$ with the participle, grouped according to use, occurs in the two authors as follows:

1. *Principal classical use of $\mu\eta$ with the participle.*

A. Generic (Attributive participle).

Longus, 3, 13 (*init.*): τὰς δὲ μήπω τετοκυίας οἱ κριοὶ κατεδίωκον.

Achilles Tatius, VIII, 8, 2: ἡ γὰρ εἰς τὸ μήπω λεχθέν ἐπειεῖς τοῦ λόγου τὸ ὀλόκληρον τῶν ἤδη λεχθέντων παραιρεῖται.

B. Characteristic (Attributive participle).

Achilles Tatius, VIII, 9, 7: ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁ σώζων τοὺς

²⁷ Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 1137.

συκοφαντηθέντας τύραννος, ἀλλ' ὁ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας.²⁸
Ibid., IV, 8, 6: τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὴ φοβούμενον
 ἀγριαίνει μᾶλλον τὸ θυμούμενον.

C. Conditional (Circumstantial participle).

Longus, 3, 26 (*init.*): ἐκφρων ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ Δάφνις
 γίνεται . . . ἀποθανεῖσθαι μηκέτι νεμούσης Χλόης λέγων.
 Achilles Tatius, VIII, 10, 12: ὥσπερ γὰρ μὴ μένοντος
 [γάμου] ὁ μοιχὸς οὐκ ἦν, μένοντος δὲ μοιχὸς ἐστίν.

2. Subordinate classical use of μή with the participle.

A. Substituted participle with μή (predicative or transferred).

(1) Indicative conditional.²⁹

Achilles Tatius, V, 20, 5: εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν
 περιμένεις, μηδὲν προκαταγνώσκουσά μου.

(2) Indicative conditional relative.³⁰

Ibid., I, 10, 2: ὅσα δέ ἐστι κοινὰ καὶ μὴ τῆς εὐκαίρου
 τύχης δεόμενα. ταῦτα ἀκούσας μάθε.

(3) Infinitive of indirect command.

Longus, 2, 4 (*fin.*): ἐδεόμην οὖν εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν
 μηδὲν φοβούμενον ἔτι.

Ibid., 4, 29 (*fin.*): καὶ δεῖται μηδὲν ἔτι μνησικακοῦντα
 δοῦλον ἔχειν οὐκ ἄχρηστον, μηδὲ ἀφελέσθαι τραπέζης.

(4) Subjective or objective infinitive.³¹

Achilles Tatius, VII, 2, 4: εἰκὸς γὰρ σε μηδὲν
 ἀδικήσαντα πονηρῶ περιπεσεῖν δαίμονι.
 (There is also a concessive force here.)

(5) Imperative.³²

Achilles Tatius, V, 17, 8: λέγε μηδὲν ψευδόμενος.
Ibid., VIII, 4, 3: λέγε, τέκνον Κλειτοφῶν, μηδὲν
 αἰδούμενος.

B. Causal participle with μή.³³

Achilles Tatius, I, 8, 6: ἀπέκτεινεν Ἰππόλυτον φιλοῦσα
 Φαῖδρα, Κλυταιμνήστρα δὲ Ἀγαμέμνονα μὴ φιλοῦσα.

²⁸ Cf. Longus, 4, 10: ἰκέτευν . . . πατρώας ὀργῆς ἐξαρπάσαι τὸν οὐδὲν
 ἀδικήσαντα.

²⁹ Soph., *O. C.*, 1110; Hdt., I, 50; VII, 139; Eur., *Suppl.*, 254 (clas-
 sical parallels are taken from Howes, *op. cit.*)

³⁰ Aes., *Sept.*, 3; Eur., *Tro.*, 1166; fr. 503; 1049; Hdt., VII, 132;
 Thuc., VIII, 74, 3.

³¹ Theog., 280; Aes., *Suppl.*, 414; *Eum.*, 301; Soph., *Aj.*, 261; *O. C.*,
 1509; Eur., *Hel.*, 814.

³² Tyrt, 13, 5; Theog., 332; Aes., *Suppl.*, 215; *Ag.*, 897; Soph., *O. C.*,
 489; Eur., *Hec.*, 874; *Heracl.*, 175.

³³ Kühner-Gerth, II, p. 201. See note 13 above.

Longus, 3, 23 (*med.*): ὁ Πᾶν ὀργίζεται τῇ κόρῃ, τῆς μουσικῆς φθονῶν, τοῦ κάλλους μὴ τυχών.

Achilles Tatius, VI, 18, 6: ὡς δέ ποτε ἐπαύσατο τῆς βίας, ἢ τυχών, ἢ μὴ τυχών.

Longus, 2, 10: τὸ δὲ τρίτον φάρμακον ἐβράδυνε, μήτε τοῦ Δάφνιδος τολμῶντος εἰπεῖν μήτε τῆς Χλόης βουλομένης κατάρχεσθαι.

Ibid., 4, 37: ἐδεήθησαν γὰρ τοῦτο Δάφνης καὶ Χλόη μὴ φέροντες τὴν ἐν ἄστει διατριβήν.

Achilles Tatius, VI, 8, 1: εὐθὺς εἰς τοὺς ἀγροὺς τὴν Μελίττην νεανίσκον ἀποστείλασαν . . . μηδὲν ἔτι δεομένην φαρμάκων.

Ibid., VIII, 15, 3: ἡ Δευκίππη δέ, ἅτε δὴ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα μηκέτι αἰδουμένη, . . . τὰ συμβάντα μεθ' ἡδονῆς δηγεῖτο.

Longus, 1, 25: πᾶσαν αἰτὴν ἔβλεπεν ἀπλήστως οἷα μηδὲν αἰδομένου.

The last two examples contain the only usage which would never have occurred in classical Greek. Kühner-Gerth, II, p. 200: "When the participle stands in connection with ὡς, ὥστε, ἅτε, οἷα, οἷον, ὥσπερ, καίπερ, οὐ will be used, even when the construction of the sentence would demand μὴ, except when the leading verb is an imperative or is a construction with a meaning similar to that."³⁴

3. Late uses of μὴ with the participle.

A. With circumstantial participle.

(1) Concession

Achilles Tatius, VIII, 2, 2: ἐγὼ δὲ μηδένα ἀδικήσας, . . . τύπτομαι παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ βωμῷ.

Ibid., VII, 3, 5: καταλέγει μηδενὸς ἐρωτῶντος αὐτόν.

Ibid., VI, 10, 5: ὅταν οὖν ἡ Διαβολὴ τοξέυση τὸν λόγον, ὃ . . . τιτρώσκει μὴ παρόντα καθ' οὗ πέμπεται.

When a concessive participle is conditional μὴ is possible,³⁵ but this use is rare, and the grammars generally make no mention of it.³⁶ The above examples from Achilles Tatius are not conditional, except possibly the last.

³⁴ See also Smyth, §2689c. and Gildersleeve, "Encroachments of μὴ," p. 56.

³⁵ J. Humbert, *Syntaxe Grecque*³ (Paris, 1960), p. 362.

³⁶ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 345 allows only οὐ. Smyth (§2733) also, although in another connection (§2382) he cites Eur., fr. 440 (Nauck

(2) Time

Longus, 3, 25 (*fin.*): καὶ ἐλυπεῖτο μᾶλλον μὴ μαν-
θάνων ἢ ἔμελλε μαθῶν.

Achilles Tatius, I, 6, 3: τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τραύματα,
μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος, πολὺ μᾶλλον ὀδυνᾷ.

Longus, 3, 25 is perhaps causal, and the μὴ κινουμένου of Achilles Tatius, I, 6, 3 has some conditional force. I suppose a temporal participle could have μὴ on the analogy of the conditional participle equalling the protasis of a condition, that is, when the temporal participle is equivalent to a temporal clause which would be conditional (Smyth, § 2397), generic (*ibid.*, § 2094), or would refer to indefinite future time (*ibid.*, § 2401).

In the remaining examples divergence from classical idiom is at once apparent. There is no explanation to offer for these uses except that they demonstrate the "desire to color facts by feelings,"³⁷ and are extensions of the uses already occurring in classical Greek.

(3) Manner

Longus, 3, 33 (*init.*): τὸν τε γάμον εὐηγγελίζετο
καὶ ὡς γυναῖκα λοιπὸν μὴ λανθάνων κατεφίλει.

Ibid., 3, 31 (*init.*): Δίκαια ποιεῖτε . . . πενίας
ἀγαθῆς πλοῦτον μὴ νομίζοντες κρείττονα.

(4) Co-ordination or attendant circumstance.

Longus, 1, 26: ὁ δὲ Δάφνις . . . ἐξάγει τὸν βέλτιστον
τέττιγα μὴδὲ ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ σιωπῶντα.

Ibid., 1, 28 (*med.*): ἰδόντες δὲ μειράκιον . . . μηκέτι
μὴδὲν μὴδὲ εἰς τὰς αἶγας μὴδὲ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀγροὺς
περιεργασάμενοι, κατῆγον αὐτόν.

Ibid., 1, 32 (*med.*): τὰ δὲ πάντα κατέκειτο μῆτε
νεμόμενα μῆτε βληχώμενα.

Ibid., 2, 21: Ὁ δὲ Δάφνις . . . μῆτε τὰς αἶγας ἰδὼν
μῆτε τὰ πρόβατα καταλαβὼν μῆτε Χλόην εὐρών . . .
πρὸς τὴν φηγὸν ἔτρεχεν. (May also be causal.)

Ibid., 3, 33 (*init.*): Θᾶπτον οὖν νοήματος μὴδὲν πῶν
μὴδὲ φαγὼν παρὰ τὴν Χλόην κατέδραμε.

Achilles Tatius, I, 10, 2: εἰς γὰρ ἡ ὥδις παραγένη-
ται, . . . μὴδὲν πλανηθεῖς . . . εὐρήσεις τεκεῖν.

Ibid., II, 31, 6: μὴδὲν οὖν ἐρωτήσαντες ποῖ πλεῖ,
μετεσκεναζόμεθα ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν.

443): γυναῖκι πείθου μὴδὲ ἀλληθῆ κλύων without comment. Note that the
participle κλύων is not a substitute for an imperative.

³⁷ Gildersleeve, "Encroachments of μὴ," p. 56.

Ibid., IV, 14, 5: οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐκ πρώτης προσβολῆς μηδὲ κινήσαντες τὰς αἰχμὰς ἀπώλλυντο· οἱ δὲ οὐ λαβόντες σχολὴν ἀμύνασθαι, ἅμα γὰρ ἐμάνθανον καὶ ἔπασχον.

Ibid., IV, 18, 5: διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἄκρατον ὁ Αἰγύπτιος πίνων οὐ φοβεῖται, Διονύσου μὴ δεόμενος.³⁸

Ibid., V, 16, 2: θάλαμον ἡμῖν θέλεις γενέσθαι μὴ μένοντα;

Ibid., VI, 5, 2: ὁ μὲν οὖν νεανίσκος . . . προῖδὼν ἀποφεύγει, μὴ λαβὼν καιρὸν ὑπὸ δέους κάμοι προμηῦσαι.

Ibid., VIII, 9, 7: ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁ σώζων τοὺς συκοφαντηθέντας τύραννος, ἀλλ' ὁ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, μήτε βουλῆς, μήτε δήμου κατεγνωκότος. (See under Characteristic [1. B.] above.)

Ibid., VIII, 14, 4: τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ οἶον ἦν κατὰ χώραν ἔμενε, μηδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον ἀναθορὸν τοῦ συνήθους μέτρον.

B. With supplementary participle (indirect discourse).

Achilles Tatius, VII, 13, 1: ἡ Λευκίππη, τὰς μὲν τοῦ δωματίου θύρας ἀνεφγμένας ὀρῶσα, τὸν δὲ Σωσθένην μὴ παρόντα, περιεσκόπει.

Ibid., VII, 1, 5: τὸ δὲ τέχνασμα ἦν τῷ Θεερσάνδρῳ εὐρεθέν, ὥς ἂν ἀπογνοὺς ἐγὼ μηκέτι ζῶσαν τὴν ἐρωμένην, καὶ τὴν δίκην φύγοιμι, μὴ πρὸς ζήτησιν αὐτῆς ἔτι τραποίμην.

The last example is complicated. The participle is in indirect discourse following ἀπογνοὺς which is in the apodosis of a future less vivid condition, and the whole condition constitutes a purpose clause after ὥς.

C. *μή* adherescent.

Longus, 4, 28: ὁ δὲ ἔξω τῶν φρενῶν γενόμενος . . . καρτερεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος . . . ὠδύρετο.

Ibid., 4, 33: ἐξέπληττε γὰρ κάκεινας ἡ Χλόη, κάλλος ἐκφέρουσα παρευδοκιμηθῆναι μὴ δυνάμενον.

It is not certain that *μή* is really becoming adherescent like the οὐ adherescent of classical Greek, but it is significant that every time δύναιμι in the participle is negatived (with one exception: Achilles Tatius, I, 12, 5) *μή* is the negative used. *μή* occurs with the participle of δύναιμι (in addition to the above two) in

³⁸ But οὐδὲν . . . δεόμενον in Longus, 1, 32.

Longus, 1, 24; 3, 26; 3, 29; 3, 30 (*bis*); Achilles Tatius, II, 25, 2; VIII, 10, 12. The same adherescence may be developing with $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega$, but the examples are too few to say. The participle of $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega$ accepts $\mu\acute{\eta}$ twice (Achilles Tatius, IV, 12, 2; V, 15, 6) and $\omicron\upsilon$ once (Longus, 3, 25).

Counting the examples listed under *Late uses* and the last two under the causal participle, we find only 16 cases in Longus, and 19 cases in Achilles Tatius, which can definitely be labelled "late." The two authors still prefer $\omicron\upsilon$ in these constructions (the co-ordinate participles negated by $\omicron\upsilon$ in Achilles Tatius, 17; Longus, 20; causal: Achilles Tatius, 7; Longus, 4; concessive: Achilles Tatius, 3; Longus, 2). Though Longus and Achilles Tatius have made a conscious effort to imitate the style and syntax of the Attic authors, a number of solecisms have slipped by them. It is in these exceptional constructions that the more natural idiom appears.

The subject of this paper is too limited to form any very definite conclusions about the style of Longus or Achilles Tatius: one would have to examine, in addition to $\mu\acute{\eta}$ with the participle, all the negative constructions that occur in both authors, while giving some attention to other writers of the same period. My purpose was to see, by citing specific examples from two late writers, how naturally the negative $\mu\acute{\eta}$ could spread to other uses of the participle. Though our authors were careful Atticists, it was difficult for them to maintain the subtle distinctions of the negatives with the participle. Thus Longus and Achilles Tatius represent one stage in the process of the encroachment of $\mu\acute{\eta}$ on $\omicron\upsilon$.

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AUGUSTUS RIDICULES HORACE'S SHORTNESS: A COMMENT ON THE WORD *SEXTARIOLUS*.

In one of the fragments of Augustus' correspondence which Suetonius included in his biography of the poet Horace there are some unexplained and difficult points. The fragment (p. 3, lines 9-14 in Klingner's Horace, pp. 23 f. in Henrica Malcovati's *Imp. C. Augusti operum fragmenta* [Turin, 1948]) reads as follows:

Pertulit ad me Onysius libellum tuum, quem ego ut
accusantem quantuluscumque est boni consulo, uereri autem
mihi uideris ne maiores libelli tui sint, quam ipse es; sed
tibi statura deest, corpusculum non deest. itaque licebit
in sextariolo scribas, cum circuitus uoluminis tui sit ὀγκω-
δέστατος, sicut est uentriculi tui.

Let us dispose briefly of the corrections suggested for the fragment, which is here given in accordance with the manuscript tradition:

Onysius (maintained by many editors) has been changed to less rare names: *Dionysius* (Muret, Bentley, Wolf), *Oniscus* (Reifferscheid), *Onesimus* (Glaeser), or even the participle *onustus* (Van Johnson, *C. P.*, XXXV, pp. 420 ff.). Some scholars found in the possible combination of some derivative of *ovos* and the name of Vinnius Asina, the carrier of the *carmina* sent by the poet to the Princeps (*Epist.*, I, 13), an allusion to that particular missive: so T. Frank, *C. P.*, XX, pp. 29 f. and A. Rostagni, "La 'vita' svetoniana di Orazio ne'suoi elementi e nelle sue fonti," *Atti Acc. delle Scienze*, LXX (Turin, 1935/6), pp. 14-49 = *Scritti minori*, II, 2, p. 288, n. 2. E. Fraenke, *Horace*, p. 20, hits out with his philological indignation at the latter's attempt, which according to him repeats the "wild guess" of J. Bernays, *Rhein. Mus.*, XVII (1862), pp. 313-15.

ut accusantem has repeatedly been the object of the indiscreet zeal of editors and commentators: *ut non accusem breuitatem* (Nannius, Jani, Bothe, Zeunius, Ritter), *ne accusem breuitatem* (Lambinus), *ut accusem te* (S. Polenton, Bentley), *ne accusem te* (Casaubon), *ut a causante* (Roth), *ut excusantem* (Reifferscheid, Malcovati, Gelsomino), *ut accusatorem* (Lenchantin), *ut <se> accusantem* (Heinze, Rostagni). Few editions maintain the unanimous reading of the manuscripts: Vollmer, Villeneuve, Klingner. Fraenkel seems so unconvinced of the reliability of the manuscripts, that he puts *ut accusantem* between crosses and says that "no plausible emendation has been suggested." *ut aculeatum*, lately suggested by Steffen, does not hit the mark.

sed tibi has sometimes been changed to *sed si tibi* (Nannius, Muret, Cruquius, Bentley, Wolf, Wickham). The manuscript Blandinianus antiquissimus fell into the temptation of making this sentence a conditional by writing *sed si statura*, omitting *tibi*, which is really very necessary. S. Polenton suggested *si tibi* omitting *sed*; cf. M. Lenchantin de Gubernatis, *Q. Horati Fl. opera*, 2nd ed. by D. Bo (Turin, 1958), I, pp. XL f.

quum or *cum* is the reading of all the manuscripts; only those of the shorter redaction (cf. A. Reifferscheid, *C. Suetonii Tranq. praeter Caes. libros reliquiae* [Leipzig, 1860], p. 44) show *ut*, which pleased Bentley, Bothe, etc. Salmasius' correction *quo*¹ has had a great success, and is to be found in Gessner, Vollmer, T. Frank, Villeneuve, Klingner, Malcovati, Gelsomino, Steffen. What is worse, it entailed² the change of *ὀγκωδέστατος* to *ὀγκωδέστροπος* by F. Leo (see Fraenkel, *Horace*, p. 20, n. 4).

I believe the best rules of textual criticism recommend the avoidance of unnecessary emendation. The fragment seems to have been well preserved, and can be explained as it stands. Its translation would run: "Onysius (whoever he was) has brought me your little volume, of which I have high regard, small though it is, as a proof against you. For you seem to me to be afraid that your books may be bigger than you are yourself; but it is only stature that you lack, not girth. So you may write on a small sextarius, since the circumference of your volume may be well rounded out, like that of your own belly."³

There are six points which seem to need comment, in order to interpret the fragment and prove that it is clear and therefore does not need any emendation.

1. The *libellus*, the small book offered by Onysius to Augustus

¹ C. Salmasius made his all too successful emendation in his treatise *De modo usurarum* (1639), which I was not able to see. He proposed to read: *itaque licebit in Sextario illos scribere, quo circuitus*, etc. As a sample of the acceptance of it, see D. C. G. Baumgarten-Crusius, *C. Suet. Opera* (Leipzig, 1816), II, p. 402: "illud [*sextario illos*] minus necessarium; sed uerissima mutatio inepti *quum* in *quo*"; or F. A. Wolf (*C. Suetonii Tranq. Opera . . . cum Io. Aug. Ernestii animaduersionibus*, etc. [Leipzig, 1802], III, p. 51) characterizing it as *felicem emendationem*.

² See the correct observation of W. Steffen, "Krit. Bemerkungen zu Suetons Vita Horatii," in J. Irmscher et al., *Römische Literatur der august. Zeit* (Deutsche Akad. Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft, XXII [1960]), p. 21.

³ We give the translation of J. C. Rolfe, *Suet.*, Coll. Loeb, II, p. XXVIII, but italics indicate our divergences.

on behalf of the poet. A. Rostagni, *Scritti min.*, II, 2, p. 288 (cf. *idem*, *Suetonio de poetis e biografi minori* [Turin, 1944], p. 118) is probably right in believing it to be the Epistle to Augustus. With its 270 lines, it still falls short of that to the Pisones (476 lines), and is much shorter than any ordinary book (Odes II, the shortest Horatian book, has, for instance, 542 lines). When we read lines 250 ff. of that Epistle, we understand the imperial answer *ut accusantem*:

nec sermones ego malle
repentis per humum quam res componere gestas, . . .
si quantum cuperem possem quoque; sed neque paruum
carmen maiestas recipit tua⁴ nec meus audet
rem temptare pudor quam uires ferre recusent.

E. Fraenkel (pp. 397 f., cf. pp. 220 f.) has brought this passage in line with the repeated *recusationes* of the poet. Augustus may be disappointed with the comparatively short poem, which is furthermore not an epic song, and so he answers jokingly, as if believing that the short and stout poet is afraid of writing volumes bigger than himself.⁵

2. *boni consulo* is an idiom which, coming from the legal language, becomes quite frequent in the Silver Age and later Latin. So Quintilian, I, 6, 32 explains the old expression: '*rogat boni consulas*,' *id est* '*bonum iudices*.' Before Augustus

⁴ Notice that here is found "il primo esempio . . . di *maiestas* nell' allocuzione di un sovrano" (G. Pasquali, *Studi Ital. di Filol. Class.*, XXIV [1950], p. 128).

⁵ The most sensible idea is that the *libellus* is the Epistle to Augustus, which, as Suetonius says, the princeps *expressit*, squeezed, from the poet (see the reservations of C. Becker, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* [Göttingen, 1963], pp. 9, 231 f., or the acceptance of its face value by C. O. Brinck, *Horace on Poetry* [Cambridge, 1963], p. 191, n. 3). But nevertheless other possibilities are open: the *libellus* could have been a small volume with a few poems dedicated to the Princeps (I. G. F. Estré, *Horatiana Prosopographia* [Amsterdam, 1846], pp. 355 ff., 359); a selection like the five poems of book IV which are concerned with Augustus and his family (Brinck, *op. cit.*, p. 191, n. 2); or a single poem, as the *Pindarum quisquis*, which is also a *recusatio* (cf. Fraenkel, pp. 438 f.; Steele Commager, *The Odes of Horace, A Critical Study* [Yale University Press, 1963], p. 62), or the epinikion to Drusus (IV, 4), "the book's most elaborate work, deliberately inflated in style" (Commager, *op. cit.*, p. 230). The Emperor definitely received from the poet a small volume. As Isidor, *Etym.*, VI, 12 explains, *quaedam nomina librorum apud gentiles certis modulis conficiebantur*.

it is found only in Plaut., *Truc.*, 429 *quidquid attulerit, boni* (thus the recentiores; *bona* the old MSS) *consulas*, and in a fragment of a speech by Cato (58, Malcovati) quoted in Gell., X, 3, 17; *eane fieri bonis, bono genere natis, boni consultis?* From the rich collections in the *Thesaurus* (II, 2095, 76; IV, 580, 71) we may quote: Ovid, *Trist.*, IV, 1, 105 f. *carmen, interdicta mihi, consule, Roma, boni*; Pont., I, 3, 93 f. *munus tua grande uoluntas ad me peruenit, consuliturque boni*; Sen., *Cons. ad Pol.*, 10, 6 *gaude itaque habuisse te tam bonum fratrem et usum fructumque eius . . . boni consule*; Paneg., VII, 8, 5 *Mynors Germania aut boni consuluit ut quiescat aut laetetur quasi amica si pareat*; C.G.L., IV, 26, 27 *boni consolendum in partem bonam*; *ibid.*, V, 8, 24 *boni consultum bene acceptum*; *ibid.*, IV, 543, 47 *boni consulere boni iudicare*. Once more the Emperor shows his taste for snappy, conversational Latin.⁶

3. *ut accusantem*. Augustus still considers the poet not to have discharged his duty to him. The brevity of the poem may be taken as a proof of his reluctance to sing the Emperor and his deeds, of the definite refusal to write an epic in the Vergilian manner: it accuses the poet of disobedience of the wishes repeatedly expressed to him. Furthermore in the very Epistle, Horace openly contradicts Augustus' literary preferences (Fraenkel, pp. 395 f.). The Caesar prefers to allude jokingly to the supposed fear of the poet to produce something bigger in its book form than himself.

4. *autem*. I prefer to translate this particle rather as 'for' than as 'but' (cf. F. Hand, *Tursellinus* [Leipzig, 1829], I, p. 573), since *autem* is often used "ubi in narratione aut res aliqua describenda, aut causa explicanda esset" (*ibid.*, p. 566).

5. *in sextariolo* is the difficult point, the solution of which remains only conjecture, since we do not possess the word

Breviori forma carmina atque epistolae. This passage is considered by Reifferscheid, *C. Suet. relig.*, p. 133, to be derived from Suetonius. Th. Birt, *Die Buchrolle in der Kunst* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 131, describes the smallest libellus, "der zwar die übliche Blatthöhe hat," but it is only one sheet, as seen in the Pompeian picture of Admetus. Short poems, like the *Copa* or the *Carmen saeculare*, were such small monobibla, cf. *ibid.*, p. 217.

⁶ Cf. H. Malcovati, *Augusti fragm.*, pp. XVI ff.; R. Gelsomino, *Rh. Mus.*, CI (1958), p. 333 rightly points out that this expression is "ex usu sumpta magis quam ex lectione."

attested in the meaning which seems necessary and vital to explain the passage.

The interpreters thought of the possibility of *sextariolus* (attested only here)⁷ being a diminutive of *sextarius*. This is what is found in the dictionaries: 'una quarteruola, uno stajuolo' (Forcellini), 'a small measure = a pint (Lewis-Short)', 'Schoppenflaschen' (K. E. Georges), or, developing the indication of Georges, 'petit vas contenant un setier' (F. Gaffiot).

But as this translation did not fit in detail, there is a variety of interpretations. Thus some scholars (1) maintain that the *sextariolus* would be a vessel of measurement onto which (a) the poem would be rolled: "pars congii, quae erat, congii formam imitabatur uentrosam; ut uidere est . . . in congio celebri Farnesiano, ad formam uasis uinari hodierni, uulgo *barile*, prope *accedente*. . . . Ludit igitur Augustus in nomine, et forma congii, et sextarioli, cui similis erat Horatii uenterculus; nempe ut pro umbilico uolumen noui carminis sextariolo inuoluat."⁸ And Fea refers to Martial, II, 6: . . . *Lectis uix tibi paginis duabus spectas eschatocollion, Seuere. . . . Quid prodest mihi tam macer libellus, nullo crassior ut sit umbilico, si totus tibi triduo legatur?* Or (b) the poem would be written on this very vase (supposing that *sextarius* or *sextariolus* would mean 'pot'). So the archaeologist O. Jahn, *Berichte der Verhandlungen der K. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Philol.-hist. Klasse, IX (1857), pp. 191-205, believed that the poet ought to write "auf ein solches kleines bauchiges Gefäß." But the proof that Jahn gives is an inscription of only three words on the belly of a Gallo-Roman jar. Nobody has ever seen a poem written on a pot. The ostraca are entirely different: never entire jars, nor in a rounded form (cf. P. Jouguet in Daremberg-Saglio, IV, pp. 262 f.). We may wonder how "a sufficiently big fragment of a large wine-jar or some similar

⁷ We have to add that in A. Souter, *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A.D.* (Oxford, 1948), p. 376, *sextariola* is recorded as an adjective qualifying *uasa*, as opposed to *uasa potarica* in the *Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem* (ed. B. Kübler, *Iuli Valeri res gestae Alexandri* [Leipzig, 1883]), p. 193. In the same letter, p. 218, *coeleae sextariales* is quoted, meaning some kind of shell-fish.

⁸ C. D. F. I. Fea as quoted in the book *In Q. Horatii Flacci uitam a C. Suetonio Tranq. conscriptam notas uariorum collegit suasque et commentarium perpetuum nec non synopsis chronologicam adiecit* Dr. E. J. Richter (Zwickau, 1830), p. 95.

earthen vessel," as E. Fraenkel, p. 20, explains, would be short and stout, like the poet.⁹ Nor is what Th. Birt says in his monograph *Die Buchrolle in der Kunst* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 39, more convincing: after denying that in our passage the Emperor ordered the poet to write on a papyrus which should be rolled on a jar, he believes that the poet should write on a jar, and as a proof of such an usage he presents the example of a vessel covered with the Etruscan syllabary and alphabet in seven lines with a total of about 120 letters. We have looked at the drawing of that jar (R. Lepsius, "Vas étrusque avec deux alphabets grecs," *Annali dell'Istituto di corrispondenza archeologica*, VIII [1836], pp. 186-203, Plate B), and our answer is that in such a way of writing on a jar, there is no space for more than three hexameters. This is evidently excessive brevity!

Still a third interpretation of *sextariolus* as a vessel is found, but (c) in a figurative sense: J. M. Gesner (*apud* F. H. Bothe, *Horace* [Leipzig, 1822], p. XXXIII) reports some young Englishmen as the inventors of the translation of *sextariolus* as some kind of "lectica lucubratoria, siue cabinetum."

A different interpretation is (2) to abandon the idea that *sextarius* means a jar. It would be a capacity measure. So Monsieur Dacier translates (a) our passage: "et rien n'empêche que vous ne puissiez tenir et écrire dans un boisseau; car la taille de votre livre ressemble à la votre" (*Oeuvres d'Horace en Latin et en François* [Hamburg, 1733], I, p. LXXI). Better is J. M. Gesner's comment (b): he believes (*Q. Hor. Flacci Eglogae*, ed. G. Baxterus [Leipzig, 1772], on the Suetonian biography) that the *sextarius* would be a form of *umbilicus*, the rod on which the *uolumen* was rolled. A *sextariolus* would be "cylindrus brevis, sed proportione crassus (ut si axim aequet uel superet adeo diametros)." ¹⁰

But we think that the best interpretation would be (3) to understand *sextariolus* as precisely the name of a brand of papyrus. T. Frank, *C. P.*, XX (1925), pp. 28 f. and afterwards

⁹ An eclectic, or vague interpretation, in F. Ritter, *Q. Hor. Flaccus ad codices saec. noni decimique exactus* (Leipzig, 1856), I, p. XI: "membrana aut cera sextariolo circumdata multas litteras potest accipere."

¹⁰ The weak points of this explanation appear in its acceptance by Ch. Vanderbourg, *Les Odes d'Horace* (Paris, 1812), I, p. lxj: "C'est à Gesner que l'on doit la véritable explication de ce passage. La plaisan-

A. Rostagni, *Scritti min.*, II, 2, p. 288 and *Suetonio, De poetis*, p. 119, were the first to suppose that *sextariolus* could be a technical word to indicate the format of a papyrus, which they believe to be the smallest size, of about 2 inches, "a sixth" of the great size.¹¹

This explanation wrongly criticised by R. Gelsomino, *Rh. Mus.*, CI (1958), p. 334, can be further defined, in the light of information from Pliny about qualities and sizes of papyrus, mainly confirmed by those found in Egypt (cf. W. Schubart, *Das Buch*, p. 11). The highest papyri were of 40 cm. and the lowest less than 5 (*ibid.*, p. 54). The most beautiful manuscripts preserved, as book III of the *Odyssey* and the Berlin commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*, are composed of sheets of respectively 13 x 9 or 12½ x 10 inches (Kenyon, *Books and Readers*, p. 50). A moderate size for a page would be 10 x 7½, the medium height of a volume being from 9 to 11 inches (Kenyon, *The Palaeography of Greek Papyri* [Oxford, 1899], p. 18).

When Augustus in joke orders Horace to write in *sextariolo* he is not only alluding to a small format for his short book,¹² but also to the fact that *sextariolus* must have been¹³ the name

terie d'Auguste se rapporte à la manière dont les anciens rouloient leurs Mss. sur une baguette plus ou moins longue. Le *sextarius* (sextier) étoit la sixième partie du congius; le *sextariolus*, son diminutif, devoit être une mesure plus petite: la forme cylindrique qu'on lui donnoit permet de penser qu'il étoit très court, et que son diamètre égaloit à moins son axe. Auguste dit donc à Horace: 'Je te permets de donner à ton volume assez peu de hauteur pour qu'il tienne dans un demi-sextier pourvu qu'il en remplisse la circonférence' (italics mine).

¹¹ On the size of the papyri, see the greatest authorities, namely F. G. Kenyon, *Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1951), and W. Schubart, *Das Buch bei den Griechen und Römer* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1961). The ancient authority is Pliny, XIII, 74-8.—If we compare the names of paper sizes, as *quarto*, *octavo*, etc., or *letter double*, *letter-heads demy*, we could quote, too, capacity measures like *quart*. What we do not know is whether Augustus uses an extended denomination for the *emporitioc*, otherwise unknown to us, or only an occasional name for the six-fingers broad papyrus.

¹² Small papyrus books are quoted, as for instance the Almanac containing epigrams on women (Schubart, *Das Buch*, p. 55; Kenyon, *Books and Readers*, pp. 51 f.). But this kind of nice volume is not what Augustus mockingly recommends for Horace.

¹³ It seems that the numerous references to *sextarii* in the papyri, after checking those of F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griech. Papyrusurkunden* (Berlin, since 1925), are all to the capacity measures, and this

for the worst class, that which Pliny calls *emporitica*, whose *brevitas sex digitos non excedit* (Pliny, XIII, 78), and furthermore, as he says, *inutilis scribendo, inuolucris chartarum segestriumque mercibus praebebat, ideo a mercatoribus cognominata* (*ibid.*, 76).¹⁴

Augustus' pun is to put before the eyes of the meticulous and refined poet the vision of his poems being written on wrapping paper, so as to give *scombris tunicas molestas* (Mart., IV, 86, 8) or to cover fried tunny-fish (*cordyla*) or to be *turis piperisue cucullus* (*idem*, III, 2, 4 f.). Because, as Kenyon (*Books and Readers*, pp. 48 f.) explains, the size of the papyrus was in relation to its quality, since "the central portion of the pith was the best . . . ; the portions nearer the rind were employed only for inferior qualities. The size of the sheets in which the material was manufactured differed according to the length in which the strips could be cut without weakness or fracture. The best quality was that in which the horizontal strips were longest." The small size papyrus was not the *charta regia* used by a productive poet alluded to by Catullus (22), but of inferior quality, at the same time rough and thick. So the volume would be, like the poet, short and stout, containing only a short poem. The Emperor recommends in joke that the poet write on cheap paper!

6. *cum*. All the MSS have *cum* or *quum*. Syntactically it can be explained as a case of "cum identicum" (Hofmann-Szantyr, *Syntax*, pp. 622 f.), as for instance in Cic., *De nat. deor.*, I, 29 *cum idem omnino . . . neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit . . . ?*; *idem*, *De amic.*, 24 *facile indicabat ipsa natura uim suam, cum* (i. e. 'insofern als,' as is explained) *homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicaret*. Or, with indicative, *C.I.L.*, I², 1202 *hospes, gratum est, quom apud meas restitistei sedes*.

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is the case with the half dozen examples of the word in the Greek-Latin glossaries.

¹⁴ Cf. Isidor, VI, 10, 5, and Th. Birt, *Das antike Buchwesen in seinem Verhältniss zur Literatur* (Berlin, 1882), p. 249 (compare p. 273): "endlich an letzter Stelle steht die Charte des Krämerladens, die *emporitica*, das Dütenpapier, nur 6 digiti oder 0,1109 Meter breit, auf dem garnicht geschrieben wurde."

THE LEKYTHION AND THE ANAGRAM OF
FROGS 1203.

In the choral introduction (1098-1118) to the famous agon between Aeschylus and Euripides the contestants are urged to unleash every subtlety of their art. The chorus assures the poets that this is a sophisticated audience schooled in war and books (1109-16). "Try out every device for those who watch," they advise, "as though they were wise" (1118). If the audience is taken to include the readers of the *Frogs* in future generations, the chorus seems to have been overly optimistic, for the lekythion device continues to puzzle as much as amuse. Most interpretations assume that the significance of the lekythion is reserved for an audience of ready wits and have tried to see beyond the obvious humor of the repeated and nagging application of this unlikely literary weapon. Sophisticated metrical or syntactical niceties are seen by some scholars. Others hear double-entendres. The interpretation which follows is only one solution to a puzzle which doubtless has several answers.¹

Aeschylus' attack is inspired by Euripides' charge of *congeries verborum* (1154):

δὲς ταῦτ' ἡμῖν εἶπεν ὁ σοφὸς Αἰσχύλος.

Euripides supports the charge with two lines from the *Choe-phori*. In the one Euripides complains that ἦκω and κατέρχομαι are equivalent in meaning (1157). Dionysus sees the point. It would be as if to ask for a μάκτραν and a κάρδοπον (1159). In the second the fault is the same; κλύειν and ἀκοῦσαι are tiresome equivalents.

¹ W. B. Stanford, *Aristophanes: The Frogs* (London, 1958), ad 1209, summarizes various interpretations having to do with meter, syntax, and subject matter. Such interpretations as those of J. H. Quincey, "The Metaphorical Sense of Lekythos and Ampulla," *C. Q.*, XLIII (1949), pp. 32-44 and E. Harrison, "Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1203," *C. R.*, 1923, pp. 10-14 require considerable sophistication, the former calling for an amazing familiarity with the shapes, sounds, and uses of pots, the latter for an ear well-tuned to metrical peculiarities of the tragedians. J. Taillardat, *Les images d'Aristophane* (Paris, 1965), p. 268, arrives independently of Quincey at a similar interpretation of lekythion as a term connoting a turgid rhetorical style. He also explains

Twice-thrown, Aeschylus turns to the attack and challenges Euripides to demonstrate that his own prologues are any better (1177). Euripides agrees and defies Aeschylus to find any padding in his verse, e.g., like the Aeschylean doublets (1178-80):

ἐγὼ φράσω.
 κἄν που δις εἴπω ταῦτόν, ἥ στοιβῇν ἴδῃς
 ἐνοῦσαν ἕξω τοῦ λόγου, κατὰπτυσον.

Aeschylus makes the ensuing offensive twofold. The first part seems to suggest that Euripides would have done well to allow himself some padding. Aeschylus claims that his opponent has used incompatible terms in naming Oedipus τὸ πρῶτον εὐδαίμων (1182), for even before his birth Oedipus was κακοδαίμων φύσει (1183).² Euripides had disallowed Aeschylus' nice distinctions between ἦκω and κατέρχομαι or κλύειν and ἀκούσαι. Now Aeschylus chides Euripides for his inability to make nice distinctions. Some "Aeschylean-στοιβή" would have brought welcome elucidation of terms.

The second ploy of Aeschylus' attack is to make the claim that he can destroy any line of Euripides' prologues with a lekythion (1200). "I can do it with one oil-flask, because you compose in such a way as to make fleecelet and potlet, and baglet fit in your iambs" (1202-4):

ἐνδὲς μόνου.
 ποιεῖς γὰρ οὕτως ὥστ' ἐναρμόζειν ἅπαν,
 καὶ κφδάριον καὶ ληκύθιον καὶ θυλάκιον,
 ἐν τοῖς ἱαμβείοισι.

The three household items κφδάριον, ληκύθιον, and θυλάκιον are clearly chosen for their similarity. The repeated diminutive suffix and the metrical equivalence immediately call attention to the similarity while the thrice-repeated καί adds to the monotony.³ That Aeschylus squeezes in an abnormal tribrach in

the fig-stye joke in 1247 as another reference to the swollen shape of the lekythos.

² For the present argument it makes little difference whether εὐδαίμων or εὐτυχής be read. The latter reading is supported with Wilamowitz by E. Fraenkel, *Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes* (Rome, 1962), p. 142, against Radermacher.

³ The reading θυλάκιον is required for the present argument. It is that of most texts since Dindorf's edition and is supported in addition

the sixth foot is a sure clue that he is sporting with the sounds of the three words. The consonants *lambda*, *kappa*, and *theta* are scrambled in the last two words so that *ληκύδιον* and *θυλάκιον* are virtual anagrams. The *eta* and *alpha* are different and the quantity of the *upsilon* varies, but these differences are not sharp enough to conceal the anagram. They still fall within the type of *paronomasia* (*adnominatio*) discussed by ancient writers.⁴ Even the *κωδάριον* carries an anagrammatic ring with the other two words. While only two of the consonants are identical, the other two are similar, *delta* like *theta* being a dental, the *rho* like *lambda*, a liquid.⁵ Aristophanes was known in antiquity for humor through anagram. *Plutus*, 278:—ὁ δὲ Χάρων τὸ ξύμβολον δίδωσιν is explained by the Schol. *ad loc.* thus: ὁ Χάρων κατὰ ἀναγραμματισμὸν Ἄρχων λέγεται. The force of the anagram underlies the whole *lekkythion* attack. With it Aeschylus implies that no matter what Euripides says, unscrambled it amounts to nothing loftier in importance than an oil-flask.⁶

by B. B. Rogers, *The Frogs of Aristophanes* (2nd ed., London, 1919), p. 269 (Appendix *ad* 1203) and W. Rhys Roberts, "Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1204: A Metrical Joke," *O. R.*, 1922, p. 71. B. Thiersch, *Aristophanis Ranae* (Leipzig, 1830), p. 234 *ad* 1224 (1201) saw the reason for the diminutive: "Quicquid sit, *θυλάκιον* veram lectionem esse, sensus et vicinae voces, in eundem usum electae, perspicue docent." F. W. Hall and W. M. Geldart, *Aristophanis Comoediae* (Oxford, 1907), however, read *θύλακον* like Porson, who wanted to be rid of the tribrach.

⁴ Cf. the *Ad Herennium*, IV, 29 for various types of *adnominatio* including the transference, mutation, lengthening and shortening of letters in the making of word-plays.

⁵ E. H. Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin* (2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1940), p. 89, discusses the awareness amongst the ancients of the relationship of mutes *delta* and *theta*. Aristophanes himself plays on the affinity of *lambda* and *rho* at *Wasps*, 44 where Alcibiades mispronounces *rho* as *lambda*. On this cf. W. B. Stanford, *The Sound of Greek* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 10 and 141. When the verse is read aloud, the anagrammatic sound of the consonants is not dampened by the slight difference in the vowels *omega* and *upsilon*. Democritus, moreover, was known to have pronounced *ma* as *mō* (Diels-Kranz, II, 146, 19-21). On this cf. Stanford, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 and 23, n. 32.

⁶ One thinks of Lucretius' famous analogy of letters to *elementa*, I, 823-7. But Aeschylus implies the opposite of Lucretius' *tantum elementa quaeunt permutato ordine solo* (I, 827): In whatever order they fall Euripides' letters never get out of the kitchen. Cf. Schol. *ad* 1202: οὐτω γὰρ τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖς ὡς πάντα προσδέχεσθαι. ὅτι μικροπρεπὲς τὸ κωδάριον.

Thus Euripides, poet of household affairs,⁷ is convicted not only of saying the same thing twice (1179) but the same thing always.

Aeschylus first shows that Euripides confuses clarification of terms with padding. Then he shifts the argument to show that Euripides himself is guilty of padding.

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THE ANCESTRY OF GORDIAN I.

The editor of *P.I.R.*², M, now in process, will wish to examine carefully an inscription from Corinth published in 1966 by J. H. Kent, *Corinth*, VIII, iii, 264. On the basis of the lettering Kent dates the inscription to the reign of Antoninus Pius. It reads as follows:

[.] Μαίκιϛ[ν]
 [Φ]αυστέινο[ν],
 σ[τ]ρατηγός[ν],
 Παυ[έ]λλ[ηνα],
 5 ῥή[τορα] ἀγαθ[όν],
 ἡ πα[τρ]ὶς ἐπὶ
 καλο[κ]αγα[θ]
 ἰα
 ψ β

The text has importance because of the support it gives to the *Historia Augusta* on the father of Gordian I. In the *Vita Gordiani senioris* 2, 2 it is said that Gordian I was the son of Maecius Marullus and Ulpia Gordiana, and in the same *Vita*, 4, 2, he is said to have had a daughter named Maecia Faustina. Much of the Lives of the *Gordiani tres* was derived from Dexip-

⁷ Aeschylus' exaggeration of this common charge against Euripides, frequently alluded to in the play, may in part spring from Dionysus' remark about the kneading-trough (1159), where Aeschylus' own verse is compared to household utensils.

pus, and it now seems that the information about the family name came from Dexippus, himself a native of Achaia. The name Maecia Faustina can no longer be dismissed as spurious.¹ In fact the accompanying stemma becomes likely.




FIGURE 1. The Family of the Roman Emperor Gordian I.

The future emperor Gordian I seems to have been adopted by a man with the nomen Antonius, so that his own name Maecius Gordianus was changed to M. Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus. The name he gave his daughter was ultimately derived from his paternal grandfather, but it may have come to his daughter by a shorter route. For instance, his father Maecius Marullus could easily have had a sister named Maecia Faustina, whose husband, perhaps from the rich Corinthian family of M. Antonius Achaicus (*Corinth*, VIII, iii, 224), may have adopted her nephew, the future emperor.

Philostratus dedicated his *Lives of the Sophists* to the *clarissimus consularis* Antonius Gordianus under the impression that the great man was descended from Herodes Atticus, as he says in the preface. This has always seemed inexplicable, but now the inscription from Corinth in honor of the sophist Maecius Faustinus shows how the error arose. The great man was indeed descended from a famous sophist, but Philostratus confused the

¹ If the inscription at Corinth had been published in 1964, the names of Maecius Marullus, Maecia Faustina, and Maecius Gordianus might not have been condemned by R. Syme, "The Bogus Names in the *Historia Augusta*," *Bonner Historia-Augusta-Colloquium 1964/1965* (= *Antiquitas*, Reihe 4, III [1966]), p. 260.

true ancestor with an even more brilliant figure in the Second Sophistic.

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OPIMIAN BITTERS OR "OPIMIAN" WINE.

Trimalchio served his guests with a wine described on the labels attached to the gypsum sealed glass amphorae which contained it as "Falernian Opimian, one hundred years old" (*Falernum Opimianum annorum centum*).¹ In an entertaining article recently published² Barry Baldwin has pointed out that according to the elder Pliny³ (23-79 A.D.) Opimian wine, dating from the consulship of Opimius in 121 B.C., was still in use in his day; not however as a beverage in its own right, for it had turned into a bitter, syrupy substance, but as a kind of seasoning with other wines. He suggests therefore that the joke is that Trimalchio served his unfortunate guests with an ancient equivalent of Angostura bitters as a choice drink by itself.

One would like this interpretation to be correct but there are two difficulties with the supposition upon which it rests, namely that Trimalchio's brew is genuine Opimian wine.

The first of these difficulties is the age of one hundred years stated on the labels. That it should be stated at all is odd unless we are to suppose that Roman wine merchants attempted to entice pretentious nouveaux riches to purchase an expensive⁴ and exotic item by issuing a special label on which its great age was advertised in a convenient round figure. In any case, this would not be a very good explanation of the given age of one hundred years. By the Neronian period, the dramatic date of the *Satyricon*, Opimian was about one hundred and eighty years old. Surely a dealer with the Trimalchio type of customer in mind

¹ Petronius, *Satyricon*, 34.

² Barry Baldwin, "Opimian Wine," *A.J.P.*, LXXXVIII (1967), pp. 173-5.

³ Pliny, *N.H.*, XIV, 6, 55.

⁴ Pliny, *N.H.*, XIV, 6, 56.

would have chosen the more impressive round figure of one hundred and fifty years.

Compared with the second difficulty the first is almost trivial. Some paragraphs later than the one from which Baldwin quotes, Pliny makes the observation⁵ that in Opimius' time the various vintages whose merits he, Pliny, has been discussing were not yet celebrated (*nondum tamen ista genera in claritate erant*). Consequently, all the wines grown in that year bear the name of the consul only (*itaque omnia tunc genita unum habent consulis nomen*). Among the *genera* referred to is Falernian which, incidentally, Pliny regards as only *secundae nobilitatis*.⁶ The only alternatives to concluding from this that Trimalchio's *Falernum Opimianum* is a fake are, first, to suppose that after vintages had become established, some connoisseur, upon tasting a sample from a cask of Opimian laid down in some cellar, identified it by its flavour and other characteristics as Falernian and, unknown to Pliny, the bottles drawn from this cask were marketed accordingly as Falernian Opimian. The second is to attribute the following history to Trimalchio's beverage. It was made out of grapes grown in the Falernian district and there laid down in casks. These were not disturbed until the time when a Falernian vintage had become recognized. Because the origin of this particular batch was known it was retailed after bottling as Falernian Opimian, a fact of which Pliny must again be supposed to have been ignorant.

Neither of these involved explanations is very attractive and in view of this, together with the difficulty about the one hundred years, we are all but forced to accept that the liquor which Trimalchio serves his guests is not authentic. A fraud has been deliberately perpetrated in Trimalchio's household, a fraud immediately apparent⁷ to the sophisticated Encolpius and Ascyltus because of at least two gross blunders committed by their host and his retainers. A vintage is assigned to a wine of which the vintage cannot be specified and an age, a wrong age at that, is incongruously added. Perhaps even that does not exhaust Trimalchio's boorish ignorance. According to one of the inter-

⁵ Pliny, *N. H.*, XIV, 16, 94.

⁶ Pliny, *N. H.*, XIV, 8, 62.

⁷ Can there be a hint of this in Encolpius' description of the bottles as "*diligenter*" *gypsatae*?

locutors in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* who is made to quote the physician Galen "Falernian wine is sufficiently aged for drinking after ten years and good from fifteen to twenty years; any that surpasses this limit induces headache and attacks the nervous system" (ὁ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ἐκπίπτων τὸν χρόνον κεφαλαλγῆς καὶ τῶν νευρώδους καθάπτεται).⁸ Trimalchio has chosen to assign to his "Opimian" the vintage whose preservation for excessively long periods would be the most unlikely.

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LIVY, XXXI, 39, 6.

Following his defeat by the Romans at Ottolobus, Philip V executed a strategic withdrawal over trails where the enemy could not pursue him (Livy, XXXI, 39). Philip clearly wanted to avoid another pitched battle. At one point, however, the Romans did draw near and made camp at the Oosphagus River. *Rex haud procul inde et ipse vallo super ripam amnis ducto—Erigonum incolae vocant—consedit* (Livy, XXXI, 39, 6). He quickly left this position in order to barricade the pass which leads into the region of Eordaea. To me the *vallum* appears pointless. Why construct a rampart only to abandon it, and how could such a work seriously hamper the movement of twenty thousand Roman soldiers?¹ Rather, Philip intended to avoid battle by interposing a river between himself and his enemy.

This difficulty of the *vallum* can be solved by reference to Livy's very similar description of Hannibal's conduct at the Tagus (XXI, 5, 9): *Hannibal proelio abstinuit castrisque super ripam positis, cum prima quies silentiumque ab hostibus fuit, amnem vado traiecit valloque ita producto ut locum ad trans-*

⁸ Athenaeus, *Deipnos.*, I, 26C.

¹ Two Roman legions had been allocated to the Macedonian War (Livy, XXXI, 8, 5). Mommsen, *The History of Rome*, II (New York, 1895), p. 424, equates this with almost twenty thousand, while Maurice Holleaux, *C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 165, reckons the number at twenty-five thousand.

grediendum hostes haberent invadere eos transeuntes statuit. Here Livy has produced a passage which can be understood only through consideration of its ultimate source, Polybius. The latter, as Walbank notes,² has only one thing which could correspond to Livy's *vallum*: 'Αντίβου καὶ πρόβλημα ποιησαμένον τὸν Τάγον καλούμενον ποταμόν (III, 14, 5), "he made the river a bulwark." Livy has taken the figurative for the literal. This, I suggest, is also the case at XXXI, 39, 6. In narrating Philip's retreat, Polybius must have repeated the expression which he uses at III, 14, 5: Philip put the river between himself and the Romans as a bulwark³ in order to avoid battle, but Livy once again understood πρόβλημα as an actual military work.

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² *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, I (Oxford, 1957), p. 318.

³ See also II, 66, 1: λαβὼν πρόβλημα τὸν Γοργύλον καλούμενον ποταμόν.

REVIEWS

P. R. COLEMAN-NORTON. *Roman State and Christian Church. A Collection of Legal Documents to A.D. 535.* 3 vols. London, S.P.C.K.; Naperville, Illinois, Alec R. Allenson, 1966. Pp. lxxvii + 1358. \$38.50 (postpaid \$39.10).

This book represents immense labor, and the author may take pride in its being the first book of its kind in any language. In 1178 pages Professor Coleman-Norton, of Princeton University, has translated and annotated 652 legal documents affecting the Church in the Roman Empire, beginning with Trajan's rescript on trials of Christians. The *terminus ad quem* for the documents issued in the western half of the empire is the deposition of Romulus Augustulus, the "last emperor in the West" (476), while for the documents issued in the East the *terminus* is the publication of the second (extant) edition of the Code of Justinian (534). The latter *terminus*, the author notes (p. l, n. 3), was chosen because the publication of the second edition of the Code (he believes) "can be regarded as the virtual end of ancient Roman law." (It should be noted, however, that the exclusion of the legislation of 535 and the following years deprives the collection of important material, as will be noted below.)

Aids to the reader are numerous and carefully compiled. These are an Introduction of 34 pages; an annotated table of names and dates of emperors; an Appendix on Persecutions containing reported imperial legislation on persecution; a list of titles of address, a Glossary, and indexes of sources, persons, places, subjects, and of biblical, classical, legal, and patristic quotations and allusions. The indexes comprise 111 pages. It appears that in some instances the indexes refer to passages in the notes now missing which were eliminated or reduced after the indexes were compiled.

To the task of translating and editing the texts Professor Coleman-Norton has brought a wide experience in classical studies, church history, and Roman law, having demonstrated his scholarly qualities both in a masterly edition of a patristic text, *Palladii Dialogus de vita S. Joannis Chrysostomi* (Cambridge University Press, 1928) and in his collaboration with A. C. Johnson and F. C. Bourne in the work of translating and editing the collection *Ancient Roman Statutes* (Austin, 1961). The collection of the documents, within the limits chosen, is as complete as it is possible to make it and the translations are executed with skill and accuracy.

The author's special purpose has been to assemble a "collection of legal documents affecting the Christian Church in the Roman Empire" (p. xxxvii) containing "only such documents as seem to be in a legislator's words and to be legislative or mandatory in purpose" (p. xlv). The documents (most of them originally in either Greek or Latin) are "strictly secular," that is, they "emanate from the State's officials, ordinarily the emperors, and thus expose the State's attitude toward the Church" (p. xxxvii). What gives the collection its unique character so far as the selection of the

documents is concerned is that the author has expressly departed from the purpose of the extant collections of legal documents in English (those of Kidd, Ayer, Bettenson, Morrall, and Stevenson) in that while these collections "contain legal documents and some reprint also ancient author's reports of such legislation, and some do not supply comments to clarify their contents, yet these sylloges emphasize doctrine rather than legislation and . . . do not pretend to be complete in the legal phase—nor, indeed, do their compilers claim completeness in any category" (p. xlix, n. 1). Thus the reader of the present collection is to understand that he will find doctrine (including the doctrine on which relations of church and state were based) represented here only so far as doctrine is reflected in the extant legal documents.

In addition to documentation of the relationship of the state and the church, the student of Roman history will find here important insights into the social, economic, and political life of the empire. However, it is on the relationship between the government and the church, between the *imperium* and the *sacerdotium*, that the book should make its contribution to knowledge, and this is a matter that concerns all students of Roman history. Indeed the correct interpretation of this relationship pertains to much more than our knowledge of the history of the church in the Roman Empire. The tradition of the imperial office established in the Christian Roman Empire was handed on to the Christian royal houses of Europe and Russia; but the Christian imperial office could not have taken the form that it did unless the original imperial office had been given the form that lasted successfully from Augustus to Constantine. Thus when we read of Justinian's pronouncements on the church we must remember that he was the successor of Augustus as well as the emperor-theologian. It is for this reason that it is necessary for the reader of this volume to have before him an accurate account of the results of the extensive study that has been devoted to this large and complex subject.

The interpretation of this material has presented major problems and the debate over "Caesaropapism" has become a very active battleground. The problem goes beyond the limits of Roman history because the example of the rule of the Christian Roman Emperor, especially in Byzantium, was so important for the later development of monarchical rule. The conversion of Constantine, involving as it did a major alteration in what might be called the emperor's official personality, brought up the question of what should be the administrative relationship of a Roman Emperor, formerly a pagan, now a Christian, to a church which was now to become officially favored and protected. Because he was now to rule a different kind of society, it was necessary to work out a new political theory of the sources and the nature of the emperor's powers. According to the new theory, the emperor, now the vice-gerent of God on earth, was responsible for the spiritual health of his subjects and the harmony of the church; the classic statement of this theory as set forth in the extant texts is that of N. H. Baynes, "Eusebius and the Christian Empire," an article originally published in 1933 and reprinted with some additions in his *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London, 1955), pp. 168-72. On the basis of this

theory new kinds of legal enactments concerning the church began to be issued. While these enactments for the most part were concerned with purely administrative measures within the church, certain emperors for special reasons considered it necessary from time to time to issue legislation on points of doctrine, in which case they might be considered (both in antiquity and today) to be interfering without justification in matters of faith over which the church ought to have exclusive control. From this evidence, some scholars have concluded that the emperor's role constituted what has (in modern times only) been termed Caesaropapism, "the system whereby an absolute monarch has supreme control over the Church within his dominions and exercises it even in matters (e.g. doctrine) normally reserved to ecclesiastical authority" (*Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* [1957], s. v.).

However, this view is far from being universally accepted, and in recent years more and more scholars have concluded that the emperor's control over the church was in effect limited. According to this view, while the emperor was capable of exercising autocratic control over the administrative affairs of the Church, objective examination of the evidence shows that his power in the matter of definition of dogma was far from absolute. With the possible exception of certain efforts of Justinian (who was notably despotic in this respect), every imperial attempt to revise the traditional dogma eventually failed, all such efforts being defeated by the will of the people. (For a comprehensive review of the debate, see D. J. Geanakoplos, "Church and State in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of the Problem of Caesaropapism," *Church History*, XXXIV [1965], pp. 381-403; *idem*, *Byzantine East and Latin West* [New York, 1966], pp. 55-83; *idem*, "Church Building and 'Caesaropapism,' A.D. 312-565," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, VII [1966], pp. 167-86). To name only the scholars whose works are readily accessible, the following have argued that the concept of Caesaropapism does not represent the true relationship of the emperor and the Church in the Christian Roman Empire and Byzantium: T. M. Parker, *Christianity and the State in the Light of History* (London, 1955), pp. 65-80; Baynes, *Byzantine Studies* (cited above), pp. 32-5, 47-58, 80-2, 168-72; Baynes in the Introduction to *Byzantium: An Introduction to East Roman Civilization*, ed. by N. H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss (Oxford, 1948), pp. xxviii-xxix; H. Grégoire, "The Byzantine Church," *ibid.*, pp. 86-7, 128-32; W. Ensslin, "The Emperor and the Imperial Administration," *ibid.*, pp. 275-8; for further bibliography see the studies of Geanakoplos above, also G. B. Ladner in his lecture on the impact of Christianity on the Roman Empire in the volume of studies entitled *The Transformation of the Roman World: Gibbon's Problem after Two Centuries*, ed. by Lynn White, Jr. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), p. 90; F. E. Cranz, "Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea," *Harvard Theological Review*, XLV (1952), pp. 47-66; E. Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine: Passages and Documents Illustrating the History of Social and Political Ideas, 336 B.C.-A.D. 337* (Oxford, 1956), pp. 472-80; J. Stevenson, *A New Eusebius: Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church to A.D. 337* (London, 1957), pp. 391-6; A. H. M.

Jones, *The Later Roman Empire, 284-602* (Norman, 1964), pp. 93-7, 933-7; *idem*, *The Decline of the Ancient World* (New York, 1966), pp. 50, 123.

Scholars who are familiar with this important debate will be disappointed to find that Coleman-Norton in his Introduction and commentaries has presented only one interpretation of the material. Evidently he is so convinced of the correctness of this interpretation that he does not consider it necessary to deal with the contrary opinion. Early in his Introduction he presents Justinian to the reader as "the most conspicuous champion of Caesaropapism in the East" (p. xxxvii), and he declares elsewhere in his Introduction that "most of this sylloge's documents demonstrate this interference [i. e. imperial interference in matters ecclesiastical]" (p. lxvi, n. 44). The "tradition" of imperial interference in the dogma and discipline of the Church is described as an inheritance from pagan times when the emperor was pontifex maximus (p. lvi, n. 26, cf. p. xl). The reader is also told that "The privileges accorded by the State to the Church were furnished for a price which religion always has paid for governmental favours: political interference in religious affairs" (p. lx, n. 32).

The reader must bear in mind, however, that according to the principles on which the texts in the collection were chosen, evidence which is vital to the problem of Caesaropapism is not present here. The complete picture of the relationship of the sovereign and the Church is not limited to legal documents—indeed one of the principal legal documents is excluded from this collection by reason of its date, as will be seen presently—and there are important literary texts which must be taken into account. Coleman-Norton presents his picture of Caesaropapism on incomplete evidence, and does not allow himself the opportunity to refute the views of those scholars whose opinions differ from his, contenting himself with the observation that "although doubtless no universally accepted formula for the ideal relation between church and state can be devised, yet on this problem much has been printed" (p. lx, n. 31).

One of the basic documents is Eusebius' *Oration on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Constantine* (Coleman-Norton mentions this, p. lvii, n. 29, but does not quote it and does not supply a reference to the text of Eusebius). Here Bishop Eusebius, one of the emperor's closest advisers, sets forth the new Christian political theory of the imperial office which has been described above (cf. Baynes, *Byz. Stud.*, pp. 168-72). This theory was given classic expression in the *praefatio* of Justinian's *Novella VI*, published in 535 (cf. E. Barker, *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium from Justinian I to the Last Palaeologus: Passages from Byzantine Writers and Documents* [Oxford, 1957], pp. 75-6). Coleman-Norton does not have occasion to mention or quote this document since it was published in the year following the date which he chose as the *terminus* of his collection. The theory is also set forth at length in the address to Justinian by the deacon Agapetus, written probably soon after Justinian's accession in A. D. 527 (Migne, *Patrologia graeca*, LXXXVI, cols. 1163-1186; excerpts in translation appear in Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-61, and cf. K. Praechter, *Byz. Ztschr.* XVII [1908], pp. 152-64). Since it is a literary text and not a legal document, Coleman-Norton

does not have occasion to mention Agapetus' address, in the first sentence of which it is stated that God gave the emperor his earthly power "after the likeness of the heavenly kingdom."

Writings such as Eusebius' oration, Justinian's *Novella*, and the address of Agapetus show that in the eyes of some people, at least, what some modern scholars have called Caesaropapism did not exist. Indeed the basic question is not whether Caesaropapism existed, but what was the nature of the society in which church and state existed, and whether such a thing as Caesaropapism is a part of such a state. The essence of the situation has been well stated by George Every, "The difference between Church and State was that the Church was larger in space and time . . . The Church was too old and too vast to be turned into a department of the palace . . ." (*The Byzantine Patriarchate* [London, 1962], p. 14). Thus when church and state form the same society, ecclesiastical legislation represents a natural function and responsibility of the emperor. It is true that the emperor on occasion attempted to legislate on dogma, on which only an ecumenical council was entitled to pronounce; but these imperial efforts were not successful and did not permanently alter the church's belief and life. Thus, according to the citizens of the empire who accepted the principles set forth by Constantine, Justinian, and others, and in the view of the modern scholars who accept these principles, the documents that Coleman-Norton sees as Caesaropapistic actually represent the normal and accepted role of the government and the emperor. Constantine had declared that the stability and prosperity of the Empire depended upon harmony in the Church (see the letters of Constantine and later emperors cited and discussed by F. Dvornik, "Emperors, Popes and General Councils," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, VI [1951], pp. 3-23). The immoderate language of some of the laws concerned with the affairs of the Church does not necessarily indicate hostility toward the Church; language of this kind (with abundant examples in the code of Theodosius) is characteristic of imperial pronouncements on secular matters. The reader should also remember that the church had its own domestic ordinances, embodied in the decrees of the councils. The impression that the state alone legislated concerning the administrative problems of the church would be quite misleading.

Another point on which Coleman-Norton may expect disagreement from some readers is the choice of the date (534) of the publication of the second edition of the Code as the *terminus ad quem*, "which (he writes) can be regarded as the virtual end of ancient Roman law" (p. I, n. 3). While this may be taken as "an arbitrary, but a natural, limit" (p. xxvii), this *terminus* excludes not only *Novella* VI but many other *Novellae* (sc. *constitutiones*) of Justinian, mostly issued between 535 and 539, bearing on the emperor's ecclesiastical policies. Justinian intended to collect the results of this further legislation into another codification, but this plan was not carried out. The *Novellae* are important in the history of the relationships of the sovereign and the Church because they are complete specimens of Justinian's constitutions in their original form, not altered, divided, or cut down, as we have them in the Code. On the history and significance of the *Novellae*, see H. J. Wolff, *Roman Law* (Norman, 1951), pp. 169-70; H. F. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduc-*

tion to Roman Law, ed. 2 (Cambridge, Eng., 1952), pp. 506-9; A. Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (Philadelphia, 1953; *Trans. of the Amer. Philosoph. Soc.*, N. S. XLIII, pt. 2), p. 600.

Some addenda may be useful. P. lxvii, n. 49; on the account given by Theodoret of the dramatic encounter between St. Ambrose and the Emperor Theodosius, see F. H. Dudden, *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose* (Oxford, 1935), pp. 389 ff. and N. Q. King, *The Emperor Theodosius and the Establishment of Christianity* (Philadelphia, 1960), p. 69. The story of the encounter in the atrium is a legend designed to underline the triumph of the bishop over the humiliated emperor. A similar story grew up concerning Bishop Babylas of Antioch and his refusal to allow the Emperor Philip the Arabian to enter the church at Antioch; see G. Downey, *A History of Antioch in Syria* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 306-8. P. 49, n. 6 (and p. 927, n. 1) add: A. H. M. Jones, "Were Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?" *Journal of Theological Studies*, N. S., X (1959), pp. 280-98. P. 170, n. 2: F. Lot's *The End of the Ancient World* should now be cited in the reprint, with additional bibliography and notes, published in the Harper Torchbook series, 1961. Pp. 351 ff.: on the legislation of Theodosius I, reference should be made to the monograph of N. Q. King, cited above. P. 620, n. 7: Reference should be added to the claim of the church at Constantinople to apostolic foundation, discussed by F. Dvornik, *The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew* (cited elsewhere in another connection, p. 374, n. 5). P. 967, n. 2: to the discussions of Justinian's ecclesiastical policy by Bury and Gavin should be added M. V. Anastos, "The Immutability of Christ and Justinian's Condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, VI (1951), pp. 123-60; G. A. Kinsella, *The Two Phases of the Ecclesiastical Policy of Justinian I* (Washington, 1948), and other literature cited by H. G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (Munich, 1959), pp. 377-8. P. 1027, n. 1: on Justinian's reasons for bringing about the closing of the pagan philosophical schools at Athens, see also G. Downey, "Justinian's View of Christianity and the Greek Classics," *Anglican Theological Review*, XL (1958), pp. 13-22; *idem*, "Julian and Justinian and the Unity of Faith and Culture," *Church History*, XXVIII (1959), pp. 339-49. Pp. 1197-8: to the references to modern studies of official titles of address should be added K. M. Setton, *Christian Attitude towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century, especially as shown in Addresses to the Emperor* (New York, 1941), the titles being indexed on pp. 237-9; also M. P. Charlesworth, "The Virtues of a Roman Emperor: Propaganda and the Creation of Belief," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XXIII (1937), pp. 105-33. On πρόνοια see M. P. Charlesworth, "Providentia and Aeternitas," *Harvard Theological Review*, XXIX (1936), pp. 107-32.

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R(ICHARD) E(DWIN) SMITH. *Cicero the Statesman*. Cambridge (Eng.), Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. vii + 269. \$8.50.

Cicero in every generation challenges either admiration or criticism, particularly as a statesman. Indeed, no English study of him has attempted to present him in his varied political, rhetorical, philosophic, and social "persons" since Torsten Petersson's *Cicero: A Biography* (1920, reprint 1963). Even the excellent German article in *RE* 2 VII/13 (1939) is divided among four authors. As a statesman, Cicero has not in recent years been treated in English. F(rank) R(ichard) Crowell's *Cicero and the Roman Republic* (1948 and Penguin reprints) uses his career as a focus for a general treatment of government and history under the later Republic. John Dickinson's *Death of a Republic, etc.* (1963) analyzes the weaknesses which brought the Republic to an end, though it does devote its concluding chapters to a comparison between "Cicero the Institutionalist" and "Caesar the Instrumentalist." Thus Professor Smith's study of *Cicero the Statesman* provides a timely reassessment of Cicero's political career and significance.

Professor Smith is already known to Roman historians for his essay on *The Failure of the Roman Republic* (1955). The main thesis of this present book is that of his earlier one, namely that the Republic failed because of a moral weakness, the narrow and selfish short-sightedness of the dominant "noble" clique in the Senate, Cicero's *optimates* or *pauci*. He concludes (p. 258): "We at this great remove in time can see so clearly the many failings of Rome's republican government . . . but it carried none the less within itself the seeds of freedom, as the Imperial system never did; the *libertas* that Cicero cherished and defended was a truer and finer thing than anything that Tacitus could know; and Caesar begat Domitian, Cicero left no political issue but a memory and a name." This is perhaps too hopeless a summation of Cicero and a criticism of the Empire; just above, Smith has said of the period after Cicero's death: "ten more years of bitter misery made even Augustus' Republic seem like heaven; no wonder Cicero was prescribed reading in his imperial republic." Thus he hints at the possible (though disputed) sincerity of Augustus' "Restoration of the Republic," which he claimed in the *Res Gestae*, 1, 1 to have reclaimed for liberty, and also at the thesis of Eduard Meyer that Augustus modeled his Principate on that of Pompey and of Cicero's *De Republica*. The concept of political *libertas*, discussed by Chaim Wirszubski in his *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome, etc.* (1950), survived at least until the time of Tacitus, as the present reviewer sought to show in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, LXVI (1963), pp. 93-113. And the memory of the free Republic stood in the memory of the senatorial class of the early Principate in sharp contrast to the increasing autocracy under which they lived.

Smith finds two faults in Cicero's political ideal. He was blind to the incapacity of the city-state form of government to cope with imperial rule, as, again, the present reviewer argued in *City-State and World State, etc.* (1951). This fault had as a consequence a second, failure to appreciate the needs of the provincials. Never-

theless, Cicero emerges in Smith's account as the hero of the last years of the Republic, at once true throughout to his ideals of liberty and the Republic, and also a more skilful political manoeuvrer than many have thought. He commanded a strong following not only among the urban and Italian voters and the equestrians but even within the senate. Only the *pauci*, blind to any interests except their own prerogatives and scornful of a *novus homo*, failed to perceive the real issues and the genuine leadership which Cicero could give against Caesar. Indeed, Cicero twice nearly succeeded in blocking Caesar, during the latter's consulship of 59 and again in 57/56, when Caesar had to re-cement the second triumvirate at the Conference of Luca to defeat Cicero's growing strength. Finally Cicero emerged as the stalwart leader of the last fight to save the Republic in 44/43, so well described by Hartvig Frisch in his *Cicero's Fight for the Republic, etc.* (1946). This fight, Smith thinks, Cicero might have won had he had better support from the Senate and from the idealistic but impractical Brutus. Nevertheless, Smith admits that this would have been a barren victory. Even Cicero's purified senatorial Republic was not the answer to the need for an imperial government.

Smith's narrative flows smoothly and very readably; the book itself is attractively produced. He offers no footnotes and only a brief bibliography of the most significant previous studies, on the just ground that the Ciceronian period has been so well studied that full references to the ancient sources and modern literature are readily available. There is an index containing persons only. Though at first sight such a book might seem chiefly useful to interested non-specialists or to students, scholars will read it not only with pleasure but with profit. More attention is given to the analysis of motives and actions than to a merely chronological record of events. Major figures from Marius through Pompey to Caesar and also the minor actors like Verres, Catiline, Clodius, Antony, and Lepidus are well and consistently presented. In every chapter and almost on every page, in so fully documented and so much worked over a period, there are statements which are open to dispute. For instance, the actuality of the "first Catilinarian conspiracy" in 66/5, here accepted on pp. 86-9, is played down by Petersson, p. 198, and on the whole by M(ax) Cary in *C. A. H.*, IX (1951), pp. 476-8. The usual view, given here on p. 153, that Clodius began his tribunate in 58 as a protégé of the triumvirs, and particularly of Caesar, has recently been disputed by Erich S. Gruen in *Phoenix*, XX, 2 (1966), pp. 120-30. On a larger scale, some may feel that Caesar was more of an opportunist than he is here portrayed. Smith regards Caesar as consistently driving toward power from the beginning of his career, although he does not commit himself on whether, as Mommsen claimed, Caesar had any "grand plan" for the empire beyond his own personal control. Caesar is described as ready to override both political and ethical principles in his own interest. Indeed, though the basic cause of the failure of the Republic is charged to optimate selfishness, Caesar emerges as primarily responsible for the final break-down of 50/49. M(ax) Cary, in his *A History of Rome, etc.* (1935, 2nd ed. 1954), p. 396, takes just the opposite position, that "From the point of view of formal law, Caesar was the person

primarily responsible for the civil war, . . . On broader grounds it may be confidently stated that the civil war was not of Caesar's making."

Despite such possible differences of interpretation, this book gives a reasonable and coherent picture of the men and motives behind the events. It will serve to counterbalance such anti-Ciceronian books as those of Mommsen and Carcopino. For English readers, it affords an up-to-date, interesting, and scholarly study of a major figure in a significant historical period.

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J. ROUGÉ. *Recherches sur l'organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous l'empire romain*. Paris, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1966. Pp. 540. (*École Pratique des Hautes Études*. VI^e Section, *Centre de recherches historiques: Ports, Routes, Trafics*, XXI.)

For the past decade, J. Rougé has been publishing highly useful articles on various aspects of the maritime commerce of the Roman Imperial period. In this massive book he spreads his net wide and far to give us the full range of his research.

Rougé's intention is not a history of Rome's commerce as such; he eschews discussion (except incidentally) of the objects, volume, and direction of trade, or evaluation of its effect on Roman political and social development. His interest is in form rather than history: his fundamental aim is to define the cast of characters, as it were, involved in the maritime trade of the Roman Empire, to establish their precise functions, and to interpret the body of law that governed their conduct.

The first third of the book Rougé gives over to what he calls the "infrastructure" of maritime commerce, a formidable term that happily turns out to mean no more than the setting (geography, routes, ports) and the instruments (ships, port facilities). This section is uneven in treatment. The nomenclature of a ship's rigging, a most narrow and specialized topic, gets a leisurely 18 pages (47-65) while the broad and general subject of geographical setting receives a scant 9 (31-9), and the crucial question of storms gets none at all (though much evidence is readily available; see *R.-E.*, s. v. "Winde," cols. 2267-79).

Rougé gets to the heart of his work in the second third of the book, which attempts to define the various roles attested in the commerce of the period. He takes up port personnel (*saccarii*, *mensores*, etc.), shipboard personnel (*nautae*, *gubernatores*, etc.), "les exploitants du navire" (*naucleri*, *navicularii*), "les gens du commerce" (*kapeloi*, *emporoi*, etc.). The final chapter in this section, leaving definition for a moment to turn to sociology, treats the social level and ethnic origin of the above groups.

The last third is given over for the most part to maritime law.

Rougé takes up, in more or less detail, chartering, its rights and liabilities; the rights of salvage; maritime loans; freights, both those of the free market and those paid by the state; the respective liability of shipper, charterer, and owner, and the legal actions available for and against each; jettison (in which connection he examines what the "Rhodian Law" was, whether a body of custom or an actual code, and its relations with Roman law); the forms of commercial enterprise, from itinerant peddling to the large-scale operations attested in the Theodosian Code; contraband, taxes, customs. A final section reviews the relations of the state to maritime commerce and attempts to pinpoint when the government began to exercise control and to what extent.

In presenting all the above, Rougé has ranged over an area never before brought within the covers of one book, and has throughout alerted the reader to the multiplicity of opinions that have been expressed on practically every phase of it. Since he has firm ideas of his own, in most cases he has a final resolution to propose. These he supports with good documentation from legal and epigraphical sources and full documentation from the Church Fathers, where he is very well read; other sources, particularly papyri but also literature, have not been so carefully combed, and, when it comes to secondary material, Rougé makes no attempt at wide coverage but leans heavily on French writers. Some of the issues discussed are so crucial that full, rather than selective, documentation would have been advisable. When Rougé argues (pp. 469-74) that, from at least the 2nd century on, certain *corpora of navicularii* were actual business organizations and not just trade associations (i. e., the equivalent of General Electric or General Motors and not the National Association of Manufacturers) he is arguing a vital point which properly deserves presentation of all relevant opinion and analysis of all available evidence. When he turns to the much debated question of what period first witnessed government requisitioning of maritime commerce, he settles matters in a page and a half (pp. 476-7) which, with no evaluation of the arguments of others, presents his own for putting the date after Diocletian.

Despite its scope, the work has some curious artificial limitations. The words "en Méditerranée" in the title mean just that: though the Black Sea, Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic coasts outside Gibraltar were integral parts of Rome's maritime network, Rougé has for some reason excluded them from consideration. Moreover, though he shows that Roman commerce in the west as well as in the east was largely in the hands of Greeks and other easterners (p. 309), he seems to equate "Roman" with "Latin": his section on nautical terminology (pp. 47-61) brings in Greek terms only incidentally, he discusses *corpora* and *collegia* but not *oikoi* and *koine*, he passes by the nautical contracts preserved in the papyri because they do not enter (p. 382) "en ligne de compte pour l'étude du droit maritime romain" (a hasty dismissal of a very relevant problem, that of the reception of Roman law in the east).

I have three major criticisms to pass on this book.

The first, and most serious, concerns Rougé's handling of evidence: he too often draws conclusions that are by no means justified. One citation—and from Isidore of Seville, at that—hardly proves

that carrying lifeboats on deck (instead of towing them astern) "est sans doute devenu la règle à la basse époque" (p. 49); two passages which merely say "grab the *versoria*" hardly inform us that this was the standard term for "brace" (p. 53), particularly since the word is otherwise unattested; one papyrus that mentions one voyage to Rome via Cyrene hardly proves that this was the normal Alexandria-Rome route (pp. 87, 416); the casual mention of a Jewish skipper in one of Synesius' letters hardly "nous montre donc que ces marins juifs participaient à l'exploitation de la ligne commerciale . . . Alexandrie-Cyrénaïque" (p. 313). A most cavalier handling of evidence occurs in Rougé's argument that the sail hung on a short mast slanting over the bows is not the *artemon*, as generally agreed, but the *dolon* (pp. 58-60). He arrives at this conclusion by misinterpreting a text from the *Digest*, by giving the evidence of Isidore of Seville priority over that of Livy, by omitting two relevant passages (Diod., XX, 61, 8; Proc., *De Bello Vand.*, I, 17, 5, both of which, as in Livy, emphasizing the use of the *dolon* as a pusher [a bow sail simply aids steering], show that the *dolon* is far better interpreted as a warship's emergency rig), and by not appreciating the significance of his own convincing demonstration that a dockside crane was called an *artemon* (p. 164; a dockside crane slants out and over vessels moored along the quay—where did it get its name if not from the similar masts in the bows of ships?). The description (p. 367) of the identifying marks on amphorae is most misleading, giving the impression that each could carry half a dozen marks, whereas most marked amphorae have but one or two and by far the greater number found have none at all (a feature with important implications that Rougé has left unexplored). The conclusion (p. 65) that "au moins à partir du III^e siècle, un nouveau perfectionnement de l'appareil de gouverne est entré en service" is based on a rhetorical pleonasm in Oppian, which Rougé takes literally, coupled with a simile in a clergyman's paschal letter which he treats as if it were a passage from a seaman's manual. Rougé identifies the *toicharchoi* of merchant vessels as rowers (p. 217); Artemidorus, I, 35 and II, 23 are clear evidence that there was only one aboard a vessel and that he was one of the ship's officers, probably (cf. Philostratus, *Vita Ap.*, 6, 12) the supercargo. Perhaps the most serious case in point is the discussion of the term *naukleros*. This, hitherto taken to mean "ship-owner" or "ship-charterer," Rougé argues refers always and only to the agent who is embarked on a vessel to represent the interests of the owner or charterer. His evidence boils down to the single instance, in Demosthenes 34, of a slave acting as *naukleros*. To conclude from this that (p. 231) "De toute manière nous pouvons retenir du corpus démôsthénien que le naulére est un représentant du propriétaire ou de l'armateur du navire" is to fly in the face of the facts. Nowhere else in the corpus of Demosthenes is there support for such a statement, and Demosthenes 35 is certain evidence against: the *naukleros* here (35, 10-11; 18) was demonstrably not aboard the ship, for the affidavit as to what cargo was loaded (genuine or not, it reflects contemporary practice) was sworn to (35, 20) by the captain, supercargo, five other witnesses—everybody, in short, save the *naukleros*. (The slave *naukleros* in Demosthenes

34 is simply the Greek equivalent of the slaves whom we find in Roman times acting as *exercitores* [e.g., *Dig.*, IX, 4, 19, 2]). Rougé has obviously read every line of Synesius, *Ep.* 4, since he cites it in one context or another a dozen times, yet he failed to see how clear its evidence is on the nature of the *naukleros*: again and again Synesius laments the bad luck that led him to take passage on a ship ill-fitted and ill-crewed because the *naukleros* was head over heels in debt. And we can add Artemidorus, II, 23, where Artemidorus tells of knowing "a *naukleros* who paid back the creditors to whom he had pledged his ship as security so that he no longer had anyone with a claim on the boat." Both writers, no question about it, are talking of shipowners, not their agents. Rougé clings to his interpretation even when it forces him to go through some remarkable mental gymnastics (pp. 254-5) to avoid having to translate the word in two different ways in the same selection (Lucian, *Nav.*, 7 and 14). Having satisfied himself on his new meaning for *naukleros*, he then goes on to equate it with *magister navis* in Latin, reviving an old theory that a *magister navis* was in no sense a captain but only the business representative of the *exercitor*. That the term is simply not this restricted in meaning has often been pointed out, most recently in C. Moschetti's comprehensive study "Il 'gubernator navis,'" *Stud. et Doc. Hist. et Iuris* (1964), pp. 50-115 (republished as part of his *Gubernare navem, gubernare rem publicam, Quaderni di "Studi Senesi,"* XVI [Milan, 1966]), a work Rougé has not consulted. Rougé makes much (p. 237) of *Dig.*, XIV, 1, 1, 13 (a passage to the effect that, when there are a number of *magistri*—*si plures sint magistri*—the *exercitor* may assign one to chartering, another to collections, etc.), arguing that, since there cannot be multiple captains aboard a ship, *magister* cannot mean captain. But the passage nowhere speaks of a single ship; it has in mind a fleet operated by one *exercitor*, who would naturally find it expeditious to divide up port duties among all his available shipmasters. Rougé unwittingly reveals the truth of the matter on page 287 where he tells us that "à la formule grecque *naukleroi kai emporoi* correspond très exactement la formule latine *navicularii* (ou *nauleri*) et *mercatores*"; a *navicularius* is, of course, a shipowner or ship-charterer and nothing else but, as Rougé himself states (p. 245). The reader must be on the *qui vive*, for, throughout the whole second half of his book, Rougé adopts as proven his special understanding of what he refers to as the "*magister-naulère*."

My second major criticism is that Rougé has, to his misfortune, missed some very relevant bibliography, particularly of recent date. I have already referred to his failure to use Moschetti's important contribution. On page 82 Rougé refers to "le mystérieux instrument de bronze" found in the Antikythera wreck, although well-nigh a decade has passed since Derek Price solved its mystery ("An Ancient Greek Computer," *Scientific American*, June, 1959). In dealing with the crucial question of tonnage (pp. 66-71) he has consulted neither Wallinga's definitive study "The Unit of Capacity for Ancient Ships" (*Mnemosyne*, 1964, pp. 1-40) nor the recent literature on underwater archaeology with the firsthand evidence from wrecks that it has to offer. Rougé's calculations rest on the

assumption that the *castrensis modius* (17.56 litres) "correspond en gros à la contenance ordinaire de l'amphore italique" (p. 67). He has in mind the 19-litre (net content) jars found in the wreck of the Grand Congloué. But what of those at Spargi (net content of 20) or those at Albenga (net content of 26)? And in dealing with a ship's capacity, whether expressed in weight or area, it is gross, not net, measure that counts. The ship in Demosthenes, 35, 18, which was to load 3,000 *keramia*, comes out in Rougé's reckoning as "une trentaine de tonneaux" (p. 79); deux-cents tonneaux would be more likely (cf. Wallinga, pp. 18, 20). To prove his views on how to calculate tonnage, he offers a formula from Heron of Alexandria (p. 70) and, applying this to the big grain freighter described by Lucian, arrives at the Brobdingnagian figure of 3,220 tons—just about the size of the biggest clippers that ever rounded the Horn! He failed to notice that Heron worked from the dimensions of the hold of a ship, using a figure for the height that was a mere one-tenth of the length; Rougé has unthinkingly used Lucian's figure for the total height of the vessel and this—a quarter of the length—naturally produces a hugely inflated result. On the basis of his erroneous figures Rougé reaches a conclusion that runs like a leitmotif through this book: that "le grand commerce" starts only in the period of the Empire, that down through the first century B. C. only "navires de tonnage relativement faible" were in use (p. 492; cf. 173, 226, 330). Yet we have available the first-hand evidence of a wreck of the early 1st B. C. that had no less than 10,000 unmarked 26-litre jars aboard (*Riv. St. Lig.*, 1961, pp. 213-20)—a vessel, in a word, that must have run 500 tons or better and was carrying some 70,000 gallons of wine intended for a single consignee. Rougé republishes and discusses at length (p. 348) a significant papyrus I edited in 1957 without being aware that E. Seidl has offered a completely different interpretation of the piece along what are surely the correct lines (*Stud. et Doc. Hist. et Iuris*, 1958, p. 439). Rougé mentions (p. 382) Brecht's *Zur Haftung der Schiffer im antiken Recht* in a minor connection only, disregarding Brecht's exhaustive study of the papyrus contracts and his conclusion (p. 47) that responsibility for *vis maior* was not envisaged in these contracts, which is precisely the opposite of Rougé's stand (p. 382, cf. 395). Rougé's section on specialized types of cargo ships (pp. 76-7) overlooks the rich material available in the papyri (collected in *Aegyptus*, 1929, pp. 110-34). Since Rougé is a skilled epigrapher it is surprising to find that, for his statistical study (p. 296) of the names in the *corpora* of *lenuncularii* and *fabri navales* in Ostia, he omits the considerable new material Bloch has published (*Not. Sc.*, 1953, pp. 278-85). In discussing Justinian's Edict XIII, 8 concerning the freight rate the government would pay, Rougé offhandedly assumes (p. 378) that *modii* was the measure used and arrives, as he himself admits, at a queer figure; *artabae* are most likely intended, as a glance at the literature would have revealed.

Lastly, the work is marred by much carelessness. The book was published under very trying conditions, which excuses such things as misprints, but there are mistakes for which only the author can be held responsible. *Versoria* becomes "versatoria" (p. 51); as

illustrative evidence for the topsail the one picture of a large ship (the Sidon relief) is cited (p. 57) in which no topsail appears; the ship Verres had the Mamertines build him was not named "The Cybaea" (p. 259), it was a *cybaea*, an oared merchantman (cf. *P. Cairo Zen.*, 59012); the *actuaria* is far from being the only type of oared merchantman, as Rougé seems to think (pp. 60-1, 464); Pliny's words (*N.H.*, II, 121: *circius Ostiam plerumque secto Ligustico mari perferens*) prove not that "c'est une route directe de Narbonne en direction des bouches de Bonifacio" (p. 94) but rather that the route went nowhere near Bonifacio; the Alexandria grain fleet, sailing over open water to Rome, could not possibly have had a naval convoy as Rougé (p. 266) suggests (galleys had to stick close to shore); the shipper of Pompeii, Naevoleia Tyeche, comes out "Naevia" on page 215 and "Naevolia" on the caption to plate ore; the important word *navis* has been omitted from the passage cited in n. 4, p. 235; and, on page 362, we read "*ναύλου πλοίου κ* (c'est-à-dire 800 drachmes)."

Despite all the drawbacks I have mentioned, we must thank Rougé for this ambitious pioneering study. The student of ancient commerce will find that, handled with judgment, it will prove a useful tool for further efforts in a difficult and complex field.

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LEONARDO TARAN. *Parmenides. A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 314. \$10.00.

If the greatness of a thinker is to be reckoned by the problems which his thought arouses, today Parmenides is still a thinker to be feared and respected. None of the pre-Socratics, not even the notorious Zeno, has been so much studied, examined, and reexamined. The historiography of contradictory interpretations of his work might baffle philologists and philosophers alike.

Yet despite the labor of his predecessors, Professor Taran contends that we possess enough of Parmenides' poem to recover and assess once and for all the original meaning of the Eleatic's doctrine without indulging in unnecessary textual emendations and unhistorical speculations. Since Parmenides' philosophy is "one in which all is in all" (p. vii) Taran offers, in the first part of his study, the complete translation and a line by line commentary, following the critical apparatus of Diels-Kranz, of all nineteen surviving fragments. The second part of the work is dedicated to a critical appraisal of Parmenides' notion of Being, to a clarification of the structure of the *Doxa* and its relation to the *Aletheia*, and lastly to the assessment of Plato's and Aristotle's understanding of Parmenides' doctrine. The thesis Taran's work wants to defend can be put in a nutshell. Historically Parmenides' greatest achievement was to lay down the fallacious implications involved in every cos-

mological theory which had explained change and motion "without positing first the problem of identity and difference" (p. 279). Philosophically he was the first of the pre-Socratics "to have applied the law of the excluded middle" (p. 38) and the first to show that the identity of Being precludes the possibility of any characteristics except just Being. After Parmenides, Greek philosophy had to choose between either following the argument (*logos*) or being reasonable. This is the thesis which was sketched by Cherniss (*Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* [1935], pp. 65-6, 383-4, 398-9; *J. H. I.*, XII [1951], pp. 338-9) and which Taran, while he acknowledges his debt to Cherniss, supports and validates through his philological skill. The result is a unique work of scholarship which indirectly offers the most inclusive review of Parmenidean studies, from the older views of the 19th century pioneers to the most recent discussions of Owen (*C. Q.*, X [1960], pp. 84-102) and Woodbury (*H. S. C. P.*, LXIII [1958], pp. 145-60), far superior in completeness of reference to Mansfeld's contemporary and original work, *Offenbarung des Parmenides* (1965).

We shall comment only on the book's problematic and fundamental assertion, upon which the success of this interpretation depends, i. e., the existential import of Parmenides' Being.

All agree that the logical structure and the meaning of the whole of Parmenides' poem depend on the correct handling of B 2, 3 and 5; precisely on what to make of the subjectless *ἔστιν* and its contrary, *οὐκ ἔστιν*, which are the two ways of inquiry the goddess bids Parmenides consider. To make sense of these ambiguous lines modern scholars have offered good arguments in favor of an unexpressed subject in the form of *τὸ ἓόν* (Diels and others) and in the form of *τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἓόν* (Owen), or of a subject which is expressed in an emended or supplied *τι* (Cornford and Loenen). Other scholars have disregarded the problems of the subject altogether and have concentrated on the semantic-syntactic import of *ἔστιν*, arguing either for an impersonal *ἔστιν* (Fränkel) with ontological implications (Patin) or for a logical *ἔστιν* expressing an affirmative judgment (Calogero's copula).

Taran rejects the views of the propounders of the unexpressed subject on the now recognized ground that there is nothing in the text to justify the need of a subject whose various meanings would depend upon the interpretation given either to the whole poem (Verdenius' Truth) or to B 8 (Burnet's matter). Furthermore, Taran argues, there is enough in B 2 to invalidate any claim for an expressed subject which is either the supplied *τι* of Cornford or the emended *τι* of Loenen. That Loenen's emendation is impossible is evinced by the strict logical function of the *τε καί* denoting the implication of necessity in line 3 and of existence in line 5 (p. 191). In all fairness to Loenen we have to notice that Loenen himself had considered a similar hypothesis and rejected it on the ground that, if one statement (line 3) is apodictic, so the other one (line 5) must also be apodictic. But to consider the assertion of non-existence apodictic leads to absurdity. Therefore neither line 3 nor line 5 is to be considered apodictic on account of the binding *τε καί* (Loenen, *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias* [1959], p. 16). Perhaps this line of argument might have influenced Taran, but he wants to

maintain that in line 3 the assertion of *ἔστιν* implies the impossibility (via the logically binding *τε καί*) of *οὐκ ἔστιν*, while in line 5 the assertion of *οὐκ ἔστιν* implies only its existence but not its ontological necessity. "The assertion of non-Being implies the necessity of non-Being, i. e., its existence" (p. 191). From the above arguments Taran concludes that the *ἔστιν* of B 2, just as in B 8, lines 2 and 11, must be subjectless, so that the gist of his argument depends solely on his interpretation of the semantic import of *ἔστιν*. For this purpose he claims that the text shows that Parmenides never falls into the syntactic fallacy of confusing the predicative use of "to be" with the existential. Thus it is misleading to appeal to Parmenides' linguistic inadequacy to justify the ambiguity of the text (Kirk, Raven). However, the examples Taran offers to justify this common complaint are far from being satisfactory (pp. 40, 125). That Parmenides can use negative statements which are meaningful (B 8, 22, 32-3) and positive statements with Being as a subject (B 8, 22, 43) actually appears to prove no more and no less than that the coherence of the argument (*logos*) compels Parmenides to make only analytical statements which are either negative or positive, in the sense that to deny any one of them is to be involved in the logical ontological contradiction of asserting non-Being. (The same remarks hold good for Taran's arguments against the propounders of Parmenides' Materialism or Idealism, p. 193.)

Secondly, Taran maintains that it is useless to distinguish among the various terms used by Parmenides as correlative of *ἔστιν* and its contrary. In fact *ἔστιν*, *εἶναι* and *μὴ ὄν*, *μηδέν* are all synonymous (pp. 37, 59) and reducible to Being and non-Being. This valiant attempt to get rid of a "logomachy" (cf. P. Shorey, *A. J. P.*, XXI [1900], p. 209) would be worth considering if the semantic import of the terms of the reduction were clarified. But because this needed clarification is never attained (pp. 38, 192, 201), Taran's suppositions seem to lack worth. Taran finally accepts part of Calogero's interpretation, but claims that only the concept of existence is expressed by the *ἔστιν* and its contrary. So while Calogero had concentrated on the logical, verbal, and ontological unity of Being expressed in the copula, Taran concentrates on the ontological factor alone expressed by the absolute construction of the *ἔστιν*. His translation reads: "'Exists and it is not possible not to exist,'" and "'Exists not' and 'not to exist is necessary'" (p. 32). From this translation we are to understand that Parmenides asserted through the mouth of the goddess, "Existence, and the impossibility of non-existence," as the first road of inquiry based upon the *logos*; and that Parmenides asserted and rejected the existence of non-existence as the inconceivable and unexpressible path which brings to no result. In fact, this is the road of non-Being to which, Taran claims, Parmenides returns in B 7, 1-2, 3-6, and B 8, 17-18, to criticize as the path of sense perception and which is in the final argument the false way of the *Doxa*. To be sure, Taran's interpretation saves Parmenides from Cornford's charge that Parmenides began his discourse from a flat contradiction, and indirectly it simplifies the dispute on the number of 'ways' in Parmenides' poem. (See Campbell, "Sur une interpretation de Parmenides par Heidegger," *Rev. Intern. Philos.*, pp. 390-9, according to whom the

δόξα is to be understood as a fourth road, the road of the "connaissances des hommes" in addition to the roads of the *ἔστιν*, of the *οὐκ ἔστιν*, and the road of the *ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν*.) Because just as the *μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν* of B 6, 2 is analogous to the *οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι* of B 2, 3 (and as such refers only to the first way of inquiry), so the *εἶναι μὴ εἶντα* of B 7, 1 refers to the second way, and is a criticism of the phenomenal world, while the *βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν* of B 8, 4 is a criticism of the partisans of the identity of contraries, who are the *δίκρανοι* who assert that Being and non-Being are the same and yet not the same. (There seems to be no historical reason to doubt that this criticism is directed against Heraclitus.) Indeed Parmenides' recognition of the logical disjunction of *ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν* does determine his choice to restrict his domain of discourse only to existence, whose semantic input can not be anything but itself. So all of the semata of Being, ungenerated, imperishable, homogeneous, continuous, immovable, unchangeable, complete and unique are deduced from the presupposition that to deny one of them entails a logical and ontological contradiction.

Undoubtedly Taran's interpretation which is, if we borrow an expression from Owen (*C. Q.*, X [1960], p. 92), that Parmenides was "preoccupied merely with the truism that what exists exists" clarifies Parmenides' methodology and gives a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between the first and the second part of Parmenides' poem. However, Taran has not been equally successful in clarifying what semantic function is to be assigned to the syntactically absolute *ἔστιν* with which Parmenides begins his discourse. Assuming that the concept of "unrestricted existence" arrived at in B 8, 35-41, is meaningful, Taran has failed to prove what bearing it has with the *νοεῖν* of B 3, with the *νοεῖν* and *λέγειν* of B 6, 1 and with the *νοεῖν* of B 8, 34. None of the philological arguments Taran uses against the scholars with whom he happens to disagree has proved in the long run devastating. Taran's impetuous and Zenonian language and the condensed arguments he uses in the commentary of B 2 and B 8 against the propounders of the predicative *ἔστιν* indicate two positions equally problematic. On the one hand, Taran seems to imply that the *ἔστιν* of B 2, 3 is existential but not necessarily full-fledged ontological (pp. 38, 191), but it acquires the ontological connotation only after the last "word" of B 8, 1 is spoken (p. 104). If this were the case, then the brunt of Taran's arguments against the propounders of an unexpressed subject would lose its weight because he—like them—would be forced to admit (1) that the meaning of *ἔστιν*, if not its subject, is dependent upon his own interpretation of B 8, and (2) that there is a slight difference in the semantic behavior of the *ἔστιν* of B 2 and the *εἶναι* of B 8. Hence, it would also follow that all the terms Parmenides uses for his Being are not synonymous. On the other hand, Taran also maintains that to the existential use of the verb corresponds at the outset a full-fledged ontological Being, absolute (pp. 37, 124) and unrestricted (pp. 125, 130). Thence it follows that the arguments Parmenides offers in B 8 for the uniqueness of his Being and for asserting—to use Taran's own words—"Being is the only thing there is" (p. 59) are circular. Eventually Taran accepts this view and endorses the circularity of the argument in considering the logical *κρίσις*: *ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν*, as the only premisses of B 2, 3-5.

But this very interpretation, *pace* Taran, endangers the validity of any deduction of thinking from Being (p. 192), while it reduces Taran's criticism of other scholars to meaningless objections.

Our point becomes clear if we take as an example Taran's criticism of Owen. It is to be remembered that Owen (*C. Q.*, X [1959], pp. 84-102) maintains that the $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ of B 2, 3 has a subject whose content, deduced by simple transposition from B 2, 7-8 $\sigma\upsilon\tau\epsilon \gamma\alpha\rho \delta\upsilon\nu \gamma\nu\omicron\iota\eta\varsigma \tau\acute{o} \gamma\epsilon \mu\eta \epsilon\acute{o}\nu$, appears openly expressed in B 6, 1 as "what can be thought or spoken of exists." Taran impatiently silences Owen's argument on the ground that "for Parmenides the converse of B 2, 7-8 would yield the necessity of saying and thinking Being" (p. 35). Philologically there is no reason why Burnet's and Owen's translation of B 6, 1 is to be considered wrong, while there are some doubts as to Taran's own translation from which the $\epsilon\mu\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ is omitted and in which he considers the $\tau\acute{o} \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ a complementary infinitive which he says in the line above it is not (p. 58). Logically Owen's entailment is perfect. In fact, by transposition the statement "what does not exist can not be spoken or thought of" does yield the statement "what can be spoken or thought of exists." Moreover, Taran's claim that for Parmenides the inconceivability of thinking non-Being yields "the necessity of thinking Being" (p. 35), and/or "to think is to think what exists" (p. 192) (the common semantic denominator of B 3 and B 8, 34) is logically untenable and semantically unclear. It strains logical sequence to maintain that from the necessity of Being (B 8, 35-38) and from the fact that non-Being is inconceivable one can derive the statement that to think is to think Being. (In the language of logic, so dear to Parmenides, given (1) $B = U$ i. e., Being is the only thing there is, and (2) $\bar{B} \subset \bar{T}$ i. e., non-Being is unthinkable, (3) $T \subset TB$ i. e., to think is to think Being does not follow.) But even if Taran is right and Parmenides did hold the above statements, would it not follow that the only form thinking can take is the form "it is" as Woodbury states (*H. S. C. P.*, LXIII [1958], pp. 150-1; Taran finds his view "too narrow" on p. 123)?

We leave this book with a question as to how much Taran's work changes the traditional view of Parmenides. His virtues are at the same time his faults. The task of subjecting to critical scrutiny everyone who has written on the subject makes the book hard to digest. The book abounds in repetition; arguments stated in the commentary are restated or reiterated in the critical essays. With the statement that "Being is the only thing there is" Taran flogs his predecessors who tried to surmount the absurd consequences of Parmenides' Being: "Parmenides could not have attributed any reality to the goddess because for him there exists only one thing, the unique and homogeneous Being" (p. 31); "... to say that they [Dike, Ananke, Moira] are immanent in Being is beyond the point because if this were the case it would imply the existence of difference which for Parmenides is tantamount to asserting that non-Being exists" (p. 118); Parmenides' theory can not be linguistic "for he could not have considered speech as existing" (p. 142). This is the language of another Parmenides or Zeno.

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JEAN-PIERRE CÈBE. *La caricature et la parodie dans le monde romain antique des origines à Juvenal*. Paris, Éditions É. de Boccard, 1966. Pp. 408; 19 pls. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, CCVI.)

This volume sets itself the task of describing the occurrence and function of caricature and parody in Roman literature and art down to Juvenal. The author has chosen to define caricature and parody broadly, and to present his discussion in a non-chronological framework. However, his opening section, on the comic stage, necessarily focuses on earlier literature than that examined in his chapters on eloquence and the other forms of literature. These last perhaps suffer most from a quality of harried survey-taking as the discussion leaps back and forth in time, and lights upon the same text over and over again, for different illustrative purposes. This drawback, however, is less disconcerting to the reader than more serious ones, as will emerge.

As Cèbe points out, there is no satisfactory work on this subject, and he assumes that a synthetic work would be valuable. This assumption rests upon the fact that there were works long ago (e.g., 1851, 1865, 1870) in the field but they did not concentrate on Rome. Further, Cèbe believes that the lack of work on Roman caricature and parody is a significant lacuna in our knowledge of Latin antiquity. One may wonder if the dearth of book-length synthetic writing on this subject for 94 years is not the result of oversight or inertia, but rather is indicative of a trend in classical scholarship. Have we perhaps lost an ability to assimilate (if not to produce) works which synthesize an approach to reality, an ironic viewpoint, an attitude of life in a whole national literature? Or is it rather the case that such works have but a small place now in classical scholarship of literature? We have, it is true, no lack of works touching on an author's or a period's uses of a mood, but it has been more likely the optative rather than the ironical. However, the potential relevance of a broad study of such categories of artistic perception and expression as caricature and parody must be examined, and not presumed. The ideal work on the subject would examine the quality of caricature or parody in a given work, and would suggest its impact and function within its literary context. More important, such an ideal study would go on to suggest what caricature and parody offered in the way of generic possibilities to writers at different moments in the development of the various genres of Latin literature. If the study were really first-rate, it could draw some conclusions about putting Latin literature into new perspectives and new periods of literary history. By seeing how comedians and poets, historians and orators used these comic resources, new insight could be gained not only into the individual artist but also into his audience's education and its literary expectations. Cèbe, by ignoring the role of the audience completely and by eschewing the larger implications of the questions and topics which he raises, has assembled a *catalogue raisonné* (which turns out to be confusing and defective) and a critical discussion (which is oversimplified).

By trying to represent the whole field of caricature and parody,

Cèbe scants analysis. He is aware of this. "Une peinture synoptique comme celle que nous projetons de brosse obliger, par sa conception même, à faire des choix et à écouter les analyses" (p. 1). There are three elements here about which the reader may have reservation. The first is *conception*, already touched upon above. The second is *choix*, the third *les analyses*. The balance of these remarks will be addressed to these two areas.

The scholar who wishes to present a coherent and sustained discussion of Roman caricature and parody must decide if he is going to assemble an exhaustive amount of material or whether he is going to study what occurs to him to judge as representative. If he follows the latter course, he must be equipped with faith in his judgment and a sense of discrimination. It is one thing to prepare an article embarking upon an absurd interpretation of a long-understood Horatian ode; it is another to offer a long discussion about an ancient emotion or category of experience without carefully selecting and limiting material for presentation and evaluation. The first effort can result in splashy bluff and engenders reply. The second can stifle thought, bore the reader, and drive off subsequent works which may have been more intelligently conceived. Those students of remote literatures who have offered most historical insight have been those who practiced limitation of cited texts. Auerbach, Spitzer, and Curtius too opened up new worlds through their vigorous examination of representatively chosen texts. It is clearly from techniques like theirs that future work in literature (and the history of religions) can most profit.

If Cèbe's choice of document is too broad to be useful in understanding either the sub-category of caricature or parody under his momentary gaze, or the writer's use of the phenomenon itself, his method of analysis is also open to question. His main goal seems to be flaying a dead horse. The conclusion of many sub-sections plays upon the theme of the originality of Latin letters, particularly in Cèbe's realm. He defends their caricatural and parodistic aspects against all comers who look like Greeks. (He abandons this stance, naturally, in his 33 pages on plastic caricature.) His reiteration of the independence and value of Latin literature is so plangent that one is compelled to believe that someone still has a stake on the other side of the question. However, working on the assumption that no well-balanced student of antiquity doubts the meritorious creativity of Latin culture and its literary vehicles, the reader may think he makes too much of this.

Cèbe's reliance upon biographical criticism is also distinctly *vieux chapeau*. If used cunningly, this technique can be effective stimulus for thoughtful redress. But here it is delimiting. When one reads of Horace's "forcing his nature" to compose the vituperative epodes 8 and 12, one can hope that the critic is employing an overly active metaphor. But when the critic raises the marsh-fire of "sincerity" and explains these two poems by referring to "situation d'homme amer, déçu, isolé sans argent," we see that he has moved from literature to speculation (pp. 184 f.). Catullus fares no better. Lucretius emerges as, among other things, "un tourmenté qui n'accéda sans doute jamais à cette 'ataraxie' qu'il présente comme le but de son entreprise" (p. 201). Because of Cèbe's

biographically conceived "Juvénal," we read of the Roman satirist, "Aucun caricaturiste romain n'est plus atrabilaire et moins objectif. Aucun n'a moins de souplesse et moins de sens des nuances" (p. 212). If this were susceptible to precise evaluation, it could be refuted. Indeed, Cèbe's Verlaine-like vocabulary (see, in addition, his title for the third large section, "Le reste de la littérature"), is linked to a level of exposition and understanding which does not go very far toward elucidating the Roman use of caricature and parody. His appeal to "leur imagination exubérante de méridionaux" (p. 140) recalls nothing so much as the century-old efforts of Hippolyte Taine. Likewise, his definition of Roman oratorical debate as a form of literature viewed by its practitioners "comme une façon de spectacle, de petit drame, de jeu. Jeu foncièrement méditerranéen . . ." (p. 147) is in the same vein.

In his sections dealing with various aspects of religious parody (pp. 231 ff.) Cèbe draws dubious conclusions about the liveliness of ancient beliefs (e.g., p. 246) and their survival, "si affaiblies, dénaturées, et 'contaminées' qu'elles fussent." This ignores what little we know about Roman religion on distinguishable social and class levels after the Second Punic War. Incredulity about, say, Anna Perenna does not go hand in hand with laughing at Fortuna Primigenia, whose sanctuary at Praeneste so hard-headed a soldier as Sulla rebuilt; also, religious faith and belief in old or new religion in a society like Rome is not a stable entity whose temperature can be taken reliably by what poets say. Religious belief, understood in light of what J. P. Elder has written of Lucretius and of what A. D. Nock has written of conversion and adolescence (e.g., *Conversion* [Oxford, 1933]; *Reallexikon für Antike u. Christentum*, s. v.) should be seen as part of Rome inevitably purveyed by classical education. Hence Jerome's concern. Educational reading-lists were effectively read; everybody knew about the old gods and their stories, and needed to look no farther than to their coins to see religiously conceived propaganda. Religious parody is independent of belief or non-belief, just as writing literature is independent of "sincerity" or "authenticity" or their absence (see e.g., pp. 169 f., where there is confusion about this in reference to Persius).

If Cèbe may be allowed an error of judgment in following a great scholar like Carcopino in studying the stucco work of the underground basilica of Porta Maggiore (p. 352, and elsewhere), it is harder to understand how anything except zeal for his topic led him to his views on Vergil's *Aeneid* and the gods there. In opening discussion, Cèbe writes. "Il arrive, dans l'*Enéide*, que les dieux et leur entourage soient présentés sous un jour amusant et ressemblent quelque peu, malgré la constante dignité de leur parler, au Jupiter et au Mercure de l'*Amphitryon* plautinien" (p. 236). The author finds his chief proof of his thesis in *Aeneid*, X, 104-13, Jupiter's speech. For Cèbe, it is "plein d'expressions pompeuses et de constructions pesantes. . . . La conclusion de la tirade—'les destins trouveront leur voie'—en découvre la vanité" (p. 237; see p. 271). *Fata viam inveniunt* can mean more than this if one does not try to see parody everywhere in a (non-existent) age of disbelief. As it is, Cèbe reads God this way: "Ici, le maître absolu de l'univers

n'est pas très éloigné d'un père de famille trop faible . . ." (p. 237). *Autres temps autres mœurs*. Ovid gets no marks for seriousness; even the *Fasti* exhibit "la raillerie des divinités" (p. 238; there is no reference to H. Fränkel's *Ovid: a Poet between Two Worlds* [Berkeley, Sather Series]). Cèbe does not take on Propertius, who is cited only as an example of how Romans named ugly creatures with beautiful names (p. 156). Though Cèbe does not pretend "épuiser le sujet" (p. 1), should the student infer from his silence about the extremely complex Propertius and his relationship to Apollo in Book III that there is nothing of "raillerie" here? Petronius is explicitly denied a moral force (p. 213), and because he pokes fun at philosophers and commits atrocious puns, Cèbe remarks: "On mesure par ces exemples la faute que commettaient les érudits du Moyen Âge, qui regardaient Pétrone comme un moraliste" (p. 265; who are these *érudits*?). That ends the matter for M. Cèbe. It may at this point be needless to remark that Cèbe puts Martial and Petronius in the same framework for judgment (pp. 243 ff.). Critics have been attributing a moral purpose to Petronius, as a glance at the past several years of *Satire Newsletter* will show; Martial has not been so rehabilitated, for good reasons.

This book does not give its reader a good idea of what Roman parody and caricature were like in the context of continuous literary works, excepting perhaps some of Cicero's *bons mots*. Cèbe is best in presenting graffiti of impact but of little or no edification, for which he offers translations, as he does for nearly all material cited. (Most often the Latin itself lives in a footnote limbo.) There is a refreshing candor about a scholar setting out to deal with *C. I. L.*, IV, 1939, and others of the "X futator" or "X fellas Y" type ("un qualificatif inconvenant") who can write: "Nous ne nous arrêterons pas longtemps sur ces inscriptions, parce qu'on ne sait si elles doivent vraiment être interprétées comme des charges . . ." (p. 160). One asks what other kinds of interpretations than "comme des charges" might occur to the thoughtful passer-by. Elsewhere, the present anatomizer of parody and caricature remarks of epigrams like these, "Il est simplement regrettable à nos yeux qu'aiguillonés par la haine ou par la volonté de frapper l'esprit du lecteur, ils franchissent parfois les limites du bon ton, voire de la décence; mais, répétons-le, les Latins n'avaient pas nos délicatesses" (p. 229). Perhaps the scribbblings in public places on M. Cèbe's Cour Mirabeau are either the work of "méridionaux" throwbacks, or authors of something other than "des charges."

Cèbe's discussion of pygmy frescoes from Pompeii, grotesque terra cotta figures, dwarfs, and others of "le tout-venant" and of various particular motifs is harder to deal with. He assembles over eighty illustrations, but there are more referred to in his text which are not reproduced in the plates. There is no attempt to assess the possible programmatic function of the frescoes, but, as in the sections on literature, Cèbe is content to list types and assemble examples of subjects. Cèbe again ignores the question of audience and its implications for parody. To be effective, parody and caricature must evoke some previously experienced standard of comparison in the eye or mind of the audience. How many Romans saw pygmies outside of art? Art employing pygmies must be a different

kind of parody from art depicting the deformed. There is no discussion of Greek negroid rhytons' possible relevance. Cèbe also passes by what to the reviewer's mind would be a highly fruitful line of investigation: the possible relationship between Alexandrian and neoteric poetry's fondness for the romantic and the geographically remote (e.g., Catullus, 11, and others) and programs of domestic architectural decorations using these themes. The parody which Cèbe elicits from his grotesqueries is different from that in Roman literature, and rightly has only a subsidiary, if unfortunately not an auxiliary, role here.

To do justice to this book which skirts so many important problems about literature and psychology and texts of such diverging levels of intent, more than a mini-review would have to be written. However, it may not be otiose, in this welter of reservation, to say that Cèbe has performed a service for all those students (including the reviewer) who wished that they had begun a log or commonplace book of parody and caricature when they began serious study of the ancient Latin corpus. His omissions have been touched upon; one is perhaps most surprised not to see Horace's *Integer vitae* placed against Catullus' *Furi et Aureli*, which it parodies. The remark of Asinius Pollio, recorded by Quintilian, about the *Patavinitas* of Livy's speech, is also missed. Bibliographically, the book is weakened by serious omissions. This work on parody and caricature cites five passages of Persius for lengthy analysis and mentions him on seven other pages, but nowhere uses or cites the important work of Dietrich Henss, "Die Imitationstechnik des Persius," *Philologus*, XCIX (1955), which is crucial for understanding this aspect of the satirist. Seneca is cited eleven times for discussion, Juvenal over a dozen and a half times, but no use or citation is made of Carl Schneider, *Juvenal und Seneca* (Würzburg, 1930) whose speculations on Seneca's influence on Juvenal would have been useful to Cèbe's own. Other deficiencies of a more venal nature occur (e.g., H. T. Rowell's name is misspelled in text and Index) but these examples should draw to a close. One may finally ask if a work dealing with matters of parody may not reasonably be expected to be aware of its own style. One example: "Bien que ce troisième volet de notre triptyque tranche avec les deux autres par le champ qu'il recouvre . . ." (p. 151). This is as grotesque an image as anything from Alexandria or Pompeii; but, then, the ancients did not synthesize their humorous inventiveness.

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HANS DREXLER. "Lizenzen" am Versanfang bei Plautus. München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1965. Pp. xiii + 187. DM. 32. (*Zetemata: Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 38.)

Hans Drexler's working principle can be stated most succinctly in his own words: "leaving aside the schemes of the verse, all the

rules of Roman metrics are of a linguistic nature."¹ Taken in itself there is nothing startling about such a statement, especially since "sprachliche Natur" can be taken to mean almost anything connected with language. In Drexler's understanding it means something rather specific, but he assumes in this study that his views are common knowledge to his readers. This monograph contains ramifications of hypotheses he has long held concerning Latin metrics.

The title is singularly inapt, since the work deals with far more than licenses, those phenomena which seem to run counter to the generally observable conditions of Latin verse. Drexler regards the term licenses as inadequate,² which is why he adds quotation marks to the word in the title. He means to indicate that he regards their invocation as the result of an essentially spurious handling of a complex question, or considers them legitimate phenomena of the verse (see p. VIII). Nor does this monograph concern itself simply with the initial part of the verse, but ranges across the structure of whole lines of spoken verse. Finally many examples (considering the extent of the corpus) are taken from the plays of Terence.

Drexler states that the book arose out of a "parergon," a re-examination of the discussion of iambic shortening in the work of C. F. W. Müller. This re-examination was in itself a preliminary study towards a complete discussion of Plautine metrics (p. VII). Since the author nowhere in this work offers a clear statement of his basic approach to early Latin metrics, I think it worthwhile to give a brief account of it, especially since his work is not well-known to English-speaking scholars.³

Unwilling to offer only a descriptive account of Latin metrics in the fashion of Paul Maas' *Greek Metre* (Oxford, 1962)⁴ Drexler wanted to provide a *ratio* for the phenomena of Latin verse. He presented his theory in the form of a working hypothesis (which he now believes to be established) in his dissertation, later published

¹ "Zum lateinischen Pentameter," *Philologus*, CIX (1965), p. 242, n. 2. The following abbreviations will be used in this review: Leumann = Mant. Leumann, "Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre, 1931-32," *Glotta*, XXIII (1935), pp. 119-44; "N. P. A." = H. Drexler, "Neue Plautinische Akzentstudien," *Maia*, N. S. XI (1959), pp. 260-314; *Plaut. Akzentstud.* = H. Drexler, *Plautinische Akzentstudien* (3 vols., Breslau, 1932-1933); "Quantität" = H. Drexler, "Quantität und Wortakzent," *Maia*, N. S. XII (1960), pp. 167-89; "Rhythmus" = H. Drexler, "Rhythmus und Metrum," *Glotta*, XXIX (1941), pp. 1-28.

² I object to the term "licenses" for quite different reasons from Drexler, for I believe that those tendencies of Latin verse to assume certain patterns which are generally called "laws" or "rules" had best not be referred to as such. There is something a trifle absurd when dealing with a dead language in jumping from an observation that something does not occur in the verse to the statement that it cannot. In spite of the fairly substantial scholarly heritage of the term, it has led to so many misunderstandings that it would be better to drop it, if only because metricians seem to confuse what they find in verse with the Ten Commandments.

³ His work on the hexameter, for example, is ignored by L. P. Wilkinson, *Golden Latin Artistry* (Cambridge, 1963).

⁴ H. Drexler, "Hexameterstudien I," *Aevum*, XXV (1951), p. 545.

in an expanded form as *Plautinische Akzentstudien*. He has repeated the principles established in that work, sometimes practically verbatim, in a series of articles which have been appearing for almost forty years now.⁵ Drexler observed the following negative rules for the placement of cretic and dactylic words in early Latin spoken dramatic verse:⁶ words like *dicere* and word-groups like *dicere mi* were not placed in the verse so that in the first case the central syllable formed part of the guide-element⁷ of a foot, and in the second the first syllable of *dicere* and the word *mi* were both parts or the whole of guide-elements.⁸ The only form allowed would place the guide-elements on the first and last syllables of the dactylic (or cretic) word. This could be accomplished in various ways by the poet, e.g., by elision of the final vowel with a following closed syllable, placing the word at verse-end, etc.⁹ Since there is no metrical reason for this phenomenon, there is, in all likelihood, a linguistic reason. This same rule of word-placement in the verse holds true for words and word-groups which show an "innere Geschlossenheit." There are also other group accent laws, but they need not detain us here. There is no question that the observations of Drexler are correct, even if at times the evidence does not make this obvious.¹⁰

Now it is a well-known fact of early Latin dramatic spoken verse that the Roman insensitivity to the distinction between long and short makes it difficult to assume that the rhythm of the verse was carried, as perhaps it was in Greek, by a regulated alternation of *anceps*, *breve*, and *longum*. Since the foot in early Latin iambic verse, for example, takes the form *anceps* + *longum* (x -), various substitutions are possible: among "iambic" types (i.e., those containing three *morae*) we have - - and - - -; among "spondaic"

⁵ A convenient summary of *Plaut. Akzentstud.* can be found in the index volume to it (including a *κεφαλαίωσις*, pp. 64-7), and in Leumann, pp. 128-31.

⁶ H. Drexler, *Gnomon*, LXIII (1951), pp. 170 f.

⁷ I use this handy term of L. E. Rossi, *Metrica e critica stilistica* (Rome, 1963), p. 13, n. 23 to avoid presuppositions concerning Latin verse which are inherent in the synonymous terms "rise," "Hebung," "arsis." The guide-elements would be, for example, the even elements in iambic, the odd elements in trochaic verse.

⁸ The type *dicere mi* can also be discussed in terms relating to the placement of double short filling a verse element (the so-called "law of the split anapaest"). The first short or the two shorts of the non-guide-element cannot be the final part of a long word. Thus, marking the guide-elements with a dot beneath them, we can state that if *dicere* were to be used in its dactylic value in the phrase *dicere mi* - - - | -, an "anapaest" of the forbidden type would result. It follows that words like *dicere* can only be used in iambo-trochaic verse in the form of a cretic, giving the pattern - - -

⁹ In cases of ambiguous scansion such as . . . *dicere volui, femur* (*Miles*, 27) which can be analyzed as -, - - - -, - - - || (which goes against the Bentley-Luchs prohibition of double iambic cadence) or -, - - -, - - - -, - - - ||, the second, making the final -e of *dicere* into *syllaba anceps* at the break, would seem preferable. See "N. P. A.," p. 260 and "*Lizenzen*," pp. 58 ff.

¹⁰ Leumann, p. 130.

types (i. e., those containing four *morae*) —, — —, — — —. Conforming to what seems to be a general principle of Indo-European verse that the line-end tends to be more "regular" than the rest of the line, we find — to be invariable as the last foot of the iambic line.¹¹ We are surprised to find, however, in Plautine verse that even under these circumstances "spondaic" types of feet predominate (in a six-foot line) almost 4 to 1 over feet of "iambic" types, whereas in the more "Greek" Senecan verse there is a slight preponderance of "iambic" types.¹²

What then carried the rhythm of the verse? We might say, without making any assumption as to its *nature*, that the rhythm was sustained by the natural Latin word accent. But this natural accent, as defined by the penultimate law, does not always fall on the guide-elements. We might argue that there was an inherent *internal*¹³ verse beat (usually referred to by the term *ictus*) which, falling invariably on the guide-elements, supplied a steady and unvarying rhythm (what Nietzsche so caustically termed the "Hopsasa" of the verse).

It remains for those who regard both principles as essential to the verse to explain the discordance between the two. Drexler does this by setting down the thesis that if ictus does not agree with word accent (which, according to him, was not fixed according to the penultimate law in the time of Plautus), it should agree with the accent of the phrase.¹⁴ Analysis of metrical texts in syntactical terms leads Drexler to the hypothesis that if differences in ictus correspond to differences in syntactic structure, ictus must be of a linguistic nature, i. e., it must be identical with accent, or at least reflect the phrase accent.

Further, Drexler agrees with the German school of metricians that the Latin word accent was an expiratory stress accent¹⁵ and

¹¹ Note that the cadence of the trochaic septenarius is the same. Iambic and trochaic verse have many common features, but it would be wrong to conclude that iambs and trochees have an identical *rhythm*, in spite of Drexler's statement to the contrary with regard to Plautus ("*Lizenzer*," p. 121).

¹² Statistics of this rough sort must not be pressed too far. Among other things they do not take into account word-types. As one indication of aesthetic relevance they are useful. That the frequency of stressed syllables in Keats' *Endymion* is greater in the even places is a sign that the verse is iambic. See A. W. De Groot, "Phonetics in its Relation to Aesthetics," in *Manual of Phonetics*, ed. L. Kaiser (Amsterdam, 1957), pp. 396 f.

¹³ Failure to distinguish internal from external ictus, the beat of the reciter or conductor, can lead to many misunderstandings. Drexler does not make this distinction, and as a result can misinterpret the evidence for ictus. He states, in a discussion of Hungarian quantitative verse (anticipated by K. M. Abbott, "Ictus, Accent, and Statistics in Latin Dramatic Verse," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV [1944], pp. 139-40), that the rhythm of this quantitative verse is unclear in *recitation* unless a verse beat is added. It is obvious that he is here dealing with an external ictus ("Quantität," pp. 172 f.).

¹⁴ *Plaut. Akzentstud.*, I, p. 3.

¹⁵ He prefers to use the terminology of Alfred Schmitt (*Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Akzentlehre* [Heidelberg, 1924], pp. 75 ff.) who

the ictus a "dynamische Hervorhebung"¹⁶ of the guide-element in so far as it is not identical with the accent of a word, group of words, or sentence.¹⁷

Needless to say, none of Drexler's views on phrase accent and ictus can find any support in the statements of antiquity,¹⁸ and his views have been seriously attacked ever since the publication of *Plaut. Akzentstud.*¹⁹ He has never made any attempt to disprove or answer any but the most peripheral of his opponents' arguments, and continues, as in the present volume, to heap up the data which support his position.²⁰ His industry in collecting material and the uneven, almost oracular way in which it is summarized have led some of his recent critics to be astounded by his energy as though scholarship's monuments were to be understood literally as a pile of bricks higher than the pyramids.

In "*Lizenzen*" Drexler begins by discussing exceptions to the rule of cretic accentuation (i.e., to the law of the split anapaest). Here the nature of the word groups (e.g., preposition + object) explains the accent types. Drexler never defines word group, and when we pass beyond some fairly obvious groupings we are met by such impressionistic language as that used to discuss the accentual type *non pōtest* (opposed to the cretic grouping *nōn potēst*):²¹

calls it a strongly centralizing accent, although it is often not clear how Drexler understands Schmitt's distinction between this and an expiratory stress accent.

¹⁶ See Alfred Schmitt, "Probe eines Wörterbuchs der sprachwissenschaftlichen Terminologie," *Indogermanische Forschungen*, LI (1933), Beiheft, pp. 31, 40.

¹⁷ Of his arguments for the expiratory nature of the Latin accent (see, for example, *Plaut. Akzentstud.*, II, pp. 348-51), the phenomenon of *Kürzung durch Tonanschluss* (enclitic vowel-shortening; e.g., *sī + quidem > siquidem*) is probably not to be used as a witness; see B. Löfstedt, *Gnomon*, XXXVIII (1966), p. 66.

¹⁸ To give but one example, his citation in "Quantität," p. 168 of Cicero, *Orator*, 184 would seem to prove the opposite about internal ictus to what he believes. For a thorough discussion (and denial) of internal ictus in ancient verse see L. E. Rossi, "Sul problema dell' ictus," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Lettere, storia e filosofia*, Ser. 2, XXXIII (1964), pp. 119-34.

¹⁹ Especially by W. Theiler, *D. L. Z.*, LVI (1935), pp. 799-805, 850-6; M. Nicolau, *R. E. L.*, XIII (1935), pp. 173-8; J. Safarewicz, *Rev. Phil.*, Ser. 3, VIII (1934), pp. 299-312; W. Beare, *C. R.*, XLVIII (1934), pp. 72-4. Drexler seems to have taken to heart only the German review of Theiler, but he is mistaken if he believes that because the first part of this review, where Theiler reaches an inadequate conclusion from the comparison of the Greek trimeter with the Latin senarius (see E. Kalinka, *J. A. W.*, Supplbd. CCL [1935], pp. 371 f.), has been refuted, the rest of the review, in particular pp. 803 ff., has not damaged his thesis.

²⁰ Typical of his belief are the following statements in *Gnomon*, XXIII (1951): "Hier bleibt nur übrig, dass man die vorstehenden Feststellungen an Hand des Materials strikt widerlegt, oder dass man sie annimmt" (p. 171); and, "Es ist mir trotz allen Widerspruchs, den ich erfahren habe, noch nicht gelungen, einen Zweifel an der Beweiskraft dieses Materials und an der Eindeutigkeit seiner ratio in mir wachzurufen" (p. 171, n. 1).

²¹ Drexler uses Bentley's sign for ictus, the acute accent mark, to

"Dass das anfangsbetonte iambische oder pyrrischer Verbum nach vorwärts weist, nicht wie das unbetonte ansteigend, im Schatten des folgenden Akzents, sondern umgekehrt seinen Schatten vorauswerfend und die nächste Silbe mit ihm deckend, ist Plaut. Akzentstud. I 151 ff. dargelegt . . ." (pp. 34 f.). Nor do the examples, well organized as they are, help to *explain* the shadow-play. The section on *ádde gradúm* types (pp. 46 ff.), types that clearly do not fit the law of cretic accentuation, is unsatisfactory in its treatment of the problem, but Drexler is very conscious of this difficulty. I regard his suggestion that we can go from *dic áuc fac* to an assumption of *add(e)* as highly unlikely. He himself admits that there are "phonetische Bedenken."

The second chapter deals with resolved guide-elements which are divided between two words. At the beginning he discusses a passage from Quintilian (*Inst. orat.*, IX, 4, 67 f.) which he had already discussed in "N. P. A.," p. 284 and in *Gnomon*, XXXII (1960), p. 240. He still does not seem to know that this passage on rhythm in prose was discussed at length before him by M. P. Cunningham, "Some Phonetic Aspects of Word Order Patterns in Latin," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CI (1957), pp. 496-8.²² I might point out here that scholarship outside of Germany seems hardly known to Drexler. There are many citations of German works or Latin dissertations by Germans, but references to English and French scholarship are very few and limited to the work of W. M. Lindsay and L. Nougaret. Such parochialism in modern scholarship is deplorable. The chapter does not contain anything that had not already been formulated in "N. P. A." The format of presentation seems to repeat the order of Drexler's files, rather than taking into account the reader who cannot, without clearly marked headings, keep the varied examples and their purpose in mind. Drexler had previously suggested that we can choose between alternate scansiones according to his accentual principles and also that such "laws" as that of Jacobsohn need to be reformulated. The truly important implication of pause and lengthening at the *loci Jacobsohni* is not that one can choose a more satisfying scansion, but that Drexler shows, without recognizing it fully, that performance must have had a far greater effect in Latin dramatic verse structure than has been thought. How to account for this, considering the paucity of our evidence of performance, is beyond the scope of this review, but Drexler's verbal metrics gives us a good starting point.

Chapter III deals with various types of final ictus at the beginning of the senarius and concludes with a short excursus on Saturnian colometry whose purpose seems to be to show how certain of Drexler's principles can be applied to this verse form and how the Saturnian can be compared with Plautine verse. Chapter IV on verse colometry discusses in some detail views already expressed at some length by the author in "Caesur und Diaeresis," *Aevum*, XXIV (1950), pp. 332-66. One could say of this chapter what

indicate position of the guide-elements. He assumes also, of course, that this word group was so accented by Plautus.

²² This paper is as a whole of great importance in any study of Latin metrics.

Drexler says of the kind of work he is doing, that "investigation breaks up more and more into isolated observations . . ." (p. 160). There is much still to be done in the study of Plautine metrics, as he explains in the "Ausblick" (pp. 160-7) which ends the work.

As a whole the book has a kind of Lucretian charm: the utter seriousness of the approach, the tone sometimes hortatory, sometimes oracular, the asides to the reader and the offers of additional material²³ remind us of the Lucretius of the last books who offers explanations of various natural phenomena. Drexler is also convinced that there is a *ratio* and he seeks it everywhere. It is necessary nevertheless to conclude that this book ought not to have been written. It is essentially a repetition of all that Drexler has said before, and the waste of energy here is sad. In 1935 Drexler announced that he had contracted to prepare a Latin metrics for the *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*.²⁴ Some thirty years later he announces a small *ars metrica Romana* for which he has supplied a kind of preface on some fundamental metrical concepts.²⁵ Considering the length of time that Drexler has been propounding his ideas, it is perhaps forgivable if we are pessimistic about this latest announcement of a synthesis of his data.^{25a}

The scholar who does have the patience and willingness to work through this inchoate and disorganized book will come to realize the importance and value of a *verbal* metrics, one which takes into account not only the rhythmical movement of the verse, but its syntax and structure, and he will also learn how inextricably the two are related. Drexler also notes that some basic "laws" of Latin metrics need to be reformulated, e.g., Jacobsohn's law and the Bentley-Luchs law. Such reformulations might tell us a great deal about the nature of Latin verse.²⁶ A comparative study, involving both Greek and Latin verse, would be most useful, particularly in reference to the Bentley-Luchs law. Karl Rupprecht has pointed out²⁷ that there are striking similarities between Latin spoken verse and the verse of Hipponax and the Greek iambographers in which the dipody law does not hold, and also that there is a real correspondence between the trimeter of the iambographers and Callimachus on the one hand and the Latin senarius and septenarius on the other. Rupprecht says that he cannot explain these similarities. Any attempt at explanation certainly must take Drexler's collection of material into account whether it assumes the validity of

²³ Offprints of "N. P. A." can be made available to interested readers ("*Lizenzen*," p. 71, n. 10).

²⁴ "Einflussige Wörter am Vers-Schluss . . .," *Glotta*, XXIII (1935), p. 225.

²⁵ "Concetti fondamentali di metrica," *R. F. I. C.*, XCIII (1965), pp. 5-23.

^{25a} Drexler has now published a summary of his principles as *Einführung in die römische Metrik* (Darmstadt, 1967, only available 1968).

²⁶ See, for example, the increase of our knowledge of the structure of Greek verse which we owe to L. P. E. Parker's reformulation of Porson's law in "Porson's Law Extended," *C. Q.*, N. S. XVI (1966), pp. 1-26.

²⁷ *Gnomon*, XXIX (1957), p. 120.

his theories or not. He himself has said, "I have no doubt of the scepticism with which my work will be greeted; nevertheless, I hope that even those whom I cannot convince will at least learn this much: to come to a better understanding of the structure of Platine verse" ("N. P. A.," p. 288).

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WILLIAM O'NEILL. Proclus: Alcibiades I. A Translation and Commentary. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965. Pp. viii + 247.

Classical philosophy has known many prolific writers, but few of them have been more favored by manuscript tradition than Proclus. Written towards the close of classical antiquity, his work was for the greater part still available in copies not far remote from the originals when the systematic hunt for classics in the Photian era began, and for mere quantity of extant work I believe that nobody but Philoponus can rival him. A collected edition of his writings (which is not likely to appear soon) would be about three times the complete Plato, and more than half of it would be taken up by five commentaries on Plato (*Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, *Alcibiades*, *Republic*, *Timaus*).

This generosity of fortune has not proved an unmixed benefit, for the very bulk of Proclus' oeuvre has tended to discourage editors, translators, and readers. To the best of my knowledge, the commentary on the *Timaus* was thus far the only one ever translated into English (by the competent, though eccentric Thomas Taylor, 1820), and with Chaignet's French translation of the *In Parmenidem* (1900) this was all we had in modern languages, as far as the commentaries on Plato are concerned.

Dr. O'Neill has now contributed his translation of the commentary on the *Alcibiades*, originally a Liverpool Ph. D. thesis. Because of its protreptical character and its subject, knowledge of oneself, the *Alcibiades* was used occasionally as an introduction to Platonic philosophy in the Middle Platonic period, and this became the standard practice from Iamblichus onward.

Proclus' commentary represents the thought of many generations of Platonists on the dialogue, and much in it is still worth considering, especially the emphasis on the inner unity of the whole and on the bearing that each step in the argument has upon the central theme. Essentially, however, it is a Neoplatonic piece of writing, and its main value to us lies in information about Proclus' doctrines and his technique of interpretation. His principle of exegesis is that "everything is in everything," so that what happens on the human plane (a conversation between Socrates and a promising but capricious boy) beyond its obvious logical and moral meaning reflects a cosmic and a metaphysical reality as well.

In spite of the introductory character, a certain degree of familiarity on the reader's part with the whole intricate system is taken for granted. O'Neill, who feels the commentary can still serve as an introduction to later Neoplatonism, has met this difficulty by

extensive footnotes, mostly consisting of extracts (in English) from the *Elements of Theology* and the other commentaries. He has deliberately left aside the long and complicated *Platonic Theology*, though in some cases it could have provided useful material for illustration; e.g. at 31, 15-16, where the words 'authoritative' and 'unconditional' give no clue to the rank and function of the ἡγεμονικοί and ἀπόλυτοι θεοί (*Theol.*, VI, 1-15; 16-24), and at 52, 5-10, where the strings of adverbs correspond exactly to the successive orders of the divine hierarchy.

The style and reasoning of Proclus do not lack clearness, but the task of translating him is complicated by his preference for long sentences crammed with *epitheta ornantia* and technical terms. In dealing with these, one often has no other choice than either to use words of the kind Taylor permitted himself, such as 'boniform,' 'doxastic,' 'unical,' or to overload the sentence still further by resorting to circumlocution. It is therefore no mean achievement to present, as O'Neill has done, a translation which is at the same time faithful and very seldom requires rereading, so that it can be a valuable help in getting acquainted with Proclus and especially with his approach to Plato, of which this commentary naturally gives a much clearer picture than the *Elements*.

There are a few passages for which I would suggest a different translation: 17, 10 διὰ πάντων ἡλάττωται τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν, 'he has been worsted by all his rivals': 'he has been worsted by his rivals all along the line.'—21, 10-11 τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις γνωστοῖς καὶ τὰς γνώσεις συστοίχους προβάλλειν, puts forward knowledge consonant with existing common knowledge': 'puts forward knowledge on a level corresponding to that of its objects.'—23, 13 τὸ ἥθος ὑφοράται τοῦ νεανίσκου φιλότιμον ὄν, 'the ambitious nature of the young man is also hinted at': 'Socrates proceeds with caution in view of the young man's ambitious nature.'—37, 1-2 τίς ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ποῦ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην αὐτὸν ὑποθετέον, 'what man truly is and where Alcibiades is to place him': '... where A. himself is to be ranked.'—38, 8-9 καὶ μόνον αὐτὸν καὶ πρῶτον ἀποκαλῶν, 'summoning him "alone" and "first"': 'describing him as ...'.—38, 12 εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, 'if it is lawful to speak of it': 'if it is lawful to say so' (viz. that the action of the One extends even below that of its inferiors).—66, 15 ἀεὶ 'blew': 'always' (cf. L.-S.-J., ἀεί 3).—94, 7-8 καὶ τούτων ἡ φύσις . . . τῷ φαινομένῳ σύμβολα ἅττα περιῆψεν, 'to their appearance nature had attached certain tokens': 'to his outward appearance nature had attached certain tokens of these qualities' (τούτων refers back, not quite grammatically, to ὑπεροχῆς with its three adjectives).—95, 1 τελεώτερον ἔκρινε, 'he judged him to be even more perfect': 'judged him even more perfectly.'—97, 20-98, 1 τῶν ὑπαρξάντων κατεφρόνουν, 'they despised what he already possessed': 'they were careless of their own possessions.'—101, 21 ἐσχημάτισε τὸν λόγον, 'stylised his account': 'used an indirect approach' (Hermogenes, *Inn.*, 4, 13).—107, 23-24 πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, 'in relation with all other things': 'in addition to all the rest.'—126, 3 ἐπήνεγεν, 'complained': 'went on to say.'—163, 1-2 τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας αἰρέσεις, 'what is contrary to our preferences': 'what depends on our free-will' (L.-S.-J., παρὰ C III 7).—

181, 2-3 ἐκθέμενοι τὴν λέξιν, 'after expounding the diction': '. . . citing . . .'.—201, 15-16 τὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἔργου κυρουμένων δεικνύναι ταῦτόν, 'for instance the same proof through confirmation by word and confirmation by deed': 'the same proof applied both to verbal and to manual skills'.—209, 3-4 ἀπογυμνοῦν πὺς αὐτὸν ἄρχεται, 'begins as it were to strip him bare': 'begins to disclose it' (the refutation).—214, 19 ἵνα μὴ βλαβῇ, 'that he may not do harm': '. . . suffer harm'.—291, 14 ἡμαρτηκότα . . . λεληθότως ἀπέφηνε, 'has revealed him as . . . gone astray un-awares': 'has revealed him unobtrusively . . . as gone astray' (similarly frag. 1, 1).

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LLOYD W. DALY. Contributions to a History of Alphabetization in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Brussels, 1967. Pp. 99. F. 150. (*Collection Latomus*, XC.)

Lloyd W. Daly, well known to a wider public than that of Classical scholars through his charming book on Aesop, comes naturally to the study of alphabetization because Greek prose versions of the Aesopic fables were arranged in alphabetic sequence according to the first letter of the opening word of each fable. Having undertaken the investigation, Daly has contributed an interesting and lucid study. Wherever the reviewer has checked the sources, he has found accuracy and good sense in Daly's citation and treatment, and he admires the precision and range of his learning. The book, which must be added to every research library, brings honor to the widely disseminated collection in which it appears.

The author's suggestion that the organization, classification, and cataloguing of the library of Alexandria provided the need and occasion for the effective conception and application of the principle of alphabetization seems reasonable to the reviewer, who in view of the modest title finds it important to indicate the contents with the following notice, which unfortunately does not reveal the richness of the study.

Alphabetic arrangement cannot yet be traced back beyond the Hellenistic Period, and the principle seems to have been first put to use by the scholars of Alexandria in the time of the first two Ptolemies. By the end of the third century, however, epigraphical evidence on Cos suggests a dissemination into other areas of Ptolemaic influence. In extant literature Galen must be our prime example with his *Hippocratic Glosses*, although it is reported that Bolos of Mendes used the alphabetic arrangement around 200 B. C. in discussing the sympathetic and antipathetic qualities of stones, while some of the Greek sources of Pliny's *Natural History* and of Athenaeus on drinking vessels obviously arranged their material alphabetically. The *Palatine Anthology*, VII (not VI), 364-405 presents forty-one epigrams in alphabetical order from the Garland

of Philip of Thessalonica, and Diogenianus of Heraclea Pontica allegedly gave an alphabetic arrangement to his Anthology in the second century after Christ. Tax documents and other papyri from Egypt are drawn to the reader's attention with the comment that the number of alphabetized lists is small in comparison with the number of unalphabetized lists. In treating four inscriptions from the *C.I.L.* the author points out that the device of alphabetization did not gain any kind of official recognition or acceptance for public documents in the West. In Latin literature there are traces of it, familiarity with it, from Plautus on.

In the Roman Period compilers of apophthegmata and lexica seem to have frequently used an alphabetic system, but "progress toward the regular use of alphabetic order does not, in fact, follow anything like a straight line," and in the ninth century Photius arranged his lexicon according to only the first two letters. The author carries the reader through the Suda and other works down to the Medici ledgers at Florence and the Barbarigo ledgers at Venice.

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BARBARA EHLERS. Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros. Der Dialog *Aspasia* des sokratikers Aischines. München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1966. Pp. 150. DM. 22. (*Zetemata, Monographien zur Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 41.)

Aware of the necessarily hypothetical character of her attempt (pp. 9, 55, 58 f., 60, 81, 138), Dr. Ehlers has persuasively reconstructed Aeschines' *Aspasia* from its few remaining fragments. She has also interpreted its relation to his *Alcibiades* and to the accounts of *Aspasia* preceding and following it.

In the *Alcibiades*, Socrates persuades Alcibiades that he lacks even the deficient ἀρετή of Themistocles (pp. 10-25). Humbled by this realization, Alcibiades tearfully implores Socrates for guidance. At the dialogue's close, Socrates contrasts his maieutic, erotic wisdom, which alone can save Alcibiades, with the technical expertise of the sophists. While the *Alcibiades* concentrates on Socrates' ability to humble vanity, the *Aspasia* is concerned primarily with the positive side of Socrates' erotic pedagogy (p. 93).

Ehlers' reconstructed *Aspasia* begins with the wealthy, corrupt Callias asking Socrates to suggest a teacher capable of inculcating ἀρετή into his son (pp. 35-7). When Socrates recommends the notorious *Aspasia*, even Callias is shocked and demands an explanation (p. 42). In reply, Socrates first cites other famous women who employed their sexual attraction to lead their lovers to ἀρετή (pp. 44-63). In the longest section of the dialogue, Socrates proves to Callias' satisfaction that *Aspasia* was of this sort (pp. 63-5). Although her pedagogical success with Pericles might be ascribed to his natural gifts, her transformation of the politically inept Lysicles into an astute statesman testified to her excellence as a teacher of


ἀπερὴ (pp. 73-85). Aeschines also revealed her didactic skill in a conversation preserved in Cicero's *De Inventione* (I, 31, 51-2). There she takes advantage of a couple's mutual love to persuade each to please the other by acquiring the noblest ἀπερὴ (pp. 85-95). Finally convinced that Aspasia regarded her sexual charm not as an end in itself, but as a means to ἀπερὴ, Callias is persuaded to entrust his son's education to her (cf. Plato, *Sym.*, 178C2-180B5, 184B5-185C1).

Ehlers notes that both Plato's *Symposium* and Aeschines' *Aspasia* ascribe the highest wisdom not to Socrates, but to his female instructors. Through Diotima's erotic mysteries, Socrates became the Platonic Socrates known to history (p. 134). Employing a less metaphysical curriculum, Aeschines' *Aspasia* awakened Socrates' eros for the noblest ἀπερὴ (pp. 135-6). Both women, according to Ehlers, employed their femininity or eroticism as a didactic tool to inculcate a yearning for ἀπερὴ in their disciples. Both, therefore, encourage a masculine eros in others, utilizing their feminine wiles as a "siren-song," to entice their lovers onto the paths of manly ἀπερὴ (cf. Plato, *Symp.*, 216 A6-8; Cicero, *De Fin.*, V, 48-9). Thus Ehlers rejects Dittmar's contention that Aeschines intended to defend the equality of the sexes in his *Aspasia* (pp. 5-6). In the *Aspasia*, as in Plato's *Republic*, equality required the acquisition of manliness by women; for, as women, they are inferior (pp. 45-51). Not the philosophers, Plato and Aeschines, but the comedian, Aristophanes, in his *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae*, advocated an equality which presupposed the acquisition of feminine ἀπερὴ by men (pp. 27, 57). Ehlers rightly implies that such subordination of austere, manly ἀπερὴ to the soft ἀπερὴ of femininity was characteristic of un-Socratic sophists and rhetoricians or of the Spartans among whom philosophy was not permitted to arise (cf. Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1269B13-1270B6; Plato, *Rep.*, 549C2-550B7, 492D9-493D9; *Gorg.*, 511C4-513C8; Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*). In their eyes, ἀπερὴ is defined as that which is conducive to worldly security and to the wealth and power required to maintain it. Virtue is not loved for itself as it is by Socrates (cf. Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1271B7-10).

Ehlers rightly assumes that the *Aspasia* was intended to prove that eros is an indispensable tool for the acquisition of ἀπερὴ (pp. 138-9). However, this conclusion is too general, since it leaves open the question whether the ἀπερὴ embraced by Aeschines (or Plato) was Socratic or sophistic. Subscribing to the traditional view, Ehlers rejects as hardly conceivable ("kaum denkbar") Gaiser's suggestion that Aeschines' *Alcibiades* is predominantly a sophistic work (p. 17, n. 19). But is it inconceivable? Have not scholars such as Popper, Crossman, and Kelsen established at least the possibility of an un-Socratic, sophistic Plato? In any case, Ehlers' dogmatic assertion of the traditional view in this matter is at odds with the commendable objectivity with which she insists on the merely hypothetical nature of her reconstruction of Aeschines' dialogues.

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Classical and Modern

VIRGIL'S AENEID

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THE TROCHAIC TETRAMETER IN GREEK TRAGEDY.

The first scholar to study trochaic tetrameters in Greek tragedy was Aristotle, who approached the subject from a historical standpoint (*Poetics*, 1449a 21): tragedy ὅπε ἀπασεμνύθη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὗρε· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν. Bywater remarks in his commentary *ad loc.* that "The time meant is presumably the age of Phrynichus." For the same reason trochaic tetrameter is excluded from the stasimon (*Poetics*, 1452b 24), because it is especially fit for the dance; and a similar statement is made at *Rhetoric*, 1404a 30: οἱ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιῶντες . . . ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμαιοτάτον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων. Aristotle thus noticed the earliest stages in the development of this metre; but what can be said about its use in the classical tragedies which have been preserved to our own time? Technical aspects of the structure of the tetrameter such as frequency and position of resolutions, metrical licenses in the case of proper names, replacement of trochees by spondees, proportion of lines with ἀντιλαβή and its position in the verse have been studied in the works of J. Rumpel (*Philologus*, XXVIII [1869], pp. 425-37), W. Christ (*Metrik der Griechen und Römer* [1874], pp. 318-25), Rossbach-Westphal (*Griechische Metrik*³ [1889], pp. 183-90), and J. Kanz (*De Tetrametro Trochaico* [diss. Giessen, 1913]). But the literary aspects of the employment of this metre have perhaps received less attention than they deserve: why is a given passage

in trochaics rather than iambics? Is any pattern visible in each poet's use of this metre? Did it lend itself especially to certain types of scenes, or was it employed more or less at random? And

<i>Play</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Passages in Trochaic Tetrameter</i>	<i>Total of Line.</i>
<i>Persae</i>	472	155-75, 215-48, 697-9, 703-58	114
<i>Agamemnon</i>	458	1344, 1346-7, 1649-73	28
<i>O. T.</i>	425? ¹	1515-23 (1524-80)	9 (16)
<i>Philoctetes</i>	409	1402-8	7
<i>O. C.</i>	401	887-90	4
<i>Rhesus</i>	455-40 ²	679, 683-91, 730-1	12
<i>Heracles</i>	421-16 ³	855-73	19
<i>Troades</i>	415	444-61	18
<i>Helen</i>	412	1621-41	21
<i>I. T.</i>	ca. 412 ⁴	1203-33	31
<i>Phoenissae</i>	411-09	588-637, 1308-9, 1335-9, 1758-63	63 ⁵
<i>Ion</i>	ca. 410 ⁶	510-65, 1250-60, 1606-22	84
<i>Orestes</i>	408	729-806, 1506-36, 1549-53	114
<i>I. A.</i>	407	317-75, 378-401, 855-916, 1338-1401	209
<i>Bacchae</i>	407	604-41	38

¹ See Bernard M. W. Knox, *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 133-47. G. Perrotta, however (*Sofocle*, pp. 257-68), argues for a date near 411. His main reason is the gradually increasing use of trochaic tetrameters in the later plays of Euripides, which is accompanied by increasing liberty in the employment of ἀντιλαβή in which the change in speakers does not coincide with the diairesis; if *O. T.* is compared with these plays, we would expect it to fit into the chronological scheme near *Helen* (produced in 412). But the essential point is precisely that *O. T.* was *not* written by Euripides, so that we cannot fit its metrical statistics into the pattern of Euripides' development and expect the results to date Sophocles' work. This approach, though superficially attractive (cf. Whitman, *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism*, p. 258, n. 58), is vitiated by its assumption of mechanical correspondence between the creative processes of two highly independent poets.

² As dated by W. Ritchie, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides*, Chapter VIII.

³ See Wilamowitz' edition of *Heracles* (2nd ed., reprinted 1959), II, p. 134; the statistics of resolved feet in the trimeters of this play (E. B. Ceadel, *O. Q.*, XXXV [1941], p. 78) point to 416.

⁴ "Für die Iphigeneia in Taurerland ist bei aller inhaltlichen Nähe zur Helena ein sicheres Kriterium für das zeitliche Verhältnis zu ihr

is it possible to trace any development in the use of this metre from the earliest preserved works of Aeschylus to the last plays of Sophocles? Such are the questions that will be examined here. As basis for our discussion we list all passages in trochaic tetrameter from the plays of the three tragedians; the texts used are those of Gilbert Murray (Aeschylus and Euripides) and A. C. Pearson (Sophocles).

The following fragments are all that remain from the tetrameter verse of the lost tragedies. The numbers are those of Nauck's edition; neither Page's *Greek Literary Papyri* (1942) nor Snell's *Supplementum* to Nauck (1964) contains any trochaic lines (nor does *Cyclops* or *Ichneutae*).

- Aeschylus: 60 (*Edonians*)
 296 (from an unknown play)
 Sophocles: 423 (*Odysseus Acanthoplex*)
 738 (from an unknown play)
 Euripides: 536 (*Meleager*: ca. 421-16)
 545 (*Oedipus*: ca. 421-16)
 147 (*Andromeda*: 414)
 245 (*Archelaos*: after 408)
 909 (from an unknown play, perhaps *Oedipus*)
 66 (*Alcmeon in Psophis*): the authenticity of this fragment is denied by W. Krieg (*Philologus*, XCI [1936], p. 42, n. 2).
 811 (*Phoenix*): this is scanned by Wilamowitz (in his edition of *Heracles*, II, p. 145, n. 55) as an iambic trimeter.
 283 (*Autolycus*): this line from a satyr-play "beweist nichts, da wir den Stil und die Zeit der

nicht zu gewinnen. Mag sie vorausgegangen oder gefolgt sein, in keinem Falle war sie vor der Helena durch einen grösseren Zeitabstand getrennt" (A. Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*, p. 184).

* The figures in this table have been checked and verified; such a statement might seem unnecessary, were it not that G. Perrotta (*op. cit.*, p. 264) gives the number of trochaic tetrameters in *Phoenissae* as 53, having neglected to count lines 1308-9 and 1335-9; likewise his total of tetrameters for *Ion* is 94, etc.

* There exists no secure date for *Ion*; Lesky (*op. cit.*, p. 186) concludes that the play belongs between *Helen* and *Orestes*; Wilamowitz in his edition of *Ion* (p. 24) placed it ca. 412. See also W. Kranz, *De Forma Stasimi*, p. 43, n. 1 for arguments in favor of 410 or 409.

Satyrspiele nicht kennen" (Wilamowitz, *loc. cit.*).

In *Persae* tetrameters appear first at line 155 when the Elders introduce the Queen in a four-line speech. The Queen replies with fourteen lines of tetrameters, to which the Chorus responds with three more lines in the same metre urging her to speak out her fears. Then Atossa launches into her long account of the dream, which she delivers in iambic trimeter, but the Chorus' reply advising her to propitiate the Gods and Spirits of the Dead is again in tetrameter. The Queen assures them in the same metre that she will do as they suggest and begins fourteen lines of stichomythia with her famous question about Athens; and then the trochaic scene comes to an end with the arrival of the Messenger, who recounts his news in trimeter.

A. O. Prickard in his edition of *Persae* (London, 1907) remarks on line 155 that "Here [tetrameters] well suit the tumultuous and somewhat extravagant language and gestures exhibited." This is not convincing, for the language of Aeschylus is "tumultuous and somewhat extravagant" in many passages where the metre is iambic; why then did Aeschylus use tetrameters here? This may be regarded as an example of the earlier style of tragedy mentioned by Aristotle, which employed the tetrameter indiscriminately where later tragedy used trimeters; but it is interesting to compare this first entrance of the Queen with her second entrance at line 598. Here she declares (in trimeter) that she has come *ἀνεν ῥ' ὀχημάτων/χλιδῆς τε τῆς πάροιθεν* (line 607): thus her first entrance must have been made in her royal chariot with horses and attendants in elaborate barbarian costume, producing an effect similar to that of the entrance of the King in *Agamemnon*. The impact of the spectacle would have been heightened by the excited trochaic metre, which explains why Aeschylus chose to use it here. We may note that he later dispensed with this device, for the similar scene in *Agamemnon* (lines 810 ff.) is entirely in iambic trimeter.

Later in *Persae* the Ghost, after its first speech in trimeter, questions the Chorus in tetrameter (lines 697 ff.); the conversation of Atossa and Darius—both speeches and stichomythia—is then continued in trochees until Darius begins his history of

the Persian monarchy in line 759. Thus trochees here emphasize the perturbation of Darius at the magnitude of the disaster, for his initial speech is in the normal iambic metre and he changes to tetrameters only after he has begun to surmise the extent of the catastrophe from the Chorus' fear of revealing it to him. The history of the kings, on the other hand, is put into trimeters because trochees since they express excitement are unsuitable for this long historical narrative; the same reason explains why Atossa's description of her dream is in trimeters while the speeches before and after it are trochaic.

Commentators who discuss the tetrameter often assume, implicitly or explicitly, with Sidgwick (in his edition of *Persae* [Oxford, 1928], on line 155) that the tetrameter was "supplanted by the iambic which was well established before Aeschylus." In fact there exists no evidence for the state of tragic metrics before Aeschylus, and Sidgwick's statement seems to contradict Aristotle's dictum that tragedy *ὁψὲ ἀπεσεμύθη*. As Gilbert Murray points out (*Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy*, p. 153), "We know from Aristotle that tragedy began 'in little myths and ridiculous diction'; that it was late in attaining *σεμνότης*, dignity or majesty; from Aristophanes, that it was Aeschylus first and chiefly who brought *σεμνότης* in." It is therefore reasonable to suppose that it was Aeschylus himself who gradually replaced tetrameter with trimeter as part of his elimination of "ridiculous diction" in favor of *σεμνότης* (cf. W. Kranz, *Stasimon*, pp. 9, 25).⁷

If this is correct, the large number of tetrameters in *Persae* lends additional support to the now generally accepted view that this play is definitely the earliest preserved work of Aeschylus

⁷ G. Else (*The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy*, p. 81) ascribes this innovation to Thespis because in his view iambic trimeter was already imposed by Thespis "who introduced speech into tragedy." Also this theory is inconsistent with Aristotle's emphasis upon *ὁψέ*. In fact we know nothing about Thespis' metrics unless the Thespis of *Wasps*, 1479 is the tragedian, in which case it is difficult not to believe that his "dances" were not in that metre which Aristotle called *ὀρχηστικώτερον*. Thus whatever evidence we possess (including the high proportion of tetrameters in the earliest preserved tragedy) seems to be against Else's suggestions. Cf. J. Kanz, *op. cit.*, p. 23, where this passage of Aristotle is taken to indicate merely that Thespis used the tetrameter.

probably an independent existence apart from π.⁸ Thus it can hardly be doubted that Diels' restoration with its four purely Ionic forms in two lines—a concentration of Ionicisms unparalleled in all Attic tragedy—must be rejected. We may trace the process by which Diels' suggestions have all but attained the status of a *textus receptus*: in 1913 J. Kanz (*op. cit.*, p. 23) although citing with approval Diels' restorations nevertheless felt constrained to add, "sed singula metra in eis non tam certa sunt, ut uti eis audeam"; in 1933 W. Kranz (*Stasimon*, p. 4) mentioned the existence of lines in trochaic tetrameter among the preserved fragments of Phrynichus' *Phoenissae* only with a qualifying "wie es scheint"; but by 1962 T. B. L. Webster (in a passage added to the second edition of Pickard-Cambridge's *Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy*, p. 65) simply cites the lines as Phrynichus' *ipsissima verba* without crediting Diels or even mentioning that the lines rest upon conjecture. Bold restoration of fragmentary papyri is no longer fashionable, and it is anomalous that this unlikely guess should still enjoy unquestioned acceptance.

But there is other and better evidence for Phrynichus' use of the trochaic tetrameter. In the *Suda*, s.n. Phrynichos, we read that οὗτος δὲ πρῶτος ὁ Φρύνιχος γυναικεῖον πρόσωπον εἰσήγαγεν ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ, καὶ εἰρετῆς τοῦ τετραμέτρου ἐγένετο. Of course Phrynichus did not invent the trochaic tetrameter, but if the statement in the *Suda* means anything it must be (as Rossbach-Westphal suggested, *op. cit.*, p. 186) that Phrynichus' name was associated with this metre, evidently because he used it extensively. Blomfield in his edition of *Persae* (5th ed., 1840, p. xvii) remarked:

Ratio autem, cur tetrametri trochaici in Persis frequentiores interserantur, haud absurda reddi posset, imitatio tragoediae Phrynichae, si verum esset id quod tradit Suidas, Phrynichum tetrametri inventorem fuisse; quo quidem re ipsa nihil falsius esse potest, quum diu ante Phrynichum istiusmodi versibus usi sint Archilochus et

⁸ Professor Handley also suggested *per litt.* the restoration νυχος δ'ο τραγ] in line 5. This supplement assumes that eleven letters are lost before the preserved left-hand margin; the presumably secure supplement of line 9 assumes the loss of ten letters. Hence the length of line 5 presents no problem.

Solon, et, quod Aristoteles tradere videtur, omnes ante Aeschylum tragici.

Now it is evident that the reason Blomfield assigns for the high proportion of trochaic tetrameters in *Persae* may be correct even if the statement in the Suda is in its literal sense false; in this case we are justified in treating Aeschylus' imitation of Phrynichus, consisting of extensive use of the trochaic metre, as evidence for the early date of *Persae* compared to the other surviving Aeschylean plays. P. Groeneboom, however, argued against this view in his edition of *Persae* (German trans., Göttingen, 1960, pp. 44-5):

Dass der trochäische Tetrameter ein Hinweis ist auf das frühe Entstehungsdatum der Perser, ist eine etwas voreilige Schlussfolgerung, da z. B. auch in Euripides' *I. T.* dieses Versmass häufig erscheint; sehr wenig Wahrscheinlichkeit hat auch Blomfields Ansicht [!] für sich, dieser Vers sei deshalb in unserem Drama so häufig, weil hier Phrynichos nachgeahmt werde, der nach Suidas der Erfinder des trochäischen Tetrameters ist!"

Groeneboom has misread Blomfield's Latin, for as we have seen the latter unnecessarily rejected his own theory; nor can we accept Groeneboom's conclusions from his comparison of *Persae* and *I. T.*, for it is apparent from the table on p. 386 that the trochaic tetrameter in fact passed through three stages, in the first of which it survived as an important portion of the dialogue while in the second it was used only in special situations until in the third it progressively regained importance in the later works of Euripides.

Trochaic tetrameter was employed in only one other of the extant plays of Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*. When the Chorus hears the King's death-cry (line 1344) it speaks three trochaic lines, as K. O. Müller puts it (in his edition of *Eumenides*, p. 76) "im ersten Schreck." Also the last twenty-five lines of the play are in the same metre; on line 1649 Fraenkel remarks (in his edition of *Agamemnon*), "Even if neither Aristotle nor anyone else had told us anything about the difference in character between iambic trimeters and trochaic tetrameters, we should probably be immediately conscious here of the jerk with which the rhythm changes to greater excitement, just as in some

of Mozart's operas we are affected by the change of measure in the finale of an act." Fraenkel then cites the "very close" parallel of the last scene in *O. T.*, which we shall discuss below. We may regard the trochaic ending of a play as a variant of the more common anapaestic ending; both metres express movement, but after the change of which Aristotle speaks the former became restricted in its use "so dass eine Steigerung des Tones Voraussetzung bleibt" (Wilamowitz, *Griechische Verskunst*, p. 265). In contrast to his practice in *Persae*, therefore, Aeschylus is now using tetrameters sparingly to emphasize certain limited situations; for although we have seen the particular reasons for some of the trochaic passages in *Persae* (Darius' excitement, the Queen's pomp) nevertheless the long conversation in tetrameters between Atossa and the Elders remains different in kind from the use to which the same metre is put in *Agamemnon*. Such extensive use of the tetrameter will have no parallel in later tragedy until the last years of Euripides, who in this as in other respects was more influenced by the art of Aeschylus than was Sophocles.

The fragments of Aeschylus' lost plays include only two recognizably trochaic lines (see above), from which no further deductions can be made as to the poet's use of this metre.

The earliest preserved play of Sophocles to have trochaic tetrameters is *O. T.* (lines 1515-30); two of these verses appear in almost identical form at the end of Euripides' *Phoenissae* (lines 1758-9 = *O. T.*, 1524-5), so that the question arises whether the lines are genuinely by either playwright and, if so, to which play they belong. The first problem is the attribution of *O. T.*, 1524-30, which the MSS give to the Chorus although a scholion on line 1523 reads καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει τὸ δράμα. τὰ γὰρ ἐξῆς ἀνοίκεια, γνωμολογοῦντος τοῦ Οἰδίποδος. The scholiast therefore had a MS which attributed these lines to Oedipus, who speaks their counterpart in *Phoenissae*. Furthermore, the MSS vary between ᾗδῃ and ᾗδει at line 1525; Jebb establishes in his commentary *ad loc.* that the former cannot stand in classical Greek as a *third* person singular (as it does e.g. at *Iliad*, V, 64), and Wilamowitz (*Hermes*, XXXIV [1899], 66-8) gave the lines to Oedipus arguing that the MSS which preserve the verb in the first person point to the original attribution of the speech. Jebb, however, insisted (*loc. cit.*) that "Of extant Greek tragedies, the *Pro-*

metheus and the *Agamemnon* are the only ones which end with words spoken by one of the actors, and in each case this is justified by the scheme of the trilogy to which the play belonged"—and yet in his own edition of *Trachiniae* Jebb himself gave the final speech to Hyllus!

Other scholars from the scholiast to H. D. F. Kitto (*Poiesis* [1966], p. 219) have objected to both attributions, qualifying the lines in question as an ill-adapted interpolation—which in the view of Frans Ritter (*Philologus*, XVII [1860], pp. 424-8) was imitated from the end of *Phoenissae*; against this it has been argued that *O.T.*, 1524-30 are genuine and *Phoenissae*, 1758-63 interpolated (thus Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*, p. 95); or that the lines are spurious in both plays, as A. C. Pearson holds (in the *apparatus* to his text, on line 1524): "Vide ne, ut in Euripidis Phoen. 1758 sqq., omnia sint ab histrionibus profecta in Oedipi persona occasionem γνωμολογίας idoneam se nactos esse ratis: itaque minus dolendum quod v. 1526 et tres ultimos nemo adhuc concinnavit." In fact line 1526 is in need of extensive emendation if it is to make sense (Jebb adopted three conjectures in this single line and still had to discuss the odd use of ἐπιβλέπω in an Appendix), and in line 1529 the construction of ἐπισκοποῦντα is as Jebb admits "peculiar." Thus the strictures passed upon these lines by Knox (*Oedipus at Thebes*, p. 265, n. 1): "tasteless and hardly intelligible . . . miserable lines . . . meaningless . . . defy sense and syntax alike" seem to be justified.

The last indisputably genuine lines of *O.T.* are therefore the agitated dialogue in trochaic tetrameters which portrays the clash of two opposing and irreconcilable wills: exactly the formula of the end of *Agamemnon*. Clearly Sophocles was influenced in his use of the trochaic metre by the powerful pattern in the great play of his predecessor; for as P. Maas suggested in more general terms (*Greek Metre*, Eng. trans. by Lloyd-Jones, paragraph 75): "In the early period the alternation between the two different dialogue metres of tragedy served only the purpose of variation for its own sake. Later drama reserved the tetrameter for animated scenes, a practice which may have been initiated by one particular famous instance, such a scene as the last one of the *Agamemnon*." What Maas means by "the early period" is not clear: if he is referring to the lost

plays from before the time of Aeschylus, there exists no evidence for his statement; and if he is hinting at *Persae*, we hope that our discussion of that play has acquitted Aeschylus of the charge of using tetrameters merely as metrical "variation for its own sake."

Before discussing late tragedy we must try to discover the reasons for the appearance of trochaic tetrameter at the end of another Sophoclean play, *Philoctetes* (lines 1402-8). In this passage Neoptolemus and Philoctetes, after having made their final decision, leave the cave for the ship which is to take them back to Greece; the tetrameters continue as they lay plans to defend themselves against their former allies, until the epiphany of Heracles transforms the situation. This passage is closely parallel to the genuine conclusion of *O.T.*, for there Oedipus is about to leave the stage and abandon the way of life as tyrant of Thebes that he had led till then, just as Philoctetes here is about to leave the stage and abandon his way of life as friendless exile. The tetrameters in *Philoctetes* may be considered counterparts of those in *O.T.* and *Agamemnon*, since in all these plays the trochaic passages bring the end of the action in so far as the working-out of the plot according to normal cause and effect is concerned; the epiphany of the divinity in *Philoctetes* is outside the structure of the plot.⁹

The last passage in which Sophocles used tetrameters is *O.C.*, 887-90 where Theseus, interrupting his sacrifice to Poseidon, hurries on stage at the moment when Creon is carrying off Oedipus and his daughters. As he runs on, Theseus makes a point of saying that he has interrupted the religious ceremonial to come to the aid of his suppliant. Whitman (*Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism*, p. 209) points out the importance of this fact: "Far from dallying over mere religious formalities, Theseus leaves a sacrifice half-finished in order to go to battle for his guests—the sort of religious enlightenment which Sparta, for instance, would not risk in the crucial year of Marathon." Clearly Sophocles chose tetrameters to emphasize the special urgency in this particular situation, for although Euripidean characters who come on stage at a run usually speak in trochaic

⁹ For the technical influence of *Helen* upon the ending of *Philoctetes* see p. 399.

verse (*v. infra*) this is the only such example in the preserved works of Sophocles, whose other characters, though they enter in haste and excitement (e. g. the Messenger at *Ajax*, 719, who has very important news indeed), nevertheless confine themselves to the ordinary trimeters. This technical innovation in Sophocles' last play may therefore be due to the influence of Euripidean dramaturgy.¹⁰

The only lost play of Sophocles known to have contained verses in trochaic tetrameter is 'Οδυσσεὺς Ἀκανθοπλήξ (see above); this seems to have been quite similar in plot to *Trachiniae* (cf. Wilamowitz, *Philologische Untersuchungen*, VII, pp. 194-7; a somewhat different reconstruction in Pearson's ed. of the *Fragments* of Sophocles, II, pp. 105-10) and may therefore have been close to it in date.

For a conspectus of all Euripidean passages in tetrameter see tables above. We may note that no play dated later than *Heracles* is without trochaic tetrameters (nor do any of the trochaic fragments derive from plays known to be earlier than *Heracles*); the single exception is *Electra*, which though without trochees is generally thought to have been produced in 413 (see J. D. Denrison's edition, pp. xxxiii ff.). If 413 is right (G. Zuntz, *The Political Plays of Euripides*, pp. 66-71, dates the play considerably earlier), the explanation for the lack of tetrameters is surely to be found in the archaizing style of *Electra* (W. Kranz, *Stasimon*, p. 233). A table similar to that on p. 386 was constructed by W. Krieg (*Philologus*, XCI [1936], pp. 42-51) in order to prove that the length of the trochaic passages in each play increases progressively according to the chronological order of the dates of production, but it is clear that any date assigned to a play by the sole criterion of its number of trochaic tetrameters can claim to be no more than approximate. Indeed (as Krieg admits, *op. cit.*, p. 43) it would be a "fast befremdende Stetigkeit" if the number of trochaic tetrameters in the works of Euripides rose mechanically in proportion to the advancing age of the poet! In fact E. B. Ceadel (*C. Q.*, XXXV [1941], pp. 66 ff.), on the basis of increasing frequency of reso-

¹⁰ For similar use of the trochaic tetrameter in comedy, where the Chorus (rather than single actors, as in tragedy) often employs this metre as it makes a hasty entrance, see White, *The Verse of Greek Comedy*, p. 99.

lutions in iambic trimeter, arranges the middle plays in this order: *I. T.*, *Ion*, *Helen*, *Phoenissae*; his statistics place *Electra* earlier than *Heracles* (another indication of the archaizing style of *Electra*), though in his discussion (pp. 76-8) he saves the date of 413 by the unlikely hypothesis that an interval of six years elapsed between Euripides' completion of the play and its actual production. What our table shows, therefore, is simply the existence of a general trend that may well be counteracted in particular instances.

According to Ritchie (*op. cit.*) *Rhesus* is the earliest of Euripides' extant plays; its tetrameters, which heighten the excitement of two short passages, have no parallel in the other early works of the poet, presumably because those plays most nearly contemporary with *Rhesus* have been lost. As Ritchie remarks (p. 294):

The trochaic tetrameters of *Rhesus* are not really to be compared with those in the later plays of Euripides. In the latter trochaic tetrameter is a metre of ordinary spoken dialogue, which is introduced in increasing measure as an alternative to the iambic trimeter, often, it would seem, for the sake of variety in a long scene, sometimes also to underline a change of emotional tone. With internal division between speakers it is effective for rapid exchanges of dialogue, in which use it is often preferred to the less flexible iambic stichomythia. In *Rhesus*, on the other hand, the tetrameter verses are part of a lyric composition, in which both the Chorus and actors participate and which is accompanied by lively movement.

In fact the trochaic tetrameters of *Rhesus* differ from those of all other Euripidean and Sophoclean tragedies precisely because they are spoken by the *Chorus* in dialogue with the actors, in which respect they resemble the frequent trochaic passages of comic Choruses (e.g. *Acharnians*, 234 ff., *Birds*, 316 ff., etc.): cf. scholion on *Acharnians*, 204, and Wilamowitz, *Griechische Verskunst*, p. 265.

Seven of the twelve trochaic lines of *Rhesus* display ἀντιλαβή, which occurs among the tetrameters of all Euripidean plays that employ the trochaic meter except *Heracles*, *Troades*, and *Bacchae*. Krieg (*op. cit.*, pp. 47-50) has tabulated the places in the verse where a new speaker breaks in, with the object of proving a chronological development in Euripides' use of ἀντιλαβή from

the earlier to the later plays; but careful consideration of the evidence leads us to agree with Ritchie (*op. cit.*, p. 296) that "It would be exceedingly rash to look here for evidence of a development in the technique of Euripides." The main profit derived from such attempts has been the realization that compilation of statistics based upon variations in metrical technique cannot by themselves provide definitive criteria for the dating of the works of Euripides.

The first of Euripides' preserved mature works in which he used tetrameters is *Heracles*. Wilamowitz (in his edition of *Heracles*, reprinted 1959 [Bad Homburg vor der Höhe], II, p. 145) explains that the trochees are used because the scene is "von höchster Leidenschaft mit entsprechender Steigerung auch des sprachlichen Ausdrucks"; and indeed the apparition of Lyssa before the house of Heracles gains in dramatic effect from her sudden shift into tetrameter beginning with her reply to Iris' effort to urge her on. Wilamowitz (*loc. cit.*) rightly compares a "ganz entsprechend lebhaft" scene in *Troades*, Cassandra's lament, which she delivers in tetrameters immediately after having predicted in iambic meter the coming woes of Odysseus. This change to the more agitated meter is fittingly made at the moment when the prophetess turns from another's doom to her own. Though such employment of trochaic verse to emphasize the emotional impact of selected scenes was presumably successful with the Athenian audiences—since the use of tetrameters was continued and extended in Euripides' later career—there is interesting evidence of a reaction to this trend among those who felt that the dignity of tragedy was thereby being diminished (*Clouds*, 641; cf. Lion. Hal.; *De Comp. Verb.*, 17).

We may observe the expansion of the tetrameter's domain in *I. T.* where the single trochaic passage (lines 1203-33) takes on some of the overtones of New Comedy as Iphigenia leads off Orestes and Pylades while deluding Thoas completely as to her true intentions; not only the content but also the form of this passage, in which the trochaic meter is used simply as a vehicle for dialogue, recalls the frequent trochaic scenes in Menander. Bates (in his edition of *I. T.* [New York, 1904]) comments perversely on line 1203 that "The long trochaic lines accompanied by the flute make a solemn and fitting ending which is

very effective dramatically"; this misinterpretation of the nature of trochaic verse, which is not confined to Anglo-Saxons,¹¹ is avoided by E. B. England in his commentary (London, 1886) on the play (line 1203): "The change to the more lively trochaic tetrameters marks the quickening of Iphigeneia's energies. She feels her heart beat faster now that the time for action has arrived." Yet it cannot be denied that this scene is of incomparably less dramatic and emotional power than the passages from *Heracles* and *Troades* discussed above and therefore represents an unprecedented use of the tetrameter in a situation which, unlike any of the others we have discussed, has strong elements of the comic.

Helen, in other aspects quite similar to *I. T.*, differs from it in the employment made of trochaic tetrameters, with respect to which *Helen* attaches itself to an entirely different category, that of *Agamemnon*, *O. T.*, and *Philoctetes* with their trochaic endings: for in *Helen* the trochaic passage immediately precedes the epiphany of the Dioskouroi and (like the trochees in *Philoctetes*) brings the action of the plot to a logical but unacceptable conclusion as Theoclymenus is about to kill his sister and her servant as well. Since *Helen* was staged in 412 and *Philoctetes* in 409 Sophocles in all likelihood followed the technical lead of Euripides in regard to the function of the trochaic metre, without prejudice of course to the entirely different content of his own play.¹²

With *Phoenissae* we come to another stage in the development of the tetrameter, for in this work Euripides revived the Aeschylean technique of writing more than one dialogue passage of a single play in this metre. The last of these passages (lines 1758-63) is almost certainly spurious, as nearly all scholars who have dealt with it agree, among others F. G. Schoene (*Philo-*

¹¹ Cf. Wilamowitz' comment (in his edition of *Heracles*, II, p. 145, n. 55) on the error of his compatriots (among them may be cited J. Kanz, *op. cit.*, p. 23) who imagined that Greek trochaic tetrameter resembles the solemn German trochaic verse: "Solche Torheiten muss man sich entschlagen."

¹² The last twenty-seven lines of *Philoctetes* are anapaestic—the usual metre for entrance or exit; thus one reason why Sophocles followed Euripides' lead and wrote the abortive exit-scene in trochaics may well have been simply to avoid monotony.

logus, X [1855], p. 405), W. Gebauer (*Euripidis Phoenissarum Pars Extrema* [diss. Halle, 1888] pp. 16-17), O. Kampfhenkel (*De Euripidis Phoenissis Capita Duo* [diss. Berlin, 1888], pp. 39-43), Wilamowitz (*Sitz. Ber. Berl.* [1903], pp. 587-600), J. U. Powell (*The Phoenissae of Euripides* [1911], pp. 19, 22-3, 26-7), W. H. Friedrich (*Hermes* [1929], pp. 265-300), E. Fraenkel (*Sitz. Ber. Bayer. Akad.* [1963], p. 117). Also in tetrameters is Eteocles' uncompromising speech (lines 588 ff.) that follows upon Jocasta's appeal in trimeters for peace between the brothers; the scene continues with an increasingly intense dialogue, first in stichomythia and then in ἀντιλαβή, which ends with a final affirmation of each side's position in the quarrel. It is clear that tetrameters are employed only when emotions flare up after Jocasta's long speech; and the passage as a whole is one of the most important scenes in the play in that it establishes Euripides' revolutionary conception of the two brothers' personalities and sets the tone of frenzied destructiveness which is to pervade the remainder of the tragedy. Tetrameters regain in this scene the dignity which they lost in *I. T.*

The trochaic metre is used in two other short passages in *Phoenissae*, both marking a character's entrance on stage: in the first (lines 1308-9) the Chorus announces the arrival of Creon, about to relate the death of his son (here perhaps the tetrameters also serve as transition from choral lyric to dialogue in trimeter: cf. W. Kranz, *Stasimon*, p. 232);¹³ and in the second there enters the Messenger (lines 1335 ff.) with his description of the brothers' deadly combat. We have seen tetrameters similarly employed to heighten the effect of the Queen's entrance in *Persae* and shall see them so used again, notably in *Orestes*.

Ion also contains several trochaic passages, of which the first is the protagonist's dialogue with Xuthus in which the latter reveals himself as the boy's father; in spite of its comic overtones this scene is pivotal for the development of the plot and in this way similar to the climaxes we have seen emphasized by trochees before. The next trochaic scene is an excited entrance

¹³ But cf. *Orestes*, 1503 ff., where monodic lyrics are followed by three iambic lines that serve as a transition to dialogue in trochaic tetrameter.

like those in *Phoenissae* which we have just mentioned: Creusa fleeing her pursuers is advised by the Chorus to take refuge at the altar. A. S. Owen in his edition of *Ion* (Oxford, 1939) remarks on line 1250 that "The trochaic tetrameters in which the scene begins well suit the frenzied haste of Creusa and the excitement of the Chorus." Finally, after Athena's speech *ex machina* all the concluding dialogue and even the closing platitude of the Chorus are in tetrameter; on this Wilamowitz observes (in his edition of *Ion* [Berlin, 1926] on line 1606): "Hier ist der Abschluss so interesselos wie gewöhnlich, wenn nur ausgeführt wird, was der Maschinengott befohlen hat. Um das äusserlich zu heben, hat Sophokles im Philoktet, Euripides in Elektra und Bakchen Anapäste gewählt, die den Abzug des Chores auch in Iphigen. Taur. begleiten, im Orestes dem Maschinengott selbst in den Mund gelegt werden. Denselben Dienst tun die Trochäen." In fact the concluding scene of *Ion* exploits the trochaic ending, in earlier tragedy (see p. 395) used only when justified by genuine excitement, to enhance the interest of a mechanical dénouement.

Orestes like *Ion* has three passages in tetrameter. In the first of these Pylades enters at line 729 *θάσσον ἦ* (codd. *ἦ*) *με χρῆν προβαίνων* (cf. Theseus' words as he comes on stage at *O.C.*, 890, *θάσσον ἦ καθ' ἡδονὴν ποδός*) with the news that the citizens have decided the death of Orestes and his sister. The ensuing scene passes from a speech of several lines to stichomythia to *ἀντιλαβή* as momentum builds up: cf. *Ion*, 510 ff., *Phoenissae*, 588 ff., etc. for similar climaxes. The dialogue of Orestes and the Phrygian slave is also cast in trochaic metre; here it is Orestes who arrives (line 1505) *ἐπτοημένῳ ποδί* to begin a scene which is similar, in its tension not devoid of comic aspects, to the trochaic dialogue between Iphigeneia and Thoas in *I.T.* After a short lyric passage the Chorus makes the transition to iambic dialogue by five trochaic lines that announce the entrance of Menelaus (described as *δξύπονν* line 1550) rushing to save his daughter from Orestes. In Euripides' later works (*Phoenissae*, *Ion*, *Orestes*, *I. A.*) such a high proportion of the trochaic passages involve the sudden appearance on stage of actors with reason for haste that this feature may be regarded as characteristic of late Euripidean dramatic technique (for its influence on the late work of Sophocles, see pp. 395-6).

Bacchae is an exception to the trend in that it has only one trochaic passage, immediately after the miraculous collapse of Pentheus' palace when Dionysus appears to the Chorus and recounts his escape from prison. E. R. Dodds in his edition of *Bacchae* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1960, pp. 151-2) remarks:

The tone of the narrative is correspondingly light, almost humorous . . . The lightness of tone is matched by the use of the light and lively trochaic tetrameter . . . Euripides employs it most often as a vehicle for swift repartee, usually in the familiar style (conversations with servants, *Hel.* 1627 ff.; *Ion* 1250 ff., *Or.* 1506 ff., *I.A.* 855 ff.; comedy, *Ion* 510 ff., *IT.* 1203 ff.); formally, its use here resembles that in *Her.* 855 ff., where it is employed as here for a *ῥῆσις* descriptive of swift and violent action, introduced by a brief dialogue.

Tetrameters are used in the present passage to convey the excitement naturally aroused in the Chorus by the miracle which has just taken place, excitement which is increased by the un hoped-for deliverance of their protector; while it is doubtless possible to interpret the tone of this passage as "light" and "almost humorous," this lightness and humor characterize only the god's point of view, certainly not that of the Chorus and not necessarily that of the audience. Furthermore Dodds' interpretations of his *comparanda* are often misleading; for example, at *Helen*, 1627 ff. a cruel tyrant is about to kill his sister who is protected only by a devoted retainer willing to die in her defence: is this really an example of the "familiar style (conversations with servants)"? Nor in *Ion*, 1250 ff. does Creusa seem to employ Dodds' "familiar style" when she enters fleeing for her life. Does the Phrygian at *Orestes*, 1506 ff. really speak in trochees to the sadistic Orestes because their relationship is that of master and servant, or is the style of this passage in fact melodramatic rather than "familiar"? At *I. A.*, 855 ff. the Old Man is indeed comic in the beginning, but Clytemnestra's reaction after she hears his revelation and her appeal to Achilles are surely pathetic. The reason why *Bacchae* alone among Euripides' later plays diverges so strikingly from the trend toward ever-increasing use of tetrameters is that this tragedy represents a return to the methods and style of an earlier period of dramatic production (cf. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* [3d ed.,

1961], pp. 368 ff.) when the trochaic metre had not yet come back into use after its sharp reduction in importance in the later works of Aeschylus (cf. the case of Euripides' *Electra*, which is also archaizing).

Of all extant Greek tragedies *I. A.* makes the most extensive use of tetrameters; a scholion in L on the first trochaic line (317), spoken by Agamemnon when he comes out of his tent to see Menelaus struggling with the Old Man, explains τροχαικοὶ διὰ τὸ μετὰ δρόμον ἐξελθεῖν τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα.¹⁴ England comments *ad loc.* in his edition of *I. A.* (London, 1891), "The livelier metre not only suits a rapid appearance on the stage, but also the hasty tempers of the interlocutors in the following scene." Trochees carry the altercation between Menelaus and Agamemnon and the long speech of the former; after a platitude in trimeter from the Chorus, Agamemnon replies with a shorter speech followed by another comment of the Chorus which ends the tetrameters. This pattern of two opposing speeches, each followed by a short address by the Chorus, is common in other Euripidean tragedies (e. g. *Phoenissae*, 469 ff., *Troades*, 914 ff.); but this is the only passage where such an ἀγών with its pair of set speeches is spoken in tetrameters. Trochees express excitement and thus are appropriate to stichomythia and especially to ἀντιλαβή, but they are less well suited to long elaborately constructed displays of eristic logic. Thus this passage embodies a real innovation in the use of tetrameters, and *I. A.* is distinguished not only by its greater number of trochaic lines but by the unprecedented contexts in which they occur.

Tetrameters heighten the effect of the scene (lines 855 ff.) in which the Old Man explains to Clytemnestra and Achilles the plot behind Iphigeneia's betrothal (*v. supra*); here the pattern which we have analyzed above of two opposing speeches separated by a short comment from the Chorus is repeated, but the second long speech is not in trochees as the previous pair might suggest but in iambic trimeter. The reason for this shift to the quieter metre must lie in the unheroic and very unexcited tenor of Achilles' reply to Clytemnestra's appeal: the sudden drop in speed of the metre corresponds to the letdown in the content of the young man's speech.

¹⁴ A similar scholion is written in P against line 855.

In the final trochaic passage (lines 1388-1401) Achilles comes on stage announcing that he has barely escaped from his soldiers with his life; there ensues a discussion in ἀντιλαβή during which he resolves to fight alone against the army until Iphigeneia's great speech in tetrameters saves him and brings the trochaic part of the scene to an end. This pivotal speech has been much criticized, notably by Aristotle who declared (*Poetics*, 1454a) ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα . . . τοῦ δ' ἀνωμάλου ἢ ἐν Αἰλίδι Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρα. The basis for Aristotle's view is obvious, and in the context of the fourth-century "science of character" as expounded for example by Theophrastus such a transformation was naturally frowned upon. Yet the action of the plot had worked itself out to an impasse: Iphigeneia was doomed to die under any circumstances, and her two defenders were preparing to sacrifice themselves uselessly in her behalf; but a battle between Achilles and the Greek army was unthinkable and so the action had reached a stage of complete ἀπορία. Concurrently in the moral sphere none of the characters had shown the stuff of which tragic heroes are made, and indeed the words of the Argumentum to *Orestes* could have been written of this play: πάντες φαῦλοι ἦσαν.

But Iphigeneia is after all possessed of free will, in the Kantian sense that she is free to consent to what is necessary. By doing so, she transforms the myth of her sacrifice as it was treated, for instance, in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: for instead of an act of Agamemnon the sacrifice becomes an act of Iphigeneia herself. This decision of Iphigeneia, unmotivated by her previous characterization, saves the play in the spheres of both ethos and action, λόγος and ἔργον. What else then is Iphigeneia's speech but a sort of *deus ex machina*? Regarded in this light, *I. A.* closely resembles *Philoctetes*: for there too the complex interplay of the diverse motives of Odysseus, Neoptolemus, and Philoctetes with the inescapable imperative of the Greek army always in the background results in an impossible conclusion to the action, while in the moral sphere both the "heroic" characters firmly make up their minds to renounce war and honor in favor of inglorious desertion of their allies at a moment when deprived of their aid Greece faces sure defeat. Just as in *Philoctetes* the final and yet impossible decision of the heroes is on the verge of realization when Heracles appears *ex machina*,

so in *I. A.* Achilles is on the point of arming himself against his fellow-soldiers when Iphigeneia delivers her speech. The tetrameters bring the action of both plays to its climax and what follows is merely epilogue; we have already (p. 401) cited Wilamowitz' evaluation of the conventional conclusion of *Philoctetes*, and as for *I. A.*, "der Rest des Stücks dient ja, soweit erkennbar, allein der Heroisierung Iphigeniens und ihrer Tat" (H. Strohm, "Euripides: Interpretationen" in *Zetemata*, XV [1957], p. 142).¹⁵

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¹⁵ I am indebted to Professors Bernard M. W. Knox and C. H. Whitman who improved the present study with criticism and suggestions, and to Professor E. Handley for assistance in reading the papyrus.

THE LACUNA IN LUCRETIVS' II, 164.

The problems involved in the breach of the text of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* at line 164 of Book II, and in the controversial attack on the theory of divine origins of the world, which follows immediately at line 166, have been so often treated that some justification may well be expected for another attempt at a resolution. The best reason for reconsidering the lines seems to be the inveterate inclination of history, not least of all the history of scholarship, to repeat itself. In this case, although problems were recognized in the text much earlier, the specific history in which we are interested begins when Lachmann, and then Munro,¹ considering the contents of the lacuna and the theological arguments which follow both to be an interpolation from Book V, lines 195-200, athetized the entire section. In opposition to this, Giussani,² in his 1897-8 edition, suggested that the content of the lost passage could be supplied from the syllabus contained in lines 62-6, thus arguing against the suggested athetization of the passage. Giussani's suggestion that the lacuna contained a discussion of the formation of the cosmos through atomic combination—a subject mentioned in line 62-3—was adopted with little elaboration by both Diels³ and Bailey.⁴ Then in 1955 Jørgen Raasted⁵ introduced further support for the Giussani theory, only to be met four years later by the objections of Gerhard Müller.⁶ Müller's objections are two, and

¹ K. Lachmann, ed. *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (Berlin, 1850); H. A. J. Munro, ed. *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, 2 vols. (London, 1867).

² C. Giussani, ed. *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura*, 4 vols. (Turin, 1897-8).

³ H. Diels, ed. *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura* (Berlin, 1923).

⁴ C. Bailey, ed. and trans. *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1947). Citations of text, translation (by volume and page), or line references will be regularly to this edition.

⁵ J. Raasted, "The Lacuna after Lucretius' II, 164," *O et M*, XVI (1955), pp. 84-90.

⁶ G. Müller, *Die Darstellung der Kinetik bei Lukrez (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Institut für griechisch-römische Altertumskunde. Arbeitsgruppe für hellenistisch-römische Philosophie, Veröffentlichung 7 [1959])*.

in my opinion, well founded: (1) that the subject of cosmic formation had already been sufficiently handled in lines 62-141; and (2) that the re-introduction of the same subject here would be an interruption of an otherwise perfectly logical development of thought devoted to the exposition of kinetic theory. Much has been written concerning the discontinuity of Lucretius' train of thought.⁷ This, however, is hardly license for us to introduce between a passage on atomic speed and one on atomic direction a redundant and incongruous section on the formation of the world. In fact Lucretius is particularly consistent in his approach to his subject here. The entire first three hundred lines form an orderly, point by point exposition of atomic motion, its speed, origin, direction, consistency, and possibility. Müller may quite rightly object to the introduction of material which would wreak havoc with this consistency. His solution, however, is to return to Lachmann's position, attack the logic and latinity of the theological passage, and finally conclude for athetization of the whole, assuming the activity of that familiar pack horse, the late interpolator who, in this case, on Müller's own admission,⁸ has interpolated a section much longer than is customary. Thus, in the history of the question, we have come full circle, from Lachmann to neo-Lachmann, and the impasse which remains demands further study. The solution may, however, lie between these extremes. It is to be found, I think, in the application of the methods of Giussani and Raasted, who

⁷ Cf. C. Bailey, "The Mind of Lucretius," *A.J.P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 283 ff. and *De Rerum Natura*, I, pp. 165-8; K. Büchner, *Beobachtung über Vers und Gedankengang bei Lukrez* (*Hermes, Einzelschriften* 1 [Berlin, 1936]).

⁸ Müller, p. 23; cf. A. Danzell, "Some Recent Work on the Text of Lucretius," *Phoenix*, XIV (1960), pp. 96-105. Commenting on another suggested athetization by Müller, Danzell says (p. 104): "If lines 788-801 (IV) are an interpolation as Gerhard Müller, for example, claims, then we have to explain what the motives of the interpolator were, and these are far from clear to me." The same could be said concerning the present passage. Müller's only comment on motive for the interpolation, particularly as he assumes the interpolator to be extraordinarily late and the interpolation larger than customary, is far from satisfactory (p. 23): "Nach allem Dargelegten verdanken die v. 167-183 ihre Existenz offenbar der Wunsch eines Interpolators das antitheologische Motiv des Lukrez um jeden Preis hier in das Text zu bringen."

demand the preservation of the text and its interpretation as it stands, if we are careful to recognize and accept Müller's well-grounded demand that any introduction into the passage, intended to complete the lacuna, must form a logically consistent unit with the rest of the discussion of kinetics.

We must then begin by a reexamination of the text upon which Giussani, Raasted, and Müller all base their analyses, lines 62-6 of Book II, in which Lucretius offers a syllabus for the material he intends to cover. The lines in question read:

Nunc age, quo motu genitalia materiae
corpora res varias gignant genitasque resolvant
et qua vi facere id cogantur quaeque sit ollis
reddita mobilitas magnum per inane meandi,
expediam: ⁹ (Bailey, I, p. 238.)

All three scholars have erred in their basic approaches to these lines. Müller, probably because he is interested in establishing that the text as it stands shows no substantial deficiency, converts what is obviously a three part syllabus (i. e., *quo motu* . . . *qua vi* . . . and *quaeque mobilitas* . . .) into a two part program by combining the first two indirect questions: *Lukrez kehrt nach Erörterung der 'mobilitas' zur Frage 'quo motu' und 'qua vi' zurück.*¹⁰ Giussani and Raasted, on the other hand, both err in ignoring the fact that the subjects contained in the body of the text will be expressed not in the sentences of the syllabus at large, but in the phrases which pose the indirect questions. Thus they take their reconstruction from the phrase *genitalia materiae / corpora res varias gignant genitasque resolvant*, which in fact clearly refers not to the material immediately under discussion, which is indicated by the words *quo motu*, but to the general results of atomic activity in its full manifestation.

Thus, if we are to discover the content of the lacuna from the syllabus, we must recognize that the syllabus offers a tripartite

⁹ "Come now, I will unfold by what movement the creative bodies of matter beget diverse things, and break up those that are begotten, by what force they are constrained to do this, and what velocity is appointed them for moving through the mighty void."

¹⁰ Müller, p. 29, and cf. p. 19: "Vor allem scheinen die Gesichtspunkte 'quo motu' und 'qua vi' untrennbar voneinander."

treatment of the subject of kinetics under the following categories: direction (*quo motu* . . . with what kind of motion); motive force (*quâ vi* . . .); and speed (*quaeque mobilitas* . . .). How then does this syllabus match the subsequent text? Clearly the first subject discussed, immediately after the general comments which introduce the concept of the composition of solid matter by atoms diffused in void and consequently in motion (lines 67-141), is atomic speed (lines 142-64). As Raasted and Müller both note,¹¹ this subject must have been continued in the crucial lacuna, which follows it.

When the text picks up again, the subject has changed; after the theological passage (lines 167-83), Lucretius turns to explain the impossibility of unprovoked upward motion, atomic or otherwise (lines 184-216). Although this might loosely be characterized as a treatment of atomic direction, as Raasted assumes,¹² it is more acutely seen by Bailey to be part of the second subject which Lucretius has set himself to discuss, the force which provokes motion. As Bailey notes,¹³ this is a negative proof by contradiction, that the primal and natural motion of all matter, atoms included, is downward, under the impetus of gravity. At the conclusion of the passage, Lucretius turns to the significant and controversial theory of the *clinamen* or Swerve, the directional wilfulness which, by breaking the natural downward fall, makes possible the creation of the world (lines 216-93). This is precisely as the first phrase of the syllabus, which is properly applied to this passage, and not to the lacuna (lines 62-3: *quo motu genitalia materiae / corpora res varias gignant genitasque resolvant*), foretold. Finally Lucretius returns to the opening discussion, the diffusion of the atoms in apparently solid matter, and ends with a brief discussion on the possibility of atomic activity which is directly in opposition to the evidence of the senses.

We must notice the very artful construction of the entire passage. First the introduction of the general subject, diffuse atoms in motion. Then the discussion of the three main facets of atomic activity, *in exactly the reverse arrangement from that*

¹¹ Raasted, pp. 87-8; Müller, p. 19.

¹² Raasted, p. 85.

¹³ Bailey, *De Rerum Natura*, II, pp. 832-3.

announced in the syllabus. The syllabus presents us with three points, direction, force, and speed; the text counters with speed, (lacuna) force, direction. Finally Lucretius returns to the original subject of atomic diffusion which makes motion not only possible, but logically unavoidable, and ends with the brief but memorable appeal to the possibility of such an explanation.¹⁴ In this tight little ship what could possibly be absent? What is in the lacuna? The answer has long since been hinted at by Bailey,¹⁵ although he seems not to have made any connection between what he notes to be an obvious lack, and the lacuna some lines previous. The missing subject must be the gravitational fall of the atoms which is, at bottom, the force of all atomic motion. Not only is gravity the source of motion, it is a major innovation in the atomic system, probably by Epicurus himself, and a highly controversial issue in the philosophical basis of materialism (cf. Aristotle's criticism of Democritus¹⁶). Yet, as Bailey notes, Lucretius never attempts to prove, or even to discuss the theory. As the text stands, we are asked to take a proof of the impossibility of spontaneous upward motion as a substantiation of the primal downward gravitational fall. Surely this is unsatisfactory.

There are then two substantial points in favor of the thesis that the lacuna originally contained a discussion on gravity; first, the careful structure of the entire passage, which demands such a subject here; second, the curious absence of the subject, itself so important, from the text at large. But there is con-

¹⁴ We must notice the parallel treatment in lines 67-142 and 295-332. The first passage treats atomic diffusion at length, touching briefly at the end on the subliminal nature of the motion resulting from this diffusion and its gradual approach to the threshold of perception. The latter deals with the same two issues, with a reversal of emphasis; lines 294-307 treat again the compactness of the diffuse atoms, and then lines 308-32 develop with vivid optical references the possibility of subliminal motion.

¹⁵ Bailey, *De Rerum Natura*, II, pp. 832-3; and *Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford, 1928), p. 328, where Bailey actually quotes II, 165-6 in his discussion of Epicurus' doctrine of Gravity, as if it summed up that discussion!

¹⁶ Cf. Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, pp. 129-37, especially p. 133, for a discussion of Aristotle's objections to Democritus' natural, unmotivated motion.

firmation of several kinds. The first comes from the broken pair of lines which presumably complete the lost passage: . . . *nec persectari primordia singula quaeque / ut videant qua quidque geratur cum ratione* (lines 165-6). The subject of this fragment is probably irretrievably lost—be it the gods who do not interest themselves in running the world, as Munro thought, or the minds of men who can not follow up in detail the operation of the *primordia*, as Giussani assumed.¹⁷ The loss, however, is largely irrelevant, and certainly not crucial to an understanding of the passage. For accident has preserved for us the object in which these mysterious individuals were uninvolved, and this object is presumably the subject under discussion in the entire lost section—viz. *qua quidquid geratur cum ratione* (Bailey, I, 245. . . by what means each one [atom?] is carried on). This is what is overlooked by those anonymous persons; and this is what is lost from our text—the principle or reason for activity. And this principle, for Lucretius and Epicurus, is gravity. Surely this confirms our previous conclusions.

Yet there remains one problem. The structure and wording of the text may well indicate gravitational force as the subject of the lacuna. But how can such a discussion be related to, indeed prompt, the immediately following denunciation of a divinely oriented aetiology? To understand this we must look more closely at the role of gravitational theory in the Epicurean system, its sources, and most particularly, its purpose.

Although opinions on the role of gravity in the pre-Epicurean atomic theory vary widely, there seems to be at least a fair consensus of opinion¹⁸ on the fact that gravitational force was, for Democritus and his predecessors, only one of the forces which prevailed in a world of atoms continuously and naturally in motion. There was apparently no need to posit a prime cause

¹⁷ For a discussion of the possibilities, see Bailey, *De Rerum Natura*, II, pp. 828-9.

¹⁸ Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, pp. 128-36; V. E. Alfieri, *Atomos Idea, L'origine del concetto dell'atomo nel pensiero greco* (Firenze, 1963), pp. 81-2; B. Farrington, "Epicureanism and Science," *Scientia*, XLVIII (1954), pp. 69-72; J. Barrio, "El clinamen epicureo," *R. Fil.*, XX (1961), pp. 319-36; K. Kleve, "Die 'Urbewegung' der Epikurischen Atome und die Ewigkeit der Götter," *Symbolae Osloensis*, XXXV (1959), pp. 55-62.

for this motion, since it was a law to itself. This seems to have been the state of theory in the early writings of Epicurus as well. Bignone, Capone-Braga, and most recently, De Witt,¹⁹ have all pointed out the total absence of any causal theory of kinetics in the preserved corpus of Epicurus, even in the *Letter to Herodotus*, in which one would most certainly expect some treatment of the subject, if Epicurus had already formulated it. Thus its introduction into the system must be an occasion of great interest to us, and cannot, certainly, as Bignone²⁰ has implicitly noticed, be separated from the formation of the doctrine of the *clinamen*.²¹

On this subject the researches of Bignone²² and Capone-Braga²³ have shed much light. A brief summary of their conclusions will accordingly be valuable to our present investigation. As opposed to the traditional interpretation of the Epicurean system as a body of dogma thought out as a unified whole,

¹⁹ E. Bignone, "La dottrina epicurea del 'Clinamen,' sua formazione e sua cronologia, in rapporto con la polemica con le scuole avversarie," *A & R*, XXII (1940), pp. 159-98; G. Capone-Braga, "Aristotele, Epicuro, e Diogene di Enoanda," *A & R*, XXII (1940), pp. 35 ff.; and "Intorno al clinamen di Epicuro," *Sophia*, XXIII (1955), p. 109; N. W. De Witt, "Epicurean Kinetics," *C. P.*, XXXVI (1941), pp. 365-70; and *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1954), pp. 162-70.

²⁰ Bignone, pp. 163-5, 195.

²¹ Jorgen Mau, "Raum und Bewegung, zu Epikur's Brief an Herodot, § 60," *Hermes*, LXXXII (1954), pp. 13-24, and De Witt, "Kinetics," *passim*; both emphasize that the question of constant atomic speed, as it appears in § 60 of the *Letter to Herodotus*, is not involved in the Fall/Swerve issue, but in the discussion, current to both Plato and Aristotle, of the speed of atoms in absolute space as opposed to in combination. Yet in the Democritean universe the *clinamen* is superfluous. It is necessary only when the prime motion of the atom has been straightened out by gravity. The Swerve and the Fall are complementary halves of one unified change in atomic kinetics; and this change is directed toward providing a first cause for atomic motion (see *infra* and cf. Mau, p. 22: "Einfacher wäre es für ihn gewesen, wenn er von vornhinein unendlich viele Bewegungsrichtungen für die freien Atome angenommen hätte, aber da wird man ihm entgegeng gehalten haben: Wenn schon das Gewicht Ursache der Bewegung ist, warum bewegen sich dann nicht alle Atome in gleicher Richtung?").

²² Bignone, *op. cit.*

²³ Capone-Braga, "Aristotele" and "Intorno al clinamen."

independent of, or even in scorn of contemporary Hellenic thought, both scholars present us with a portrait of the master of the Garden as a philosophical polemicist, intimately involved through his writings in an informal dialectic with the advocates of rival systems. The fruit of this philosophical cross-pollination includes not only the *clinamen* and the developed theory of gravity, but the four-part soul as well.²⁴ Whether as Bignone sees it, the doctrines of the Fall and the Swerve were designed as a materialist's answer to the theory of the soul as the source of motion, as Bignone finds it in the early, Platonizing works of Aristotle, or to the later doctrines of the prime mover and the final cause, as Capone-Braga contends, they remain the physicist-materialist's answer to the questions of the origins of motion and its directive action, reducing to a minimal mechanical indetermination the metaphysical causalities proposed by the Platonic-Peripatetic tradition. They introduce into a system based largely on hypotheses of probability a modicum of uncontrolled variation which, however, does not disturb the statistical²⁵ validity of the hypotheses as it would the rigorous logic of the opposition. Thus the purpose of Fall and Swerve is to propose physical answers where Aristotle and others most seriously resort to the metaphysical.

In this argumentative purpose, the doctrine of gravity serves

²⁴ On the question of whether the invention of the Fall/Swerve is not rather post-Epicurus, see the detailed discussion of the pros and cons by J. Barrio, "*Olinamen*." Since the invention of the theory remains polemically directed at the Platonic-Peripatetic system, whenever it occurred, the question of authorship is, for present purposes, irrelevant. I have throughout preferred, with Bignone, to assume for lack of contrary evidence that Epicurus himself is the author, thus crediting the general ancient attribution to him.

²⁵ I am not suggesting here that Epicurus had evolved anything like the modern notions of statistical probability, but simply that his system emphasized, as a virtue, argument from probability based on empirical observation. This appears both in his methodology of proof by analogy and in his acceptance of any of several probable accounts of phenomena which do not admit of precise observation. Thus he could admit a measure of indetermination within mechanistic rules which remain generally applicable, where the stricter logic of Aristotle would demand absolute and unvarying causality. Indetermination in a fortuitous mechanistic cosmos is thus a virtue, where, for Aristotle *et al.*, it would be a flagrant self-contradiction (i. e. Cicero).

an interesting and characteristic function. K. Kleve²⁶ has pointed out that the conventional assumption of a primal state of pre-clinamen purely gravitational motion, into which the unpredictable Swerve subsequently introduces collision, directional change, and finally atomic composition, is erroneous. As gravity, so the Swerve is eternal. Thus there was never a time when the atoms held the hypothetical course of raindrops all moving parallel and at the same speed. In fact, Epicurus has retained Democritus' helter-skelter motion from eternity. However by developing the hypothetical state which would have prevailed, had there been no Swerve, he has developed gravity, a mere accessory for Democritus, into the basic source of motion. If, as Bailey suggests,²⁷ we are to see in gravity, as understood by the Epicureans, a sort of internal blow or motive force, purely physical, but originating in the natural disposition of matter, it becomes clear that Epicurus has attempted both to escape Aristotle's objection to Democritus—that he gave no cause for his motion—and to propose, at the same time, the physical equivalent to the soul as origin of motion or the self-moved mover—matter moved by its own proper weight.

Viewed in this light, the doctrines of the Fall and the Swerve can no longer be considered as the philosophical aberrations of a man who was a moralist first and a thinker second, who was willing to break the ground rules of materialism, if only he might preserve Freedom of Will.²⁸ Will is of course the center of the issue; it becomes, however, the product of the physical activity of the universe, not its *raison d'être*. Just as the corporate products of atomic combination are vastly more complex physically than the *primordia* which compose them, so the Will, the apparently spontaneous or deliberate choice toward X and away from Y, is also of comparable complexity.²⁹ Yet it remains at base an atomic motion, an *élan* of the intellectual atoms

²⁶ Kleve, "Urbewegung," p. 58.

²⁷ Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, p. 131.

²⁸ Cf. Alfieri, *Atomcs Idea*, pp. 81-2: "Epicuro (e quindi Lucrezio) ha così grossolanamente frainteso Democrito su questo punto, da attribuirli una dottrina di cui negli Abderiti non si vede traccia."

²⁹ Cf. Bailey, *De Rerum Natura*, II, pp. 838-42, especially S. Butler, quoted on pp. 841-2; and *Greek Atomists*, pp. 319, 435-7.

(ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας³⁰), the composite of the minute, spontaneous motions of the participating atoms.

If, however, the origin of the doctrine under consideration was largely polemic and protreptic, this should come as no real shock. We are accustomed to the traditional rivalry between the later Epicureans and the Stoics. The surprise comes only from the fact that this interest in gaining converts and countering the opposition is so near the roots of the formation of Epicurean doctrine. The quiet discussions of the Garden become more than the lucubrations of a small, private club's members, who shunned the turmoils beyond the garden wall. P. De Lacy³¹ has, moreover, shown that this missionary direction was an integral part of the inheritance which Lucretius' contemporaries of the school shared. Even the adoption of poetry as a vehicle of dissemination is, according to him, but part of this protreptic mission. In this mission, good arguments, even against dead foes, were retailored to fit the day, and frequently took their places against the new opposition, the Stoics.

Thus we can see how the apparently innocent theory of gravity can, to return to our original discussion, provoke the attack on the gods as originators of the world to which Lachmann and Müller objected, and lines 167-83 can no longer be billed as a theological digression.³² What once faced Aristotle's motive soul, or possibly his prime mover, can serve as well against all metaphysical aetiologies.³³ Not gods, but gravity set the top spinning. The anti-theology is both appropriate and effective

³⁰ For discussion, see Bailey, *De Rerum Natura*, III, pp. 1274-5; and *Greek Atomists*, pp. 421-3 and Appendix III, pp. 559-76.

³¹ P. De Lacy, "Lucretius and the History of Epicureanism," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX (1943), pp. 12-23.

³² As Bailey, *De Rerum Natura*, II, p. 829, *et al.*

³³ Cf. F. Hegermann, "Zwischen Aristoteles und Epicure," *Les Cahiers Luxembourgeois*, XV (1938), pp. 453-64, especially p. 459: "Da er [Epicurus] es mit der göttlichen Hoheit, Seligkeit, und Selbstgenüge unverträglich fand, sich mit gemeinen Dingen zu beschäftigen, musste er auch den aristotelischen ersten Bewegter leugnen; ausdrücklich lehrte er, die Bewegung der Himmelskörper sei nicht zur Wunsch oder Antrieb eines göttlichen Wesens erfolgt, auch seien die Himmelskörper nicht selbst ewige unwandelbare Götter, vielmehr sei alles durch eine ewige Ordnung geregelt, nach welcher Entstehen und Vergehen ewig wechseln."

The lines are, as we noted, repeated again in Book V, lines 195-9, where, however, instead of ending in a promise of further discussion, as here (lines 182-3), they are followed by exactly that promised further elaboration in the form of a list of natural accidents and faults extending from line 200 to 234. The often discussed question of the priority of composition of these two passages, though unresolved, and probably unresolvable, without further ancient information on Lucretius' habits of composition, is also, as so often, largely irrelevant. For in different ways, the passages are both thoroughly, or rather brilliantly, proper to their places. In Book V, where Lucretius sets himself to discuss the fortuitous creation of the universe, without divine guidance, the list of its scars and inadequacies is eminently to the point. In the more arcane and theoretical material of Book II their enumeration would be no less gratuitous than their omission is exact and appropriate. What is wanted here is not a diary of universal error, but a statement of the principle that the fallible and thoroughly flawed universe itself is enough to give the lie to all divine origins and to support the principle that all activity has its source in the natural drop of matter. How does the flawed universe support the doctrine of downward linear motion? The answer has been adumbrated by Bignone (*italics mine*):

E non basta, il *clinamen* secondo Epicuro spiegherebbe pure, come dice la testimonianza plutarchea citata sopra, p. 194, gli eventi fortuiti . . . per spiegare i quali il platonismo delle *Leggi* si intricava nell'oscuro problema delle due anime del mondo, una buona e l'altra cattiva. *Infatti, se il moto dell'anima comunicato al cosmo e il moto perfetto circolare, come ne derive l'imperfezione e il male?*³⁷

The perfect *circular* motion imparted to the universe by the soul (or the Stoic gods) can not account for imperfection. Only the linear and natural drop with its fortuitous Swerve can explain the "*elemento fortuito che travagliava le menti dei suoi avver-*

prove from many other things as well, that the nature of the world is by no means made by divine grace for us: *so great are the flaws with which it stands beset*. And this, Memmius, I will make clear to you hereafter. Now I will set forth what yet remains about the movements."

³⁷ Bignone, p. 195.

sarii."³⁸ Thus the discussion of gravity evokes from Lucretius a condemnation not only of the religious origins of motion in the universe, but also of the philosophical ability of such a theory, with its accoutrements of the perfection of the motion so inspired, to explain the random, and so often faulty operation of its alleged product. The very accusation against the religious opposition is grounded in the philosophical implications of linear gravitational fall, and provides our final indication of the content of the lacuna. It is as much to Lucretius' credit as a philosopher, Epicurean genre, that he has included the point here, as it is to his credit as a poet that he postponed the picturesque details until Book V. To deny either is to deny half of the man, and to do him irreparable injustice.

In sum then we can speak with some confidence about the content of the lacuna. The subject is Gravity, demanded by the philosophical direction, alone appropriate to the poetic design, called for in the syllabus, and used as a thorough student of both Epicurus and the Muses would use it; Gravity alone answers the demands we have set. And the demands, after all, were simple; it suits the words and makes good sense.

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³⁸ *Ibid.*

THE RHETORIC OF ADVOCACY IN GREECE AND ROME.

The ordinary procedure in an Athenian court of law was for plaintiff and defendant each to speak in his own behalf, but advocates (*συνήγοροι*) sometimes spoke in place of or in addition to litigants. At Rome the opposite prevailed: the ordinary procedure was for a litigant to be represented by one or more *patroni*, but sometimes he conducted his own case. How did the use of an advocate alter the rhetorical situation in a courtroom? What rhetorical advantages or disadvantages did an advocate have? What account of the possibilities was taken by rhetoricians? It is worth while to involve both Greece and Rome in the study, since the rhetorical tradition is essentially a unity, though adapted to differing legal procedures, and it is interesting to see to what extent theory is affected by practical situations.

At Athens public advocates were regularly employed to represent the state in both foreign and domestic legal procedure, for example in the prosecution of Cimon for bribery in the fifth century or of Demosthenes and others implicated in the Harpalus incident in the fourth.¹ Advocacy was also well established in private cases.² The speech against Neaera, attributed to Demosthenes (LIX), but apparently the work of Apollodorus, is a good example. In this speech the first fifteen sections are spoken by the nominal plaintiff, Theomnestus. At the end he asks the jury *συνήγορόν με κελεύσαι καλέσαι τῷ ἀγῶνι τούτῳ Ἀπολλόδορον*. *Κελεύω* can be used in a technical sense, "to give legal authority," not recognized by Liddell and Scott, but apparent in the orators.³ Then at section sixteen the manuscripts have the word *συνηγορία* "advocacy," and Apollodorus delivers a speech which runs to section 126. We may conclude that per-

¹ Cf. Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* (Chicago, 1938), II, pp. 25-38.

² Cf. Justus H. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* (Leipzig, 1915), III, pp. 905-10 and Bonner and Smith, *ibid.*, pp. 8-14.

³ Cf. Lysias, XXII, 5; Isaeus, II, 13; Demosthenes, XXXIV, 52; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V, 2, 30. In Lysias, I, 27, 32, 34, and 49 the speaker tries to take advantage of the word to extend the legal right of a husband to kill an adulterer into a requirement to do so.

mission to introduce an advocate was nominally required, but we must also conclude from other speeches that requesting permission was largely formal and not invariably observed: for example, at the end of speech fifty-six in the Demosthenic corpus the speaker summons Demosthenes to come forward, and he does not ask anybody's permission to do so. Possibly the custom was to allow an advocate to use up time left in the waterclock.

Aristotle was certainly aware of the Athenian procedure when he wrote the *Rhetoric*. He twice mentions advocates, first (1374b36) the appearance of an orator named Sophocles as an advocate for Euctemon and secondly (1393b22-33) a speech by Aesop as an advocate at Samos on behalf of a man accused of demagogery.

The case of Euctemon is obscure,⁴ but to judge from what Aristotle says, he had, like Ajax, committed suicide as a result of some real or assumed insult. The orator was prosecuting the person responsible for the insult and perhaps was representing heirs unable to act on their own behalf, young children for example. He argued that the insult should not be assessed as less serious than the dead Euctemon had regarded it, but that is all we know of the rhetorical situation. Neither in this case nor in that of Aesop is Aristotle interested in the fact that it is an advocate who speaks, but the example from Aesop is significant none the less. Aesop told a fable about a fox afflicted by ticks, the point of which is that it is better to keep an old demagogue who has already made himself wealthy than to make room for new and ambitious demagogues. Aesop makes no claim for the character of his client and thus assumes a position of objectivity. He is almost like a judge and can advise the people of Samos what is to their interest. Presumably they will trust him the more for his frankness. We do not, of course, know whether the situation has any kind of historical basis, though Aristotle apparently thought it had, but one can see how difficult it would be for the demagogue himself to present such a view

⁴ Sophocles is also mentioned in 1419 a 26, and is probably to be identified with one of the Thirty Tyrants, cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, 3, 2, and possibly also with the *strategos* of 426/5, cf. Thucydides, III, 15. The most famous Euctemon of the second half of the fifth century was the geographer and astronomer, but the name was common.

without raising the indignation of the Samians against him. Aesop the advocate, however, is an intermediary between the people and the demagogue, and his own acceptance of the latter serves to calm possible indignation.

Aristotle is of course highly aware of the roles of character and emotion in oratory, but in discussing them he never suggests the varied possibilities which advocacy might open. In his rhetorical theory the litigant is assumed to speak for himself, presumably because this is the basic situation in a Greek court.

Anaximenes, the presumed author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* in its original form, is somewhat less concerned with the nature of rhetoric and somewhat more with the practical work of orators. Through most of the treatise he speaks as though the orator and litigant are one and the same, but in the account of the arrangement of judicial oratory in chapter thirty-seven there are repeated references to an advocate. Primarily Anaximenes is concerned with the *dis*-advantages of advocacy and with how the orator, if necessary, can explain his presence before the court (1442b 12-16):

if you are speaking on some one else's behalf you must say that you are pleading his cause from motives of friendship for him or hatred of his opponent or because you were present at the event in question or for the public good or because your client stands in need of friends and is a victim of injustice.

What he fears is the charge of being a professional orator speaking for pay, which in turn implies that what the speaker says is not the truth, but what he is paid to say. Moreover, this would be undemocratic, and thus unpopular with juries, since the wealthy man could hire a clever speaker, the poor man could not. We know that paying advocates was illegal in Athens (cf. Demosthenes, XLVI, 26). Perhaps the best example of attack on advocates comes in Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates* (138-40), where we are told that advocates claim to appear out of friendship, but they ought to be ashamed of friendship for such a man. Actually they speak for pay. They have no right to claim good will for the defendant on the basis of their own services to the state.⁵ This reveals some of the excuses on which

⁵ Cf. also Isaeus, X, 1; Demosthenes, XXI, 207 and LI, 21-2.

advocates relied and suggests that the advocate himself sometimes played considerable role in a speech in Lycurgus' time.

Anaximenes considers how to meet the charge that an advocate has been hired (1444a34): one way is to be ironic, to admit it, and to claim that everyone does it. So far as I can see no orator ever says anything so rash in an extant speech. Another is to distinguish between money or gratitude or vengeance or honor as compensation for speaking and to claim that while you speak as a favor to your client, your opponent speaks for money. Anaximenes appears to regard advocates as used if a litigant legally could not speak himself or if he could not speak well or convincingly. He does not examine the special rhetorical assets an advocate may find, but he does tell the advocate to praise the client's patriotism or fidelity or gratitude or compassion (1442a10-12), and an advocate could probably bring out these virtues more directly and with less arrogance than could the litigant himself.

It is possible to classify advocate speeches into several types. Speeches written by someone else for delivery by a litigant may be left aside, since a Greek speech writer, Lysias for example, had to submerge his own personality in that of his client, and the illusion that the speech is the work of the speaker is maintained throughout. The second century A. D. rhetorician Hermogenes says (*De Methodo*, 21) that there are four reasons for employing an advocate: nature, if the litigant is a woman; age, if he is a boy or an old man or infirm; condition, if he is a slave or disfranchised; or decorum, if he has already been condemned. This classification, however, conflates two separate situations, that of a litigant who is legally debarred from speaking, the woman, the boy, the slave, and the disfranchised man, and that of a litigant who has a legal right to speak and perhaps does so briefly, but relies on an advocate to aid him. In the first case the advocate is strictly speaking a *ὑπεραπολογούμενος* who virtually assumes the litigant's role.⁶ Examples would include the two sons of the woman accused of murder in the first speech of Antiphon; in Isaeus III a son conducts a prosecution for false witness on his mother's behalf; Demosthenes XLIII,

⁶ Cf. Herodotus, VI, 136. It is hardly found in the orators, cf. Antiphon, *Tetralogy*, I, 4, 2.

Against Macartatus, was delivered by a father who is trying to establish his young son's right to an inheritance from his mother's family, while conversely Demosthenes LVIII, *Against Theocrines*, was delivered by a young man for his father who had suffered loss of civil rights resulting from inability to pay a huge fine. In these speeches the ethos developed is primarily that of the actual litigants and the advocate himself plays little part, but possibilities for development existed in Antiphon where the brothers' neglect of their duty to their father is noted (5-7) as a way of attacking their support of their mother, and the young advocate of Demosthenes LVIII is about equally involved with his father, since he will inherit his father's debts and thus his loss of civil rights.

A second type of advocate speech is that in which the litigant could legally defend himself, but is replaced or aided by an advocate. These speeches are called *ἐπίλογοι* or *δευτερόλογοι*, and the advocate is technically a *συναπολογούμενος*, since the litigant himself is regarded as the first speaker even though he may have said very little. The earliest example known is the trial of Miltiades (Herodotus, VI, 136). The defendant in that case was present in court, but wounded and dying and was defended by his friends. In this type of speech advocates are usually at pains to stress their close ties with litigants and the legitimacy of helping them. Isaeus VI is such a speech for a young man, justified by the advocate's friendship. In Demosthenes XXXVI Phormio, the freedman, could legally have spoken, but lacked an adequate fluency in Greek, we are told (XLV, 30). In Lysias XXXII one of the young men involved has just come of age, but has a logical substitute in the older husband of his sister. Sometimes the litigant seems to have spoken at length and the advocate then appears to corroborate or support him. Possibly Isaeus IV is of this sort. It is a fairly short speech (thirty-one sections) in which an older man is supporting the claim of the son of a friend, but we have no means of telling how extensive the younger man's first speech was.⁷ In Lysias V the advocate is hardly more than a character witness for an old friend whose life is in danger.

⁷ Cf. William Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge, England, 1904), pp. 369-70.

In several extant speeches the speaker ends by calling an advocate to come and help him: Andocides (I, 150) summons men chosen by his tribe; in Demosthenes, XXXIV, 52 the speaker offers to call a friend if the court gives permission (ἐὰν κελεύητε); in LVI, 50 Dareius summons Demosthenes, and in LVIII, 70 the young litigant who is Demosthenes' client makes an appeal for anybody who can come forward to help him.

Finally there are those cases in which the advocate is the real participant and the nominal litigant is a strawman. The best example of this is Demosthenes' appearance for Ctesiphon. Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* is of course directed against the advocate Demosthenes rather than against Ctesiphon and much the same is true of his earlier speech *Against Timocrates*. In the speech *Against Neaera* (Demosthenes LIX) Apollodorus, the advocate, is at least as much involved in the case as his brother-in-law, Theomnestus, who brought an action which moreover is really not directed against Neaera but is an attempt to get vengeance from her advocate, Stephanus. Apparently Apollodorus could have brought the action himself, but the strategy followed allows for greater pathos since Theomnestus can represent himself as motivated primarily by the threat to the women in the family, and then Apollodorus, the more skilled orator, can carry out the lurid assault on Stephanus and his mistress.

Among Greek advocate speeches there are only a few instances of a truly artistic development of the advocacy situation. One is Lysias XXXII, mentioned above, where a grandfather is accused of embezzling most of the inheritance of two young men. The speaker is their brother-in-law. His position as an advocate perhaps allows him to attack the grandfather more vigorously than could decently be done by the grandchildren themselves, one at least of whom is of age, and also to portray with an appearance of objectivity the shock and tears of the young men when they learned of their loss and came to him (10). The speaker's own character enters into the speech principally in the exordium where he narrates his efforts at arbitration (2). Thus, not only the litigants, but the advocate is a factor in the effectiveness of the speech, and Lysias has perceived some of the rhetorical advantages of advocacy. Dionysius of Halicarnassus,

who praises the speech (*De Lysia*, 24), notes the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος.

We have seen that the opposition regularly tries to discredit advocates. In a trial like that of Ctesiphon, where the advocate himself is the virtual defendant, his presence can hardly be criticized, but Aeschines does seek to prevent Demosthenes from appealing effectively to the jury on behalf of both Ctesiphon and himself. He takes Ctesiphon and Demosthenes together (213) and reveals what each thinks of the other: Ctesiphon is represented as worried that he will lose his case because of Demosthenes' venality, instability, and cowardice, while Demosthenes is worried that Ctesiphon's wickedness and lewdness will endanger his own defense (214). Thus they make a good pair. Demosthenes naturally takes a different approach and tries to show (16) that Aeschines is endangering the innocent Ctesiphon in a private quarrel with Demosthenes, but this is only briefly touched on, and typically he does not try to use Ctesiphon's character as a major tactic to save himself. *On the Crown* is primarily devoted to the real subject, Demosthenes' career.

Of all extant Greek advocate speeches the one which makes the most interesting use of the advocate's position is probably Hypereides' speech *For Euxenippus* (IV). Taken together with the attack on advocates in Lycurgus this might suggest some development of the opportunities of advocacy in the later fourth century. Hypereides was the second speaker, and the vague reference (15) to "the one who spoke before me" seems to imply that this was not Euxenippus himself, but another advocate. The subject is an unusual one, a suit of impeachment brought against Euxenippus on the ground that he had been bribed to falsify a prophetic dream he had during ritual incubation in the temple of Amphiaraus at Oropus. The point with which Hypereides begins and to which he subsequently returns is the impropriety of using a legal procedure designed to deal with treason for such a minor case. He claims that according to the law not private individuals, but orators should be charged with that fearful crime (4), and he introduces a passage (27-30) describing the prosecutions which he himself has conducted. This is not directly relevant to the case of Euxenippus, but contributes to the prestige of the advocate, and we have seen Lycurgus warning a jury against just such a tactic. Hypereides

offers no explanation of why he undertook the case, a point which most advocates did not overlook and this again is unusual. He would perhaps imply that he belongs among the "friends and relatives" mentioned (13) as asked for aid; certainly he would claim that he undertook the case out of a concern for justice; possibly in fact he appeared as a favor to officials of the tribes involved rather than for Euxenippus personally.⁸ The prosecution had stressed Euxenippus' wealth and may have implied that Hypereides was paid for his speech, but this does not seem to bother him, and his own activities and personality are a distinct rhetorical ingredient, separate from the individual case of Euxenippus. If Euxenippus escaped we may guess it was through the efforts and personal force of his lawyer; if he lost, Hypereides might equally be blamed.

The picture is, then, that in individual cases Greek orators could recognize and use some of the possibilities of advocacy, but these are not a common factor in Greek oratory and when they do appear they are usually not greatly developed. Possibly the advocate played a greater role in the later fourth century than he had earlier, but there is not really enough evidence to be sure.

In comparing Demosthenes and Cicero Quintilian says (X, 1, 106) that from the former nothing can be taken away, to the later nothing can be added. The remark might be generalized to apply to Greek and Latin oratory. Even when a Greek speech is long and when the style is elaborate and the argument complicated, the total impression is one of some austerity. Both ethos and pathos are frequently present, but neither is carried out in all its potentiality. Perhaps that would have offended a Greek jury.⁹ At Rome, on the other hand, even in the fragmentary speeches from the second century B. C., the moral and emotional factor is much fuller, and the logical element correspondingly less. Indeed, a Roman audience would have found naked logic, i. e. sophistry, as offensive as the Greeks found it attractive.

At Rome the only free persons debarred from representing themselves in court were those under seventeen and those totally

⁸ In section twelve he says he had been an advocate for the tribe Aegeis in an earlier stage of the dispute.

⁹ For restrictions on emotionalism in Greek courts cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1354a 23; Quintilian, II, 14, 4; VI, 1, 7; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, XIII, 590.

deaf (*Dig.*, III, 1, 1, 3); women occasionally pleaded cases (cf. Valerius Maximus, VIII, 3). Prosecutors were ordinarily expected to act as their own lawyers, but advocacy was common even in prosecution and almost universal in defense. A wide variety of terms appear: *orator*, *advocatus*, and *laudator* are mentioned by Cicero in a passage of *Pro Cluentio* (110), but there is also the *cognitor*, the *procurator*, the *patronus*, and the inglorious *causidicus*. Three principal functions can be recognized: first that of the *cognitor* or *procurator* who completely replaced the litigant and, as his agent, assumed all responsibility for the matter at hand.¹⁰ Second there was the *advocatus* or legal counsel who advised a client in the course of litigation, but ordinarily did not speak in court.¹¹ Third was the patron, who took over the presentation of the case before a jury. In addition there was the speech-writer, the Roman counterpart of the logographer, but as in Greece he lacked the rhetorical situation of an advocate.¹²

¹⁰ Cf. A. H. J. Greenidge, *The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time* (Oxford, 1901), pp. 146 and 236-43.

¹¹ Cf. Greenidge, *ibid.*, p. 148.

¹² Logography, or the writing of speeches for others to deliver, so common at Athens, existed in Rome, though it is rarely noticed. Doubtless the Romans distrusted it as commercial, or as lacking in ethos, or possibly even because it was Greek. Lucius Aelius of Lanuvium, according to Suetonius (*De Grammaticis*, 3), was given the cognomen *Stilo* because he used to write speeches for "all the famous men" during the first decade of the first century B.C. Cicero mentions Caepio, Cotta, Q. Metellus, and Pompeius Rufus as among his customers (*Brutus*, 169 and 205-7). He was also a teacher of grammar and rhetoric, numbering Cicero and Varro among his pupils. As a Roman knight he must have helped lend respectability to the educational profession. Slaves or freedmen employed as secretaries sometimes contributed to their master's or patron's oratory as did L. Voltacilius Pilutus (Suetonius, *De Rhetoribus*, 3). The allegation that speeches were the work of another was used in attack: Cicero (*Brutus*, 99-100) refutes the charge that the speech of C. Fannius against Gracchus was not his own work. Caelius claimed that Atratinus' speech against him in the celebrated case in which Cicero delivered *Pro Caelio* was actually written by L. Plotius Gallus, famous as the first *rhetor Latinus* (Suetonius, *De Rhetoribus*, 2). According to Quintilian (III, 8, 50) many orations had been composed by Greeks and Romans for the use of other men, with suitable adaptations of content to the condition and

The most Roman and most important kind of rhetorical advocate was the *patronus*.¹³ It was doubtless the traditional patron-client relationship that made advocacy so much more acceptable at Rome than in Greece. A patron's legal duties to his client presumably date from the earliest times. They are certainly evident in the earliest Latin literature, for example in the scene in the *Menaechmi* of Plautus (571-98) where Menaechmus I happens into the forum and finds himself expected to defend a client in a rather tricky lawsuit. He says that patrons want as many clients as possible and prefer those with money. Perhaps the allusion is a topical one; the date of the *Menaechmi* is uncertain. That patronage could be hired in the third century is implied by the enactment of the *lex Cincia* in 204 B. C. prohibiting gifts or fees in court cases.¹⁴ Cicero says in the *Brutus* (106) that the use of *patroni* became more necessary with the institution of the secret ballot in 137 B. C.; apparently before that time votes could be controlled, after that time the minds of the jurors had to be persuaded. By the late republic there were often four or more patrons for a single litigant.

The first Roman orator whom we know well is Cato. Although the great majority of his judicial speeches seem to have involved legal action which he undertook on his own behalf, he did appear as a patron in some sense of that word. Speaking for an otherwise unknown Turius against Cn. Gellius, Cato said:¹⁵

ita esse a maioribus traditum observatumque . . . ut si, quod inter duos actum est, neque tabulis neque testibus planum fieri possit, tum apud iudicem, qui de ea re cognosceret, uter ex his vir melior esset, quaeretur et, si pares

life of the speaker. He gives as instances not only Lysias, as one would expect, but speeches by Cicero for Cn. Pompeius and for T. Ampius, about which nothing further is known. Cicero himself mentions (*Ad Q. Fratrem*, III, 8, 5) composing a funeral oration for the use of a certain Serranus Domesticus. In the empire there was probably a good deal of ghost writing, including Seneca's work for Nero (Tacitus, *Annales*, XIII, 3) and the speech or speeches of Trachalus for Otho (Tacitus, *Historiae*, I, 90).

¹³ Cf. Greenidge, *ibid.*, pp. 146, 148, and 270-1; Walter Neuhauser, *Patronus und Orator (Commentationes Aenipontanae, XIV)* (Innsbruck, 1958), pp. 166-206.

¹⁴ Cf. Cicero, *De Senectute*, 10 and Tacitus, *Annales*, XI, 5.

¹⁵ Aulus Gellius, XIV, 2, 21; cf. fr. 206 Malcovati.

essent seu boni pariter seu mali, tum illi, unde petitur, crederetur ac secundum eum iudicaretur. In hac autem causa, de qua tu ambigis, optimus est, qui petit, unde petitur, deterrimus, et res est inter duos acta sine testibus. Eas igitur et credas ei, qui petit, condemnesque eum, de quo petitur, quoniam, sicuti dicis, duo pares non sunt et, qui petit, melior est.

Cato has no doubt about his client and uses his own prestige to aid him. Had we more of this speech it is possible that we could clearly see the ethos not only of Turius and Gellius, but of Cato. The Roman patron often plays a role which approaches that of a judge and character witness rolled into one.¹⁶ Cicero says (*Brutus*, 111) that the *gravitas* of Scaurus was such that when he spoke one would think he was testifying rather than pleading, and Quintilian (X, 1, 111) says of Cicero himself that he brought to a case *non advocati studium, sed testis aut iudicis . . . fidem*. This rather oversimplifies the situation: we may grant that Cicero was aware of all the traditional roles of the patron, including functions analogous to those of witness and judge, but at the same time Cicero hardly abandoned the *advocati studium*. His sense of expedience was too strong to overlook any element of persuasion which might be of service to his client, and that included his own role. The situation is further enhanced by the fact that his own character was a very strong one. The result is that he himself plays a significant role in almost all his speeches without sacrificing the ethos of his client.

A good example from early in his career is the brilliant speech for Roscius Amerinus. Here Cicero was a young and virtually unknown pleader undertaking the defense of a rather humble man under attack by persons of great power and influence in the state, especially Sulla's henchman Chrysogonus. Cicero's treatment of the subject brings out clearly the role and personality of his client, Roscius, of the accuser, Erucius, of the various individuals whom Erucius is representing, and of himself the patron. In fact, Cicero is not personally involved in the case, and if he were a Greek advocate he would in all probability

¹⁶ The chief patron was debarred from appearing as an actual witness in a case he was conducting, cf. Cicero, *In Verrem*, Actio II, 2, 24 and *Lex Acilia*, 1. 33.

hardly mention himself, but the Roman tradition allowed him much greater latitude, and having voluntarily undertaken the danger of speaking for Roscius he was quite right to make maximum rhetorical use of his position. He begins with himself, rather than with his client, and capitalizes on the fact of his being young and unknown (2-5): the words of others would be thought to mean more than they said; he has not been chosen for his special ability, *sed relictus ex omnibus qui minimo periculo possem dicere*. This ingenuousness is intended to win the good will of the jury and at the same time prepare the way for the introduction of dangerous and delicate matters. Cicero affects to be counting on the fact that he is too unimportant a person to be a threat to anyone. Actually he is also relying on the force of public opinion to protect him if he can make the whole matter public knowledge. Once his own role is stated he moves on to his client, Roscius, those who oppose him, and the impartiality to be assumed of the judge. But in section thirty he is back talking about himself again: the accusers, he says, had relied on the fact that no one would defend Roscius; he, Cicero, is perhaps being rash, but he will speak out. The dangers of his position are stressed, but the dangers to Roscius are greater, and thus Cicero's are gallantly labeled nothing in comparison. This is a fine bit of amplification, and it leads into a very emotional section in which Cicero has identified himself with his client and actually speaks in the first person (32):

patrem meum, cum proscriptus non esset, iugulastis, occisum in proscriptorum numerum rettulistis, me domo mea per vim expulistis, patrimonium meum possidetis. Quid vultis amplius?

Other matters then intervene, including the role of Erucius, the accuser, who is said to have nothing against Roscius, but to speak for *pæ-* (55). But beginning in section fifty-nine Cicero comes back to himself and his role. Here he describes with some vividness the scene at the beginning of the speech when Erucius, rather bored with the whole case, had finished his remarks and was looking around to see who would reply. Cicero arose; Erucius looked relieved. Cicero mentioned Chrysogonus; Erucius jumped as though stung; he mentioned him again and consternation increased, messengers were sent out: the cat was

out of the bag. It is very tempting to think that this passage was inserted in the speech after delivery and for publication.¹⁷ If Cicero actually spoke it at the time he had great ability at improvisation. In either event the passage shows how the action of the advocate can become a part of the case and discredit the opposition.

In section thirty-two, as we have just seen, Cicero identifies himself with Roscius for the sake of pathos. But elsewhere we saw that an advocate could gain an advantage from the distinction between himself and his client. He can say things which his client cannot say. Cicero was of course aware of this, and *Pro Roscio Amerino* has a fine example of the technique in section one hundred twenty-nine:

Verum quaeso a vobis, iudices, ut haec pauca quae restant ita audiatis ut partim me dicere pro me ipso putetis, partim pro Sex. Roscio. Quae enim mihi ipsi indigna et intolerabilia videntur quaeque ad omnis, nisi providemus, arbitror pertinere, ea pro me ipso ex animi mei sensu ac dolore pronuntio; quae ad huius vitae casum causamque pertinent et quid hic pro se dici velit et qua condicione contentus sit iam in extrema oratione nostra, iudices, audietis.

Cicero is here broadening the significance of the case, a procedure he himself always recommends in his theoretical writings as necessary for great oratory.¹⁸ Roscius and his problems are temporarily set aside as though they were only an instance of something greater, and in this greater problem it is Cicero himself, and through him the Roman state, which is endangered. This was perfectly true, but it also gains Cicero a particular advantage in the case of Roscius. He can attack Chrysogonus and represent himself as doing it against the wishes of Roscius. First he simply says that he leaves Roscius out of the matter (130). Later, more specifically, he says (143):

Verum haec omnis oratio, ut iam ante dixi, mea est, quo me uti res publica et dolor meus et istorum iniuria coegit. Sex. Roscius horum nihil indignum putat, neminem accusat, nihil de suo patrimonio queritur. Putat homo imperitus

¹⁷ Cf. Jules Humbert, *Les plaidoyes écrits et les plaidoyes réelles de Cicéron* (Paris, 1915), pp. 100-11.

¹⁸ Cf. *De Oratore*, III, 120 and *Orator*, 45.

morum, agricola et rusticus, ista omnia quae vos per Sul-
lam gesta esse dicitis more, lege, iure gentium facta

Subsequently Cicero once again shifts over to the first person, speaking as though he were Roscius (145). He gains several advantages here: sympathy is won for the unsuspecting Roscius, and he is partially protected from the powerful anger which Cicero may call down upon himself. The emotional tone is again heightened. At the same time, admiration is awakened for Cicero's courage and for his self-sacrifice in taking on himself what is really the danger of society. Cicero clearly saw in the occasion an opportunity to bring himself into the full light of the public stage as candidate for many future roles.

This speech involves a variety of artistic ethos far beyond anything evident in Greek oratory. It is also far beyond anything we know in earlier Roman oratory, but of course our knowledge is very limited. The character of all involved is skilfully woven into every part of the speech. Subsequent orations of Cicero show a similar skill: in the Verrines the participants are not only the Sicilians and Verres, but also Cicero and Hortensius. In a number of the speeches after his consulship, the *Pro Sestio* for example, Cicero the patron felt himself attacked and dominates the proceedings. Perhaps the best known case in which his role is distinguished from that of his client is the *Pro Caelio*, which also involves separate treatment of both Aratinus, the prosecutor, and those behind him, chiefly Clodia. Caelius is young, lively, charming; the opposition has represented him as a rake, but modern youth must have its fling, and anyway Caelius is not nearly so bad as he has been made to seem. Cicero, on the other hand, is the dignified consular, the saviour of the republic, the wise mentor of the young of Rome. The two are thus almost antitheses, but the likelihood of a direct development of a Caelius into a Cicero is repeatedly suggested. Cicero does not, indeed, go so far as to admit his own youthful indiscretions, if they existed, but he says at the outset (6) that he rose from similar origins: *ab his fontibus profluxi ad hominum famam* and as he approaches the end (77) he promises jury and republic *numquam hunc a nostris rationibus seivinctum fore*. In between we are told how Caelius at an early age attached himself to Cicero (9), and it was no wonder if he was

deceived by Catiline, since Cicero himself hardly escaped: *me ipsum, me, inquam, quondam paene ille decepit* . . . (14). Later Cicero assumes the role of a father to address Caelius (37-8) and defends himself against the charge of having poorly taught morality (39-47). The result is that the moral objections to Caelius are almost totally dispelled by the light of the great consular presence. If Cicero is content with his pupil, surely we cannot be more demanding. The advocate's introduction of himself into the case greatly strengthens the position of the client.

If it is granted then that Cicero makes full use of the possibilities, and especially the possibilities of ethos, of an advocate, we may ask what recognition of these techniques can be found in Roman rhetorical treatises, including Cicero's own.

In the two rhetorical treatises dating from Cicero's youth, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and his own *De Inventione*, there is very little recognition. Neither *patronus* nor *advocatus* occurs in either work. In speaking of the exordium Cicero (*De Inv.*, I, 22) says that good will can be sought from four sources: our own person, that of the adversaries, that of the judges, and from the case itself, but the discussion which follows makes it certain that *nostra persona* means the litigant, not his representative. A very similar passage occurs in *Ad Herennium* (I, 8). Here and elsewhere both works speak of adversaries in the plural, but of course the opposition often did consist of more than one person. The closest thing to a recognition of advocacy in the two works is the use of the terms *accusator* and *defensor*, which could be rendered simply as plaintiff and defendant, but apparently imply the use of counsel. Cicero says, for example (*De Inv.*, II, 35), *defensor autem primum, si poterit, debebit vitam eius qui insimulabitur quam honestissimam demonstrare*, in which the *defensor* is clearly not the same as *eius qui insimulabitur*.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cf. *Ad Herennium*, II, 5: "Defensor primum demonstrabit vitam integram, si poterit; id si non poterit, confugiet ad imprudentiam, stultitiam, adulescentiam, vim, persuasionem; quibus de rebus . . . vituperatio eorum quae extra id crimen erunt non debeat adsignari. Sin vehementer hominis turpitudine impediatur et infamia, prius dabit operam ut falsos rumores dissipatos esse dicat de innocente, et utetur loco communi rumoribus credi non oportere. Sin nihil eorum fieri

The reason why advocacy is not developed beyond this extent in *De Inventione* and *Ad Herennium* is presumably that they are both derived from a teacher who knew Greek rhetorical theory as expounded at the beginning of the first century B. C., and this like earlier Greek rhetorical theory took little account of advocacy. Litigants in Greek courts in the Hellenistic period apparently continued to represent themselves in most cases, but advocates of various sorts existed. Cicero mentions (*De Orat.*, I, 198) the presence of orators, presumably analogous to patrons, in Greek courts and of *infimi πραγμάτικοι* who advised them on legal matters. In the second mime of Herodas, which takes place in court, the plaintiff Battaros speaks his own case, though he mentions (10) having a patron (*προστάτης*) named Mennes. One of the Amherst papyri is a petition to Ptolemy VI Philometor, written about 157 B. C., objecting to the presence of an advocate in a revenue case.²⁰

Much of the greatness of Cicero's *De Oratore* comes from the fact that it does not simply repeat traditional rhetorical theory, but reconsiders the role of the orator. The resulting picture is certainly influenced by contemporary teaching, but it also draws on much earlier and partially forgotten material, especially the ideas of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and it is also affected by the actual conditions of Roman oratory and the practice of great Roman orators. In the middle of the second book of *De Oratore* (II, 182-7) Antonius is made to discuss *ethos* as a form of proof, parallel to argument and *pathos*, apparently the first time this had been recognized since Aristotle. He says:

valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum, animosque eorum, apud quos agetur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam cum erga oratorem tum erga illum, pro quo dicet orator.

Adversarii here should include both the opponent and his patron, though this is never made explicit. In what follows we are told that a jury is influenced by a litigant's rank, actions, and repu-

test, utatur extrema defensione: dicat non se de moribus eius apud censores, sed de criminibus adversariorum apud iudices dicere." This bears some resemblance to Cicero's technique in *Pro Caelio*.

²⁰ Cf. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Amherst Papyri* (London, 1901), II, n. 33.

tation, while on the part of the orator a pleasant tone of voice, a face suggestive of modesty, and affable choice of words make their contribution. The patron should deal as though unwillingly with what he really wants to press home. The converse is even more true, but not pointed out, that the orator must often pretend to be eager to discuss subjects which he does not really wish to mention at all. Cicero goes on to list some qualities which should be demonstrated by a speaker: they include liberality, kindness, and piety; the adversaries should be shown to have the opposite qualities. The client should be shown as just, blameless, scrupulous, long suffering and the like (184). This all seems rather too restrained and rational for actual Roman oratory. Cicero does (185) recognize the possibility of a more vigorous presentation, but the whole account remains less subtle than his own practice. Most especially, the possibility of effective contrast between patron and client is not recognized. Nothing further seems to be added in Cicero's later rhetorical writings.

The best treatment of the rhetoric of advocacy is found in Quintilian. He says (IV, 1, 6) that good will is derived from persons or from cases. Most have thought that there were three persons: litigant, adversary, and judge. But there is another possibility, the *actor causae*. This seems to indicate that Cicero's addition of the pleader in *De Oratore* had not made its way into ordinary rhetorical lectures and handbooks. Later in the chapter (45-6) Quintilian goes on to recognize possibilities in advocacy evident from Cicero's practice, but not before discussed. He is speaking of cases where the facts are damaging:

Ideoque agere advocato quam litigatori facilius, quia et laudat sine adrogantiae crimine et aliquando utiliter etiam reprehendere potest. Nam se quoque moveri interim finget, ut pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero, dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat et auctoritatem induat vera sentientis, quo magis credatur vel defendenti eadem vel neganti. Ideoque hoc primum intuebimur, litigatoris an advocati persona sit utendum, quotiens utrumque fieri potest; nam id in schola liberum est, in foro rarum, ut sit idoneus suae rei quisque defensor.

In the speech for Rabirius Postumus, which Quintilian cites, Cicero tries to win sympathy by admitting that his client was

unwise to lend money to king Ptolemy: the jury will think so, Cicero thinks so, and even Rabirius thinks so. Cicero is not so moved as Quintilian indicates, but his straightforwardness does give him "the authority of one who perceives the truth."

In the chapter on propriety (XI, 1, 65) Quintilian adds the fact that sometimes a patron can claim to say something against the wishes of his client and out of a sense of duty, as when he represents a son against a mother. His discussion is not prolonged, but it suggests that at the end of the creative period of ancient rhetoric theory had caught up with practice in the matter of the role of the advocate. Quintilian's references to declamation might suggest that that elegant exercise served to underline some of the possibilities. Equally important was probably Quintilian's own admiration for and careful reading of Cicero. Quintilian is not a great original rhetorician, but he is thorough and scrupulous. He was anxious to teach boys effective public speaking, and he did not think this was a matter of memorizing out of date or inapplicable Greek theory.

To conclude, advocacy seems to point to one way in which the artistic qualities of one genre of Latin literature excelled the corresponding Greek forms: ethos is much richer in Roman than in Attic oratory and would repay more study than it has received. Secondly, as was the case with poetics and poetry, rhetoric lagged considerably behind oratory. Ancient parents had some reason to think that their sons might learn as much from listening in the forum as from attending the classes of rhetoricians.

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A RARE TYPE OF FIRST FOOT DACTYL (THREE WORDS).

In a recent article on Vergil's use of hexameter patterns,¹ I discussed several ways of producing variety in repeated patterns (e.g., *ds* in two or more lines in succession) and I included among the devices the variation resulting from the different types of dactyls and spondees, arranged according to words.² For this purpose I used the lists of Father Bolaños, who gave thirteen types of dactyls and seven kinds of spondees; the dactyls range from (1) one word alone, (2) two complete words, monosyllable and dissyllable, (3) two complete words, dissyllable and monosyllable, (4) monosyllable and part of next word, to (10) first two syllables = part of one word, second short = part of another, (11) beginning of a polysyllabic word, (12) end of a polysyllabic word, and (13) two whole words and part of a third.³

Unfortunately, as I now realize, the list of possible dactyls given by Bolaños is not complete. He speaks of "la increíble variedad" of Vergil's dactyls, and refers to No. 13 (two words and part of a third) as "el último esquema."⁴ But he does not include the following (= No. 14): one word and parts of two others, i. e., a monosyllable (or elided dissyllable) preceded by the end of one word and followed by the beginning of another. This dactyl is very common: cf. Ennius, 36: *pul/cher per a/moena*; Lucr., I, 442: *pos/sint in e/o*; Verg., *Aen.*, I, 10: *vi/rum tot ad/ire*; II, 476: *Peri/phas et e/quorum*; II, 647: *di/vis et in/utilis*; Eor., *Sat.*, I, 1, 7: *poti/or quid e/nim*; 9, 4: *ma/nu quid a/gis*; Ovid, *Metam.*, I, 93: *su/i sed e/rant*; I, 132: *ven/tis nec ad/huc*. Dactyls of this type appear usually in the third or fourth foot.⁵

¹ G. E. Duckworth, "Variety and Repetition in Vergil's Hexameters," *T. A. P. A.*, XCV (1964), pp. 9-65.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 41-2.

³ See J. M. Bolaños, S. I., "Virgilio, Rey del Hexámetro (Estudio de Métrica)," *Estudios Virgilianos* (Quito, 1931), pp. 85-90.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 90.

⁵ Cf. also Verg., *Ecl.*, II, 68; IV, 54; *Aen.*, III, 195, 406; IV, 479; Ovid, *Metam.*, III, 247, 444; for this type of dactyl in the second foot,

Even more surprising is Bolaños' failure to list the dactyl of three words (= No. 15); such dactyls may be composed of three monosyllables or of various combinations of monosyllables and elided dissyllables. When my article on variety and repetition in Vergil's hexameters appeared, Professor Gilbert Highet asked me what Bolaños did with three word dactyls such as *hic vir hic* in *Aen.*, VI, 791, and said, "There are a few, a very few, of those."⁶ One would not expect them to occur frequently, for, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus states, "Two many short words in succession offend the ear."⁷ Bolaños' omission is nevertheless regrettable, inasmuch as dactyls of this type are more numerous and more varied than is usually realized, and they appear regularly in the first foot of the hexameter.⁸ The following lists

see *Lucr.*, II, 395 *ide/o fit u/ti*; *Hor.*, *Sat.*, I, 1, 19: *habe/o quod a/gam*; and, with an elided dissyllable instead of a monosyllable, *Ovid*, *Metam.*, III, 297: *ingemu/it nequ(e) e/nim*, 524: *eveni/et nequ(e) e/nim*.

⁶ Quoted from a personal letter of June 3, 1966. Highet was referring to the few occurrences of this type of dactyl in Vergil.

⁷ *De comp. verb.*, XII. We seldom find more than three or four monosyllables in succession in Latin hexameter poetry, but cf. *Lucr.*, I, 459: *per se non est, sed*; VI, 373: *hanc ob rem fit fons in*; *Hor.*, *Epist.*, I, 16, 19: *ne cui de te plus quam*; II, 2, 63: *quid dem? quid non dem?* *Verg.*, *Aen.*, XII, 833: *do quod vis, et me*; *Cyprian of Gaul*, *Numeri*, 288: *at non hic mos est, mea cum*.

⁸ Three word dactyls are very rare in the other feet, since the frequent caesuras in the second, third, and fourth feet produce dactyls (or spondees) beginning with the ends of words. Lucretius in Book VI has eighteen instances of three word dactyls in the first foot, but none in the other feet. I have not attempted, therefore, to collect these dactyls in the other feet, but I have noted in passing the following: *quo fit ut*, *Hor.*, *Sat.*, II, 1, 32 (fifth foot); *hic quis ad*, *Stat.*, *Theb.*, IX, 70 (second foot); for a few examples with elided dissyllables, see below, notes 10 and 11. Also, I do not include elegiac poetry in this survey of the three word dactyl, but it is important to note that we have here a very different situation: in elegiac poetry these dactyls regularly appear not only in the first foot of the hexameter but also at the beginning of each half of the so-called pentameter; for examples in the first foot of the pentameter, see *Catull.*, LVI, 86; *Ovid*, *Heroid.*, IV, 4; V, 100; XX, 122; *Fasti*, I, 620; V, 558, 690; VI, 594; at the beginning of the second half, *Catull.*, CXV, 6; *Ovid*, *Heroid.*, IX, 24, 36; XVII, 34; *Fasti*, VI, 18. The following chart compares the frequencies in Catullus' elegiac poems and in Ovid's *Heroides* and *Fasti* with those in the hexameter poetry of each.

present the first foot dactyls of this type which I have found in the Roman hexameter poets from Ennius to the middle of the sixth century A.D.⁹

I give first the examples of the most common type of three word dactyl, that of three monosyllables, and the hexameter poets in which they appear:

<i>an quod in</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , XIII, 34
<i>an sit et</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , X, 27
<i>aut quid in</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , II, 746; Claud., <i>In Eutrop.</i> , I, 253
<i>aut quod in</i>	Lucr., IV, 1137
<i>cum tot in</i>	Lucan, V, 685
<i>our sit et</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , VII, 686
<i>dic quis et</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , V, 25
<i>duc et ad</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 2, 117
<i>duo sit in</i>	Lucan, II, 561
<i>et bis in</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , VI, 557
<i>et quam / in</i>	Lucr., III, 394
<i>et quis in</i>	Val. Fl., VII, 517
<i>et quid in</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXIX, 17
<i>et quod ab</i>	Lucr., V, 685
<i>et quod in</i>	Lucr., VI, 1107

	Catullus Elegies	LXIV	Heroides	Ovid Fasti	Metam.
Total lines:	617	407	3,966	4,806	11,970
Three word dactyls—					
Three monosyllables:	0	0	8	8	9
Monosyllables and elided dissyllables:	3	2	5	1	10
Total:	3	2	13	9	19
One every α lines:	205.7	203.5	305.1	534.0	630.0
Total in hexameter lines:	1	2	7	4	19
One every α lines:	309.0	203.5	283.3	600.8	630.0
Pentameter lines—					
First foot:	1		3	4	
Fourth foot:	1		3	1	
Total in pentameter lines:	2		6	5	
One every α lines:	154.0		330.5	480.6	

⁹ The fragments of Ennius and Lucilius are numbered as in E. H. Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin*, Loeb Class. Libr., I (1935), III (1938); those of Cicero according to the edition of A. Traglia, *Ciceronis Poetica Fragmenta* (Rome, 1950, 1952). My references to most poets are based on standard editions, usually the Oxford Classical Text or the Loeb Classical Library; for the Christian poets I use chiefly the editions in the *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*. For other aspects of the metrical procedures of the many hexameter poets in the late period and their relation to the classical poets, see G. E. Duckworth, "Five Centuries of Latin Hexameter Poetry: Silver Age and Late Empire," *T. A. P. A.*, XCVIII (1967), pp. 77-150.

<i>et tot 'n</i>	Lucan, V, 202
<i>haec p'er et</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , I, 3, 95
<i>heu quid ab</i>	Culex, 223
<i>hic et c'b</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , V, 431; <i>Sil. Ital.</i> , III, 614
<i>hic et 'n</i>	Avien., <i>Descr. Orb. Terrae</i> , 836
<i>hic vir hic</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , VI, 791
<i>hinc vel ad</i>	Verg., <i>Georg.</i> , III, 202
<i>hoc qucd ab</i>	Arator, <i>De act. Apost.</i> , I, 3
<i>huc it et</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , IV, 342
<i>huic et in</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 3, 71
<i>id quod in</i>	Dracont., <i>Rom.</i> , V, 271
<i>me vel 'n</i>	Paulinus of Pella, <i>Euchar.</i> , 614
<i>mens ei an</i>	Juvenal, XIII, 203
<i>mos et 'b</i>	Grattius, 116
<i>mox et in</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVII, 2
<i>mox ut in</i>	Auson., <i>Opusc.</i> , XI, 8, 13
<i>nam fit ut</i>	Lucr., IV, 770; VI, 426
<i>nam ne: ad</i>	Val. Fl., IV, 227; Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , VIII, 95
<i>nam quid ad</i>	Dracont., <i>De laud. Dei</i> , II, 77
<i>nam qu'd in</i>	Lucr., I, 851; V, 526
<i>nam qu-s ab</i>	Manilius, V, 640
<i>nam quod ab</i>	Sedulius, <i>Carm. Pasch.</i> , I, 207
<i>nam quod in</i>	Auson., <i>Epist.</i> , XXXI, 221
<i>nam si 'ut</i>	Lucr., V, 7
<i>ne qua det</i>	Stat., <i>Achill.</i> , I, 955
<i>ne qua cer</i>	Claud., <i>In Eutrop.</i> , I, 36
<i>ne qua rit</i>	Lucan, IX, 906
<i>ne qua vel</i>	Auson., <i>Epist.</i> , XXX, 15; Paulinus of Nola, XI, 15
<i>ne quid ab</i>	Avitus, <i>De spir. hist. gestis</i> , V, 567
<i>ne quid in</i>	Claud., <i>Carm. minora</i> , XXX, 229
<i>ne quis in</i>	Corippus, <i>In laud. Iust.</i> , I, 205
<i>nec tot 'b</i>	Val. Fl., VI, 163
<i>neu quie ob</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , XII, 566
<i>non ut 'b</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XI, 15
<i>non ut 'n</i>	Manilius, III, 76
<i>non vel ed</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 2, 91
<i>Ω quod et</i>	Auson., <i>Opusc.</i> , XII, 13, 6
<i>quae bis in</i>	Moretum, 18
<i>quae sit at</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , I, 643
<i>quam si: et</i>	Verg., <i>Georg.</i> , III, 290
<i>qui nec 'n</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , I, 1, 26
<i>qui sit et</i>	<i>Ilias lat.</i> , 555
<i>quid qucd ab</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , X, 617
<i>quid qucd et</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , IX, 595; XIII, 223; Juvenal, VI, 45; Claud., <i>In Eutrop.</i> , II, 138; Prud., <i>Hamart.</i> , 279; Paulinus of Nola, XXXII, 113, 117; Sedulius, <i>Carm. Pasch.</i> , III, 285; Dracont., <i>De laud. Dei</i> , II, 726

<i>quin et ab</i>	Val. Fl., IV, 381; VI, 79
<i>quod nec in</i>	Juvenal, II, 108
<i>quos et in</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXI, 527
<i>sed quis ab</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , V, 2, 168
<i>sed quis ad</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , III, 186
<i>sed quod in</i>	Paulinus of Nola, VI, 33
<i>si det in</i>	Lucan, VIII, 768
<i>si qua sub</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , V, 5, 15; Sil. Ital., XV, 798
<i>si quid in</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , XII, 374
<i>si quis ad</i>	Hor., <i>Sat.</i> , II, 3, 111; 7, 24
<i>si quis et</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , I, 3, 2
<i>si quis in</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , IX, 211; Juvenal, VIII, 111
<i>sic et ab</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXI, 615
<i>sic et in</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , II, 1, 181
<i>te vel ad</i>	Claud., <i>In Rufin.</i> , II, 241
<i>tum bis ad</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , XIV, 386
<i>ut nec ad</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XIX, 397
<i>ut sit ab</i>	Lucan, VIII, 188
<i>ut vel in</i>	Dracont., <i>De laud. Dei</i> , II, 298
<i>vel quod ab</i>	Lucan, X, 242
<i>vis et in</i>	Lucr., IV, 423

The various possible combinations of monosyllables (= M) and elided dissyllables (= D) provide a long and varied list of additional three word dactyls. Some of these, e. g. *vad(e) ag(e) et* (DDM), *sed quid eg(o)* (MMD), and *fit quoqu(e) ut* (MDM), appear with considerable frequency and, like *quid quod et* (listed above), acquire a character that is almost formulaic:

DMM	<i>erg(o) ut in</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , IX, 602
	<i>iamqu(e) et ad</i>	Val. Fl., IV, 512; Stat., <i>Achill.</i> , II, 129
	<i>id(em) et in</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVIII, 325
	<i>lun(a) et in</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , I, 4, 37
	<i>namqu(e) ut ab</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , X, 148
	<i>namqu(e) ut in</i>	Ciris, 533; Sil. Ital., IV, 370
	<i>nemp(e) et in</i>	Juvenal, X, 160
	<i>terr(a) et ab</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , IX, 525
	<i>tur(a) et ab</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , VI, 61
	<i>turb(a) et ab</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 1, 109
	<i>usqu(e) et in</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 2, 121
	<i>vad(e) et in</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , XI, 112
	<i>ver(um) ut et</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVIII, 154
DDM	<i>atqu(e) it(a) et</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVIII, 292
	<i>erg(o) ag(e) et</i>	Serenus, <i>Liber Med.</i> , 771
	<i>ill(um) eg(o) ad</i>	Sil. Ital., XVI, 690
	<i>ind(e) ub(i) in</i>	Manilius, IV, 619
	<i>it(e) ag(e) et</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , X, 33

	<i>perg(e) ag(e) et</i>	Sil. Ital., VIII, 32; Paulinus of Périg., <i>De vita Mart.</i> , IV, 319
	<i>quar(e) ag(e) et</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , VII, 429
	<i>scand(e) ag(e) et</i>	Val. Fl., VIII, 111
	<i>surg(e) ag(e) et</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , III, 189; Val. Fl., IV, 35; Sil. Ital., VII, 19
	<i>und(e) eg(o) et</i>	Val. Fl., I, 328
	<i>vad(e) ag(e) et</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , III, 462; V, 548; Val. Fl., II, 127; Sil. Ital., XIII, 413
	<i>ver(um) ag(e) et</i>	Hor., <i>Epist.</i> , II, 1, 214; Val. Fl., VIII, 41
	<i>vid(i) eg(o) et</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , I, 2, 85
DMD	<i>atqu(e) is ub(i)</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , VIII, 294
	<i>ten(e) ut eg(o)</i>	Hor., <i>Sat.</i> , II, 8, 67
MDD	<i>at tib(i) eg(o)</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , I, 658
	<i>fit quoqu(e) en(im)</i>	Lucr., VI, 116
	<i>fit quicqu(e) ub(i)</i>	Lucr., VI, 145, 552
	<i>hunc quoqu(e) ub(i)</i>	Verg., <i>Georg.</i> , III, 95
	<i>in su(am) en(im)</i>	Lucilius, 272
	<i>quem quid(em) eg(o)</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , III, 557
	<i>quid tib(i) eg(o)</i>	Lucilius, 1192
MMD	<i>hoc fit id(em)</i>	Lucilius, 465; Lucr., VI, 299
	<i>hoc fit ub(i)</i>	Lucr., VI, 431
	<i>nam ut nem(o)</i>	Prosper (?), <i>De provid. Dei</i> , 951
	<i>ne quis op(e)</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , XII, 101
	<i>nunc quid ag(o)</i>	Paulinus of Périg., <i>De vita Mart.</i> , II, 6
	<i>sed nec op(e)</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , V, 240
	<i>sed quid ag(am)</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVII, 307
	<i>sed quid eg(o)</i>	Ennius, 196, 315; Lucilius, 1100; Catull., LXIV, 116, 164; Columella, X, 215; Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , I, 461; IV, 774; VIII, 65; Sil. Ital., VI, 110; Claud., <i>De bello Goth.</i> , 154; Prud., <i>Apoth.</i> , 741; <i>Hamart.</i> , 553; <i>Contra Sym.</i> , II, 182; Paulinus of Nola, XXI, 25, 551; Paulinus of Pella, <i>Euchar.</i> , 55; Paulinus of Périg., <i>De vita Mart.</i> , VI, 71
	<i>sic et eg(o)</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXIII, 16
	<i>tum quod hum(o)</i>	Sil. Ital., V, 298
	<i>ut fit ub(i)</i>	Lucr., II, 829; V, 100
	<i>vel quod hom(o)</i>	Mar. Vict., <i>Aleth.</i> I, 377 ¹⁰
MDM	<i>cum fac'e) et</i>	Auson., <i>Opusc.</i> , VIII, 42
	<i>cum fer'a) et</i>	Sil. Ital., XVII, 208
	<i>et loc(a) et</i>	Val. Fl., I, 851
	<i>et mar(e) et</i>	Auson., <i>Opusc.</i> , II, 3, 15

¹⁰ Cf. *si qua vi(a)*, Verg., *Aen.*, VI, 194 (third foot), VI, 367 (second foot); *sis quod eg(o)*, Hor., *Sat.*, II, 7, 40 (second foot).

<i>fit quas(i) ut</i>	Lucr., IV, 361
<i>fit quoqu(e) ut</i>	Lucr., IV, 818, 1218; V, 637; VI, 137, 300, 309, 443, 483, 830, 1042, 1123
<i>flet quoqu(e) ut</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , XV, 232
<i>hac grav(e) et</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXIII, 278
<i>haec cap(e) et</i>	Verg., <i>Aen.</i> , XI, 590
<i>haec ced(o) ut</i>	Persius, II, 75
<i>haec quoqu(e) ut</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , XI, 469
<i>hanc ub(i) ab</i>	Manilius, I, 242
<i>hi mod(o) ab</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XIX, 255
<i>hi mod(o) ut</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XIX, 241
<i>hic eg(o) et</i>	Auson., <i>Opusc.</i> , X (= <i>Mosella</i>), 170
<i>i de(a) et</i>	Sil. Ital., IX, 473
<i>it iug(a) et</i>	Sil. Ital., IV, 777
<i>me quoqu(e) ad</i>	Juvenal, III, 320
<i>me sin(e) et</i>	Val. Fl., VII, 455
<i>ne fug(e) ad</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , XII, 309
<i>neo mor(a) et</i>	Auson., <i>Opusc.</i> , X (= <i>Mosella</i>), 255; Paulinus of Périg., <i>De vita Mart.</i> , IV, 462; V, 83; VI, 275, 455
<i>non eg(o) in</i>	Manilius, III, 5
<i>non en(im) ut</i>	Lucr., III, 339
<i>non tñb(i) ab</i>	Val. Fl., V, 359
<i>nunc ag(e) et</i>	Val. Fl., VII, 466
<i>nunc quoqu(e) in</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , IX, 226
<i>nunc quoqu(e) ut</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , IV, 802
<i>quae ben(e) et</i>	Lucr., II, 644
<i>quae nequ(e) in</i>	Hor., <i>Sat.</i> , I, 10, 38
<i>quam iug(a) ab</i>	Sidon., <i>Paneg. Avitus</i> , 528
<i>quam quid(em) ut</i>	Lucr., VI, 80
<i>quin ag(e) et</i>	Verg., <i>Georg.</i> , IV, 329; Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 1, 154; Serenus, <i>Liber Med.</i> , 521
<i>quis rud(e) et</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , III, 2, 61
<i>quo sin(e) et</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVI, 112
<i>quod nis(i) et</i>	Verg., <i>Georg.</i> , I, 155; Grattius, 334
<i>quot loc(a) et</i>	Manilius, IV, 623
<i>res nequ(e) ab</i>	Lucr., VI, 569
<i>sed nequ(e) in</i>	Lucan, I, 53
<i>si fac(e) et</i>	Avien., <i>Arat.</i> , 1457
<i>sit mñh(i) ab</i>	Paulinus of Nola, XXVII, 630
<i>sol quoqu(e) et</i>	Verg., <i>Georg.</i> , I, 438
<i>stant iug(a) et</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , VI, 257
<i>sub iug(a) et</i>	Val. Fl., IV, 685
<i>te duc(e) ut</i>	Lucr., VI, 95
<i>te quoqu(e) ab</i>	Val. Fl., II, 592
<i>te quoqu(e) ut</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , X, 542
<i>te sin(e) et</i>	Stat., <i>Silv.</i> , V, 3, 238
<i>tu quid(em) ut</i>	Lucr., III, 904

<i>tu quaqu(e) ut</i>	Stat., <i>Theb.</i> , XII, 575
<i>tum for(e) ut</i>	Cic., fr. 11, 57
<i>tum quoqu(e) ut</i>	Ovid, <i>Metam.</i> , I, 339
<i>tuno quoqu(e) et</i>	Val. Fl., VIII, 359 ¹¹

The variety in the three word dactyls listed above, all in the first foot, is amazing. The totals of the different patterns are as follows: MMM, 80; DMM, 13; DDM, 13; DMD, 2; MDD, 7; MMD, 12; and MDM, 52. We thus have in the first hexameter foot 179 patterns, 80 composed of three monosyllables, 99 of the six different combinations of monosyllables and elided dissyllables. I have found no cases of three elided dissyllables (= DDD).

I turn now to a more important topic, the frequency of the three word dactyls in the Latin hexameter poets from Ennius and Lucilius (second century B. C.) to Arator and Corippus (sixth century A. D.). The following list gives the totals (first foot only) for the poets (or poems) and the relative frequencies. For purposes of comparison I include the poets (or poems) where dactyls of this type do not occur.

Poet (or poem)	MMM	Types of M & D	Total	Total verses ¹²	One every π lines
Ennius	0	2	2	412	206.0
Lucilius	0	4	4	607	151.8
Cicero	0	1	1	745	745.0
Lucretius	10	25	35	7,367	210.5
Catullus LXIV	0	2	2	407	203.5
<i>Oulew</i>	1	0	1	408	408.0
<i>Oiris</i>	0	1	1	535	535.0
<i>Moretum</i>	1	0	1	120	120.0
<i>Dirae</i>	0	0	0	181	—
Vergil	7	10	17	12,844	755.6
<i>Eclogues</i>	0	0	0	828	—
<i>Georgics</i>	2	4	6	2,187	364.5
<i>Aeneid</i>	5	6	11	9,829	893.5
Horace, <i>Sat.</i> and <i>Epist.</i>	2	3	5	4,081	816.2
Ovid, <i>Metam.</i>	9	10	19	11,970	630.0
<i>Halieutica</i>	0	0	0	127	—
Grattius	1	1	2	539	269.5

¹¹ Cf. *nos rap(e) in*, Verg., *Aen.*, II, 675 (fourth foot).

¹² These totals include spondaic verses, but not lines bracketed or corrupt.

Poet (or poem)	Types of MMM M & D	Total	Total verses ^{1a}	One every α lines
Germanicus Caesar	0 0	0	921	—
Manilius	2 4	6	4,183	697.2
<i>Aetna</i>	0 0	0	637	—
Columella (X)	0 1	1	436	436.0
Calpurn. Sic.	0 0	0	758	—
<i>Laus Pisonis</i>	0 0	0	261	—
Lucan	7 1	8	8,034	1,004.3
Petronius	0 0	0	294	—
<i>Ilias Latina</i>	1 0	1	1,054	1,054.0
Valerius Flaccus	5 13	18	5,586	310.3
Statius	15 20	35	14,149	404.3
<i>Silvae</i>	9 7	16	3,317	207.3
<i>Thebaid</i>	5 12	17	9,710	571.2
<i>Achilleid</i>	1 1	2	1,122	561.0
Silius Italicus	2 10	12	12,203	1,016.9
Persius	0 1	1	650	650.0
Juvenal	4 2	6	3,820	636.7
Serenus	0 2	2	1,106	533.0
Nemesianus	0 0	0	644	—
Avienus	1 1	2	3,270	1,635.0
Ausonius	4 4	8	2,640	330.0
Claudian	5 1	6	8,809	1,468.2
Juvencus	0 0	0	3,218	—
Prudentius	1 3	4	4,948	1,237.0
Proba	0 0	0	693	—
Paulinus of Nola	10 12	22	6,198	281.7
Sedulius	2 0	2	1,753	876.5
Paulinus of Pella	1 1	2	614	307.0
Prosper, <i>De ingratiss</i>	0 0	0	1,001	—
<i>De provid. Dei</i>	0 1	1	876	876.0
Marius Victor	0 1	1	1,894	1,894.0
Paulinus of Périgueux	0 7	7	3,622	517.4
Sidonius	0 1	1	2,445	2,445.0
Cyprian of Gaul	0 0	0	5,375	—
Dracontius	4 0	4	5,720	1,430.0
Avitus	1 0	1	3,418	3,418.0
Arator	1 0	1	2,325	2,325.0
Corippus	1 0	1	6,345	6,345.0

SUMMARY OF RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

Although statistics based on fragments and short poems are less satisfactory than those on longer works which total five or ten thousand verses, it still seems evident that the poets of the Republic used three word dactyls with considerable fre-

quency, with the exception of Cicero. In this respect, as in many others,¹³ Cicero appears to anticipate the metrical procedures of Vergil and Horace. The three word dactyl occurs in Cicero once in 745 lines, less than one-third as often as in Lucretius and Catullus. The frequencies of Vergil and Horace (one every 755.6 and 816.2 lines respectively) provide a striking contrast to those of Valerius Flaccus and Statius (one every 310.3 and 404.3 lines; cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, one every 630.0 lines). On the other hand, in Lucan and Silius Italicus, the three word dactyl appears only once in about a thousand lines (1,004.3 and 1,016.9, to be exact). This striking difference between Lucan and Silius on one hand and Valerius and Statius on the other is one more indication of the many metrical features which distinguish the two pairs of Silver Age epic poets.¹⁴ In the hexameter poets of the late Empire, both secular and Christian, the three word dactyl is very rare, with the exception of Ausonius and Paulinus of Nola. It occurs less than once in every two thousand lines in several poets (Sidonius, Avitus, and Arator), and in all of Corippus (6,345 verses) I find only one instance. In their use of the three word dactyl, therefore, almost all the poets of the late period differ from the earlier classical poets.

The following additional points are of interest:

1) Lucretius has three word dactyls once every 210.5 lines, but the distribution in the six books of the *De Rerum Natura* is highly irregular: of the thirty-five instances, eighteen (51.43 per cent) occur in Book VI, a frequency of one every 71.1 lines; on the other hand, Book I has only one instance in 1,103 lines. How is this discrepancy to be explained? Was Lucretius hurried or careless in the composition of his final book? Or did he develop an interest in "formulaic" expressions, such as *fit quoqu(e) ut*, which occurs eight times in Book VI? In an earlier article, I pointed out that Lucretius' metrical procedures support Büchner's theory that Books I, II, and V were composed before III, IV, and VI.¹⁵ Lucretius' use of three word dactyls gives added confirmation to this view; in I, II, and V we find

¹³ See G. E. Duckworth, "Studies in Latin Hexameter Poetry," *T. A. P. A.*, XCVII (1936), pp. 69-70, 79-80.

¹⁴ See Duckworth (above, note 9), pp. 88-100.

¹⁵ See Duckworth (above, note 13), pp. 72-3, 78, note 35.

eight instances only, one every 465.8 lines (cf. Cicero, one every 745.0 lines), but in III, IV, and VI dactyls of this type are more than three times as numerous (twenty-seven, 77.14 per cent of the total) and almost three and one-half times as frequent, one every 134.9 lines.

2) Three word dactyls appear about two and one-half times as often in Vergil's *Georgics* (one every 364.5 lines) as in his *Aeneid* (one every 893.5 lines). The higher frequency in the *Georgics* may be due to the influence of Lucretius, or the avoidance of this type of dactyl in the *Aeneid* may result from Vergil's desire to give a greater dignity and majesty to his epic hexameters. We might expect three word dactyls to appear more often in the colloquial hexameters of Horace's *Satires* and *Epistles*, but such is not the case; we have one instance every 816.2 lines in Horace, in Vergil as a whole one every 755.6 lines. Vergil and Horace both differ from the Republican poets in their use of the three foot dactyl, as in their other metrical procedures.¹⁶

3) Vergil's *Eclogues* contain no three word dactyls in the first foot, and it is interesting to note that none appears in the later bucolic poetry of Calpurnius Siculus and Nemesianus. But the total verses in each collection are perhaps too few to give significant results.

4) In Statius' *Silvae* three word dactyls occur far more often (once every 207.3 lines) than in his epic poetry (*Thebaid*, once every 571.2 lines; *Achilleid*, once every 561.0 lines). Like Vergil, Statius apparently disliked an excessive number of such dactyls in his more dignified and ambitious compositions.¹⁷

5) In my article on the metrical procedures of the hexameter poets in the Silver Age,¹⁸ I showed that the poet of the *Ilias Latina*, although resembling Lucan in some respects, was far closer in his technique to Silius Italicus; this confirms the theory that Silius himself was the author of the *Ilias Latina* and composed it in his late thirties after the publication of the first

¹⁶ See G. E. Duckworth, "Horace's Hexameters and the Date of the *Ars Poetica*," *T. A. P. A.*, XCVI (1965), pp. 75-6.

¹⁷ Three word dactyls are also more frequent in the elegiac *Heroides* and *Fasti* of Ovid than in his hexameter epic, the *Metamorphoses*; see above, note 8.

¹⁸ See Duckworth (above, note 9), pp. 100-2, 104-5, 107-9.

three books of Lucan's *De Bello Civili*. The use of the three word dactyl in the *Ilias Latina* gives added support to this view: one instance in 1,054.0 lines, whereas in Lucan we find it once every 1,004.3 lines, in Silius once every 1,016.9 lines.

6) Persius and Juvenal are remarkably similar in their use of three word dactyls (one every 650.0 and 636.7 lines respectively); this is slightly more frequent than in Horace's hexameter poetry (one every 816.2 lines). But four of the five instances in Horace occur in the *Satires* (2,113 verses), with a resultant frequency of one every 528.3 lines. Neither Horace nor the later satirists follow the practice of Lucilius, who apparently favored this type of dactyl (four in 607 verses of fragments, or one instance every 151.8 lines).

7) When we survey the whole range of Latin hexameter poetry from Ennius to Corippus and examine the poems (or collections) of 2,500 verses or more, we find the three word dactyl appearing with the greatest frequency in the following five poets: (1) Statius, *Silvae*, one every 207.3 lines; (2) Lucretius, one every 210.5 lines; (3) Paulinus of Nola, one every 281.7 lines; (4) Valerius Flaccus, one every 310.3 lines; (5) Ausonius, one every 330.0 lines.

8) For a final summary of the frequency in Latin hexameter poetry of a first foot dactyl composed of three words, I present the following table with totals for the various literary periods:

Periods	Types of		Total	Total verses	One every <i>x</i> lines
	MMM	M & D			
Republican period					
(Ennius to <i>Dirae</i>):	12	35	47	10,782	229.4
Augustan Age					
(Vergil to Manilius):	21	28	49	34,665	707.4
Silver Age					
(<i>Aetna</i> to Juvenal):	34	48	82	47,882	583.9
Classical period					
(Ennius to Juvenal):	67	111	178	93,329	524.3
Late Empire					
(Serenus to Corippus):	31	34	65	66,914	1,029.4
Total					
(Ennius to Corippus)	98	145	243	160,243	659.4

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NOTES ON THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTIUS, BOOK IV.

In past years it was maintained that, since the subjects of Book IV are so various and its composition apparently so incoherent, the collection was assembled by some posthumous editor.¹ Rather recently, L. Herrmann has held that Book IV is the work of a later *pasticheur*.² Reacting against this proposal, P. Grimal argues that, as Propertius promises in the opening elegy to retrace Rome's destiny, so, in spite of the apparent fantasy with which the subjects of the different poems have been chosen, has the poet in fact done just this. According to Grimal, Book IV presents a fresco of different scenes to the reader, following the tradition of the Roman narrative relief. In the first half we encounter the three peoples who are, together, the ethnic ferment from which Rome will grow to greatness: Romans from Romulus, Sabines from Tatius, and Lucumo's Etruscans. In the book Augustus himself appears as the heir to this glorious line. The Rome which Propertius forms before our eyes is not only the city of Romulus, it is the divine state which Destiny has prepared until now to present to Augustus.³

Thus Grimal stresses the structural unity of the book. He represents this in the form of a pyramid, in which IV, 2 corresponds to IV, 10, IV, 3 to IV, 9, IV, 4 to IV, 8, and so forth, until the two "slopes" culminate in the grand poem which

¹ By J. P. Postgate, *Propertius: Select Elegies* (London, 1881), pp. liii-liv, whom P. H. Damsté supported, "De Propertii Elegiarum libro quarto," *Mnem.*, LVI (1928), pp. 214-19. For a typical objection to the book's arrangement, cf. p. 217: "Conuertere animos uolo ad elegias septimam et octauam iuxta positas: non credo eas ab ipso Propertio isto ordine iunctas esse, sed imprudentia nescio cuius editoris, qui, cum in utroque carmine de Cynthia esse sermonem uidisset, accuratior rerum cognitione supersedit."

² L. Herrmann, *L'âge d'argent doré* (Paris, 1951), pp. 137-65. See p. 168: "Dans le Livre IV de Propertius, toutes les élégies sans exception sont apocryphes et sont l'œuvre de Passennus Paullus Propertius, qui les a conçues sous Titus . . ."

³ P. Grimal, "Les intentions de Propertius et la composition du livre IV" *Latomus*, XI (1952), pp. 322-3. In future references, "Grimal."

articulates the whole—IV, 6, which celebrates Apollo and Caesar at Actium.⁴ According to this thesis, Propertius was enthusiastic about Augustan Rome and not only conferred literary consecration upon acts of Augustus (e. g. the restoration of the temple of Feretrian Jupiter—IV, 10), but, in those poems which have nothing to do with history, wrote in sympathy with Caesar's moral program by treating different aspects of *fides*—the concept for Grimal which unifies the book (it is through Apollo's *fides* in IV, 6, 57 that Octavian wins at Actium). Propertius had seen revealed the mystic destiny of the state, but it was even more important that Apollo's loyalty towards Augustus and Rome find resonance in an entirely different *fides*—that of Rome's women towards their husbands and families.⁵

⁴ Grimal, p. 446. In the last year, a study by E. Burck, "Zur Komposition des vierten Buches des Properz," *Wien. Stud.*, LXXIX (1966), pp. 405-27, has concluded, with Grimal, that the various elegies are meaningfully and effectively organized. However, Burck rests his evaluation on the *innere Leben* of the book, rather than on any attempt to substantiate the formal symmetry Grimal detects: "Jedes Gedicht erwies sich als bedacht an seinen Platz gestellt, und die zahlreichen Fäden, die zwischen den einzelnen Gedichten und den beiden Buchhälften unter verschiedenen Aspekten hin- und herlaufen, liessen an den verschiedenen Elegien neue Dimensionen und Schwerpunkte sichtbar werden" (p. 419).

Thus, IV, 2 not only resembles IV, 10, but IV, 11 as well ("beide Gedichte geben eine Rede wieder," p. 415, n. 24); IV, 3 and IV, 4 are considered together as offering, each, an effective contrast to the other—total devotion to husband and country vs. total devotion to the country's enemy (p. 422); and Cynthia in IV, 7 is even more like Cornelia in IV, 11 than she is an opposite of Acanthis in IV, 5—cf. IV, 7, 35-48, 73-6 with IV, 11, 60 f.; IV, 7, 59-70 with IV, 11, 19-26; IV, 7, 87 f. with IV, 11, 81 f.; IV, 7, 60 with IV, 11, 101 (p. 418). The upshot of this approach is to stress the many interconnections from poem to poem, and this is a useful procedure; for example, we now know not only that the *Aeneid* can be divided into halves as Duckworth discerned, but in other ways, too. If Book VIII resembles Book II with Aeneas lifting his father, in one, and his shield, in the other, Book VIII also can be likened to Book VI (in both there is a mystical journey—into the forest for the golden bough, upstream along the Tiber: cf. M. C. J. Putnam's *Poetry of the Aeneid* [Harvard, 1965], for a comparison between the golden bough and the white sow in VI and VIII, respectively). To date, nevertheless, the question of the formal structure of Book IV of Propertius has not been settled.

⁵ Grimal, pp. 449-50. *Fides* does seem to occur in a great many of the poems in Book IV: IV, 1, 80, 92, 98, and 108; 3, 11; 4, 87; 5, 27;

Thereafter, L. Celentano, whose study is particularly to be noted for its stimulating discussion of the relation Horos' speech bears to the first seventy lines of IV, 1, has preferred to think of this first elegy as the key to Book IV. If not the high point of Propertius' art, this poem, better than any other of his works, allows us to apprehend the extreme complexity of his personality. Each of the other compositions in this book should be viewed as the expression of a different side of a spirit which delights in the interplay of conflicting attitudes towards morality, politics, and literature. For Celentano, Propertius' coherence lies in his very lack of that quality.⁶ Consequently, perhaps we should hesitate to impose too ordered an arrangement on the chaos of the book:

Vano sarebbe cercare nel libro un'architettura qualsiasi, perche ogni schema da noi concepito sarebbe ragionato, *a posteriori*, e urterebbe contro l'intuitivo *a priori* della poesia. Nella disposizione delle elegie nel libro IV, che sfugge ad ogni ordinamento troppo logico, sentiamo la mano dell'artista, la mano di Properzio.⁷

Following Celentano's approach, we should not seek any consistent political attachment or disaffection in Propertius; the poet varied unpredictably in his attitude towards Augustus' program.

Such emphasis on *complessa spiritualità* may be misleading in one regard: the fact that Propertius "erat ingenio et loquendi

6, 57 and 60; 7, 53; and IV, 11 is all about *fides* (though the word does not appear there). However, J.-P. Boucher, *Études sur Properce. Problèmes d'inspiration et d'art* (Paris, 1965), pp. 102-4, shows that *fides* is not a regular theme of Augustan propaganda: it is not mentioned on the *Monumentum Ancyranum*, Suetonius never refers to it in his *Life* of Augustus, it is absent from Augustus' coins and had no influence on the *Princeps'* definition of powers and imperial titulature. Augustus did not restore the temple to *Fides* which was damaged in 43 B. C., and the *clupeus aureus* set up in the Curia celebrates *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas*, but not *fides*. The concept, rather, seems to have been essentially republican, and to have embodied those feelings of sympathy and obligation which bound man to his fellow, citizen to citizen.

⁶ L. Celentano, "Significato e valore del IV libro di Properzio," *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere della Università di Napoli*, VI (1956), p. 68: "La coerenza di questo poeta è infatti nella sua incoerenza." Henceforth, "Celentano."

⁷ Celentano, p. 68.

more abrupto et peculiari,"⁸ that is—that his *persona* is one of a man whose thoughts are tortured and tumultuous,—does not mean that Grimal's arrangement should be dismissed. Indeed, it seems that great care in balance and organization is a characteristic of Propertius' craftsmanship: many studies exist for individual elegies.⁹ Further, we know that Propertius was writing in the company of poets who took great pains to create units which embodied diverse internal harmonies and symmetries,¹⁰ and in III, 1-5, Propertius constructed a block of elegies, which, though somewhat unrelated in content, nonetheless have the same motifs in common and are held together by a careful alternation of conflicting moods that reenforce the overall architectural framework imposed by the triumphal scenes at the beginning of III, 1 and the end of III, 5.¹¹ This is a group of poems such as Horace had composed; still, one might object that even Horace, while assuredly each of his books contains a certain general symmetry with regard to mood and subject, never tried putting a whole book of Odes into the closely knit construction Grimal has postulated for Book IV.¹²

⁸ E. A. Barber, *Properti Carmina* (Oxford, 1957), p. v.

⁹ For example, J. Vaio, "The Authenticity and Relevance of Propertius 2.14.29-32," *C.P.*, LVII (1962), pp. 236-8; or the helpful work of T. A. Suits, "Structure in Propertius 2.8," *T.A.P.A.*, XCVI (1965), pp. 427-37.

¹⁰ Cf. G. Duckworth's many articles on the *Aeneid*, e.g. "The Architecture of the *Aeneid*," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15, or "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 1-10. For symmetry in Horace's Roman Odes, cf. Duckworth, "*Animae dimidium meae*: Two Poets of Rome," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXVII (1956), pp. 300-2. Also cf. W. Ludwig, "Zu Horaz, C. 2.1-12," *Hermes*, LXXXV (1957), pp. 336-45, on the disposition and function of those Odes which begin Book II.

¹¹ W. R. Nethercut, "Ille Parum Cauti Pectoris Egit Opus," *T.A.P.A.*, XCII (1961), pp. 389-407, especially pp. 397-8.

¹² Ludwig (above, note 10) has shown that the first twelve Odes of Horace, Book II, do form a perfectly arranged cycle, and that they stand in the exact center of Books I-III (Book I has 38 poems, the rest of Book II has 8, and there are 30 Odes in Book III). As yet, however, we can not know whether any of the books by itself manifests architecture similar to that suggested by Grimal. For the structure of Propertius' first book, cf. O. Skutch, "The Structure of the Propertian *Monobiblos*" *C.P.*, LVIII (1963), pp. 238-9. Although there is no chiasmic pairing of individual elegies, such as Grimal would have, chiasmic opposition is demonstrable in its composition.

And yet from every aspect the external features of Book IV allow the possibility of what Grimal suggests. Notice the incomparably smaller number of poems in this book than in any of the other books of Propertius and Horace: Propertius might well be departing from the style of the poet who composes a larger number of shorter poems and be doing something akin to what Vergil did in working with a smaller number of longer units to form a carefully integrated whole. In addition, the number eleven is interesting, incidentally, in that it is an odd number (thus recalling the first five poems of Book III, where Propertius constructed a group from an uneven number of elegies) and is unlike the even numbered groups which are better known (e. g. the six Roman Odes and the two hexads of the *Aeneid*), and primarily because it provides an arrangement in which one of the constituent parts can stand as a sort of keystone in the exact center, thus allowing the artist to impart a feeling of direction and emphasis which the writer working with a group whose components are of an even number (that is, not a multiple of three)¹⁸ cannot so easily create.


Likewise, if one puts the poems in Book IV into the pattern Grimal favors, some interesting observations can be made:

VI—86. verses	
V—78 verses	VII—96 verses
IV—94 verses	VIII—88 verses
III—72 verses	IX—74 verses
II—64 verses	X—48 verses
I—150 verses	XI—102 verses

¹⁸ Although Horace's famous Odes number six, 6 can be divided into three groups of two each, and thus the Roman Odes can be viewed as 1 and 6 (which deal with morality and moderate behavior) forming the outside frame, 2 and 5 (military discipline and loyalty) forming the inside frame about 3 and 4 (which contain the central message of wisdom, order, and peace). Likewise, the *Aeneid* in twelve books can be reduced to three groups of four, cf. Duckworth (above, note 10). In each of these cases, the poet is able to work with a central unit which is not imaginary or theoretical, but which really exists (i. e. if one were working with 4, he would have to reason out that the middle came between 2 and 3. This would be mere calculation and would have no real significance for the impression the whole creates for the observer). Such a center-piece is capable of contributing appreciably to the feeling created by the finished product.

In at least three cases it would appear that Propertius had intended to balance two poems in respect to general length: both the first and the last (numbers 1 and 11) are the two longest and number over 100 lines; the second pair, starting from the bottom (numbers 2 and 10), are the two shortest poems in the book; and the third pair (numbers 3 and 9), nearly equal in the number of their verses, form a sort of middle ground between the longer poems with ninety lines and the shorter ones (just as 3 and 9 stand in the middle of each "slope" of the pyramid, between numbers 1 and 5, 7 and 11).

Final indication that Grimal's system should be considered seriously was furnished over sixty years ago by A. Dieterich, who showed the organizational balance which exists between types of subject matter in Book IV to be generally symmetrical, sustained architecturally by poems 1, 6, and 11 (which would be the case according to Grimal):¹⁴



The poems on the left side of center are those which revolve around history and myth; those on the right deal with love and topics more properly elegiac. Numbers 1, 6, and 11 are neither, *per se*, but combine different elements (e. g., the elegiac tone of verses 120-50 in IV, 1, which contrasts strangely with the more "patriotic" first half, viz., verses 1-70; also cf. the end of IV, 6, verses 69-86, for the same effect; and IV, 11 is neither elegy entirely nor political writing, but a blend of both approaches).

¹⁴ A. Dieterich, "Die Widmungselegie des letzten Buches des Propertius," *Rh. M.*, LV (1900), p. 220. Burck (above, note 4), p. 414, feels that IV, 1, 6, and 11 are pivotal: "Die drei axial verbundenen Gedichte."

Let us look more closely at the individual elegies as they can be paired. In each case I shall summarize as briefly as possible Grimal's reasons for proposing that each poem on each of the "slopes" of the figure corresponds to that which stands directly opposite; then I shall add evidence which corroborates his position.

(1) IV, 2 and IV, 10: the second elegy about Vertumnus is, as the tenth, primarily of topographic interest. In addition, the poems are arranged to stand out against each other: Vertumnus suggests the rhythms of peace and everyday existence; the Claudii and their line of triumphant generals symbolize the victories gained by Roman arms.¹⁵

As indication of Propertius' enthusiasm and interest in Augustan Rome, Grimal also sought to demonstrate that many of the elegies in Book IV are intended to evoke different personalities well known both to the poet and to other Romans. Can the figure of Vertumnus in IV, 2 call to mind Maecenas? Both were Etruscan; both, peaceful and mild.¹⁶ This supposition can be debated.¹⁷ However, the contrast drawn above by Grimal is the central issue, for it involves recognition of a major structural principle in the book. Vertumnus is pacific (IV, 2, 3-4):

Tuscan ego et Tuscis orior, nec paenitet inter
proelia Volsinios deseruisse focos.

He is characterized by his happiness to be outside an ostentatious temple (*nec templo laetor eburno*, IV, 2, 5), his intimate association with the forces of fertility and productivity (cf. the beautiful lines IV, 2, 13-18, 43-6), his infinite adaptability (*tot in uno corpore formas*, IV, 2, 1—cf. verses 47 and 63 as well)

¹⁵ Grimal, pp. 448-9.

¹⁶ Grimal was joined by R. Lucot, "Vertume et Mécène," *Annales publiées par la Faculté des Lettres de Toulouse (Pallas II)* (1953), pp. 65-80, in supposing IV, 2 to be an allegory containing reference to Maecenas; however, while Grimal thinks Propertius intends to praise his patron, Lucot would have the poem parody Maecenas.

¹⁷ Celentano, p. 65: "E' una pretesa affatto gratuita quella di vedere nell' elegia un cumulo di significati allegorici, simbolici o . . . cabalistici. Vertumnus non è Mecenate, e, naturalmente, non è neanche Properzio."

and supreme passivity. Things must act upon him before he can have something to which to adjust (IV, 2, 22):

In quaecumque (sc. figuram) uoles uerte, decorus ero.

Opposed to these qualities are those implicit in IV, 10, a poem concerned with arms, whose *raison d'être* is the housing of these arms (how different from IV, 2, 5, above!), and the themes of which are the destruction of lives (again a contrast with the fertile influence of Vertumnus) and activity. Also it is to be noticed that IV, 2 and IV, 10 are both about *men* (although Vertumnus will become *non dura puella* if one should wish, IV, 2, 23).

This very first set of poems demonstrates what will be shown to be characteristic of the poems Grimal places in twos, viz., that they form a contrast between them concerning a specific subject.¹⁸ It will also be noted that, although in several cases Grimal acknowledges this to be true, he tends to place more emphasis on general similarities (e. g. he likens IV, 2 to IV, 10 because each has to do with the topography of Rome).

(2) IV, 3 and IV, 9 show two women guarding sacred traditions in the absence of men who have gone away to war. In the same way as the priestess watches over the rites placed in her keeping in IV, 9, so, at home, by herself does Arethusa accomplish the duties required of a wife and pays their due to the household gods.¹⁹

As Grimal felt that IV, 2 contained some allusion to the character of Maecenas, so in IV, 9 he argues that the priestess is Livia, who remained behind to care for the moral welfare of the state when Augustus went off to battle the Cantabri in 27-25 B. C. More, Grimal would have the tired and victorious Hercules represent the Princeps himself, returned home from this war. He calls the reader's attention to Horace, *C.*, III, 14, 5-6, which mention Livia's loyalty in Augustus' absence:

¹⁸ This is true of several of the Odes Ludwig discusses (above, note 10), p. 339. For example, around *Odes*, II, 6 and 7, which form the center of the cycle, we find 5, with Lalage of virtue as yet intact, and 8, with Barine's baleful (and often experienced) charms. The first looks to the future; the second bids farewell to the past. Again, the exhortation in II, 4 is gay; in II, 9, Horace seriously counsels a friend overcome by the loss of his love.

¹⁹ Grimal, p. 448.

Unico gaudens mulier marito
prodeat iustis operata diuis.

Celentano stresses the good-natured comedy inherent in IV, 9 and contradicts Grimal—a bit dogmatically, as it seems to me.²⁰ The humor latent in IV, 9 in no way conflicts (as Celentano's sequence of thought seems to imply) with the supposition that Propertius had in mind that famous couple. After all, how, really, could Propertius write about the return of Hercules from his labors and fail to think of Augustus, who had arrived for the biggest triumph in recent years on the day on which Hercules had overcome Cacus?²¹ And why does he bother to include a reference to the sanctuary of the Bona Dea (in which Livia had an interest),²² unless he wanted to suggest her in some way? As it is, what could be a nicer touch than to have the hero who bore the world on his shoulders (IV, 9, 37) come home after the most important battle, only to find his might ineffectual before the rites of women, which, in one form or another, real or pleaded, had been the cause of so much annoyance to lovers like Propertius? And may this not go deeper and evoke the small uncertainties Augustus endured because of Livia? He had extended his power over great reaches of territory, but at home he had constantly to maintain a certain amount of guard in his dealings with his wife, who, although undoubtedly a great help in many problems, had interests of her own in the matter which lay closest to Augustus' heart and about which he felt the greatest frustration as the years passed—the succession.

But even if we were to agree with Celentano that IV, 9 does not suggest Augustus and Livia,²³ we can not deny that this

²⁰ Celentano, p. 65: "L'elegia IV 9 dev'essere interpretata sull'un piano di sorridente arguzia, di bonaria comicità; l'elegia vale anche come dichiarazione dell'azione dell'Ara Massima, ma non è il caso di vedervi allusioni a fatti o a personaggi contemporanei, ed Ercole non è Augusto di ritorno dalla guerra cantabrica e la vecchia sacerdotessa non è la casta Livia, come ritiene il Grimal."

²¹ Octavian was preparing to triumph on the day sacred to *Hercules inuictus* (i. e. on August 12; cf. *C. I. L.*, I, 399). The celebration began on the 13th (cf. *C. I. L.*, I, 478).

²² Ovid, *Fasti*, V, 157-8:

Livia restituit, ne non imitata maritum
esset et ex omni parte secuta uicem.

²³ Here we should also take notice of W. S. Anderson's "*Hercules Exclusus*: Propertius IV, 9," *A. J. P.*, LXXXV (1964), pp. 1-12, which,

poem does resemble IV, 3—perhaps even more remarkably than Grimal believes. In both the contrast is made of the woman who stays alone and the man who fights far away from the woman's dwelling (alluded to, but not made explicit by Grimal). Yet the two women are not entirely alone (cf. IV, 3, 41-2, with its mention of *soror . . . et pallida nutrix*; and the *inclusae puellae* who spend time in the sacred grove with the *sacerdos* in IV, 9, 23). In both poems purificatory and sacrificial fires shine (IV, 9, 28 and IV, 5, 58, respectively), and in both the women are *within*, guarding something sacred to them (the last part is owed to Grimal). Now, there are obvious differences between the two elegies which have not been underlined. Perhaps the two most striking are the facts that in IV, 3 the season seems to be winter (verse 53), while in IV, 9 Hercules' lips must be parched by summer heat (verses 21-2), and that in IV, 3 the woman longs for her hero's return, while in IV, 9 the hero's arrival is an event of little importance compared with what the women are doing. These distinctions can be seen as another manifestation of what was pointed out earlier: that is, that each of the poems Grimal considers together, do, in fact, seem to be joined, not only by their similarities, but also (and in some cases even more effectively) by the fact that they each present one side of a situation—e.g. IV, 2, broadly speaking, has to do with peace; IV, 10, with war. We can note, too, that the two sets we have discussed so far appear intentionally to have been placed side by side so as to provide variation: IV, 2 and 10 center about the male; IV, 3 and 9, about the female. And just as the movement from IV, 2 to IV, 3 is from peace to

as Celentano's article, stresses the humor of the poem. Pointing to the fact that Propertius makes no mention of the essential features of the Ara Maxima tradition as we find it in other writers of the time, Anderson argues that placing an undue emphasis on the propagandistic nature of IV, 9 will cause us to miss entirely the end of a composition which, with its giggling *puellae* and sharp contrast between Hercules, the opponent of Cacus, and Hercules, the passionate lover, is by no means serious stuff. As J. P. Sullivan remarks, if we fail to appreciate the amusement in "Hercules' hairy chest held in by the Roman equivalent of a brassiere," it is unlikely we would enjoy any of the poet's funny touches (Sullivan, *Ezra Pound and Sextus Propertius* [Austin, 1964], p. 62).

time of war, so is there a contrast between the tranquility of a home setting in IV, 9 and a monument of war in IV, 10.

(3) IV, 4 and IV, 8: Tarpeia is the guardian of a city under siege; Cynthia, on the other hand, comes into Propertius' house as if she were taking a city by assault: *spectaculum capta nec minus urbē fuit* (IV, 8, 56). In both cases a breach of faith is punished: that of the guilty Vestal, and that of the faithless lover. Finally, as the story in IV, 4 prefigures the treaty which united Sabines and Romans, so, at the end of IV, 8, do Cynthia and Propertius conclude a pact.²⁴

Other points that might be added are: the pathway leading up the hills, along which Tarpeia hoped to lead Tatius and his troops (cf. IV, 4, 49-50 and 83) and the *sacer descensus* of IV, 8, 5; the fact that in both poems a maiden is mentioned (cf. IV, 4, 92 and IV, 8, 6 and 11-12—the only places the word *uirgo* appears in Book IV), and that in either case the problem of chastity is involved—Tarpeia would gladly have hers violated; Cynthia, who could hardly be called pure, makes her way to Lanuvium, a location where chaste maidens are put to the test (cf. *si fuerint castae* . . . IV, 8, 13-14), for the purpose of unchaste behavior. It is also interesting that, in Book IV, apart from IV, 1 which gives a general view of Rome and is really an introduction for the book, the word *Tarpeius* occurs only in IV, 4 and IV, 8 (verses 1 and 29, and 31, respectively). Also, both poems are set in darkness: as Rome has settled to sleep when Tarpeia moves to betray her city (IV, 4, 85), so are all in slumber when Cynthia rouses the neighborhood (IV, 8, 59-60). Finally, as the two female figures of IV, 3 and IV, 9 were loyal women who stayed inside their different edifices, so, in IV, 4 and IV, 8, are Tarpeia and Cynthia women of action, who distinguish themselves by going abroad and by greatness of spirit. The reversal of position which we have noted as a feature of the pairs we are considering lies here in the fact that in IV, 4 a woman betrays a city besieged by a man; in IV, 8, a man is besieged by a woman.

(4) IV, 5 and IV, 7: according to Grimal, the important common ground which separates these two elegies from IV, 11 (which also deals with the death of a woman and is given over

²⁴ Grimal, p. 447.

to her speech) is that the former are concerned with a type of love—*profane*—in which marriage has no part. In addition, contrast between Cynthia, who in spite of all, has kept faith (*me seruasse fidem*, IV, 7, 53), and thus has been admitted to the Elysian Fields, and Acanthis, whose advice to young girls is *sperne fidem* (IV, 5, 27) and who thus deserves to have her grave abused, is too obvious to be coincidental.²⁵

There are other reasons for taking the two together. Most striking, perhaps, is the similarity of the opening lines of the two poems: *Manes*, which appears only twice in Book IV, occurs in IV, 5, 3 and IV, 7, 1, and in both elegies *umbra* is in exactly the same place—the first of the two disyllables which conclude the last half of the first pentameter (*umbra sitim*, IV, 5, 2; *umbra rojos*, IV, 7, 2). Furthermore, in both the poet reminisces about nights gone by, when he came stealthily to his love (IV, 5, 73-4 and IV, 7, 15-18); and both contain passages which deal with the treatment of the tomb of the departed (in IV, 5, 75-8 people are to heap abuse and stones on Acanthis' resting place; in IV, 7, 79-82 Propertius is to keep the ivy from shutting in Cynthia's tomb).

(5) IV, 1 and IV, 11: the first affirms the eternal validity of the pact which binds Augustan Rome and the gods; in IV, 11 Roman virtues become incarnate in the life and death of Cornelia, half sister to the emperor's daughter. In the first poem the gods have promised Rome glory and prosperity; in her nobility, her descent from a family renowned in battle, in her three children, in her piety, Cornelia represents the realization of these promises. In Cornelia, as it were, lives the soul of the state.²⁶


Although IV, 1 and IV, 11 are the two longest poems in Book IV and while it is thus tempting to seek a link between them, it must be noted that Cornelia represents on one plane (moral) fulfillment of the grandeur and destiny which were promised in another context (that of *uictoria arma*) in IV, 1, 39-56. This fact weakens the connection of promise (IV, 1) and realization (IV, 11) to some degree. Still, it might be said that, as IV, 2 and IV, 10, IV, 3 and IV, 9, etc. complement each other, so do IV, 1 and IV, 11 talk of arms and morals, two

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Grimal, p. 449.

important aspects of Augustan Rome (cf. Roman Odes 2 and 5, 1 and 6). But beyond this, the two poems have in common no points of detail such as we have seen join the other combinations; and, in addition, there is a more obvious item of *contrast* to the first part of IV, 1 than IV, 11. I refer to IV, 1, 71-150.²⁷

Yet we have seen enough by now to be forced to acknowledge the reality of what Grimal proposes regarding the symmetry of the elegies in Book IV. Only his representation of the book as a pyramid lacks real justification. The poems in question might just as easily be arranged in the following way:



This is, in fact, more probable.²⁸


²⁷ Celentano, unconvinced by Grimal, finds yet further cause to doubt in the latter's omission of any consideration of IV, 1, 71-150. Cf. p. 35, n.: "Naturalmente il secondo monologo è trascurato." Structurally, IV, 1, 109-18 correspond to and answer IV, 1, 39-54. Just as the earlier passage begins to mention vaticination at the 39th verse of the first half, so does the second passage, also having to do with prophecy, begin at verse 109—i.e. 39 verses from the start of the second half! In addition, in each part of IV, 1 we have two groups which successively concern the Trojan War and then Propertius as Umbrian. Moreover, both verses 39-54 (section A) and 57-70 (section B), verses 109-118 (section A₁) and 121-134 (section B₁) are separated by one couplet which rounds off A and A₁ before B and B₁ start. And on top of this, the two divisions regarding Propertius' homeland are the same number of verses—14. The contrasts lie in Propertius' changed attitude towards his poetry (in IV, 1, 57-70 he waxes enthusiastic as an Umbrian contributing to the chronicling of national success; in IV, 1, 121-34, his provenience sets him apart as one who chose in his art to shun the affairs of the insane forum). Also, in the mention, in IV, 1, 39-54, of Troy's promised resurgence (cf. *victoria arma*, 47), as against that, in IV, 1, 109-18, of the immoderation of the victorious Greeks (*victor Oiliade, rape nunc et delige uatem*, 117).

²⁸ Such a "panel" structure would find many precedents, not only with the arrangement of words within a line (e.g. Terence, *Andria*, 351: *hoc me libera niserum metu*), but with lines within a poem (e.g. Catullus, 68: see D. F. S. Thomson, "Aspects of Unity in Catullus 64," *C.J.*, LVII [1961], p. 50), and with poems within a book (e.g. the *Bucolics* in which 1 and 9 are alike in that they refer to the aftermath of civil war, while 2 and 8 are the most obviously Theo-

Poems 1, 6, and 11 do not relate to other elegies or to each other as the rest do. What they do share is their placement at structurally crucial positions (be these two supporting bases and a keystone, or beginning, middle, and end). Thus they impart a particular cast to the book and highlight its overall mood. It is fitting that these three mark the three places in Book IV where the name of Caesar appears.²⁰

Celentano is therefore mistaken when she implies that the only unity in Book IV is of an essentially negative nature. As Grimal discovered, and as it is possible to substantiate by somewhat closer attention to detail, the unity of this book does not lie in the "incoherence" of the poet's personality, but in a system of careful balances. In Book IV Propertius has stepped

criterean in subject, etc.). In the *Bucolics*, poem 5 stands at the center with its apotheosis of Daphnis, while 10 stands outside the body of the whole, balancing the apotheosis in 5 with its description of the hell on earth which the tortured Gallus suffers. O. Skutch's work on the *Monobiblos* (above, note 12) shows that in his first book Propertius did use panel arrangement and placed beyond the whole of the sequence thus established a "superstructure" of poems, much as *Bucolic* 10 appears apart from the sequence of 1-9. Now Brooks Otis, *Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963), p. 217, finds the *Aeneid* to be based on a similar pattern, with Books I and VII recalling *Bucolics*, 5 and 10:



For panel structure after Propertius, cf. D. F. Bauer, "The Function of Pygmalion in the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid," *T. A. P. A.*, XCIII (1962), p. 12, who shows that Book X of Ovid's poem is fashioned in this way. One wonders if the widespread employment of this organization dates from Ennius' experiments in matching Greek forms to Latin (the Greek genitive in the attributive position creates a box-structure, e.g. τὸ τοῦ παίδου δῶρον). It is interesting to find that even earlier, in the very first line of his translation of the *Odyssey*, Livius Andronicus shaped his words in this manner:

Virum mihi, Camoena, in sece uersutum.

The mutual relationship of *uirum*—*uersutum* is other than that which links *mihi*—*insece*; nevertheless, the balance is the same.

²⁰ *Caesar* is found in IV, 1, 46; 6, 13 and 56; 11, 58. *Augustus* is restricted to IV, 6, 23, 29, 38, and 81.

beyond the limits to which he had followed Horace in composing a block of shorter poems (III, 1-5) and is doing something more like that which Vergil had done in ordering a relatively smaller number of lengthier units. The alternation from one point of view to that standpoint which is the complete opposite (Propertius' enthusiasm for national poetry in the first part of IV, 1 pales during Horos' address in 71-150) is introduced in the opening elegy as the principle operative in the rhythm of this last book. Such alternation is present in each of the pairs identified by Grimal: IV, 2 (a god of nature and peace) and IV, 10 (*arma*, war, god of the destructive thunderbolt), IV, 3 (girl, waiting for her absent warrior, wants him home) and IV, 9 (elderly priestess keeps the warrior away when he has returned), IV, 4 (a country at war, man besieging woman) and IV, 8 (lovers at war, woman besieging man), IV, 5 (subverter of the *fides* of lovers) and IV, 7 (a lover who kept *fides*). Perhaps this shifting of mood was presented naturally by the elegist's medium of expression—the couplet with its contrasting hexameter and pentameter. Or we may here see the influence of Horace (cf. note 18).

Elegies IV, 6 and 11, like IV, 1, have no real counterpart. Like IV, 1, however, they contain within themselves at least one important opposition. IV, 6 is more like IV, 1, in that it concludes with a section which is more purely elegiac in tone and which stands off against the patriotic concerns of the first portion (Apollo's role as festive god of music and peaceful celebration emerges in IV, 6, 69-86 over his earlier leadership in war). And IV, 11 perfectly blends personal with national verse, as an individual's sorrow is sublimated in thoughts for one's own country and service to the future. This concluding elegy poses the opposition most basic of all—that of life and death. And when one sets it down, one can not quite carry away the radiance Grimal felt to shine so clearly in IV, 6. As with Vergil, Propertius' knowledge of loss stamps his work (unreconciled, Dido can not speak in *Aeneid*, VI; Horos' recollection of the poet's youth emphasizes from the first the presence, amidst flashing temples, of bitter memories). As for Vergil, Roman glory and the brilliance of her achievement only just detach themselves from darkness (before Duckworth, Poeschl pictured the *Aeneid* as a trilogy, of which only the center section, Books

P. HIBEH, 198 ON RECAPTURING FUGITIVE SAILORS.

The Ptolemaic ordinances of *P. Hib.*, 198¹ are as exasperating for their poor preservation as they are obviously important for their contents. As a result of L. Casson's recent demonstration that "the Hellenistic Age . . . provides us with no certain proof of the use of slaves as rowers,"² it is now possible to clarify to the point of reasonable certainty the section on police action to apprehend and return fugitives from the fleet. As presented by the editors the relevant text reads:

85 καὶ μὴ ἐπαναγάγει, ἔνοχος ἔστω τῷ α[ὐτῷ ἐπι]τίμῳι
καθάπερ καὶ ὁ ληιστής· κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ [δὲ καὶ το]ύς να[ύ-]

τας τοὺς τὸν χαρακτηῖρα ἔχοντας κα[ὶ τ]οὺς [8-10
ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αἱ φυλακῖται ἐν[.]...[.]ς φυλα[c. 6

ἀλῶσιν

οἱ αὖ ὧν ἐπαναγέτωσαν πρὸς [τοὺς 2-3 ε]στηκότα[ς τῶν
90 φυλακῶν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπαναγάγ[ω]σιν ἐξελεγχθέντες α[ὐτοὶ
ἀποστελλέσθωσαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς· ἔνοχοι δ' ἔστωσαν κ[αὶ οἱ
ὑποδεχόμενοι τοὺς ναῦτα[ς] φωρᾷ βασι[λ]ικῇ· ἀγῶγ[ιμοι]

δ' ἔστωσαν οἳ τε ληισταὶ καὶ οἱ λοιπο[ὶ κ]ακοῦργοι καὶ οἱ βασιλ[ικ]οὶ
ναῦται πανταχόθιν καὶ μηθεῖ[ς αὐ]τῶν ἀφαιρέσθω

95 ἢ ἐν[ο]χος ἔστω αὐτ[ὸς] ὁ κωλύ[ων] ἢ ὁ [3-4]μενος τοῖ[ς] αὐτοῖς
ἐπιτ[ίμ]οις οἷς καὶ ὁ λ[ηισ]τῆς καὶ ὁ τῇ[ν να]ύην λελο[ι]π[ώ]ς·

κατὰ

τὰ α[ὐ]τὰ δὲ καὶ οἱ ὑποδεχόμενοι [τὰς λεί]ας (?) παρὰ τ[ῶν
ληισ]τῶν ἢ κακούργου ἢ αὐτοὺς ὑπ[ὸ]δεχόμε[νοι] ἐν[ο]χοι ἔσ-
τω[σα]ν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιτίμοι[ς] κ[αθ]άπερ

100 γέγ[ρα]πται·

Let us now consider *seriatim* the individual problems of text and interpretation.

1. THE RESTORATION OF LINE 87.

The editors comment in their note (pp. 98-9), "To restore τ[ὸς] [ἀλλους τοὺς] may give the sense, but it is likely that the

¹ *The Hibeh Papyri*, Part II. Edited with Translations and Notes by E. G. Turner, with the collaboration of Marie-Thérèse Lenger. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1955. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, 32.)

² *Trans. Amer. Philol. Assn.*, XCVII (1966), pp. 35-44; the quotation is from p. 41.

class description was more precise. [ἀποστάτας], a suggestion prompted by P. C. Z. 59024. 1 and P. Teb. 703.219 (cf. editorial note), would blur the distinction between the classes. It seems not unlikely that one category of sailors was of slaves, the other of freemen. Ptolemaic sailors were recruited not only from free men of the native population, but also from slaves, prisoners of war, and pressed men (Lesquier, *Inst. mil.* pp. 256-8). The slave class seems to be indicated by the description τοὺς τὸν χαρακτήρα ἔχοντας."

A way out of the dilemma is provided by Casson's rejection of the notion that these branded men were slaves.³ This in turn dispels the editors' objection that the restoration [ἀποστάτας] blurs the distinction between the two categories of fugitives. The branded men would be—following Casson's thinking—recidivists, while the others were first-offenders.

In addition to [ἀποστάτας], the desired sense can be obtained with alternative restorations such as [πεφευγότας]. But, as the editors' note implies, the former appears to have something of the quality of a technical term and is therefore to be preferred here.

2. THE RESTORATION OF LINE 89.

The editors suggest (p. 99), "e. g. ἐφε]στηκότα[ς or καθε]στηκότα[s." There really is no choice, however. καθίστημι denotes appointing someone to or establishing him in an office. Clearly what is wanted here is the sense of being in charge of or supervising the guards, i. e. the appropriate form of ἐφίστημι (cf. LSJ, s. v.: ὁ ἐφεστηκός = officer in command). It is no accident that a well-attested official in Ptolemaic Egypt bore the title ἐπιστάτης τῶν φυλακικῶν (cf. line 103).

³ *Loc. cit.*: "We know that one of the common purposes of marking a face was to identify runaway slaves; why not runaway rowers as well? Could not the branded sailors referred to in the papyrus be second-offenders, conscripts who had deserted once before but been recaptured and on recapture were given an immediately identifiable mark to discourage them from another try? Either this explanation, or one like it, is preferable to assuming a practice in the Ptolemaic navy [i. e., use of slaves] for which there [are] no other grounds of support and which is not consonant with the general picture of slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt."

3. THE MEANING OF LINES 90-1.

It is essential to distinguish carefully the several stages of the police action involved, viz. (i) finding, (ii) apprehending, and (iii) returning the fugitives. Obviously, failure to accomplish i and ii is not *per se* punishable, but where i and ii have been accomplished failure to perform iii is culpable. Thus the editors translate, "If they do not so convey them" (i.e., the runaways whom they capture), correctly supplying the object of the verb from the object of the same verb in the preceding line. (Note also the similar implication in the opening words of line 85.) Unfortunately the editors introduce a degree of imprecision when they speak in their note (p. 99) of "policemen convicted of neglect of duty in failing to arrest the culprits."⁴ Casson's translation, "If (the police) do not arrest (the deserters)," follows the same drift. But the dereliction of duty charged to the police is not failure to arrest (which may be beyond their power), but failure to return captured fugitives to the proper authorities. The same sense emerges from the instruction concerning fugitive soldiers and sailors recorded in *P. Teb.*, 703, 219-22, ὅπως[ς] . . . τὰ ἐμπ[ι]τοῦτα συνέχῃται [μέ]χρι τῆς εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἀποστο[λ]ῆς—i.e., the responsibility of the arresting officers is to "detain the ones who fall into their hands" until their return is arranged.

In this light the penalty provided in *P. Hib.*, 198, 90-1, also becomes clearer. The editors observe (p. 99) that "the substitution for the deserting sailors of policemen convicted of neglect of duty in failing to arrest the culprits is a completely original sanction in Ptolemaic penal law."⁵ So it is, if the dereliction is viewed as a failure to arrest. But when the dereliction is accurately construed as a failure to deliver wanted persons (over whom one has control) to the proper authorities, then the penalty, stripped of originality, conforms to that provided in suretyship for appearance. Several Ptolemaic documents reveal that if the suretor failed to deliver the defendant when summoned, he was held personally liable in lieu of the defendant.

An illustrative case is that recited in *P. Mich. Zen.*, 57

⁴ Repeated by R. Taubenschlag in his review of *P. Hibeh*, II, *Journal of Juristic Papyrology*, IX-X (1956), p. 545.

⁵ See note 4.

(248 B. C.). Alketas stood surety for Theophilos, the defendant in a lawsuit, engaging παρέξεσθαι εἰς κρίσιν ἐν ἡμέραις πέντε ἢ ἀποτίσειν τὸ ἐπικαλούμενον.⁶ Theophilos decamped, Alketas' crops were sequestered pending disposition of the case, and if he does not produce Theophilos κατακριθήσεται καὶ κινδυνεύσει ἀποτίσαι Ἀλκέτας τὰς τ (δραχμίας) (= τὸ ἐπικαλούμενον).

P. Hib., 92 (= Mitteis, *Chr.*, 23; 263 B. C.) and *P. Lond.*, 220, II (= Mitteis, *Chr.*, 35; 133 B. C.) contain similar provisions for payment by sureties if they fail to produce (παραστήσειν) the individual whom they guarantee.

Even more directly to our point is *P. Teb.*, 156 (= Mitteis, *Chr.*, 47; 91 B. C.) in which two sureties undertake to deliver a third party to the police chief upon request within five days, εἰν δὲ μὴ παραστ[ήσωμε]ν ἐπὶ σ[ε] ἑξέστω σοι παραδ[ιδ]όναι ὑμᾶς (l. ἡμᾶς) ἀντ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπίτιμον εἰς τὸ βασιλικὸν κτλ. As Mitteis long ago emphasized, "Diese Urkunde ist auch darum merkwürdig, weil der Bürge hier nicht bloss auf Geld haftet, sondern eventuell selbst gefangen werden soll."⁷

4. LINE 92: THE MEANING OF *φώρα*

In a detailed note (p. 100) the editors weigh the issues involved, assuming that the reading is correct, in choosing between *φώρα* (= *ἔρευνα*) and *φωρά* (= *κλοπή*). The note concludes, "Turner believes the linguistic evidence is not strong enough to sustain the former interpretation while Lenger is not convinced that it must be rejected. Where the editors disagree the reader must choose" In the printed text (as we have seen) the decision is made in favor of *φωρά*, which results in the translation "liable to the penalties for theft from the crown." Since *φωρά* means "theft," the notion of penalty must, in this interpretation, be obtained by implication either from *φωρά* or from *ἐνοχος*. Let us analyze the penalty clauses of the whole passage to see if such an inference is supportable.

This schema reveals that the dative following *ἐνοχος* always expresses the *actual penalty* incurred and not, as would be the case in reading *φωρά*, the *cause* (reason, occasion) of the penalty.

⁶ On the meaning of ἐν ἡμέραις πέντε see *Bull. Amer. Soc. of Papyrologists*, V (1968), p. 30.

⁷ L. Mitteis, *Grundzüge*, p. 266, n. 3.

<i>Lines</i>	<i>Misdeed</i>	<i>Consequence</i>
85-86	ἐὰν]. . . μὴ ἱπαναγάγηι	ἐνοχος ἔστω τῷ α[ὕτῳ ἐπι]τίμῳι καθάπερ καὶ ὁ ληιστής
91-92	οἱ] ὑποδεχόμενοι τοὺς ναῦτα[ς]	ἐνοχοὶ ἔστωσαν . . . φῶραι βα- σι[λ]ικῇ
95-96	ὁ κωλύ[ων]	ἐν[ο]χος ἔστω . . . τοῖ[ς] αὐτοῖς ἐπιτ[ίμ]οις οἷς καὶ ὁ λ[ηισ]τῆς καὶ ὁ τῇ[ν να]ῦν λελο[ι]π[ώ]ς
97-100	οἱ ὑποδεχόμενοι τὰς ?λεί[ας] . . . ἢ αὐτοὺς ἱπ[ο]δεχόμε[νοι]	ἐν[ο]χοὶ ἔστω[σαν] τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιτίμοι[ς] κ[α]θάπερ ±12] γέγ[ρα]πται.

Therefore the word in line 92 must be *φώρα*—i. e., the penalty for harboring runaway sailors is a royal search party. This interpretation is also more congruent with the general context of search for fugitives, and receives particular support from the instruction *ἐ[ρ]ευναν ποιεῖσθωσαν* in lines 102-3.

As the editors point out (pp. 100, 101), the interpretation placed upon *τὸν φῶρ* *τὸν βασ[ιλικόν]* in line 103 depends on the view taken of *φῶραι* in line 92. In the light of the foregoing this *φῶρ* emerges as a member of the search party and—in the editors' words—"φῶρ *βασιλικός* is a kind of crown detective."

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have presented the case for the following readings and restorations: [*ἀποστάτας*] *aut sim.* in line 87, *ἐφε*-*στηκότα*[ς] in 89, and *φῶραι* in 92. Incorporating these emendations, I translate *P. Hib.*, 198, 86-92, as follows:

Likewise the police [are to track down?] the sailors bearing the brand and the deserters from the fleet, and they are to deliver as many as are captured to the commanders of the police stations. If they do not deliver them, upon conviction they themselves are to be sent off to the ships. And those harboring the sailors are also liable to government search.

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TERENCE, *ANDRIA*, 74-79 AND THE PALATINE
ANTHOLOGY.

SI. primo haec pudice vitam parce et duriter
agebat, lana ac tela victum quaeritans;
sed postquam amans accessit pretium pollicens
unus et item alter, ita ut ingeniumst omnium
hominum ab labore proclive ad lubidinem,
accepit concicionem, dehinc quaestum occipit.

The verses cited are crucial to Terence's *defensio Chrysidis*, as Donatus *ad loc.* views it—the playwright's attempt to portray the courtesan in a favorable light (*partim defendenda, partim etiam laudanda*, says Donatus, *ad And.*, 71). She must be treated sympathetically if Glycerium, whom Chrysis has brought up as her sister, is to seem worthy of ultimate marriage to Pamphilus.

How well Terence—and presumably Menander—succeeded in this attempt, both here and in the famous *o Mysis Mysis* speech of Pamphilus (*And.*, 282-98), is known to all who have studied the play. It is small wonder that Terence's portrayal inspired Thornton Wilder to write his brief but sensitive and beautiful *Woman of Andros*.

The present passage has been rather fully discussed by commentators from Donatus down. G. P. Shipp, in his annotated edition of the *Andria* (2d ed.; Oxford, 1960), points out *ad And.*, 75 that Greek and Roman women "could not earn an honourable living away from their homes; so here *lana ac tela* and the *quaestus meretricius* are the only alternatives thought of."

But neither Shipp nor apparently any of his predecessors as editors of the *Andria*, nor any of the scholars who have written separate articles on the play, has brought into connection with our passage several poems of the *Palatine Anthology*, which show that Chrysis' *facilis descensus* was a recognized culture-trait of Hellenistic society, with a *rite de passage* all its own: the dedication of the spinster's implements to the goddess of respectable feminine employment, Athena, whom she thus abjures, and her dedication of herself to a new patroness, Aphrodite. This is most cleverly expressed in an anonymous epigram, *Anth. Pal.*, VI, 48, which closely parallels the preceding poem, attributed to Antipater of Sidon (*fl. ca.* 130 B.C.):

Κερκίδα τὴν φιλοεργὸν Ἀθηναίῃ θέτο Βιττῶ
 ἄνθεμα, λ-μηρῆς ἄρμενον ἐργασίης,
 πάντας ἀπόστυξασα γυνή τότε τοὺς ἐν ἐρίθοις
 μόχθους καὶ στυγερὰς φροντίδας ἰστοπόνων·
 εἶπε δ' Ἀθηναίῃ· Τῶν Κύπριδος ἄψομαι ἔργων,
 τὴν Πάριδος κατὰ σοῦ ψῆφον ἐνεγκαμένη.

Compare also *Anth. Pal.*, VI, 285, in similar vein.

The other side of the coin is shown by a whole series of epigrams, wherein working-women who have continued, in some cases throughout their active lives, to earn their living *parce ac duriter*, dedicate their implements to Athena, without—except in one instance—apparently giving a thought to her more seductive rival. These are *Anth. Pal.*, VI, 39, 160, 174, 247, 287, 288, 289; VII, 726; IX, 96. The one exception, also by Antipater, clearly shows in its last two lines that the three wise virgins who dedicate their basket, spindle, and comb to Pallas have indeed been tempted by the alternative, but have womanfully rejected it (*Anth. Pal.*, VI, 174, 7-8):

ζώειν γὰρ δίχα παντὸς ὀνείδεος ἤθελ' ἐκάστα,
 ξεῖνε, τὸν ἐκ χειρῶν ἀρνημένα βίοντον.

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REVIEWS.

WARREN D. ANDERSON *Ethos and Education in Greek Music: The Evidence of Poetry and Philosophy*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 306.

One of the most fascinating conceptions of Greek culture is the idea that music could express various moral qualities, and perhaps even produce them. Hermann Abert, in his monumental work, *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik*, has up till now provided the authoritative treatment of this subject. The present work, though it echoes the title of its Germanic predecessor, is an independent re-appraisal of much of the primary source material which not only profits from another two thirds of a century's scholarly activity, but also keeps in mind historical and developmental considerations more clearly than Abert's work. The result is a first-rate piece of scholarship which, in my opinion, replaces the earlier work as the authoritative exposition of the subject (at least for the period covered) and establishes Anderson as a worthy student of his great teacher, Werner Jaeger, and of his acknowledged guide on musical matters, Professor Winnington-Ingram.

Anderson's treatment is selective, not exhaustive: he discusses no author after Aristotle except Philodemus. Of Hellenic authors he has chosen to concentrate on Plato and Aristotle, though some of his more perceptive remarks concern earlier writers such as Pindar, Aristophanes, and Damon (whose role in the creation of ethical and political theories about music Anderson had already discussed in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVI [1955]) and the anonymous writer of the Hibeh papyrus. Moreover, his concentration is heavily on "ethos"; "education"—by which he means what Jaeger meant by "Paideia,"—is only lightly touched upon.

Anderson modestly disclaims any intent to make a contribution to the musicological aspect of his topic. His approach is philological—"a chapter," as he puts it, "in the history of ideas." Nevertheless he quickly and surely demonstrates his familiarity with the treacherous terrain of speculations, ancient and modern, on the nature of the music itself. His introductory chapter sets out, with admirable conciseness and clarity, a reasonable survey of what we know of the music and its historical development, with summaries of leading modern theories, ending with a statement of his own views. What comments I have on some of the positions taken in this chapter I shall reserve until after a review of the major portion of the book.

Anderson begins his analysis with Pindar, the first "professional musician." However, since Pindar is already familiar with "the practice of modal ethos" (p. 26), we must then go back even earlier—first to the pre-Socratic philosophers, and then to the "lyric" poets. I feel that this section of the book would have gained immensely in clarity if the material had been treated in chronological order. There has been no thematic gain in beginning *in mediis rebus*, so far as I can see. The content, however, is most rewarding; Anderson's treatment is perceptive and illuminating, and

masterful in the handling of problems of every kind that cluster around each item. His footnotes are particularly important; the attention he pays to Aristophanes' attitude to music is especially welcome.

The main portion of the book is found in two brilliant chapters on Plato and Aristotle. They are constructed on careful expositions of the many relevant passages in each author, with full attention being paid to scholarly opinions, yet with fresh and independent judgments by Anderson himself on every page. He concludes that Plato recognizes music's practical worth, applies moral terms to the "modes," is somewhat ambiguous in his application of music to *paideia*, grows in tolerance in later dialogues, such as the *Lysis*, and yet has a theory of music's ethical force in society which is "unassailable provided we accept his assumptions" (pp. 109-10). Though he inherits ideas from Pythagorean, Sophistic, and Damonian sources, Plato's concepts are essentially his own. Aristotle, on the other hand, fails to utilize his own theories of sensation and alteration to provide an explanation of the alleged ethical force of music, and though he is more tolerant than Plato, his approach is "less thoroughly considered than Plato's" and serves best as a supplement to Plato's ideas (pp. 145-6).

Anderson then discusses the diatribe from the Hibeh papyrus. He dates it in the first half of the fourth century. In itself the document lacks substance, but is interesting as evidence for various aspects of the harmonicist theories it attacks (those of Damon and Plato). One matter of interest is the fact that ethical values are attributed, the writer claims, to various genera. Philodemus' work *On Music* is studied more for what it can tell us about Plato's thought, or the thought of other Hellenic writers than as an important contribution of its own to the subject. Among the ideas I find interesting was a reference to a realization that individuals vary widely in their response to the same music (p. 53). Anderson feels that although Philodemus criticizes many details of Plato's theory of ethos, he is not "Plato's enemy" (p. 175).

Anderson's general conclusions are simple, and in my opinion, convincing: "... there exists no common denominator which can be termed *the* Hellenic theory of ethos" (p. 177)—as Abert tacitly assumed in his analysis. Instead of this illusory standard theory of ethos Anderson would substitute "... a basic phenomenon: the real or supposed effects of music, which Greek writers sought to explain or utilize in their several ways..." (*ibid.*). Though there was awareness of primitive tribal connotations, of ethos through conventional associations with certain genres of literature, and of various religious associations, these were only rarely used to explain the phenomena. The best thinkers did not ascribe ethical power directly to technical characteristics. Plato felt ethos mainly in the combination of word, rhythm, and music, not in technical "modality." Nonetheless all Greeks believed in the paideutic ethos of music which "sank deep in the soul" and in some way assisted in the formation of human character (*ibid.*).

These conclusions are, in my opinion, fully convincing. But they lead inevitably to another question: what was the nature of this "basic phenomenon" to which these ethical qualities are attributed?

Unless we can gain some impression of this phenomenon for ourselves we are like men from the kingdom of the blind arguing the difference between blue and green. Is it possible for us today to share to any degree whatever in the experience? This brings us again to the introductory chapter where Anderson outlines his own positions as to the nature of the music itself.

After a survey of the differences between ancient and modern music, a discussion of the various Greek musical instruments (in which, by the way, he discusses the *auloi* without mentioning Schlesinger's work, although he later discusses her controversial theories of modality), ancient treatises on *harmoniai*, *tonoi*, *systemata*, and species of the octave, and a few of the modern theories of modality—those of Monro, Macran, Sachs, Gombosi, Schlesinger in particular (why not Winnington-Ingram from his book, *Mode in Ancient Greek Music*, which seems to be used as a source for Aristides' scales only?)—Anderson states his own position (pp. 26 ff.). He begins with an eloquent affirmation of the philologist's credo: "As matters stand, the source of final authority here is the written word: the evidence of poet and philosopher remains sovereign, not to be coerced into agreement with any *a priori* assumption" (*ibid.*). As a declaration of method for the rest of his book this is admirable; for a chapter on the music itself it is misleading. *A priori* assumptions are not the only pretenders to sovereignty; evidence comes from many other quarters, some of which have higher authority than poets and philosophers—at least in the areas of musicology. There are principles of acoustics and mathematics; there are technical treatises and relics of actual pieces of music. Archaeology supplies us with evidence of, among other things, relics of the actual instruments themselves which provide facts, however puzzling, which one cannot simply "grant" or "not grant" for the sake of argument (as on p. 24). This need not drive us to accept (say) Schlesinger's hypotheses *in toto*, and we need to be sobered in our enthusiasm by the kind of inconclusive results reported by Landels in *A. B. S. A.* and *Hesperia* recently, but the existence to some degree of equipartite sequences of intervals does not depend on a controversial interpretation of a single phrase of Aristotle. It is attested even in some of the scales reported by Ptolemy, including the one of his own labelled "*homalon*" ("level" or "normal"). In a word, I do not believe that Vogel (quoted pp. 216-17) has said the final word on equipartition.

I am not being fair to Anderson, who fully understands "the vulnerability of whatever statement may be attempted . . ." (p. 26) and has more than demonstrated his familiarity with all of the evidence I have mentioned. My purpose is merely to underline the tentative nature of some of the positions taken, particularly when in the main part of the book they seem to have acquired a somewhat greater degree of certainty. I shall take one example: on page 62, discussing Aristophanes, Anderson suggests that "true Harmoniai" were being obscured by the increasingly prevalent use of the octave-species at the end of the fifth century. On page 71 he suggests that the "modality" of Plato's day was that of the octave-species, and rejects Chailley's claim that Harmoniai and octave-species were distinguished in Plato's thought. On page 117,

discussing Aristotle, he asserts that Aristotle's references "seem to presuppose the interchangeable and, so to speak, tempered modes complex which replaced the original modes . . . and that species likely dominated theory and practice." What emerges is the position that Plato and Aristotle, in the passages which are analyzed throughout the book, are talking about octave species. Yet the introductory chapter does not take this position; it in fact is very (and rightfully) wary of settling on any single hypothesis as to the nature of the *Harmoniai* about which the philosophers are talking. There is no hint that these *Harmoniai* are really these neat and easily comprehensible scale patterns known as species (*eide*) which fail, upon further examination, to provide us, at any rate, with any glimpse of "the basic phenomenon," and about which there is, besides, no ethical speculation in ancient authors.

For this reason I regret that Anderson has not completely abandoned the misleading English words "mode" and "modality." For the Greek-less reader it calls up either "major" or "minor" or, perhaps, the Church Modes. As Anderson himself states (p. 29, quoting Chailley), "Now, not a single one of these criteria (of mode) has any value for ancient music." In fact I am coming to believe that all discussions of Greek music to be fair should *transliterate* Greek musical jargon. We already long have had "*kithara*" instead of "harp." Surely Campbell's defense of "flute" for "*auloi*" is just silly (*J. H. S.*, LXXXIV [1964], p. 63); the term "flute" is wrong precisely because it has all the *wrong* connotations. In every case, not just in some chosen for stylistic variation, the reader is entitled to know whether the Greek author is using *harmonia*, *tropos*, *toros* or just an ethnical adverb *doristi*, etc. Only in this way can he savor the full complexity of the ambiguities involved.

This is the second work to appear in English in recent years on the general topic of Greek conceptions about music, the other being E. A. Lippman's *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece*. After writing the review to this point I re-read the earlier work—particularly the chapter on "Theories of Musical Ethics." (Anderson lists the Lippman work in his bibliography but it had evidently appeared too late to discuss in the body of the book; in any case I found no discussion of it.) There is no doubt in my mind that Anderson's work grapples more realistically with the primary evidence, showing not only a command of the original language, but also of all the scholarship, including that concerned with the musicological side. Yet Lippman's work will have a useful value because he emphasizes more than Anderson the relationship of the concept of *ethos* to the broader scope of Greek culture as a whole; myth, religion, medicine, general philosophy, literature, and even war. Anderson's work, on the other hand, provides a valuable corrective in bringing the student back to the actual evidence, with all its frustrating ambiguity. It is somewhat ironic that it is the professor of Music who puts music in the context of *paideia* as a whole, and it is the professor of Classics who shows the firmest grasp of the musicological aspects of the problem.

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BEN EDWIN PERRY. *The Ancient Romances. A Literary-Historical Account of their Origins.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967. Pp. xii + 407. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXXVI.)

Few scholars, if any were as well qualified to write this book as Professor Perry. It presents in comprehensive and definitive form views built up over a lifetime of fruitful scholarship. It was worth waiting for.

The first part of the study is an extensive elaboration of the author's important article on Chariton in *A.J.P.*, LI (1930). Perry looks, for the origins of the Greek novel, not to its formal *Vorläufer* but to its essential nature, as exemplified particularly in *Chaereas and Callirhoe*. This examination is preceded by two chapters whose function is to clear the ground of theoretical misconceptions and to set the reconsidered question in a background wide enough to show the novel as the major literary form it is; and concludes with a detailed examination of the *Ninus* fragments (Perry argues cogently for the order BAC), which in all probability represent fairly the very earliest stage of the form. "The first romance," concludes Perry, "was deliberately planned and written by an individual author its inventor. . . . It did not come into being by a process of development on the literary plane. What had really developed was the complex cultural outlook, the *Weitanschauung*, of society as a whole in the Alexandrian age."

One can only applaud Perry's whole approach. Literature is primarily a function of the society that produces and consumes it, and not of other literature; but it is not thus that the origins of the novel have commonly been explained. Scholars have looked rather for precise literary affiliations for the form, sometimes to the complete exclusion of more general considerations—v. e. G. Giangrande in *Eranos*, LX (1962), where Lavagnini is taken sternly to task (p. 147, n. 1; cf. p. 151, n. 2) for even mentioning such a concept as "l'evoluzione dello spirito greco," and for abandoning thereby a commendable "concreteness in literary analysis." Perry's point of departure is polemic against such would-be scientific analysis of literary "development"; it is an entirely inappropriate procedure, transferred from biology, which does not have to reckon—as literary analysis does—with deliberate human intention. Another voice, thus, is raised in rebellion against the dictatorship of Aristotle in literary criticism. In our times Rohde saw the novel as a development by fusion of *Reisefabulistik* and Hellenistic love-elegy; half a century ago Schissel, starting from the same point as Perry (*Entwicklungsgeschichte*, Vorwort), dismissed the earlier and lengthier part of *Der gr. Roman* as "the content of one sentence" (cf. Perry's word "irrelevant"); but since then scholar after scholar has done obeisance to him, and one has even seen revived very recently (Q. Cataudella, *Il romanzo classico* [Rome, 1958]) his theory of the genesis of the novel in the concoction by sophists of fictitious court-cases. Here he is summarily dismissed. Other studies—Lavagnini's *Origini* and Ludvíkovský's *Řecký román Dobrodružný*—are seen as more penetrating. They too, however, have failed to examine critically the central concept of "development."

In particular, historiography did not "develop" into the novel, and could not have done so; it "passed through zero"; that is, at a precise point of time ("a Tuesday afternoon in July") a specific writer deliberately decided to create a new kind of book, the novel. In so doing he used much of the material of historiography, notably historical characters, in deference to the traditions of prose; but he was writing something that was not in any sense historiography. There is thus no spectrum starting with Xenophon's *Cyropedia* and going on through the Alexander-romance, *Ninus*, and *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, to end with, say, *Leucippe and Clitophon*. Rather, there is a full stop after the Alexander-romance; the *Zeitgeist* intervenes; and a fresh sentence, indeed a fresh chapter in literary history, begins with *Ninus*, or with something very like it.

Perhaps the forces of social evolution are often taken as read rather than disregarded entirely; this full stop is more startling, more revolutionary, than the Hellenistic *Weltanschauung*, its complement in Perry's theory. For if any theory may be said to hold the field today, it is that of Eduard Schwartz; R. M. Rattenbury puts it neatly: "romantic history with less or more attention to the affairs of the heart developed into erotic romance with a spice of adventure" (*New Chapters*, III, p. 222). Schwartz's term was *Zersetzung*, "dissolution"; Perry describes romance, in this theory, as "a disease of historiography." An arresting thought, and excellent rhetoric. But this is loading the dice; what is involved is creation, not decay. And the creative force is working on historical material. The *Ninus*-author, for all that his intentions were novel, was still making up episodes in a celebrated life; and this was surely suggested to him by what, say, Ps.-Callisthenes had done. The term "development" is thus not without meaning as a description of the *Alexander-Ninus* interval, and it is a useful concept.

But if at times Perry seems rather vehement in this whole discussion, his positive emphasis on "the cultural factor" is strongly to be commended. It leads him next to situate the novel in relation to other major forms—epic, drama, and other prose literature—in European as well as classical times. Romance, as the narration of the experiences of the individual, is seen as a variety of epic, "the open form *par excellence* for the open society," and the natural vehicle for the megalopolitan, centrifugal society, as much 2000 years ago as now. In Perry's social biology there are distinct undertones of Trilling and Wilson; and one will even find the phrase "historical necessity" employed. We are given a stimulating *aperçu*, in these terms, of a history of Greek literature, from Homer on; until finally, in a new age, a "transvaluation of narrative values" occurs which transfers the "plasmatic license" long conventional in drama to prose, whose function had hitherto been essentially informative. The Greek novel, thus, while employing the outward form and literary sanctions of historiography, is essentially Hellenistic drama cast in the narrative form appropriate to the distribution of late Hellenistic society (cf. here K. Kerényi on the transference of cultural life to papyrus in the Hellenistic age, in *Neue Rundschau*, Oct. 1938, pp. 393-405). This chapter forms a particularly rewarding essay, which should be read by all students of Greek literature. In ch. III Chariton's sentimental story is taken

as a fair representative of presophistic romance, written by and for the "poor in spirit"; it is contrasted with later novels, notably with *Leucippe and Clitophon*; which, alike in its sophisticated narrative technique and in its non-ideal orientation, marks a critical advance in prose fiction—Achilles Tatius, suggests Perry, is to Chariton as Fielding is to Richardson. And this thesis is made the basis for an illuminating discussion of the nature of Greek romance in both earlier and later stages, though the later novels are treated only in an intermitteat way.

The ideal novel only became fashionable in literature well after Chariton's day, and in a "sophisticated" form (Perry suspects that Chariton wrote "in the early part of the first century rather than later"; A. Papanikolaou [diss. Köln, 1962], puts him even in the 1st century B. C.). But the comic novel, says Perry, turning to his second main theme, is inspired by no proprieties of fashion, by no world-view; it occurs as a sporadic phenomenon, a *jeu d'esprit* on the part of a highly sophisticated writer. A fundamental distinction is thus to be made between ideal and comic narration; and for the latter, all one can attempt to elucidate is the special circumstances of its genesis. Part II deals in these terms with Petronius, "Lucian's" *Metamorphoses*, and Apuleius; here again, the discussion is indebted to the author's earlier work, notably to his 1920 thesis, with its well-known view that Lucian was the author of the original story from which both *Asinus* and Apuleius' romance are (independently) derived. In this whole section the guiding concept is that of the power of academic tradition: the writers of the comic novels all *wanted* to write straight "entertainments," but dared not because "the ancients had no use for prose fiction." Thus: for Perry, Lucian's *Met.* essentially a *divertissement*, is legitimized by being given a veneer of satire; Apuleius' novel is justified by XI, which is not integral in the story; and as for that notorious puzzle the *Satiricon*, it was deliberately written as farce so that Nero—Roman, artist, and therefore literary snob—would feel only contempt, and not dangerous admiration, for its author.

Earlier, one felt perhaps that Chariton wrote "history," as Alexander invaded Asia, simply because "it never occurred to him not to"—rather than in positive deference to academic tradition. And here too one has reserves. Is Lucian's satire on superstition in *Met.* / *Asinus* only an academic face-saving pretense? That, at least, sounds very unlike Lucian. Can Apuleius' religiosity really be detached from his literary method? Above all, did Petronius really write farce so that no one would pay any attention to him? Rare bird indeed; and much good it did him. Better, if that was his aim, not write a book at all. Surely he simply saw literary possibilities in farce? This part of Perry's study will perhaps carry less conviction than the first part. The comic novel is, certainly, a rarer phenomenon than the serious one; but this means, not that it has "no genetic relationship" with the serious novel, but that comedy is harder of achievement than seriousness. Photius was surely not wrong in making a *rapprochement*, however tenuous it may be, between *Asinus* and erotic romance (one thinks particularly of the exotic adventures of the *Ephesiaca*).

More generally, however, Perry opens up a whole new vista in

emphasizing the twin forces of a new *Weltanschauung* and academic tradition. They do indeed dominate the whole literature of the period; the novels are very much the product of their times. But in Perry's book—paradoxically, given its whole orientation—there seems too much emphasis on form and too little, at least in the first part, on content. Perry is concerned with origins, true; but it is dangerous to separate origins too clinically from the developed form, for more is implicit in the earliest novels than shows there. What, after all, are the novels about? To the present writer it seems profoundly mistaken to say, as Perry does, that the sophistic novelists are not really interested in the framework of the love-story, but use it as a peg on which to hang their Second Sophistical *pièces d'occasion*. The principal themes of the novel are love, travel, and adventure—even though Rohde said so; one should add, divine protection. To lump all this under the heading of “the individual suffering the assaults of Tyche,” as Perry does in effect, is to sell Hellenistic man rather short. The novels, even the earliest, show him reacting to his situation; countering his isolation by loving, discerning behind the buffets of fortune a divine guiding hand; the epic dimension is not entirely lost. And here one may situate the topical question: what does Perry think of Merkelbach's (and Kerényi's) theory of the religious origin of the novels as *Mysterientexte*? Very little; it is “all nonsense,” in fact. As indeed it is. But elsewhere Merkelbach and company, we read, “know not the way of the spirit until it is institutionalized”; and this remark, if it summarizes the case as neatly as any of the many adverse reviews of Merkelbach's book (Perry could add, notably, that of R. Turcan in *R.H.R.*, 1963), also underlines the fact that Perry himself really says very little about that “spirit” which he puts at the base of his own theory. Here too, however, as everywhere, he is always liable to throw out valuable suggestions; v. especially pp. 120 ff. on the possibility of tragic themes in the novel.

The appendices discuss the pseudo-Clementine romance; *Apollonius of Tyre* (an original Latin composition, Perry argues convincingly); and “the egg-narrative in comic stories.” To the bibliography—much of which is contained in the notes—some references may be added here. J. W. B. Barns, in *Akten 8. Kongr. für Pap.* (Vienna, 1956), suggests an influence of Demotic narrative on Greek romance (this is surely an important element; one has only to think of the importance of translation for Roman and Elizabethan literature). For a bibliography of recent work on the novel in general, v. O. Mazal in *Jhb. est. byz. Gesellsch.*, XIII (1964), pp. 29-86. Finally, on the date of Heliodorus: A. Colonna, *Ath.*, 1950, is much more important than Perry suggests (p. 349, n. 13; his “elsewhere” is *M. O.*, XVIII [1951], pp. 143-9); his arguments are substantial, and are not met, as van der Valk's are, by Altheim's (*Lit. u. Geschellsch.*, II, pp. 272 ff.) and Weinreich's “erste Heliodorleser” theory; v. now R. Eydell, *Polychronion* (= *Festschr. für Fr. Dölger* [Heidelberg, 1966]), pp. 345-50 (I am indebted for this reference to Dr. Stephanie West). It seems that Heliodorus must go back to the latter part of the 4th century.

This review cannot do more than suggest the richness of *The Ancient Romances*. Professor Perry, it seems, is incapable of

writing anything that is not stimulating and eminently readable. To find much of his discussion provocative, even to question some of his conclusions, is in no way to impugn the value of his study, for it deals in a pertinent and often profound way with matters of fundamental importance for the novel. More than that; since the author displays throughout his book the breadth of view, unflagging thoughtfulness, and ample scholarship we long ago learned to expect from him, it transcends that question on every page. This is clearly the most important study of the novel since Rohde and Lavagnini; and it deals a shrewd, sensible, and welcome blow to the whole traditional approach to the subject of its origins.

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CHRISTIAN MEIER. *Res publica amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik*. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1966. Pp. 332.

This is a work which no student of the Late Republic can overlook. Much of the ground has already been deeply plowed, and Meier does not seek new views simply for the sake of novelty; but the structure of politics which emerges here has its surprises. Always the focus is on Rome, not its overseas activities; and, within Rome, on the senatorial aristocracy. This element, in turn, is seen as the focus of a network of personal ties (*necessitudines*) rather than of programs (*partium sensus*), both in elections and in the conduct of daily political life. Cicero plays very little part as theoretician or practical politician, though the title of the work comes from his letters (cf. *ad Att.*, I, 18, 6); nor do any of the warlords save Sulla, "more senatorial than the Senate." This point of view helps Meier to find an answer to one problem which spurred his researches: Why did the old form of government persist so long? His concentration on the Senate also has utility if we look at the Late Republic from the past of Rome rather than its future in the Empire; the inevitable weakness which also results I shall note at the end of this critique.

Meier's work is very broadly based; if anything there are too many footnotes (and certainly too many cross-references). But his conclusions are always his own, the fruit of very careful study. Above all, he has thought himself into the period of roughly 100-59 B. C. so deeply that one feels that breath of life which animates really good history. Early he lays down the principle (p. 14), "Schon geringe Unterschiede in Auffassung, Temperament und Urteilsfähigkeit konnten sich sehr kräftig auswirken"; and he examines the nuances and divagations of his tale for their own sake, not to illustrate any iron determinism forcing Rome toward that situation which Tacitus summed up, *iura quis pace et principe uteremur*.

Two-thirds of the book present an analytical study of the prin-

ciples on which the Roman constitution actually operated during this period; the last section illuminates the development chronologically. Meier's portrait is essentially as follows.

Down to 150 the senatorial aristocracy controlled the processes of government without difficulty on the basis of its consecration to public duty and "kollektive Moral." The survey of the limitation of the assemblies (pp. 53, 116 ff.) deserves careful consideration, though he overidealizes early conditions. Thereafter the aristocracy appeared to control until 59 through an extensive web of *clientelae*, which interwove "public" and "private" life and also fractionalized Roman politics. Neither Sulla nor the great individuals of the 60's and 50's always determined who would be elected, as in the elections for 54 (on this period cf. beyond Meier, pp. 11-12, T. P. Wiseman, in *J. R. S.*, LXVI [1966], pp. 108 ff.). While indebted to Gelzer, Wieacker, and also to Badian, Meier will have none of the great blocs postulated by Scullard and Syme (cf. his trenchant, detailed rebuttal on pp. 175-90).

Four times between 95 and 80 there were efforts to realign the practice of government, each time by strengthening the Senate; but each made the situation fundamentally less stable. Thereafter "reform" virtually ceased to be a major subject of debate or a determinant in elections; to be a *popularis* was not to present such a program but rather to seek to use the people against the senatorial group for one's own ends (cf. Meier's article s. v. *Populares* in R.-E., Supplementband X). Within the framework of principles which Meier traces there was, he argues, no alternative by which the crisis could be solved.

Why was there a crisis? The answer advanced here, given at length and with careful shading, is basically the extension of Roman rule. The most important consequence was the "Extensivierung" of the body politic, i. e., its enlargement as the equestrians, urban proletariat, and army expanded. Not that these elements stood directly opposed to the Senate; in a long survey of the equestrians (pp. 65-95) Meier establishes clearly both their growth in power and also their general support of the Senate—if it knew its mind. But the pressure of the *publicani* hindered, narrowed, and weakened the senatorial sense of responsibility, and in the chaos of the 50's the equestrians could tack and veer, "Ein Element der Störung und der Unsicherheit in der Politik, gleichsam einen nicht vertäuten schweren Ballast im römischen Staatsschiff" (p. 93). And so this element could come to terms with Caesar, and the forthcoming monarchy use its members in administration. Alike the equestrians, proletariat, and army were practically satisfied with the inherited structure of senatorial politics but, not really fitting within it, introduced serious distortions in politics and power-relations.

With the "Extensivierung" went a correlative decline in public interest and a stiffening of inherited institutions and principles which removed their life while hardening their forms. The aristocracy, thus, lost its inner solidarity and devotion to duty; its position became rather a possession. Yet for long the empire permitted the Romans not to change their structure of government—save in making it more lax and permissive in meeting the personal, private needs of each small group bound by *necessitudines*. "Die

weitesten Teile von Senat und Bourgeoisie waren primär an der Erhaltung des Status quo interessiert: man fühlte sich in dem extensivierten, schwachen Staat unglaublich wohl" (p. 156, cf. pp. 4, 301). Men thus held to the inherited order the more it weakened internally, and became the less able to visualize real reforms; the structure of *necessit-dines* prevented real debate at elections and threw leaders now together, now in opposition in the turn of the kaleidoscope. This line of approach seems to me an admirable one to explain the world of Lucretius and of the *piscinarii*.

The Sullan wars dealt the aristocracy further blows, both by wiping out many leaders (cf. Meier's remarks on the few *principes* active in the 80's and 70's, pp. 243, 268-9) and by weakening the morale of the Senate. "Popular" politics, especially that connected with Pompey's extraordinary commands, went further in disintegrating the moral foundations of the established order; had not the assemblies stood beside the Senate the latter might have been able to make its compromises with the great individuals, rather than producing an explosion. Even though the nobility by now was not the leader but the servant of society (p. 156), its outward position revived markedly in the 60's. Here Meier breaks fresh ground, as also in his justification of the policies he ascribes to Cato in the last years of the decade. This frozen system might well have lasted longer, but a series of semi-accidents brought Caesar's consulship with its host of actions taken despite the bans of Bibulus, open blows at "die geheiligten Grundsätze der Verfassung" (p. 143; cf. Meier's article in *Historia*, X [1961], pp. 68-98). Thereafter the struggle of the self-seeking individuals led on inexorably to the civil war of Caesar and Pompey. So the *res publica* was "lost"; or more properly, reality ceased to correspond to political theory (cf. Cicero, *Rep.*, V, 2, *rem publicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam pridem amisimus*).

As summarized, much of this may sound familiar; but as Meier treats it in rich detail it assumes vivid life. To give only a few examples, he turns the key neatly to unlock Pompey's problem, which made him always unsure "ob er nämlich besser daran tue, durch Zurückhaltung ein gutes Einvernehmen mit Senat und *boni* anzustreben oder seine Position gewaltsam mit Hilfe der Volksversammlung zu verbessern" (pp. 272-3). For the recent Russian efforts to interpret the declining Republic as an era of social upheaval he, like Heuss, has no place (e. g., p. 145); there is a superb analysis of *why* a police force was impossible within the senatorial regime (pp. 157 ff.). While Meier draws helpful parallels with 18th century England (and recent Bundestag elections), he is fully aware of the great differences between modern and ancient conditions. Nor will he take one or two specific cases and turn them into general practice; his remarks on generals and land distributions are thoughtful, as is his comment on the limited possibility of using military force in politics (pp. 103-5).

Some readers will wish that he had paid more attention to the problems overseas; in this work the provincials exist mainly to be plundered. But this limit was for him to set; Meier's concern is that of the basic issues in the conduct of public life at Rome. Here too his youthful vigor will produce violent disagreement on a

number of matters of interpretation, especially with respect to his refusal to see the Late Republic in terms of blocs; my own criticisms would concern rather two elements in the general situation. In the first place, his picture of the equestrians is not totally satisfying. Early, they cooperate with the Senate by and large; later (e.g., pp. 148-50, 154, 277) Meier seems almost to veer away from the proper view which Badian (*Historia*, XI [1962], p. 224) trenchantly summed up, "The Equites could impose or block a particular measure and thus prevent a policy from being pursued; but they were never capable of pursuing a policy." And always Meier tends to call them a "Grossbourgeoisie." This term has as little relevance as does the word "feudalism" in various ancient situations, and should be avoided; Hill did better in *The Roman Middle Class*, though even this description has misleading aspects (cf. my review in this journal, LXXV [1954], pp. 421 ff.). In the second place, Meier pays virtually no attention to the upper classes of the Italian municipalities, an element which cannot be overlooked; cf. E. Lepore, *Il Princeps Ciceroniano* (1954); E. T. Salmon, *Phoenix*, XVI (1962), pp. 107 ff.; Badian's summary, *Historia*, XI (1962), pp. 220-1, 224 (after Gabba).

More generally, Meier views the Late Republic solely as coming out of the past. If we look from the future, i.e., the Empire, backwards, the foreshadowing of what was to come is far less clearly visible, though Meier essays in his concluding chapters, a chronological study of developments, to discuss the rise of the great individuals. Still, the Senate stands in his foreground here too, and the end of the Republic appears as an explosion. So perhaps it was from the senatorial point of view; but one looks forward to his promised study on the monarchy of Caesar, who is treated very lightly here. It remains to note that proofreading has been excellent, though a few errors remain; there are four indices, of persons, general topics, specially important subjects (aristocracy, elections, etc.), and sources.

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H. D. F. KITTO. *Poiesis: Structure and Thought*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966. Pp. vi + 407. \$7.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXXVI.)

In his first chapter, "Criticism and Chaos," Professor Kitto bluntly poses an urgent question: what criterion (if any) still remains by which the meaning of an ancient literary work may be determined? There is no denying that classical literature, which appealed to earlier generations precisely because of its apparent assurance, permanence, and clarity, is now sharing the fate of most phenomena of twentieth-century culture. The assurance is no more, the lines are blurred, the colors psychedelic. No two observers can agree on what is seen. Kitto's examples, selected from the professional criticism of the past dozen years, show astonishing contra-

dictions not merely in the interpretation of short passages such as *Agamemnon*, 1202-13 (pp. 5-7, 22-4) or *Eumenides*, 734-741 (pp. 19-22), but in the critics' understanding of entire authors: of Sophocles, for example; and of Aeschylus.

It is Aeschylus above all who occupies Kitto in both his first and his second chapters. Aeschylus makes, indeed, an excellent test case. For here the traditional view, according to which he expressed, and meant to express, something profound about our existence through the medium of a superb craftsmanship, has been flatly contested by an influential and technically very able group of English classicists. Aeschylus, they proclaim with evident satisfaction (and in a prose style which Macaulay or Housman would not have disowned), was in fact a permanent victim to the crudest primitive superstitions; he was a naïve and sadly incompetent playwright; his thought, if so it can be called, has nothing to tell us; and our only resource with this botcher is to enjoy gratefully what they term, with uncharacteristic imprecision, his poetry. To discern sublime ethical or religious notions therein is to commit the unscholarly errors of anachronism and subjectivity.

Kitto offers two replies to this charge. First, the accusers have obtained their result by correlating merely external details, and by neglecting an essential principle of ancient art: that the artist conveys his thought not through such details (which are only his local, temporary medium) but through the structure and disposition of the total work. To this principle, which is the foundation of Kitto's book, we shall return shortly. His second answer is that they have ignored the nature of classical Greek religion. That religion was unlike any religion known to Oxford or Cambridge in its fluidity, its immediate and undissoluble connection with society and politics, and above all in its capacity as an artistic medium. The antique artist was almost entirely free to manipulate its endless population of deities and abstractions as instruments for the location of religious, social, and political realities—realities not bound to time. Kitto's presentation of this second point (pp. 38-74) seems to this reviewer mastery; a classic exposition of the most perplexing problem faced by the modern student, at any level, of Greek classical art, in any medium. He might, perhaps, justifiably have rounded off his case for Aeschylus by retorting the charge of *anachronism* against the prosecution. For he could easily have shown that their approach to Aeschylus rests on a misapprehension about poetry, and about the use of language and symbol in poetry, which did not exist until about a century ago; and then only in certain special quarters. It has, indeed, been reserved for our own unhappy time to witness historic objectivism, the doctrine of art for art's sake, and logical positivism, wrought together into a tool for the criticism of poetry. The same tool can of course be used—and this Kitto himself shows, by implication, in the course of the book—to demonstrate the futility and incompetence of *any* given poet from Homer through Goethe.

Kitto would rather not. Instead he has sought for a criterion more apt to the matter under criticism. And this criterion appears not only in the first of his answers (Chapter I, pp. 24-7, 31-2) to the charge against Aeschylus, but in the title of his book: *Poiesis*.

It may be summarized thus: the prime means by which the ancient artist conveys his meaning is not what we call the "poetry" (Aristotle's *lexis*), but the selection, juxtaposition, and organization of the material (Aristotle's *poiesis*, or *systasis tōn pragmatōn*). "It is agreeable indeed," says Kitto (p. 26) "to have Aristotle on one's side." This reviewer is not certain, in fact, that Kitto does have Aristotle entirely on his side. The philosopher never claimed that the religious, say, or ethical meaning of a poem was deducible from its *poiesis*, but only that *poiesis* was the most important "part" of a poem; and would probably have been really shocked at any suggestion that religious or moral instruction should be sought anywhere outside the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. Still, Kitto's proposed canon, so far as it goes, seems acceptable even without Aristotle: one's first approach to the ancient poem should be to examine it for itself as a structure, a *thing made*. And made, one is to assume, by a fellow human being who was no fool; who knew what he was doing to his mythic material as precisely as Exekias knew what his fingers were doing to the red clay. One will construct the statement of the whole from the emphasis and proportion given to the several parts, rather than by scrutinizing related but differently proportioned structures, or even such unsavory lumps of raw material (in this case, mythic and ritual material) as happen to be visible around the workshop. "Our whole argument is that the surest way of discovering how a *poietes* thinks is to watch his *poiesis*" (p. 259).

That is the fundamental principle of Kitto's book, laid down, for the most part, in his first and second chapters. There follows the practical application. In the latter part of Chapter II (pp. 74-107) the *Persians* is examined; then, in the succeeding chapters, the *Odyssey*; Sophocles, with special attention to the *Trachiniae* and *Oedipus Rex*; "Pindar and Plato" (Chapter V, in fact a somewhat swift treatment of the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*); Thucydides; and—Shakespeare's *Jorielanus*.

In these chapters comes a disappointment. It is like that felt by Socrates as he advanced to closer grips with the Anaxagorean system. *Nous* as a principle sounded very well; but just where and how did it operate in the swirling mass of the phenomena themselves? If a critical canon is to be generally accepted, it must be shown to be generally workable; the detailed interpretations must be rigorously deducible from the universal principle, or of what use is it? This condition Kitto just does not fulfil. For the greater part of the book *poiesis* hangs in the air, to be pulled down to earth, so far as this reviewer can see, only as a verbal justification for observations which are uniquely Kitto's. Furthermore, it is not the only criterion to be used in this way; the text is full of similar justificatory abstractions, which are slipped in without any examination at all. Let the reader consider the assumptions behind the following typical statements (emphasis mine):

P. 140 (the problem of the *Odyssey's* ending): "In any case, *no Greek audience could think* that the tale had reached its conclusion in a bedroom. . . ."

P. 146 (Athena's intervention on behalf of Odysseus in his quarrel with Irus): "This one instance is instructive, partly because the

reason for it is so clear, partly because, for us, it is so obtrusive, yet *obviously so natural for Homer and his audiences.*"

P. 155 (on the *Trachiniae*): "What Sophocles does next is *as natural as can be . . .*"

P. 224: "We will ask ourselves if *a reasonable audience*, not being of the nineteenth century, *would naturally suppose* that Sophocles was telling them *what to think about Oedipus, or about Iocasta.*"

P. 233: "We have seen *what Sophocles thought of that.*"

P. 244: "Pindar did not preach: for one thing he was *a Greek poet.*"

P. 261: "Further, when we reflect how lively and informative *the normal Greek was . . .*"

P. 287: "*If we allow ourselves to think, we shall realise that so far the expectations of Archidamus have been realised.*"

I have assembled these statements to illustrate the real texture of the book. In by far the majority of the detailed interpretations it is not *poiesis* that is invoked, but something quite different: the "natural," the "obvious," the "reasonable," the "normal Greek," the reactions of a Greek (or even of a Homeric) audience. But even where *poiesis* itself is invoked, it tends to be invoked like this:

P. 118: "It should become clear, I think, that the faults should be imputed not to Homer but to the critics, for they have assumed without question that Homer was trying to do one thing, . . . when in fact he was trying to do something rather different, something that lay outside their personal experience of literature."

P. 302: "This, I trust, is obvious (unless we can think that Thucydides, here, was writing like an incompetent chronicler)."

At this point, perhaps, one begins to realize that an unstated assumption underlies the *poiesis* principle and indeed the whole book: *nothing made by a Greek is wrong*: if we think it is wrong, that is because we have misunderstood its *poiesis*. Everything is for the best in the best of all possible literatures, and all we need is to become so many Dr. Panglosses.

In short, it must be concluded that the *poiesis* criterion is not workable in practice, even in Kitto's own practice. The theory still leaves so much play for the subjective that any absurdity can be proved by its means (an example in detail is the startling interpretation of Thucydides, III. 39, 3-4 on pp. 343-8—one of the few passages where the principle is really rigorously applied). The reader of the book will perhaps profit most if he strips away its shaky theoretical structure, and concentrates simply on what Kitto himself, out of a rich experience in the regions of poetry and common sense, has to teach about Greek artistry. In passage after passage this reviewer, overcoming with some effort his objections to Kitto's logic and rhetoric, found himself in complete sympathy with Kitto's insight.

The first two chapters are perhaps the most valuable in the book. The refutation, already mentioned, of the current campaign against Aeschylus, the analysis of the function of religion in ancient art, and further the short passage on Ionian philosophy and the tragic poets (pp. 111-15), mark a real advance in the dialectical process (for so it must remain, rather than a process of system-building) of understanding Greek literature. The chapter on the *Odyssey*, though

saying little new on the poem's narrative structure, makes the interesting claim that that structure in itself, with its careful abstinence from surprise, states (more clearly than any explicit words could state) the poet's belief in an orderly cosmos. The long chapter on Sophocles is at its best in its imposing defense of the organic unity of the *Trachiniae*, at its worst in the curious digression on oracles in Shakespeare (pp. 191-9), which suffers from a complete neglect of the ambiguity inherent in the English word "prophesy." In the discussion on Thucydides (Chapter VI) we are reminded very firmly, and rightly, that Thucydides too was a *poietaes*; a *poietaes* comparable in degree, quality, and ultimate aims with the tragedians. The final chapter, on Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, contains a thoughtprovoking survey of that great play: though it is not made at all clear how the *poiesis* principle, which was introduced (p. 32, last paragraph) as one which applied uniquely to *classical Greek* literature, is now found applicable to Shakespeare as well.

To discuss fairly the very wide range of opinions included in this book is not possible in the available space. All are stimulating, so that even where one is not convinced one is sent back to the Greek text with a new question; and behind all one feels a sympathetic and balanced understanding of Greek literature which, though indefinable, should perhaps contribute more than anything else to redeem us from that critical chaos which Kitto deplures. It is only to be regretted that he has tried to justify that understanding by an inadequate critical theory.

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D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY. Cicero's Letters to Atticus. Volume V (Books XI-XIII). Volume VI (Books XIV-XVI). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966-1967. Pp. x + 428. \$11.50. Pp. viii + 331. \$9.50. (*Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries*, 7 and 8.)

The fifth and sixth volumes of Shackleton Bailey's edition cover the correspondence from 48 to 44 B. C. Since they appeared before the publication of volumes III and IV, a gap now exists for the years 53 to 49, a gap which causes some difficulty in cross references. That problem, however, is minor and (the author assures us) will disappear shortly.

The high quality manifested in the first two volumes is maintained throughout these new contributions. It will not be necessary to dwell for long on the characteristics and format (cf. the review of the earlier volumes in this Journal, LXXXVIII, pp. 346-51). Shackleton Bailey has provided a new text, a changed and improved version of his own edition of 1961. This edition, however, includes not only text and apparatus, but complete translations, as well as commentary, appendices, and indices. No Latinist or student of Roman affairs can but admire the extent of Shackleton Bailey's

achievement. Textual critics will be better equipped to comment on that aspect of his enterprise. The translations continue to combine accuracy with vividness. Cicero comes to life to an extent unmatched by any previous translator (though it is unfortunate that Shackleton Bailey persists in translating *boni* as "honest men"; V, pp. 21, 47, 241; VI, 21, 65, 187). The commentary is replete with important insights. The author is imaginative and bold, but rarely rash. Of the appendices, one, on the identification of the Fannii, demonstrates caution and good sense; final resolution is unlikely and Shackleton Bailey wisely abjures a definite stand. Another, the longest is the best available discussion on Cicero's effort to create a commemorative shrine for his daughter Tullia. (Not everyone, however, will accept his identification of the Clodia whose gardens Cicero coveted with the famed Clodia *βοῶπις*. The identification was earlier suggested in his *Towards a Text of Cicero "Ad Atticum,"* pp. 96-7).

The chief drawback in the earlier two books is present again in these volumes: large and disappointing omissions in the commentary. Some of the most important aspects of Cicero's personal life and his reflections upon the political scene receive only the briefest treatment, when they are commented on at all. There are innumerable examples. Antony's edict on returning exiles, specifically exempting Cicero (V, p. 20) deserved some mention. So also Cicero's funds which had been used by Pompey to help finance his military operations (V, p. 3E). Cicero's reactions to the political climate under Caesar's dictatorship provide indispensable data (e.g. V, p. 104; VI, p. 4). Even more important, because fuller, are his comments on the situation after the dictator's assassination. The letters fluctuate between caution and boldness, confidence and desperation, elation and despair. Nowhere is there a richer storehouse of information for any period in ancient history than in the letters of 44 B. C. Shackleton Bailey's commentary is much too skimpy to reflect that richness. Cicero recognized swiftly that the death of Caesar had not removed all the characteristics of tyranny: *non una cum libertate rem publicam recuperatam* (VI, p. 8); *vides tamen tyranni satellites in irperiis, vides eiusdem exercitus. vides in latere veteranos* (VI, p. 10). There follows growing concern about the possibility of civil war and characteristic uncertainty about which way to move (VI, p. 28); then the revealing exchange of letters between Antony and Cicero, with Antony's subtle, but unmistakable threat: *arbitror malle te quietam senectutem et honorificam potius agere quam sollicitam* (VI, p. 34). Through the correspondence one can visualize the gradual crystallization of the struggle between Antony and the liberators (cf. VI, pp. 16, 20, 26, 112, 178, 186) and the ambiguous roles played by the moderate Caesarians like Hirtius, Pansa, and Balbus (cf. VI, pp. 62, 66, 102, 120). And, much more significant, one can follow the emergence of Octavianus as a pivotal figure, his relations with Antony and the Caesarians, and the increasing fears of Cicero (cf. VI, pp. 12, 22, 26, 76, 102, 188, 192). The commentator has opted to take almost no notice of all these developments. Similarly there is disappointingly little comment on the inflammatory public funeral of Caesar (VI, p. 20), on the revealing meeting between Cicero and the liberators in June,

44 (VI, p. 96, 98, 100), and on Cicero's agonizing deliberation over a prospective trip to the east (cf. VI, p. 168).

Information on Cicero's personal relations with individuals is, of course, abundant in the letters. Almost every minor figure receives notice and identification in the commentary. All scholars will acknowledge the value of that labor. But relations with important personages are not explored in any depth, even when they would be most stimulating and fruitful. A few striking illustrations will suffice. The origin and development of the quarrel between Cicero, his brother, and his nephew require elucidation, especially as they affected Cicero's status vis-à-vis Caesar (e.g. V, p. 24). The friendship between Cicero and Brutus did not always run a smooth path. Even when outward relations were cordial and close, there was an undercurrent of tension. In the mid 40's these currents had political as well as personal implications (cf. V, pp. 86, 118, 130, 134, 192; VI, pp. 32, 176). And one would particularly like to know why Cicero, who harps on the mutual admiration which he and Brutus have for one another, must so often carry on his dealings with Brutus through Atticus as intermediary. There is strain evident even between Cicero and Atticus; Atticus had roundly criticized his friend's intention to sail to the east in August, 44, calling forth a lengthy rejoinder by Cicero (VI, pp. 174, 176, 178). It unfortunately receives small attention from Shackleton Bailey. Finally, one might note the mysterious woman Caerellia, mentioned frequently in the letters (V, p. 158; VI, pp. 56, 72, 128), but largely ignored in the commentary.

There are other occasions where issues raised by the letters clearly call for some remarks, but none appear. There is no discussion, for example, on Cicero's poem dedicated to Marius, whose date and contents are much disputed (V, p. 156); nor anything on Cicero's famous remark about his philosophical writings: *verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo* (V, p. 160); nor even on his very interesting reappraisal of Caesar, presented to Atticus in a semi-apologetic fashion in May, 44 (VI, p. 84). Somewhat larger matters arise as well, but find no place in the commentary: the publication of Cicero's treatises (V, p. 212), the attitude of landlords toward property and tenants (VI, p. 18), and the confrontation between Ciceronian and "Attic" oratory (VI, p. 74).

Where Shackleton Bailey does choose to comment, he is usually sure-handed and persuasive. But not in every instance. From November, 48 to September, 47, Cicero's letters to Atticus are dominated by anxieties about his own status, caught between Caesarians and republicans. Cicero had left the Pompeian camp and was now in Brundisium, the war still raging and his own position especially precarious. It was one of the most difficult periods of his career. Shackleton Bailey chooses to put the worst construction on Cicero's attitude: the orator dreaded a republican victory and preferred to take his chances with Caesar; defeat of the dictator would mean suffering at the hands of former compatriots who would regard Cicero's desertion as betrayal (cf. V, pp. 275, 281; 297). But the letters themselves would not seem to bear out that cynical interpretation. It was not at all clear in 47 that Cicero had anything to gain from a Caesarian victory. He had many enemies in that camp and,

despite Atticus' continuous efforts, he was persuaded that suspicion and hostility toward himself continued unabated. On this matter the letters are consistent (V, pp. 20, 24, 26, 40, 42, 46). At the same time Cicero expresses constant disapproval of Caesar and Caesarism (V, pp. 22, 50, 66). Of course, it is true that he was worried about the personal consequences of a republican victory (V, pp. 20, 22, 30, 32, 38, 42, 52). But nowhere does he evince a desire to see the republican cause go under. Quite the contrary: *illa esse firma quae debeant, nos stultitiae nostrae gravissimas poenas pendere* (V, p. 32); *tum maxime quod in eam causam venisse me video ut sola utilia mihi esse videantur quae semper nolui* (V, p. 38); *haec autem eius modi sunt ut obliviscar <mei> multoque malim quod omnibus sit melius <quam quod iis ad> quorum utilitatem meam iunxi* (V, p. 66). Cicero's one hope lay in the prospect for peace and negotiations, a prospect which grew progressively dimmer with the course of events (V, pp. 36, 46, 58). Therein lies the root of the agony which pervades these letters.

The famous Συμβουλευτικόν which Cicero composed to Caesar in 45 and which was never delivered because of censorship by Oppius and Balbus is among the most fascinating episodes of this period. The remarks of Shackleton Bailey give no indication of the complexities and problems involved. That a letter of advice to Caesar should be written at all was Atticus' idea, not Cicero's, and the latter was reluctant from the beginning (V, pp. 138, 150). Cicero insisted that a draft be shown first to Caesar's agents (V, p. 158), and it was with mixed feelings of annoyance and relief that he learned of their disapproval (V, pp. 164, 166, 168). The character of the letter, however, and the reasons for disapproval are not at all clear. Shackleton Bailey suggests that Cicero had made too much of Caesar's projected Parthian campaign and not enough of domestic affairs (V, pp. 343-4). But it is difficult to see why this should have called forth the opprobrium of Oppius and Balbus. And, in fact, it appears that Cicero had recommended the postponement of that expedition until Caesar should reorganize the legal and constitutional system at home (V, pp. 174, 190). Just how much detail Cicero included on those matters will never be known. It seems that he set forth some principles which could be interpreted as indirect criticism: *in eo quia non nulla erant paulo meliora quam ea quae fiunt et facta sunt, reprehenduntur* (V, p. 168). Hence, the usual view prevails that Cicero withdrew the draft for fear that the dictator would react adversely to criticism. Yet *Ad Att.*, XIII, 27 would suggest a very different interpretation. The Συμβουλευτικόν contained excessive flattery and Cicero anticipated a charge of servility which could be used against him by enemies (V, p. 166). The whole question requires reappraisal and more extensive treatment.

Finally, a few minor points. *Achaici etiam Fufio spem deprecationis adferunt* (V, p. 46) can hardly mean that the men in Achaëa offered Fufius hope of reconciliation with the republicans (V, p. 287). The context of the statement shows clearly that the favor of Caesar is under discussion. It is excessive also to claim that Cicero had come to admire Sulla's dictatorship in his old age (V, p. 296). Shackleton Bailey cites *De Leg.*, III, 22, but views

put in the mouth of brother Quintus do not necessarily reflect those of Cicero. And why deny that Cicero was thinking of the Romulus story when he contrasted the temple of Quirinus with that of Salus (V, pp. 156, 338)? Elsewhere Shackleton Bailey accuses Atticus of being obtuse for failing to understand a story told by Cicero (VI, p. 214). But is the point of that story perfectly clear (VI, p. 4)?

Gaps in the commentary are large. Many important questions are left unanswered or, indeed, unacknowledged. It is perhaps pointless to fault Shackleton Bailey for failing to do what he never intended anyway. Some of the disappointment evoked by the work might have been averted by a preface which set forth his criteria of selectivity and the limited aims of the commentary. Bibliographical references on those matters which did not arouse the author's interest or for which he lacked space would have helped to fill the need. As the work now stands such references are far too few to serve that purpose. In the end, however, the quality of the product puts into the shade all criticism by lesser men. Shackleton Bailey's edition, translation, and notes will stand among the most distinguished achievements in Ciceronian scholarship of this generation.

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RAMSAY MACMULLEN. *Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv + 370.

Here is an important and valuable book, or rather, let us say, the latter three quarters of it is valuable and important. At least, this reviewer has large reservations on the first two chapters. The book is also very interesting, extremely well written, and enormously learned in a mass of diverse and *recherché* source material. There are seven chapters: I Cato, Brutus, and their Succession; II Philosophers; III Magicians; IV Astrologers, Diviners, and Prophets; V Urban Unrest; VI The Outsiders; and a brief VII Conclusion. Then follow two appendices on Famines and Brigandage; these do not pretend to be more than collections of evidence underlying parts of the foregoing text—useful, valuable service. Then twenty-four pages of bibliography, and seventy-one of notes in documentation of the text but often going far beyond that, to offer supplemental discussion. Finally, a four-page index, mostly of proper names; it appears to be more serviceable than that brevity would suggest.

The first word in the half-title is not apt. The reader learns on the second page that plots, conspiracies, and rebellions are not within the author's purview; so nothing here on Varro Murena or Iullus and Julia, Libo Drusus or Sejanus, Scribonianus or Piso or Saturninus, and the rest. The author's concern is with the "Republican" opposition and the "Stoic" opposition, as they are

familiarly called; he should have written "Opposition" instead of "Treason."

The first two chapters deal for the most part with the first century and, accordingly, the principal underlying source is Tacitus. Here the author accepts Tacitus lock, stock, and barrel. (But in chapter six, as will be noted below, he regards Tacitus most critically in another historical context where that historian is again the principal source.) So we read of book-burning, and of guilt by association or family relation, and of Cassius Severus, Cremutius Cordus, Helvidius, Thræsea, Arulenus, Senecio, and all the rest, accused and convicted of treason because of what they said and wrote.

Yet the author cites with evident approval McAlindon's "Senatorial Opposition to Claudius and Nero" (*A. J. P.*, LXXVII [1956], pp. 113-32), and the present writer's "A Group of Domitianic Treason-Trials" (*C. P.*, LV [1960] pp. 19-23). Now McAlindon showed that cases of treason in the period he discussed were of treasonous conspiracy, and that conspiratorial activity continued in certain families from generation to generation; and we showed that the cases of Helvidius, Arulenus, Senecio, and their associates did not rest in fact, but only in Tacitean propaganda, on their writings, and that there is no exclusive connection of book-burning with treason. And "A Tacitean Pattern in Narrating Treason Trials" (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIII [1952], pp. 279-311), which the author does not cite, demonstrated much the same thing for a large number of other cases throughout the whole span of the *Annals*.

From this unfortunate bondage to Tacitus the author frees himself elsewhere in the book in a different historical context, and writes: "When Tacitus fills the mouth of some insurgent chieftain with an angry speech, he does indeed introduce such topics as 'our common gods,' *libertas*, ancestral 'customs and culture.' These were sentiments not of the real speakers, whom Tacitus never heard, nor even wholly Tacitus' own invention, but borrowed by him from his reading in Greek sources . . ."

For the rest of the book we have the highest praise and admiration; each succeeding chapter almost seems better than the one which went before it. It is irresistible temptation to quote a few choice excerpts which exemplify the perceptive insights or the noteworthy judgments and give some indication of the excellent writing which are characteristic of the study.

"The Romans, subordinating their love of order to their distrust of 'big' government, had entered on the business of running an empire with habits of mind almost impossible to eradicate, and not at all suited to their responsibilities. They compromised with necessity. Their law, occasionally aroused by particular crimes or crises, declared in gathering detail what a person must not do. If he did it anyway, without causing disturbance, the law slept on. *Quieta non mouere*. If he did it, and caused complaints registered in proper form with the proper authorities, the law awoke, laid about it with the weapons of arrest, fines, imprisonment, or execution, and, having made all peaceful, resumed its slumbers" (pp. 155 f.).

"Conditions of the fourth century would lead one to assume

more class tension, but for this there is no evidence. At most, the methods of agitation changed, to make greater use of organized groups. Horizontal divisions of the population such as have appeared in modern industrial societies could hardly appear in the ancient city because of the vertical ties binding together opposite extremes, a cobbler being unlikely to join in attacks on some local magnate who turned out to be patron of the leather-workers' association, a sailor loath to take part with longshoremen, let us say, in burning down a bishop's house, when the bishop was Athanasius. His power over the grain fleet has been mentioned. Sympathies of this sort cut across classes and existed in profusion . . ." (p. 184).

The chapter on *The Outsiders* is especially rich.

"The lifelines of the various groups in the African population, and such abstract forces as modern historians are used to calling nationalism, social revolution, and anti-imperialism, have been woven together in startling patterns by scholars of the last generation—patterns which it has been the aim of the preceding few pages to pick apart; Donatists from Berbers, Berbers from a nonexistent African nation, circumcellions from raiders and brigands, and all groups together from anachronistic theories of social justice. Better to take the past on its own terms" (p. 206).

"From the many laws against these several unrooted groups, an unlooked-for effect followed: they made *outlaws*. Roman rulers should have been careful to keep their subjects within the law by withholding decisions and pronouncements that could not be enforced, that ran counter to received behavior or alienated too large a part of the population. Such self-restraint was beyond the emperors. Bewildered by conditions too complex for their understanding, they offered one response to every ill: legislation. They succeeded only in driving more thousands into the ranks of their enemies. Certain it is, in any case, that respect for law slowly gave way to every kind of corruption and complaint about the government's instruments and inefficiency, while at the same time the injustices that turned men into criminals grew more severe" (pp. 210 f.).

Surely, lesson here for us.

"Far from being a congregation of city-states, in the ecstatic vision of Aelius Aristides (to say nothing of descriptions to be found occasionally in modern writers), the empire was rather made up of thousands of tribes. Many and infinitely the more important ones had risen to an urban life. Others were only partly dissolved into an undifferentiated peasantry and others again arrested in a semibarbarous condition. They did not love their nation; there was none to love. They did not hate Rome. The horizons of Musones, Brisei, Garamantes, Bessi, Cietae, Mauri, Maratocupreni, Teneteri, and the rest . . . surely reached no further than their neighbors' inviting fields, cattle, and houses. For a moment, in 68 to 70, and once more for good, when the Antonine peace had declined into general disorder, their foreign policy emerged. It was nothing but pillage" (pp. 215 f.).

Yesterday morning's newspaper, describing present-day Africa!

We mention a few small details. Typographical errors are few and none, probably, will bother readers except the rather startling "A. D. 23" (p. 18) where read "23 B. C." "Euripedes," since it occurs three times, seems to be rather an orthographical innovation than a typographical mistake. Is there a word "gladiation"? Reviewer does not agree with the author that there should be. "Before the last day of the Kalends" (p. 133) is hardly a meaningful, let alone correct, rendering of "intra Kalendas." Much worse is it to interpret the "SC" on the reverse of a sestertius as in syntactical sequence to the legend "Libertas Augusti" (p. 33) and then draw therefrom a derogatory inference. It is perfectly gratuitous to speak of "Nero's idiot performances" (p. 21); reprehensible, to be sure, from Roman (and perhaps our) point of view because unsuitable and undignified for Emperor, but idiot? No. And Egypt was not a "province," though it is of course terribly easy to call it so.

Again, as initially, this book is required (and very enjoyable, too) reading for him who has any interest in the Roman Empire.

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† WARREN E. BLAKE. *Menander's Dyscolus*. Introduction, Text, Textual Commentary and Interpretive Translation. New York, 1966. Pp. 225. \$3.50. (*American Philological Association, Philological Monographs, XXIV.*)

E. W. Handley's edition and commentary on the *Dyscolus* appeared in 1965, but by then Blake had already completed most of the work on his edition, so that, except in a few places, he was unable to take advantage of that work. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of the edition by J. M. Jacques, which appeared in 1963. But a comparison of Blake's edition with that of Handley easily shows that they do not quite travel the same road, although, of course, they both go in the same direction. Blake is less concerned with the matters of staging, scenery, acting, roles, costumes, etc. than he is with the establishment of the text and its meaning. He felt that each line and each letter of the papyrus should be subjected to a minute examination and that every possible effort should be made to keep the papyrus reading until, and if, it did not make sense or was metrically impossible. Only then would he emend. Admirable procedure. In his examination of the papyrus he was fortunate in having the invaluable aid of his colleague, Professor H. C. Youtie, whose expert opinion in such matters is well known. He was also able to profit from a new transcript of the *Codex Hermopolitanus* for lines 140-50, which C. H. Roberts had made. Finally, his own critical judgment and intuitive feeling for the situation have combined to produce a text that is everywhere clear, readable, and scholarly. The translation, printed on the left-hand page, is equipped with stage directions that allow the reader

to visualize the action very quickly. Having observed that "colloquial English is predominantly iambic in rhythm," he translated the Greek into English in the form of seven iambs per line. Despite a few limping lines, the overall result is striking. Each line of Greek has one line of English.

The main body of the *Dyscolus* is generally sound, but a number of disturbing lesions continue to invite surgery or restorative medicines. There are large numbers of minor defects, but only about ten major breaks where restorations are speculative: 548-50, 649-56, 703-10, 726 a, 756-63, 836-41, 850-1, 879, 886-8, and 936. In all of these Blake attempts restorations *exempli gratia*, and for that reason warns the reader that he will use a special type of bracket for such restorations. In some cases, however, he has forgotten his warning and has used conventional square brackets (548-50, 726 a, and 836-41). But let us select some of the *cruces* of the whole text for illustration here.

In the didascalie notice prefixed to the play Blake refuses to accept an emendation for the archon's name. He suggests that there may have been an archon named Didymogenes (the reading of the papyrus) at Athens sometime between 299/98 and 293/92 B. C. This would date the play some 20 or 25 years later than has been generally assumed and would make it a play of his full maturity. Such a suggestion appears very weak, for the archon list—so far as I can judge—will not admit a gap for that period. The papyrus reading ἐπὶ Διδυμογένῃς ἀρχοντ(ος) seems to be a corruption for ἐπὶ Δημογένεως ἀρχοντος which would be the equivalent of 317/16 B. C. I believe it possible that the corruption came about because of the copyist's preoccupation with the name of Didymus, the last great scholar of the Alexandrian Age. Didymus, in the last half of the first century before Christ, was probably the first scholar to produce what we may call variorum editions of Greek works. His commentaries were famous in antiquity, and he is known to have produced one on Menander (schol. on Aristophanes, *Aves*, 1736; cf. the *Etym. Gud.*, 338). One may, therefore, suppose that some copyist of our papyrus text consulted that commentary. Didymus may have dealt at some length with the archon's name in a discussion about the play's date, and may have concluded that the play had been produced ἐπὶ Δημογένεως ἀρχοντος. The copyist, then, with Didymus in his mind as the author of the note, combined the two names and wrote Διδυμογένῃς instead of Δημογένῃς. Thus the archon must be Demogenes and the date 317/16 B. C.

Lines 101-2. Blake has nothing really new to offer on this difficult passage. My own interpretation of the words περιφθειρόμενον ἀχράδας ἢ πολλὴν | κύφων' ἐαυτῷ συλλέγονθ' depends upon the acceptance of the note in Hesychius, s. v. περιφθείρεται where he says that the verb means τὰς φθείρας συλλέγει. Since a species of jumping louse (psylla) actually does attack pear trees, it would at least appear possible that the first two words of Menander's line may mean "delousing his pear trees." Later, when Cnemon attacks Pyrrhias, he picks up a pole (113-14) and "delouses" Pyrrhias' scalp with it (ταύτην <α> ἐκάθαιρε). The first passage sets the stage for the second, in a manner of speaking.

Lines 140-50. Aside from an excellent reversal of speakers in one pair of lines, Blake restores *εκακοπό[αις τὸ χωρίον τι δηλαδὴ* in line 141 and defends it very well. He assigns 146 to Pyrrhias and fills it out with *ποῖον λέγει[ν μοι νῦν ἔ]νι*;

Line 177. Better than "a consultation room" as a translation of *συνέδριον* would be "a great big Meeting Hall." The associations tied to Blake's phrase are out of place in the context, quite apart from the meaning of the original.

Line 185. The papyrus has *τὸ δύσκολον | τὸ τοῦδ' ἐκείνος ἀπώσαιτ'*, οἷδ' ἐγώ. The line is metrically defective, and the optative does not appear desirable in the context. Blake accounts for the optative by assuming that *ἀνταπώσεται* was the original reading and that this was later misread as if it were *ἂν ἀπώσαιτ'*. Then *ἂν* would have been lost or omitted. Accordingly he reads *<ἀντ>απώσεται*, which is exactly the kind of verb needed in the passage.

Line 223. Believing that *ὡς προκ<εμ>ένην* (the reading of Bingen, Post, Handley, and others) would refer "not to an abandoned child, but to a corpse," Blake accepts the reading *ὡς προ<σῆ>κον ἦν* (Barber, Peek, and others). His point is well taken.

Line 236. The papyrus has *ιδει ντουν* at the beginning of the line. This has generally been retained in the form *ιδεῖν τότ'*, but Blake rejects it on the ground that there is no need for Gorgias here to say, "You should have seen (*ιδεῖν*) this man approaching the girl— whoever he was—then immediately . . ." What he (i. e. Daos) should have done was to *stop* Sostratus from approaching the young girl. Blake therefore emends to *ἴσχειν τότ'* κτλ. Handley, however, takes *ιδεῖν* here in the sense of "interview," i. e. "have a talk with," an explanation that may be correct. There are parallels, as Handley points out, and one should keep the papyrus reading in such cases.

Lines 349-52. Sostratus has just asked Gorgias how he might be able to win the girl, and Gorgias replies, according to Blake's restorations of the text, as follows:

οὐκ ἂν λάβοις
πηλὸν κακ[ύνας· <σ>υν<α>κολουθήσας ἐμοὶ
ἂν συμ[παρά<σ>της — πλησίον γὰρ τὴν νάπην
οἰκεῖ με]θ' ἑμῶν—

Blake's commentary is very full on this passage, and he justifies his restorations in a most convincing manner. Throughout this passage and the lines that follow it is necessary to decide whether Gorgias was serious in the beginning (lines 349-52), when he makes his suggestion to Sostratus about accompanying him into the field. Was Gorgias then merely emphasizing how impossible it all was, or did he really think that there was a chance? Blake's restoration of 349-50 seems to imply that Gorgias thought that there was a chance: "You wouldn't get her by stirring up the mud." It is an excellent restoration.

Line 959. The papyrus has the following reading: *ωκαλλινικοιπαῖ-δοναξισκωνσιγε*. This has generally been taken to be: *ὦ καλλίνικοι· παῖ Δόναξ, Σίκων, Σέρρε*. But Blake sees in this the cry of victory *ὦ καλλίνικε χαίρ' ἀναξ* as recorded in Archilochus, frag. 119 B.

Hence he reads the line as ὁ καλλίνικε χαῖρ' ἀναξ. Σίκων σὺ τε, which has the merit of eliminating from the text the otherwise unknown and unneeded Donax. Furthermore, asks Blake, why should these men be styled "gloriously triumphant"? Sicon perhaps, but not the others. For those reasons an emendation appears in order. Only *two* men are addressed, Sicon and a (silent) assistant.

These are only a few of the very many passages for which Blake has made new and important suggestions. One may not agree with all of them, but nobody will be able to dismiss them as unworthy of consideration. What impresses the present reviewer is the continuous effort made to establish the text by a microscopic examination of every single letter or trace of a letter on the papyrus. Blake's judgment is excellent, his feeling for Menander's vocabulary and style outstanding, and his closely-reasoned philological commentary a model of the highest kind. The inclusion of the plates (separately provided in a packet at the end of the book) makes it possible at last for those who do not have the *editio princeps* by Martin to study for themselves the state of the papyrus.

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AT BUFFALO.

Menander: *Dyscolos*. Kommentar von FRANZ STOESSL. Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1965. Pp. 275. DM 36.

It is one thing to write a commentary without the accompanying text to such authors as Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, or Pliny, but quite another to do so for one such as Menander. Commentators on the former authors may concentrate on the social, political, and military aspects, while those on Menander must focus their light upon dramatic art, conventions of the theater, textual criticism, and related matters. Commentaries without accompanying text are almost always somewhat awkward, but for a work such as the *Dyscolus* of Menander they are more than annoying at best. In the case of Stoessl's present work, the result would seem to justify the conclusion that it ought never to have been done. The possibilities of punctuation changes, the numerous passages where the text is either corrupt or doubtful, the assignment of speakers, the actions of the actors, the linguistic parallels, all of these and others demand the presence of an accompanying text. For the text of the *Dyscolus* inevitably will vary with the editor. When one uses Stoessl's commentary, the major difficulty is to decide what text he should have in front of him. Stoessl's remarks are clear with one, but obscure with another. If Stoessl imagines that we should be using his own text which appeared in 1961 and 1963 in the German school series called *Schöningh's griechische Klassiker*, he dooms his commentary to a very limited public. Compared with Handley's superb edition with commentary, Stoessl's work without accompanying text is a transplant that failed.

Stoessl's previous work on Menander is well known, character-

ized throughout by his mistaken theory that the notations in the Bodmer papyrus reflect Menander's own stage directions and that therefore they are completely reliable. His thoughts on this subject have been grafted here and there onto the body of the present commentary in such a way as to suggest facts in evidence where, actually, there is room for doubt. *Caveat lector.*

The present reviewer finds many of the remarks in the commentary rather pedantic, not especially revealing, not much to the point, and not presented in a way to inspire confidence in their reliability. One leaves it with relief and flees to Handley for comfort and enlightenment.

ROBERT K. SHERK.

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AT BUFFALO.

ANTHONY J. PODLECKI. *The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy.* Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. xii + 188. \$7.50.

The author examines Aeschylus' plays and tries to identify words, passages, or general formulations that reflect Athenian or Greek politics in the poet's lifetime. He does not look for allegory; he hopes only to put the plays in historical context. A sketch of the poet's life is followed by chapters given to the *Persians*, *Seven Against Thebes*, *Suppliants*, *Oresteia*, and *Prometheus Bound*. A Conclusion sums up findings. Three appendixes (A. "Aeschylus at Salamis," B. "The Date of the *Prometheus Bound*," C. "Fragments, Titles, and Theories") close the book. Footnotes and an Index are at the back.

Podlecki reaches the following conclusions in his studies of single plays: Themistocles was very much in Aeschylus' mind when he wrote the *Persians*; the *Seven* is not a politically oriented play, although a reminiscence of Themistocles' walls and good services to Athens is not inconceivable; praise of Argos in the *Suppliants* can be associated with Themistocles' stay there; the *Oresteia* as a whole can be seen as an action at law with intimations of both primitive and civilized procedures; in the *Eumenides*, Aeschylus shows himself in favor of the Ephialtic reform that limited the powers of the Areopagus but speaks out against two Periclean reforms; the statement against tyranny in the *Prometheus Bound* derives ultimately from Aeschylus' admiration of Themistocles. In Appendix A, Aeschylus may be the author of a propagandizing tale that has Themistocles luring the Persians into the strait of Salamis. In B, the author reviews, without a dogmatic conclusion, attempts to date the *Prometheus Bound*. In C, certain attempts to see political significance in mere fragments or titles of Aeschylean plays are reviewed with due caution. The thesis of the book generally is that Aeschylus was a "dedicated liberal and pro-Themistoklean" (p. 151). A "liberal" (I judge from the author's usage, since he does not define

this notoriously ambiguous word) was for Themistocles and Ephialtes, against Pericles.

Certainly authoritative if not unanimous learned opinion has for some time past had Aeschylus in sympathy with democratic procedures, and such sympathies would not be inconsistent with admiration for Themistocles, whom most would agree Aeschylus praises in the *Persians*. Since the date of the *Suppliants* must be reconsidered in the light of *P. Oxy.*, 2256, 3, so also must interpretation. The author's evocation of Themistoclean influence from the lines of the *Seven* and *Prometheus Bound*, however, may be illusory, and the two conjectured anti-Periclean statements in the *Eumenides* are not convincing. The phrases *ἐνμα χώρας* and *φρούρημα γῆς* in *Eumenides*, lines 700-6 are said to "look suspiciously like a reference to some specific power of the Areopagus" (p. 96). From this observation, the author conjectures that Ephialtes left to the Areopagus "guardianship of the laws" (*νομοφυλακία*), that Pericles before 458 tried to divert this power or responsibility to a board of *νομοφύλακες*, and that Aeschylus is speaking out against the attempt. Lack of information makes it impossible to prove this hypothesis false, but the same lack discourages belief. On p. 99, the hypothesis is advanced that *Eumenides*, line 704 (*κερδῶν ἄδικτον τοῦτο βουλευτήριον*) refers by opposites to the institution of dicastic pay by Pericles, and on p. 129, the hypothesis has become a demonstration ("one innovation which he is seen to have opposed is firmly attributed to Pericles"). But the opposite of a tribunal untouched by gain is one where crooked judgments can be bought, not one where judges are paid to judge. Greek writers from Hesiod on speak of bribery in a sufficient variety of ways, and especially with reference to the administration of justice, for us to recognize it as a pervasive and influential practice. Aeschylus affirms the in-corruptibility of the Areopagus in a world where justice was sometimes for sale. To say more is incautious.

A few other details need further consideration. On p. 23, the assumption is that it was possibly idiosyncratic for a general to give credit for a great victory to the gods. This is not a self-evident assumption. On pp. 12 and 125, the *Persians* was written on "the eve of Themistokles' ostracism." If, as is generally supposed, the ostracism was in 471, long months of political activity in a characteristically volatile city intervened, since the play was produced early in 472. While a sense of immediacy improves the author's argument, it is not strictly accurate. On p. 160, n. 36, citation of evidence from the "Themistokles Decree" without a single bibliographical reference is surprising. On p. 163, n. 2, E. Lobel's dotting of a rho is called "hyper-conservative." To judge from the photograph of the papyrus in E. Lobel, E. P. Wegner, C. H. Roberts, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XX (1952), Plate 5, Lobel has done precisely what a responsible editor should in the presentation of a critical text. On p. 116, the rule of Hippias is said to turn "from vague benevolence to repression and terror," and on p. 117, there is a "successful repulse of Xerxes and his tool, the former tyrant of Athens."

It is a difficult investigation. The time, and even the order, of certain crucial events in the early fifth century remain conjectural.

Prosopographical study of the same period rests on insufficient data. (Who, to take an illustrative example, was Callixenus, son of Aristonymus? In an ostracophoria in which Aristides and Themistocles were named, some Athenians judged Callixenus more threatening than either, yet we know almost nothing of his political career [G. Stamires—E. Vanderpool, *Hesperia*, XIX, 1950, pp. 376-90].) Also, a play at its first performance can have an effect the author never intended. If Athenians did in fact think of Aristides while watching Aeschylus' *Seven*, that would still not in itself constitute a demonstration, as Podlecki recognizes, that Aeschylus had Aristides in mind when he wrote of Amphiaras. A student of the period must consequently often be content with a series of more or less flexible combinations and look to probability. Many problems will resist solution until more evidence is at hand, but it is wholesome practice, as Professor Podlecki understands, to review them from time to time in hope of additional light.

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ALAN L. BOEGEHOLD.

JEAN-MARIE ANDRÉ. *L'otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine des origines à l'époque Augustéenne*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. 576.

Although several studies of the Roman concept of *otium* have appeared in recent years, none has been of comprehensive nature; for the most part they have been restricted to one aspect of the problem, literary, historical, or philosophical. The present work is designed to fill this gap, the more regrettable in that no concept can be properly understood without due consideration of the cultural milieu in which it developed. The author feels that the converse is also true, namely, that the concept of *otium* in turn played a pivotal role in Roman daily life and politics as well as in literature. That it was so great a causative factor in changing *mores* as he believes remains questionable. Where an interaction of various factors is involved, as is often the case in M. André's discussion, it is scarcely possible to say whether the concept is the determining agent, or is itself determined by the cultural climate.

Admittedly, however, there are many problems in the development of *otium* that admit of clarification, and André has done an admirable job in collecting and assessing a formidable body of evidence. If his purpose was in part, as he states in the preface, to dispel the notion entertained by the general public of Roman civilization as one based on leisure and entertainment, in a word, *panem et circenses*, he might be said to have succeeded were it not for the fact that this is hardly a work designed for the general public, even had they the *otium* required for reading it. On the other hand, no student of Roman history or literature would need proof that the puritan spirit of the early Romans was an unconscionable time-a-dying, or that such an impact as Rome has made on world history

could not have been accomplished except by an energetic people with a tradition of hard work and service to the state.

André addresses himself primarily to the problem of the philosophical development of *otium* from its early pejorative connotation to the point where it becomes well-nigh an identification with the life of the mind. His method is largely a chronological one; exceptions are made on occasion, as in the case of the elder Cato whose longevity requires his inclusion in more than one period. Some confusion results from the author's practice of using literary comment from a later period as evidence for earlier attitudes toward *otium*, as, for example, where Cicero, in the *De Officiis* or *De Oratore*, is cited for attitudes to *otium* in the days of the Scipionic circle. André, although somewhat apologetic, feels that enough objectivity can be assumed in Cicero's account to render his judgments valid for Scipio's time, but surely not even a Cicero could be impervious to the environmental influences of his own age, still less Livy and others so cited.

After a brief discussion of the etymology of *otium-negotium*, where the author wisely refuses to commit himself, although leaning somewhat to the semantic approach with the origin a military one, André devotes his first chapter to *otium* in the archaic period up to the anti-Hellenic reaction. The first mention of *otium* in Latin literature, which is found in the Ennian fragment containing a soldiers' chorus from his *Iphigenia*, bears out the military slant on *otium*; the early civilization, in a double rhythm of peace and war, apparently equated *otium-negotium* with *domi-militiae*, linked to the primitive calendar where the winter months, as not required by the state for war or privately for agriculture, represented the earliest form of *otium*. The elder Cato is taken as typical of this early attitude; frequent diatribes against wasting time equate *otium* with inertia, while the adjectival form, *otiosus*, is more pejorative still. As part of the anti-Hellenic reaction, *otium Graecum*, in the sense of leisure to indulge in culture for its own sake, is likewise condemned.

The second chapter deals with Roman comedy, *palliata* and *togata*, and the changes wrought by the Punic Wars. André is very effective here, taking as evidence types and situations from the plays themselves, such as the parasite or the omnipresent *meretrix* who is busy enough, but in otiose ways. *Otium Graecum* now acquires more importance, and in Plautus, despite the influence of Greek comedy, the divergence between the *σχολή* and *otium* concepts is clearly apparent. In Plautus and Terence the *vita otiosa* is linked to the *vita urbana* as well as to love. Comedy in Rome, by portraying the dangers of *otium*, is considered by André to play its customary role, not concerned so much for moral purity as for protecting the social order.

After the Punic Wars, with the aristocracy freed from intense military pressures, *la vie intellectuelle* comes into its own; the Scipionic circle is credited with legitimatizing a philosophy of leisure for the upper class. Starting about 140 B. C., the author sees a divergence in the *otium* concept. *otium réel*, serenity engendered by peace, and *otium idéal*, the balance of the individual in a harmonious city, with the former absorbing the pejorative

connotations formerly surrounding the concept in general; the philosophic *otium* tends to be linked to the *σχολή* of the Middle Stoa. In general, the author credits the change in *otium* with creating the climate for *la vie intellectuelle*, but could it not just as well have been the other way around?

The next three chapters deal with *otium* as it appears in the literature of the Ciceronian period; these I found most interesting. André discusses the predominant conservative trend in Roman thinking in the first century B. C., with Cicero opposing the Epicurean *otium*, and many Romans viewing foreign ideas of enjoyment and leisure as causes for decay. There is an illuminating analysis of the interaction of the *otium* concept with both Epicureanism and the lyric impulse. André raises the question as to whether *otium* is not the necessary precondition of, and justification for, all the poetic activity of the Ciceronian age. That the moral evolution needed to counter the *mos maiorum* has occurred is attested by the strength of the opposition to it; the emphasis on personal enjoyment in Catullus is seen as part of this evolution, based on *otium* by way of Epicureanism. The question remains, however, whether the Catullan cult of *nugae* really implies a type of Epicurean life in poetic form, a new expression of *otium litterarum*.

André uses the famous last strophe of Catullus, 51 as evidence for a certain moral conservatism in the poet. That he was conservative, in this sense, may well be true, but it seems to me dangerous to hang too much on such controversial lines. Even their originality, which André accepts, is questionable, since they may represent a translation or rather a version of the fragmentary last strophe of the Sappho poem (fr. 31), one line of which survives. André is on safer ground when he points out its similarity to the pessimistic use of *otium* in 68B, also to references in the *palliatæ*, where *otium* appears as the ruin of young men in love. For Lucretius, the author finds that poetry was not *otium* in the same sense, but rather an *otium negotiosum*, so far had the meanings of the two concepts travelled since their inception. The author notes Lucretius' positive use of the *otium* idea as praise for the Golden Age in the past when the earth bore fruit without labor of man.

The final section, on the Augustan Age, is likewise divided into three chapters, the elegiac poets, history in general and Livy in particular, and last, Horace and Vergil. For the Augustans, *otium* appears more than ever *urbanum*, as Ovid, Tibullus, and Propertius all attest. Love has now gained a certain acceptance as a function of poetry; a complete volte-face from the *domi-militiae otium-negotium* linkage of Ennius' day can be seen in Ovid's portrayal of the soldier of love, *militat omnis amans*, with his parody of military strategy in the *Ars Amatoria*. André is less convincing in his treatment of Titus Livius; in order to make his point that certain episodes in the early books of Livy are treated as tragedies of *otium*, e. g., the Lucretia story, he equates *otium* with *libertas*, which would seem to be stretching it a bit. Earlier in the work, where the author lists concepts related to *otium* and used in conjunction with or as synonyms for it, *luxuria*, *lascivia*, *pax*, *quies*, and several others are mentioned, but *libertas* is not included.

The discussion of Vergil and Horace in the last chapter comes off much better; André sees the two Augustan poets as representing two aspects of philosophic *otium*, a personal or individualistic one in the case of Horace, a cosmic one in Vergil. In the former poet, the quest of serenity is a frequent theme, and a leisured existence clearly preferable to one haunted by excess ambition. The conflict between this individualistic philosophy and Horace's sense of duty to the new regime represents in a nutshell the history of the *otium* concept and its acceptance in Rome. The *otium* of Horace is "intime, moral, philosophique," yet owes much to the *otium civitatis* derived from the *Pax Augusta*. In Vergil, there is in a sense a reprise of the primitive peace-war concept of *otium*; central to his thinking is pastoral peace leading to the *Pax Romana*, and in the *Aeneid* war and peace are pivotal to the entire structure. Both collective and individual forms of *otium* appear, with the concomitant idea of *quies* drawing its beauty from harmony with world order.

In a brief concluding section, André glances at *otium* in the post-Augustan world. The *Pax Augusta* had freed the Romans for leisure, seen by Livy as degeneracy; Rome becomes the embodiment of *otium urbanum* for the later Principate and early Empire. That this was equated with *inertia* and *luxuria*, and that even so late as Tacitus *industria et virtus* are exalted, is further proof of André's contention that the Romans never lost their scruples of conscience.

André is to be commended for having undertaken so formidable a task, and for having succeeded so well as he does; that he does not succeed altogether is the fault rather of the subject than of the work itself. In dealing with the history of ideas and concepts, many problems must remain insoluble; so it is hardly surprising that André concludes many of his discussions with a question rather than an answer. Because, on the one hand, it asks the right question and, on the other, because of the wealth of material presented, this carefully indexed volume will prove invaluable as a source book for scholars engaged in the *negotiosum otium* of tracing the development of intellectual life in Rome.

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The Transformation of the Roman World. Gibbon's Problem after Two Centuries. Edited by LYNN WHITE, JR. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966. (*UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies*.)

In 1964, two hundred years after Gibbon first conceived the purpose of writing *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, eleven Professors of the University of California assembled at Los Angeles for a symposium to discuss the aspect of his achievement in the light of increase of knowledge and difference of point of view. Their remarks are published in this book. The introduction, by Andrew

Lossky, gives an interesting sketch of Gibbon's life and experiences, suggesting how far he was influenced by the prevailing philosophies of the 18th Century and how far he rose above them. There are then nine chapters which form an appealing and imaginative group of reactions to the historian whose greatness is cordially recognized. Fortunately the contributors are given great latitude so that the differences are not only those inherent in the subject but those of personal taste and judgment.

The simplest and most obvious approach to Gibbon's work is to call attention to the material not available to him now part of our scholarly resources. So the useful study of Mortimer Chambers, "The Crisis of the Third Century" rests not only on reinterpretation of what Gibbon saw and recorded but on such evidence as that of pottery which did not come within his range of vision at all. Miriam Leichtheim in discussing the Nestorians and the Monophysites uses Syriac and Coptic literature as von Grunebaum in discussing Islam uses Arabic; Gibbon could not. Much of the argument on economic history depends on knowledge of medieval tools, which was certainly not part of his equipment.

There is great variation in the prominence given to Gibbon himself in the various chapters. Speros Vryonis writing on "Hellas Resurgent" protests against his unfairness to the Byzantines with constant reference to the text, while Philip Levine's admirable chapter on "The Continuity and Preservation of the Latin Tradition" never mentions Gibbon's name! The most adroit achievement of all is Albert Hoxie's "Mutations in Art." Since Gibbon never mentions art the subject might seem to lead nowhere, but actually the author gives a very good account of the transition from classical to medieval art with reasonable speculations as to Gibbon's unexpressed reactions and his probable opinions about the art he never saw!

Naturally the most space goes to those areas where Gibbon's imperfect understanding or rooted prejudice has been obvious to all his successors: the tendency to reduce his account to political and military aspects alone; his indifference to the northern barbarians and the background of Islam; the often-cited shallowness of his treatment of Christianity, his misunderstanding of Christian ethics, his scorn of theology and his hatred of monasticism. Gerhart Ladner in a chapter on "The Impact of Christianity" realizes the importance of this but finds him more perceptive than is sometimes assumed. In "Autonomy versus Unity" Miriam Leichtheim shows how the advent of Christianity gave new power to the indigenous cultures of Egypt and Syria. That the Nestorians and Monophysites did not invoke hostility to Greek culture, but gave proof of the strength of the pre-Greek language and civilization Gibbon could not have been expected to understand since he was blind to the great importance of theology which caused and maintained the division of the church. Nevertheless, there is place in the chapter for a most cordial expression of homage, "the alliance of genius with essential right-mindedness makes even his least adequate chapters memorable." Gibbon's view of Islam was of course limited by the fact that he had to use Arabic at second hand and that in his day there was much essential literature not yet available to any

western scholar. He was further limited by his own bias in regard to religion and by the historical fashion and philosophy of his day. Yet his apprehension of the importance of Mohammed's mission and the dishonesty of Mohammed's means is no small achievement and is duly remarked upon by von Grunebaum in the chapter "Islam: the Problem of Changing Perspective." Unfortunately the chapter's obscurity of language and not infrequent ambiguity is such that the reader may end with an immense respect for the author's learning unaccompanied by any very clear idea of what he means to say.

As for the northern barbarians, whose inroads Gibbon regarded as unmitigated disaster, there are two chapters which deal with them in a way to remind us that the influence of a people on a mixed culture can hardly be judged until the people themselves are regarded as worthy of serious attention: Warren Hollister's "Twilight in the West" and Jeffrey Russell's "Celt and Teuton." Without exaggeration or sentimentality they show the importance of the barbarians' capacity to adapt Roman traditions and put the case for the unity of European culture in the eighth century which was the work of Boniface and Charlemagne. The whole series of lectures must have been exciting to listen to and from their published form everyone interested in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages can draw new understanding.

The final summary by Lynn White is devoted to a synthesis which I feel the original parts would hardly have suggested. It is not merely that we have accumulated new data since Gibbon's day but we are invited to believe that history has progressed in the way that physics has progressed since Newton. That is, history being a social science should follow the nature of the other sciences whose discoveries are forever invalidating the discoveries of yesterday. It is obvious that new-found facts continually enrich the resources of history and that our way of recording history changes in consequence. Chambers quite properly says "only false modesty would assert that we have made no progress in historical thinking since Gibbon." But the doctrine that "we have substituted affirmative faith in the pluralism of values for the old faiths in exclusive sets of values" seems to me to lead to the belief that history will and should be written with equal devotion to all values but with commitment to none. Well, there is a class of literature that exactly fits the requirements: excavation reports. If they are honest they have nothing to do with "exclusive sets of values." But in spite of being historical material they are not the history either of the present or of the future. White, with a commendable fondness for inclusiveness, boasts that "pluralism has embraced the common people within the scope of history" and, more poetically, "the hero of the late Roman Empire and the early Middle Ages is the peasant." But he forgets his own sage remark, "all history is in fact a matter of persons." The peasant is an abstraction. It is very good to learn as much about him as we can but exactly the thing we cannot do is make a person of him. The editor's enthusiasm for economic man is his choice and his privilege and I should not challenge it except that it seems to me to lead to a conclusion not supported by his colleagues and not likely to be shared by his readers.

"No historian of the later twentieth century can fail to be awed by Gibbon's acumen and grandeur. Yet, as history, his work is almost unbelievably obsolete, save for antiquarian details. It is a proper object of historical study, a magistral artifact of the eighteenth century, like the *B Minor Mass*. As for ourselves, we are on the way toward producing a history of the globe, and of all mankind."

ALFRED R. BELLINGER.

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J. M. KELLY. *Roman Litigation*. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. viii + 176. \$6.75.

This is an intriguing and a provocative book. In eight essays Professor Kelly has challenged some of the established views which have been repeated time and again in the text-books treating of Roman procedure. Perhaps the reason for the striking novelty of many of the studies is due to the fact that for the most part the subjects dealt with had not been specifically treated in the writings of the Roman jurists, and hence had not been incorporated into modern texts. Kelly has turned to the literary authors, and occasionally to inscriptions and papyri, to see how the Roman formulary procedure actually worked in practice.

The details of the manner and the steps by which a prospective defendant was summoned before the praetor are meticulously set forth in the juristic commentaries on the edict of the praetor. But what if the person summoned was physically stronger than the intending plaintiff? This is the subject of the first essay of Kelly. He makes out a very good case for the conclusion that the plaintiff would be thwarted in his effort to bring an expected defendant to court if the latter resisted physically at each and every encounter. And this in spite of the fact that 'on paper,' by resort to supplementary actions or extraordinary remedies, the plaintiff had the apparent support of the state behind him. There can be, according to Kelly, similar defeat of a judgment creditor who, with a judgment in his favor, is opposed by a physically stronger judgment debtor refusing to satisfy the judgment. In rebuttal it might be argued that if this were so, why should there be an action based on duress (*quod metus causa*) for the benefit of a weaker plaintiff who had been coerced into giving up suit. Kelly's answer is that during most of the classical period, the action was a dead letter.

In a second essay Kelly attempts to show that a wealthy litigant with good connections had a better chance to win a case, as plaintiff or defendant, than a poor man lacking outside influence. From the literature he adduces support for the view that bribery, along with pressure brought and favors granted (*pecunia, potentia, gratia*) were the determinative factors constantly recurring during the late Republic and the Principate. The writings of Cicero, Tacitus, and Suetonius show well how prosecutions fail or succeed, and civil suits are determined in favor of one side or the other,

depending on where the power (monetary or political) is to be found. Cicero's and Fronto's letters spell out the way in which favors are constantly solicited, and seemingly granted by judges.

The next study adds a third factor determinative of success in litigation, to the physical strength and the superior social and political status which were treated earlier. The solid, wealthy citizen has a great advantage which derives from the established legal principle of the Roman law that all judgments were monetary. In a society where the pattern favors the stronger and the socially higher-placed citizen, the wealthier are more likely to benefit—usually as plaintiff—as against the weaker who has neither ready cash nor the ability to obtain credit. Ultimately, more and more of the wealth of the state would be funnelled into ever fewer families.

These three studies occupy half the book. The arguments advanced in the first two, and to some extent in the third, are quite convincing. They shed additional light on practice in the courts, supplementing the extensive learning provided by the jurists regarding the more formal aspects of procedure. The remaining studies introduce further elements in the course of trial. It has been suggested that in many cases these questions are more controversial in nature, and there may be doubt as to the correctness of Kelly's views.¹ The problems dealt with, however, are of general interest, and always so graphically presented and cogently argued, that they should be called to the attention of the reader. They deal with topics one does not usually run across in the normal treatise.

In "The Standard of the Praetorship" Kelly advances the view that the praetors as judicial magistrates were nothing more than politicians, frequently incompetent, open to bribery, and largely insulated against suits for malfeasance. "The Misbehaving Judge" is a penetrating analysis of the effectiveness—or the absence thereof—of the action against the *iudex, qui litem suam facit* (the judge who makes the case his own). Next is "Litigation and the Passage of Time," an attempt to explain the apparent contradiction between the frequent complaint of the law's delay and the relatively short periods of time within which trials had to be brought to conclusion, eighteen months or a year depending on the type of action involved. In "The Settlement of Actions" Kelly undertakes to distinguish between the different technical terms employed to express this situation, deriving from the words *pacisci, transigere, and decidere*. He also deals with the question whether settlement of the controversy is possible after issue has been joined. An excursus on "The Quadruple Penalty" suggests that the four-fold penal damages, the 'extravagant' penalty, was actually sanctioned in those cases—for example, manifest theft, armed robbery, violation of the Furian statute forbidding persons outside the family from taking legacies of large sums of money—where the probability of success in the action was very remote. Kelly says, "the quadruple penalty is revealed as in essence a gesture of legislative despair; . . . a kind of scarecrow which only the most exceptional circumstances can animate."

Professor Kelly is a relative youngster in research in the field of

¹ P. W. Duff, review in *Cambridge Law Review*, Apr. 1967, pp. 124 f.

Roman law. He brings to it a refreshing critique of matters which seem to have been taken for granted, and which upon examination may turn out to have very little basis for support. From his early study of *Princeps Iudex*² to his recent article on "The Growth-Pattern of the Praetor's Edict"³ there is a newness of approach that is most welcome. The studies in *Roman Litigation* are grand reading and at the same time stimulating contributions to Roman law.

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H. A. HARRIS. *Greek Athletes and Athletics*. With an Introduction by the Marquess of Exeter. Bloomington and London, University of Indiana Press, 1966. Pp. 244; 32 plates + frontispiece, 7 figures, 4 maps.

Professor Harris intended his pleasant and informative book primarily for "those who know a great deal about modern athletics but nothing about ancient Greece" and "the increasing numbers of intelligent tourists who visit Greece" (p. 19), and who may want to know more about what went on in the great stadia that they see. He hoped that the book would also have some value for "those who know a great deal about ancient Greece but nothing about its athletics"; and in truth it has. In this book the scholar has a convenient and competent handbook on the subject, written by a scholar who obviously understands athletics from the inside, and who appreciates all sports. Harris knows the Greek language and literature (and Latin too), and he knows his way around in the ancient world. And so, as he tells the reader, he can offer new interpretations of several passages, imperfectly understood heretofore, in classical authors about athletics.

In successive chapters he treats the Greek athletic tradition from the Homeric epic through the great agonistic festivals to the proliferation of such festivals in Hellenistic and Roman times; the standard events and how they were performed and judged; the character and exploits of several famous athletes; athletic buildings and grounds; administration of the games; training of athletes; finally, women athletes. These topics Harris covers thoroughly; he has found all significant sources, including inscriptions and vase-paintings. As he informs us, Greek authors do not tell us what was generally known: "What is known to everyone is seldom described; authors are much more attracted by the unfamiliar" (p. 25). So he must infer many commonplaces of Greek athletics from reports of unusual happenings.

So much is good in this book that a reviewer may be reluctant to find fault with anything in it. Harris is sometimes at fault when he touches on legend and history. He is not alone in a disposition to find historical truth in legends, especially about the Mycenaean

² *Forschungen zum römischen Recht*, 9. Abh. (Weimar, 1957).

³ *The Irish Jurist*, 1966, pp. 341-55.

civilization. He assumes that the Homeric epics reflect Mycenaean institutions. They do not, as Denys Page has shown in *History and the Homeric Iliad* (pp. 178-87); for Page only the Catalogue is a Mycenaean document, and I cannot accept his argument for that. So we cannot believe, as Harris does, that "the most detailed description of Mycenaean games we have is that of the funeral games for Patroclus in the *Iliad*, . . ." (p. 35), and that Homer's "works alone have any authority for the athletics of the Mycenaean age" (p. 48). The games of *Iliad* XXIII, as described, look very like those of the eighth and seventh centuries when the *Iliad* took shape and the Olympic games had begun. The Achaeans contested in chariot-racing, boxing, wrestling, footrace, gladiatorial combat, discus-throwing, and archery. The sword fight and archery alone were not Olympic (or Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian); but contests in these were probably part of local games. If Minoans and Mycenaeans had such games as those of *Iliad* XXIII, and if they organized and executed them as described there, we have no way of knowing about them, aside from some boxing (see Harris, plate 2); the Cretans seem to have had more sport with bulls.

If the epics cannot be used for Bronze Age athletics, still less can the legends of Hyacinthus, Acrisius, Phocus, and Atalanta (p. 33), which we know almost entirely from postclassical sources (i. e., after 300 B. C.). That Androgeos came from Crete to Athens to take part in games is evidence of Minoan athletics for Harris, who cites Diodorus Siculus. These legends are worthless as historical evidence; those who told them in their extant forms knew nothing about Minoan or Mycenaean civilizations.

Harris is again credulous in Chapter V, "Some Greek Athletes," when he deals with tales of famous athletes. He wants to find truth in the story of Milo's death from wolves that caught him when his hands were caught fast in a cleft log (Paus., VI, 14, 8), but runs into the problem of eyewitnesses who gave Milo no help in his plight. So he constructs a credible tale which "Moralists then improved . . . as moralists will" (p. 113). Pausanias, who tells the story, lived more than six centuries after Milo's death. The tale belonged to the folklore which gathered about the great athletes, especially those of earlier times. For all we know, Milo may have died in bed.

The tall tales of great athletes' exploits belong to folklore and should not be taken as true history. The boy Theogenes never carried a bronze statue of a god (separating it from its base) home from the agora of Thasos (and if he did, he was surely not emulating Milo, p. 115). According to a Thasian tradition, Theogenes' real father was Heracles, about whose status as god or hero Harris seems confused. He says, "The Phoenician deity was a full god, and so entitled to a temple, while the Greek Heracles was only a demigod, the son of Zeus and a mortal woman." The Theban, or rather the usual Greek Heracles was worshipped as a god in many places, and had temples. Furthermore the term "demigod" (*hemi-theos*) was not restricted to the son of a god and a mortal, as Harris believes. He points to the honors which Theogenes claimed for himself as demigod: "It is here that the status of the Thasian Heracles is important. A son of the Greek demigod Heracles would

not be a demigod . . ." p. 117). First of all, Pausanias says that the Thasians worshiped Theogenes as a god (*theos*), not as a demigod (in fact I cannot find him as *hemitheos* in any source). Secondly, as I have said, the term *hemitheos* had much wider application, and a grandson of a god might receive the title; for Hesiod (*W. D.*, 160) all who fought at Thebes and Troy were *hemitheoi*. Harris himself speaks of the athlete Cleomedes as a demigod, who had no god as ancestor for a long way back (if any); yet here Harris is in error for another reason. He quotes the Delphic oracle indirectly "that he was now a demigod and must be honoured as one"; the oracle, however, calls Cleomedes a hero (Paus., VI, 9, 8).

There are a few strange errors of a minor sort. The Nemean Games, not the Isthmian (p. 36), commemorated the hero Archemorus. In "at the end of the first or beginning of the second century B. C." (p. 167), the "B. C." appears to be a slip for "A. D." "Magnesia on the Sipylus" (p. 163) betrays Harris' belief that Sipylus is a river on the analogy of Magnesia-on-the-Maeander. "Nearchus" occurs repeatedly (e.g., p. 74); only in the Index of Authors do we find the correct spelling "Nearchus." The opposite orthographic slip occurs in "Coephoroi" (p. 214, n. 20). In note 8 on page 209 (Plut. Rom. 28) is cited for Cleitomachus, but refers to Cleomedes. In the same note "Polyb. XXVII. 7" should have 9 in place of 7.

In speaking of the fine which the Hellanodikai ordered Theogenes to pay the god and Euthymus for having entered the boxing contest to spite Euthymus, Harris tells us that Theogenes "came to a private arrangement with Euthymus that his part of the fine should be remitted on condition that Theogenes did not enter for the boxing at the next Olympiad, an agreement which seems to us the most disreputable feature of the whole affair." But I find nothing of this in Pausanias' text (VI, 6, 6). Spiro indicates a lacuna at this point in the Teubner text, but how does Harris know that this is what filled it?

Perhaps Harris should have heeded his own remarks on non-athletic scholars who make statements on Greek athletics. He should not have ventured into fields into which he has less competence than in athletics. On his own subject, which makes up the bulk of his book, he is excellent. This is an admirable guide for the classical scholar. The reproductions of vase-paintings and other representations of athletic subjects in art, of remains of stadia, gymnasia, and other athletic structures, add greatly to the book's value, as do the maps and other apparatus.

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FRIEDRICH WILHELM EÖHLER. *Textgeschichte von Hierokles' Kommentar zum Carmen aureum der Pythagoreer*. Münster, 1965. Pp. xi + 185. (*Inaugural-Dissertation Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz*)

Thanks to its clear, pleasant style, its compact size, its moral earnestness, and above all its monotheism, Hierocles' *Commentary*

on the *Golden Verse of the Pythagoreans* enjoyed a modest success throughout the Middle Ages, which continued until the end of the 18th century. While an inventory of the material available for most of the later Neoplatonic texts shows a very limited number of Byzantine manuscripts made especially for experts, then usually some twenty to forty Renaissance copies, but no printed editions before the 19th century, Köhler lists fifteen Greek manuscripts of Hierocles anterior to 1500, after which there is a rapid decline in the number of written copies because of the early publication of a Latin translation (1474, nine reprints within ninety years), followed in 1583 by the *editio princeps* of the Greek text, the first of a series of eight editions or reprints; besides the new or revised Latin translations included in these editions, there are about a dozen translations into various modern languages: French, English, Italian, Danish, and German.

Meanwhile the interest both in monotheism and in moral instruction had waned. The last three editions (Gaisford's 1850, Mullach's 1853, reprinted in vol. I of the *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, 1860) serve scholarly interests only, and since then the total output has consisted of one English translation (1906, based upon Dacier's French translation of 1706) and a new French one by Meunier (1925). Ever from the purely historical point of view, however, Hierocles deserves something better than this. He is the first known official exponent of the compromising, Alexandrian version of Neoplatonism, which had such lasting importance for the shaping of Christian and Muslim thought as well as for the preservation of the Greek philosophers. A critical edition of his work and a systematic evaluation of his philosophy are no more than his fair share in the renewed study of post-Plotinian Neoplatonism.

Dr. Köhler has already taken all the necessary preliminary steps toward the former. He has extensively described the twenty-six complete manuscripts as well as those containing fragments and extracts (a point of detail to be corrected on p. 45: Laur. 32, 26 was written by Nicolaus Murmurius towards the middle of the 16th century, not in the 15th, an error which is repeated in the stemma, p. 183); on the basis of full collations he has carefully examined their relationships and drawn up a *stemma codicum*, which, as was only to be expected under the circumstances, proves to be a rather complicated one; he has also made a detailed study of the previous editions and identified the material used by each of the editors. What remains to be done, the redaction of a definitive critical edition, is only the smaller part of the work. The competent handling of the critical problems arising in the discussion of the stemma proves that this task is in excellent hands.

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HANS DREXLER. Die Entdeckung des Individuums. Salzburg, Otto Müller Verlag, 1966. Pp. 259. DM 26. (*Das Bild des Menschen in der Wissenschaft*, V.)

To be an individual, it has somewhere been said, one must distinguish himself from the community in which he lives. Using Cicero, Pompey, Caesar, and Horace as representatives, Professor Drexler, in this, his most recent book, attempts to show that the Romans did not "discover" the individual, that they had no concept of individuality, i. e., that they did not distinguish themselves as entities separate from the community. It remained for the Christians to introduce this concept, so basic to modern thought. In Drexler's view of the Romans, "the causes of behavior lie outside the individual. . . . These (causes) are the things which make the individual behave as he does. For them he is not responsible, and for them it is useless to praise or blame him" (B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* [New York, 1953], pp. 447-8). The causes of Roman behavior were first, "die Bindung an die *res publica* als Wirklichkeit und Idee," second, "die Bindung zwischen *patronus* und *cliens*, zwischen *amicus* und *amicus*." Service to the state, particularly in time of war, produced the idea that *salus rei publicae* came before all else and that the *res publica* was "der Inbegriff römischer Existenz"; this idea, in turn, gave rise to the notions of various *mores*, *virtutes*, and *vitia* which directed men's lives and which, in the end, assumed a life of their own, helping to destroy the republic.

In the olden days, to achieve *gloria* was laudable since it benefited the state; but, by the time of Cicero, *φιλοδοξία* (*cupido honorum*) had become an end in itself. Even when one acted or tried to act in accordance with *mos*, how he acted was determined by how he understood *mos*; Cicero's actions and attitudes were (according to Drexler) often based on absurdly erroneous examples and clichés. For instance, in considering Caesar a tyrant or Pompey a Themistocles, he misunderstood and oversimplified Caesar and Pompey, their relationships to the state, and the historical realities behind his *exempla*. In reality, Caesar was the *moderator atque gubernator* whom Cicero sought in the sixth book of his *de Re Publica* and who was looking after the *salus* of the republic which had been corrupted by Cicero's oft-praised *boni*. A politician, like a poet, should be judged by his productivity; Caesar's *magnum opus* was the salvation of the state, which remained as much a *res populi* after him as before.

The second "Bindung" likewise predetermined how men would act, for from it originated *officia*, the fulfillment of which produced *fides*. Again, in earlier days, these *officia* all worked for the benefit of the state; but, by our period, *beneficium* and *gratia* were turned to personal advantage. The necessary change from republican to monarchical form of government was in this sphere also salutary, for all the *nobiles*, and with them the whole state, came into the emperor's *clientela*. In chapter 1, Drexler fully illustrates the interplay of these forces in the affair of Auletes, in the events associated with Pompey's return from the East, in the events leading up to Cicero's exile, and in the civil war of 49. In all of

these, the difficulties were caused by the conflicting *cupidines* and *officia* of the *dramatis personae*, all of whom looked first to their own interests. Throughout, Drexler furnishes us with a number of interesting insights and passing comments, especially on Cicero's psychology. Even if one disagrees with the major theses or with individual details (e.g., I would not be so insistent on the unity of the first triumvirate as Drexler is: *Historia*, XV [1966], pp. 217-23), this chapter is clearly the best part of the book and is well worth reading.

Chapter 2 focuses entirely on Horace, the product of whose productivity is at hand for all to see, if not to comprehend. For Drexler, the Horatian question is a spiritual and a moral one: "die Frage des Menschenwertes für ihn zur Frage seines Lebens geworden ist." The question arose because "Horaz sich als Mensch in schwieriger Lage, in drückender Unfreiheit befindet und sich bewähren muss, um sich zu behaupten. Um Anerkennung hat Goethe nie zu ringen brauchen, Horaz ist von ihr schlechterdings abhängig, und er erringt sie sich auch als Dichter, viel mehr durch seinen Wert als Mensch und als Freund." The key to the problem and to an understanding of Horace is *Satire*, I, 6, the major themes of which—the true meanings of *nobilitas*, *dignitas*, and *libertas* and the relationship between poet and patron—are discussed with frequent citations (sometimes quite lengthy) from the Horatian *corpus*. The second half of the chapter elaborates variations on these themes (e.g., under "freedom" are included "Todesfurcht, Fortuna, Götter und Götterglaube, Klientel"), all of which is quite standard (cf. N. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* [Cambridge, 1966]).

A final, concluding chapter explains the thesis that the Romans (and the Greeks) did not discover the individual. Beginning with Sallust's description of Sempronia (*Cat.*, 25), Drexler discusses (with references to, i.e., Tacitus, Homer, Xenophon, and Theophrastus) the foundations of ancient characterization: *fortuna*, *ingenium*, *artes*, *mores*, all of which caused a person to be what he was and in the grip of which, they thought, man was powerless to develop his own destiny. It was Christian ethics—particularly the idea that each person gains or loses his own personal salvation—that enabled men to distinguish themselves from the community and yet to live in harmony with the community, all the members of which were striving for the same goal, helping others toward that goal, and eschewing φιλοδοξία.

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RONALD F. WILLETTTS. *The Law Code of Gortyn*. Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1967. Pp. viii + 90; 13 plates; facsimile. DM 128. (*Kadmos*, Supplement I.)

Seventeen years after Margherita Guarducci's great edition of *Inscriptiones Creticae*, IV with the Gortynian Code and twelve years

after his own important study, *Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete*, based on the Code, Ronald F. Willetts has produced a splendidly illustrated text, translation, and commentary, which certainly does not represent a step backward, though the reviewer wonders whether it was really necessary to publish an edition of the Law Code of Gortyn, so lavish and expensive. The photographs which make it expensive are all available in *I.C.*, IV, though not so large; so are the drawings. The text was already conveniently accessible and the new text contains very few changes from that in *I.C.*, IV.

In some cases where M. Guarducci repeats in parentheses a sigma lost by haplography (e.g. IV, 15, 32, and 33), Willetts uses an apostrophe. This is a matter of choice. In IV, 15 Guarducci writes $\mu|\epsilon <\tilde{\epsilon}> \tau\iota\varsigma$, but Willetts assumes the loss of $\tilde{\epsilon}$ just before $\tau\iota\varsigma$ where there does not seem to be room for an extra letter. In I, 6 Willetts follows Blass and prints $\delta\tau\iota$. In IX, 36 where Guarducci printed $\delta\iota<\alpha\rho>\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$, Willetts follows Buck and prints $\delta\iota\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$. In V, 23, X, 33, and XI, 10 Willetts adopts the more likely accentuation. There are false accents in I, 2 and in XI, 6, but on the whole the proof reading was very well done. It cannot be called a new text, but it is a specially convenient text because the apparatus appears at the bottom of each page and the translation faces the Greek.

The reviewer cannot honestly say that he finds the customs of Iroquois Indians and Australian aborigines a reliable guide for an understanding of the Greeks, but he always finds that Willetts has either an immediately satisfactory or at least an interesting interpretation. For Willetts "*Cretan kadestas* was a classificatory term within a system of continuous intermarriage of cross-cousins, a system which created bonds of obligation, loyalty and mutual respect far beyond the immediate circle of the family" (p. 20). The regulations concerning the rights of the daughters to share in the inheritance are interpreted not as enlightened legislation but as a stage in the encroachment of males upon the old established rights of tenure of females.

The real value of the work lies in the bibliography, the survey of the literature and in the author's comments on the theories presented in modern books and articles. The author's own views are always valuable but usually accessible elsewhere with patient search, for instance in his "Marriage and Kinship at Gortyn," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, N.S., II (1965), pp. 50-61, an article omitted in the bibliography. However, it is a useful, well-organized book with discussions of the main subjects in introductory chapters and with succinct line-by-line commentary, the whole followed by a good index of Greek words and a good subject index in English. Nevertheless, the Publications Committee could have made the little new material and most of the abundant old material available at far less expense and perhaps they should have insisted on it. The thin volume costs rather more than the reviewer once paid for a complete set of the beautifully printed *Inscriptiones Creticae*.

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MYCENEAN STUDIES. Proceedings of the Cambridge Colloquium on Mycenaean Studies. Edited by L. R. PALMER and JOHN CHADWICK. Cambridge at The University Press, 1966. Pp. VII + 310. \$15.00.

The Proceedings of the Third International Colloquium for Mycenaean Studies, held at "Wingspread" September 4 to 8, 1961, were edited by Emmett L. Bennett, Jr., and published by The University of Wisconsin Press in 1964, and a brief notice appeared in *A. J. P.*, LXXXVIII (1967), p. 124.

The Fourth Colloquium was held at Cambridge in April 1965, and the present volume of Proceedings is a worthy successor to the "Wingspread" volume. The new volume contains twenty-five articles in contrast to twenty-two in the earlier volume, and the authorship is over seventy per cent different in the two volumes. One noticeable difference is the lack, in the later volume, of archaeological articles in the narrowest sense, or, more specifically, of excavation reports like several which appeared in the proceedings of the third colloquium. On the other hand articles on linguistic matters are more numerous. The table of contents (which, unlike that in the "Wingspread" volume, is broken down into categories) shows five titles on dialect and phonology and six on morphology, word-formation, and syntax. The first and fourth categories are made up of papers on epigraphy and on the interpretation of texts.

The Cambridge Proceedings include a List of Members of the Colloquium and a Report of the Colloquium in which are contained not only the program of papers read but also the resolutions passed, and, like the "Wingspread" volume, it includes a short bibliography and an Index of Mycenaean Words. The volume is a credit to the two editors and to the contributors; that it is an essential item in the rapidly growing body of scholarly material on Mycenaean problems goes without saying.

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